Snow (19 page)

On 28 January Dicketts met Robertson at his club to agree final arrangements for his mission to Lisbon, and he handed back all the documents that he had been given to memorise. During this encounter, Dicketts confessed that he had become convinced that Owens was mad and was double-crossing MI5.

The next day, Robertson met Sam McCarthy at his club, where he was asked to keep a sharp watch at his home at 14 Craven Hill, Bayswater, which had been designated as the drop-off point for the infra-red information. He was instructed to note any people who seemed interested in the address, but Robertson did not mention that he had also arranged for a man to be
positioned in the house opposite with instructions to contact Robertson if anything suspicious happened.

Before his departure for Lisbon, it was agreed that Owens should see the reports written by Gwilym Williams for the Spanish journalist, Miguel Piernavieja del Pozo, now codenamed P
OGO
. Williams, of course, was supposed to be one of J
OHNNY
’s sub-agents, so Robertson gave Owens a summary of the case which, Owens thought, showed up the Germans’ lack of professionalism. MI5 was keen to know whether P
OGO
was linked to Rantzau’s operation, and Owens suggested that when he met the Doctor he would complain about the Abwehr’s practice of putting agents in touch with his men without previously warning him that they were coming. This, it was hoped, would draw the Doctor out on the subject and reveal whether he was aware of P
OGO
’s activities. Robertson told Owens to be prepared to discuss what had happened during the North Sea incident, and advised him that before he left Owens would be given the answers to the questionnaire that B
ISCUIT
had brought back from his last mission to Lisbon.

Despite Owens’ increasingly erratic behaviour, Robertson thought it unwise for him to run B
ISCUIT
down as he had made a good impression on the Abwehr during his trip to Lisbon. Owens should also expect to discuss what had happened to S
UMMER
, who had disappeared. In reality, S
UMMER
had attempted to escape from his MI5 safe-house at Hinxton in
Cambridgeshire
, and then tried to take his own life, so he had been returned to Camp 020 for permanent isolation. However, Owens was instructed to tell the Doctor that S
UMMER
had taken his wireless to Cambridge railway station and deposited it at the luggage office. He was to say that the cloakroom ticket had been sent to Sam McCarthy who had been asked to collect the wireless. Owens was also to raise the issue of the agents destined for Manchester and Swansea, and was to point out that it had been very difficult to get hold of safe-houses, and that to keep them unoccupied for any length of time would arouse suspicion.

S
NOW
was due to fly to Lisbon on 14 February 1941, so on 8 February it was his turn to meet Robertson at his club. There Owens expressed a wish to be present at 14 Craven Hill when the infra-red documents were delivered. In mentioning this, Owens said, he was only quoting MI5’s policy that, if he was expected to give Dr Rantzau a believable account of the
meeting
, he would need to be present. He also made great play of his ability to identify anyone who turned up to make the delivery, or even question the individual concerned. Robertson was uncertain and put Owens off for the
moment. Another matter to be considered was the Abwehr’s request that Owens should bring his identity card and ration book to Lisbon. Normally such documents were deposited with the port authorities on departure but, given what the Germans knew about Owens, it would be only natural that he would have several of these documents in different names, so if he did not bring them with him it might be difficult for him to explain.

The question whether Owens should be present at the Craven Hill
safe-house
for the drop of the stolen infra-red documents was a cause for much debate within MI5. Robertson felt Owens should not be present because the Germans originally had been very insistent that he should not reveal his identity. Their reasoning, he believed, was that they realised the danger of letting different cells within the organisation learn too much about each other in case one was compromised. The domino effect of exposure could be devastating, so in his response to the Abwehr’s initial message, Owens had replied that the matter was of such importance that he should handle it personally, but Robertson thought it was an unnecessary risk to allow an unknown agent to gain a description of him. Contact between Owens and the agent might also have consequences for future MI5 operations for if the need ever arose to arrest the agent, there might be repercussions for Owens as it might reveal that he was working for MI5. In his deliberations,
Robertson
believed that it might be worth sacrificing McCarthy, but not Owens. Robertson thought that it was probably vanity that motivated Owens’ wish to be involved, but concluded that if he decided to stay away the Germans would be less likely to become suspicious. In short, a safety-first attitude would be the most effective.

Robertson also deliberated over whether to arrest the mystery agent or leave him at liberty. He knew that if the agent was let run there would be no chance of compromising Owens, and that his status might even be enhanced. He also recognised that MI5 was already going to retrieve the stolen documents, so there was little to gain from holding the delivery-boy who may be nothing more than a minor agent. Allowing him to leave after the drop might offer the opportunity of following him and observing his movements over an extended period, a strategy which could lead to further gains. An arrest was irrevocable, and would end any possibility of future action. It was also possible to adapt the plan as it developed, if the agent was let run and kept under discreet observation. Furthermore, there was also the possibility that the agent would be followed to the drop, so any arrest would
be likely to scare off the whole organisation, thus preventing MI5 from ever discovering how the infra-red documents had been stolen.

On the other side of the equation, Robertson acknowledged that the agent could be an important member of an enemy organisation and this might be the only chance to get hold of him. Following such an individual would be difficult, especially at night in London during the black-out. Even if the man was only a minor agent, an interrogation might be a quicker way of finding out about his organisation than following him for weeks. Robertson was also aware of the kudos that would be gained from an arrest of this kind which would be a much-needed boost for the double-cross system that had yet to prove its worth.

Robertson wanted to keep Owens onside before his trip to Lisbon and therefore gave serious consideration to his views. Owens had suggested
McCarthy
’s address for the drop, and Robertson took this as a sign that Owens trusted McCarthy, and was less likely to run him down when he met Rantzau.

Robertson’s conclusion was that an arrest would offer a small but certain gain, whereas letting the man run was essentially a gamble, so he was in favour of taking what they could get. He was aware that more experienced MI5 officers did not share his opinion, and an alternative plan had been proposed whereby they would follow the agent in the hope that he would lead the watchers to his base of operations, but that if this had not happened before darkness fell, he should be arrested. They knew that if the man was crafty enough to stay on the move until it was dark, then he was likely to be
dangerous
and might escape altogether, in which case they would move in and arrest him. This time-scale also gave MI5 the opportunity to read the documents and re-evaluate the advantages of arresting the man or letting him run.

After much deliberation it was decided that McCarthy should be the man present at the drop and he was instructed to ask the agent into the house, but not to press him if he appeared reluctant. He was to ask the agent if he wanted the plans back and, if so, how this was to be done. He was also to add that he was not very technical and ask whether there was any explanation that should be conveyed to make them more understandable. Owens wanted McCarthy to try to engage the agent in conversation and thereby establish his identity, and it was agreed that if anything went wrong at the drop Owens was to blame McCarthy when he reached Lisbon. However, Owens was warned not to denigrate McCarthy too much because it could backfire on him. The infra-red document drop was to take place at McCarthy’s house on Owens’ advice, and if the agent noticed that he was being followed and
reported this back, then this would cast suspicion on McCarthy and, by association, have implications for Owens himself.

In the house opposite the drop MI5 installed a cine-camera fitted with a telephoto lens to capture images of whoever turned up, and placed a microphone to record the conversation. To assess the value of the documents quickly, J. C. Masterman spoke to the Director of Air Intelligence, Archie Boyle, to acquire the services of a boffin with the relevant technical expertise. Owens was due to leave for Lisbon with the documents on the afternoon of the drop, so a quick decision about the status and sensitivity of the material was essential.

Robertson was aware that Owens seemed to think that he could ‘get away with most things with the Doctor’ but MI5 wanted their agents’ background stories to be as believable as possible, so Robertson arranged for Owens to lunch with Lieutenant Richardson, the personal assistant to the Vice Chief of the Imperial General Staff. Owens would then be able to tell Rantzau that Richardson was his source of information inside the War Office, and their meeting would enable Owens to learn about Richardson and offer Rantzau a coherent story.

At one o’clock on 2 February, Owens went to the Criterion Restaurant to lunch with Richardson, but the latter reported that they achieved
nothing
more than arranging that they would say they had met through the Expanded Metal Company before Owens started talking about himself. The only other thing Owens was interested in during the lunch was
Richardson
’s address and telephone number, which he did not disclose, and whether Richardson was in a position to obtain information about
anti-aircraft
defences and troop positions. He had seemed very pleased when Richardson told him that he could probably get this sort of information, and he then invited the officer to dine with him and his family that same evening. Owens was living at Ottershaw in Surrey at the time, so he sent a 1934 Austin 12 to drive Richardson to the Anchor Hotel, Shepperton, where he was introduced to Lily and Walter Dicketts’ wife Kaye. Owens was a regular at The Anchor and, according to Richardson, the fact that he and Dicketts were spies appeared to be general knowledge among the rest of the clientele.

During the meal they drank toasts to Owens and wished him luck on his trip to Lisbon. Owens told Richardson about his troubles with his first wife Jessie, and claimed that she had tried to betray him to the Germans. Richardson noticed that Owens had a peculiar habit with regard to his false
teeth, noting ‘he only wears his false teeth when he is eating and he has a sort of sleight of hand trick of slipping the dentures into his mouth under cover of a handkerchief before a meal.’

At the end of dinner Owens invited Richardson to meet him the next morning for a cocktail, but Richardson excused himself because he felt that he had done enough. It later emerged that Owens was not just travelling to Lisbon on MI5’s behalf; Marika, The Anchor’s barmaid, had given him a note to deliver to Coronel A. Pinho Ferreira, at 10 Rue Palmeira in Lisbon:

Cheri, Apres si longtemps une petit note de moi c’est d’introduire un tres bon ami de moi soyez gentile. Je t’aime comme toujours et après la guerre je retourne te voir et te baiser. A toi Marika.

Whether Owens understood the content of this vital note is not known.

On 13 February 1941 the cine-cameras were in place and microphones had been installed at 14 Craven Hill where Dicketts and a team of MI5 officers waited for the arrival of the enemy agent delivering the stolen
infrared
documents. At 8.40 a.m. a man approached the house and, when he was directly opposite, took out his handkerchief, blew his nose and looked over his shoulder twice. He was wearing a dark overcoat, no hat and had a stiff white collar. He carried a canvas bag of the type used for large gas masks, but he left without approaching the house. When this same suspicious-looking individual was spotted the next morning at the same time, he was followed to Whiteley’s department store in Queensway where, it was discovered, he was employed as a floor-walker.

On the following day Guy Liddell recorded a further incident in his diary, although the version declassified by MI5 remains heavily redacted: