Social Democratic America (29 page)

30
. Congressional Budget Office 2008, figure 5, p. 10.

31
. See economicsecurityindex.org. Accessed January 15, 2013. These numbers are for people who lost one-fourth of their income, not including out-of-pocket medical costs or repayment of debt.

32
. Mark Rank and Thomas Hirschl have done a related calculation, also using PSID data. They ask what share of Americans experience five or more total years of income below the poverty line, of welfare receipt, or of unemployment between the ages of 25 and 60. The answer is 35 percent. See Rank and Hirschl, forthcoming.

33
. See also Dynan, Elmendorf, and Sichel 2012.

34
. Elizabeth Jacobs, personal communication.

35
. Families USA 2009.

36
. Mendes 2012, using Gallup data.

37
. Jacoby 2012.

38
. Pew Research Center. For more, see Page and Jacobs 2009; McCall 2013.

39
. Sen 1999; Nussbaum 2011.

40
. Noah 2012.

41
. The share of women aged 25 to 29 who have completed four or more years of college has risen steadily over the past half century. In fact, by the early 1990s women had caught up with men in college graduation, and in the ensuing decades they raced ahead. By 2010, 36 percent of women aged 25 to 29 had completed college, compared to just 28 percent of men. This gap in favor of women was as large as the gap favoring men was in 1960. (Census Bureau, “Educational Attainment: CPS Historical Time Series Tables,” table A-2, using Current Population Survey data.)

Women have made significant strides in employment as well. According to OECD data, in 1960 just 41 percent of prime-working-age (25 to 54) women were employed. By 2010 that had jumped to 73 percent. Among men in this age group, the employment rate fell from 92 percent to 87 percent.

Median earnings among women employed full-time and year round likewise have risen steadily, from (in 2010 dollars) $21,000 in 1960 to $28,000 in 1979 to $38,000 in 2010 (Census Bureau, “Historical Income Tables,” table P-21.). This is an advance in an absolute sense and also relative to men. In the 1960s and 1970s, women's median earnings were about 60 percent of men's. In the 1980s women began gaining ground, and by 2010 the ratio was 77 percent. In fact, if we narrow the comparison to those aged 25 to 34, the ratio is 91 percent. (Bureau of Labor Statistics 2011. The female-to-male earnings ratio then decreases for older age groups, partly because women are much more likely to leave work temporarily for family reasons. Part of the gap is accounted for by work hours (men are more likely to work overtime) and employee benefits (women are more likely to hold jobs with better benefits but lower pay). See CONSAD Research Corp 2009.)

As of 2012 women held 52 percent of managerial, professional, and related positions (Bureau of Labor Statistics 2011). At the top of the corporate hierarchy there is still a large gender gap; yet here, too, progress has been significant. Women represent only 18 percent of senior officers (vice president or higher) in Fortune 500 firms, but that's up from 9 percent in 1995. Women hold only 3 percent of Fortune 500 CEO slots, yet that's up from 1 percent in 2000. At the very top, on the boards of directors of Fortune 500 companies, women hold 16 percent of the seats, up from 1 percent in 1988. (These data are from Catalyst, catalyst.org.)

All told, women's capabilities have expanded markedly. Noteworthy gaps with men persist in various aspects of labor market success, but progress has been substantial.

42
. In 1960, only 40 percent of African Americans aged 25 to 29 had completed high school. By the end of the 1970s, the share had increased to 77 percent, and in 2010 it reached 89 percent (this includes those with a GED). The advance was not only absolute, but also relative to whites. White high school completion in this age group was 67 percent in 1960, nearly double the black share. In 2010 the white high school completion rate was 95 percent, just 6 percentage points higher than among blacks. (Census Bureau, “Educational Attainment: CPS Historical Time Series Tables,” table A-2, using Current Population Survey data.)

College graduation among African Americans has risen substantially. In the early 1960s, only 5 percent of 25-to-29-year-old blacks had a four-year college degree. By 2010, 20 percent did. On the other hand, we might have hoped for a larger increase. College completion among whites jumped from 15 percent to nearly 40 percent during that half
century, and college completion among women rose from 10 percent to 35 percent.

Reliable employment data for African Americans date from the early 1970s (Bureau of Labor Statistics, “Labor Force Statistics (CPS): Household Data,” using Current Population Survey data). Between 1973 and 2007 (business-cycle peak years), the employment rate among blacks rose by about 5 percentage points. The same was true for whites. For both groups the 2008–09 recession brought a significant decline.

In earnings, African Americans have experienced less advance (Census Bureau, “Historical Income Tables,” table P-38, using Current Population Survey data). Among those employed full-time and year-round, median earnings rose steadily in the 1960s and 1970s. But then the improvement ceased, apart from a few years in the late 1990s. Whites experienced a similar fate, though, which suggests the barrier was changes in the economy rather than obstacles specific to African Americans.

The same is true for household income (Census Bureau, “Historical Income Tables,” table H-5 and Census Bureau 2011, using CPS data). The late 1990s is the only period in the past several decades in which we observe improvement in either median household income or the share of African Americans with above-poverty-level income. Again, though, the same holds for whites.

In the past generation, incarceration has become a relatively common feature in the life course of African American men. Spending time in prison and having a prison record significantly diminishes the likelihood of employment during young adulthood, and it reduces the earnings of those who do find employment (Western 2006). We don't yet know the degree to which this effect continues through people's working career, but it seems likely to act as a permanent brake on labor market opportunity for a considerable number of black men.

Overall, opportunity for many African Americans has improved, though in some important areas both absolute and relative progress has been limited.

43
. The following discussion draws on Wilson 1978, 1987, 1996, 2009; Jencks and Mayer 1990; Fischer et al. 1996; Duncan and Brooks-Gunn 1999; Mayer 1999; Lareau 2003; MacLeod 2009; Currie 2011; Duncan and Murnane 2011; Kenworthy 2012b.

44
. Economic Mobility Project 2012.

There is additional evidence of unequal opportunity by family background. Begin with educational attainment. Caroline Ratcliff and Signe-Mary McKernan (2010, figure 5, using PISD data) examined American children who grew up in the 1970s and 1980s and found those with low-income parents less likely to graduate from high school. Among those whose household never was poor during their childhood (never had an income below the official poverty line), 96 percent got a
high school diploma. Among those whose household was poor for half or more of their childhood years, only 77 percent did.

As adults, children of low-income parents are less likely to be employed and more likely to have low earnings and incomes. Ratcliff and McKernan found that among males whose family was poor in half or more of their childhood years, only 34 percent were employed consistently as young adults (from ages 25 to 30). Among those never poor during childhood, 76 percent were consistently employed.

Markus Jäntti and colleagues (2006, using National Longitudinal Survey of Youth data) examined the adult earnings of boys who grew up in the 1960s and 1970s. Of those whose father was in the lowest fifth of earnings, 42 percent were themselves in the lowest fifth as adults, compared to just 10 percent of those whose father was in the top fifth.

A similar pattern holds for household income. David Harding, Christopher Jencks, Leonard Lopoo, and Susan Mayer (2005, table 3.4) examined the adult incomes of various generations of American children. Of those whose parents' income was in the bottom quarter, 40–45 percent were themselves in the bottom quarter as adults. Of those whose parents' income was in the top quarter, only 10 percent were in the bottom quarter as adults. Ratcliff and McKernan found that among people whose household income was below the poverty line in more than half of their childhood years, 32 percent ended up themselves poor as young adults. The share among those who grew up in a never-poor home was just 1 percent. (“Nonpoor” as a young adult is defined as having a household income above the official poverty line in two or fewer of the six years from ages 25 to 30.)

45
. Hauser et al. 2000.

46
. McLanahan and Sandefur 1994; McLanahan 2001.

47
. Ellwood and Jencks 2004; Murray 2012a; Parlapiano 2012.

48
. Lareau 2003; Duncan and Murnane 2011.

49
. Reardon 2011.

50
. Jencks 2009; Bailey and Dynarski 2011.

51
. Western 2006.

52
. Wilson 1987, 1996; Wright and Dwyer 2003; Autor 2010; Western and Rosenfeld 2011; Blinder 2009a.

53
. Schwartz and Mare 2005.

54
. Some recent studies find no indication of an increase in inequality of opportunity. See Harding, Jencks, Lopoo, and Mayer 2005, using data from the General Social Survey (GSS) and the PSID; Lee and Solon 2009, using data from the PSID; Winship 2013, using data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Young Men and the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth. Others conclude that there likely has been an increase. See Aaronson and Mazumder 2008, using estimates from Census data; Bloome and Western 2011, using data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Young Men and the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth.

55
. Rawls 1971; Friedman 2005; Kenworthy 2011c.

56
. These data are created by merging information from the Current Population Survey of households with tax records from the IRS. Each of these two sources has a strength and a weakness. Household surveys provide good information for the bulk of the population, but not for those at the top. Tax records give us much better information on those at the top, but are not very good for those at the bottom. By merging the two, the CBO has created the most accurate and complete data series available. Unfortunately, it only goes back to 1979.

57
. See, for instance, Samuelson 1995; Cox and Alm 1999; Easterbrook 2003; Rose 2010; Burkhauser, Larrimore, and Simon 2011; Meyer and Sullivan 2011.

58
. Kenworthy 2012a.

59
. Actually, it's worse than the trend for all families. That's because median income among the retired has been growing at a slightly faster pace than median income among prime-working-age families, due to rising Social Security benefit levels. The data are at Census Bureau, “Historical Income Tables,” table F-11.

60
. Census Bureau, “Foreign Born.”

61
. The data are at Census Bureau, “Historical Income Tables,” table F-5.

62
. Johnson 2004; Meyer and Sullivan 2011. See also Attanasio, Hurst, and Pistaferri 2012.

63
. See Wolff 2012.

64
. Isaacson 2011.

65
. The data in the following paragraphs come from a variety of sources, including Lebergott 1976; Cox and Alm 1999; Easterbrook 2003; Fischer 2010.

66
. For an argument that the pace of innovation has been
less
rapid since the mid-1970s, see Cowen 2011.

67
. See in particular Warren and Tyagi 2003; Lesmerises 2007; Blank 2010.

68
. Census Bureau, “Historical Income Tables,” table F-12.

69
. Census Bureau, “Historical Income Tables,” table P-38.

70
. Census Bureau, “Historical Income Tables,” table F-12.

71
. Jacobs and Gerson 2004.

72
. Presser 2003.

73
. McKenzie and Rapino 2011.

74
. Some suggest that the cost of goods and services consumed by low-income households has risen less rapidly than that of the bundle used to adjust for inflation. See Broda and Romalis 2008. Others argue that this is wrong. See Meyer and Sullivan 2011.

75
. Lesmerises 2007, figure 12, using data from Warren and Tyagi 2003. See also DeLong 2012.

76
. College Board, “Trends in College Pricing 2006,” table 4a.

77
. Allegretto 2011, table 10, using Survey of Consumer Finances data.

78
. Warren and Tyagi 2003; Weller 2012.

1
. Census Bureau 2011, table 8.

2
. The 2010 Affordable Care Act may accelerate this shift. See Hacker 2011.

3
. Seidman 2013.

4
. For additional cost-reduction ideas, see Emanuel et al. 2012; Gawande 2011, 2012; Soltas 2012; Aaron 2013.

5
. Klein 2007; Reid 2009; Davis, Schoen, and Stremekis 2010; OECD 2011.

6
. Heymann et al. 2009.

7
. Bureau of Labor Statistics 2012b, using data from the March 2012 National Compensation Survey.

8
. Waldfogel 2006, ch. 2. See also Kenworthy 2009c.

9
. Ferrarini and Duvander 2010.

10
. Anrig 2006.

11
. House Ways and Means Committee, Green Book, various editions.

12
. Kletzer and Litan 2001; LaLonde 2007; Kling 2008.

13
. Kenworthy 2009b.

14
. Murray 1984; Ellwood 1988; Marmor, Mashaw, and Harvey 1990; Jencks 1992; Skocpol 1992; Blank 1997; Gilens 1999; Haskins and Sawhill 2009; Thiebaud 2012.

15
. This logic could also be applied to existing disability policy. See Autor and Duggan 2010; Burkhauser and Daly 2012; Reno and Ekman 2012.