Read Some Day the Sun Will Shine and Have Not Will Be No More Online
Authors: Brian Peckford
There were many studies, but little real progress was made of addressing the
fundamentals of the industry. The Nordco report (page 48) highlights this issue:
“Within five years of the 1967 Royal Commission, the âfisheriesârationalization'
policy was in shambles.”
And David Alexander in his book
The Decay of Trade
expresses a similar
view:
What seems utterly absurd is that Newfoundland's restoration as a major
producer of fishery products has not been accomplished during the breathing
space provided through union with Canada. Integrating with a larger country
should have made recovery much easier by lowering overhead costs, providing
scale economies with new social and economic services, and making available
low cost development capital. (12)
With the election of Frank Moores as premier in 1972, a more interested and
assertive provincial administration regarding the fishery was finally in place.
AÂ 1973Â planning exercise ensued, which involved a push to ensure that the
foreign catch of northern cod be caught by Canadians (and most particularly by
those closest to the resourceâNewfoundlanders), and importantly that there “be
greater Federal-Provincial consultation in the determination of Canada's
position at ICNAF meetings.” (Nordco report, 49)
Finally, the province was beginning to assert that it had a role in the
formulation of fishery policy off our coast. This position expanded throughout
the 1970s as the province further developed this aspect of its policy, becoming
even more certain with the five-volume “Setting a Course” report, which said
among other things: “In view of the major
impact which the
Fisheries sector will have (as the stocks recovered as a result of the 200-mile
limit and better resource management) on the local economy in the years ahead,
it is desirable that the province should have a major input into Fisheries
policy at every level.”
The Nordco report noted another important point: “In âSetting a Course, ' the
province has re-affirmed its intention to consider the social and economic needs
of fishing regions in discussing plans for the fishery. This policy objective
was in sharp contrast to the âresettlement mentality' which had informed
Fisheries policy some two decades earlier and as late as 1967 in the Royal
Commission of that year.”
The province strengthened its position on this issue in its white paper
of 1978: “The Government of Newfoundland and Labrador holds the view that the
limited participatory role by the provinces in the decision making process by
the federal government relating to marine resources management must be replaced
by one in which Newfoundland and the other provinces play a meaningful role in
the decisions respecting resource management and all Fisheries-related
matters.”
The coming of the 200-mile limit, with attendant (temporary) larger fish
volumes, and the federal government policy, which recognized the Newfoundland
inshore effort, focused attention on how best to now manage the resurgent
northern cod resource. Of course this is what led the Moores government, and
later my administration, to call for greater involvement of the province in
fishery policy matters. Unfortunately, the federal government had no intention
of involving the province, and hence the province proceeded to try and persuade
the federal government otherwise.
Three major documents stand out:
The August 18, 1980, “Towards the First Century Together: The
Position of the Government of Newfoundland Regarding Constitutional
Change.”
The Nordco report “It Were Well to Live Mainly
Off Fish,” commissioned by my administration and published in
February, 1981.
The five-year plan entitled “Managing All Our Resources,”
promised in my first Throne Speech and published in October,
1980.
I have already referenced the Nordco report. The other documents are ones
produced internally by my administration and clearly articulate the province's
position on the fishery and the desire to have greater say in it.
In the five-year plan concerning the rising projections for northern cod we
noted:
Before this catch can be harvested, the future management regime for the
northern cod stock must be resolved by bilateral discussions between the
Government of Newfoundland and the Government of Canada. The significance of
this stock to Newfoundland and Labrador is overwhelming. It is the sole
basis of our cod fishery from Cape Chidley to Cape St. Mary's.
It went on to say:
A more structured federal-provincial decision making process based upon
written principles and procedures has to be developed, all decisions must
relate to written management objectives, and public hearings procedures must
be developed so that proposed government actions may be reviewed.
The application of these measures would be acceptable on an interim basis;
the long-term solution must be entrenchment of provincial management
rights in the constitution. To achieve this, there must be
realignment of present jurisdictional responsibilities.
This was clearly defined a few months earlier in the already mentioned
Constitutional Position document.
This was all hugely important for me at that time and for those close to this
policy in the government. We were only too aware of our history, both distant
and recent, of remote control fishery management and its disastrous
results.
Driving our position was also the knowledge that the federal government had
changed its position at the Law of the Sea talks from one supporting our
position of instituting national control to the end of the continental shelf to
just 200 miles, and then insisting that they could, with their bargaining power,
ensure that Canadian standards of management and conservation would apply
beyond 200 miles to the continental margin, a position that was not sustained
after the treaty. A gigantic mistake to so trust the federal government! We had
had other earlier promises by Great Britain of having our own government
restored after its suspension in the 1930s, only to see this, a broken
commitment.
Everyone seemed to ignore the geographic fact that the continental shelf off
Newfoundland extended beyond 200 miles in the areas known as the nose and tail
of the Grand Banks and Flemish Cap, where fish spawning was prolific and
necessary to manage for the integrity of the fish resource inside the 200-miles
area. Pierre Trudeau, in what he thought would be a clever put-down of me and
the province rather than a display of fisheries ignorance, expressed his view at
a publicly televised conference about the fish having international and national
dimensions, that fish swim, only to be reminded by me that fish swim, all right,
in our context from offshore Newfoundland to inshore Newfoundland waters. I am
unsure whether the national press fully grasped the significance of my
statement, given their later infatuation with Brian Tobin's silly Spanish public
relations efforts concerning the minor turbot species flap, long after the cod
had disappeared and on which he did precious little when he was an MP.
There is a fourth document: my letter of December 16, 1980, to
Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau, which, perhaps more than anything else
demonstrates the gigantic hill we were trying to climb given the blatant lack of
concern of Newfoundland interests by the federal government. The letter
highlights three issues concerning federal action dealing with the
fishery:
The announced decision to establish an additional fishery region
for the Gulf of St. Lawrence, headquartered in Moncton, New
Brunswick, without any consultation with the province.
The intent of the federal government to introduce a new
licensing policy that would see for the first time a specific quota
for the inshore fishery, contrary to advice the province had
provided.
And, if anything else could be more galling to a Newfoundlander,
the trading of some of our northern cod stock to foreign nations for
trade concessions of dubious value.
My letter ends with this:
From the foregoing, you will see that from our perspective there has not
been sufficient or proper consultation with the Government of Newfoundland
on these matters. It is my belief that the kind of consultation which is
necessary for coordinated action will only be possible when responsibility
for these decisions is jointly held. This belief was at the centre of our
proposals for concurrent jurisdiction during the constitutional discussions
and I am convinced that present evidence demonstrates the necessity of
achieving constitutional change.
In conclusion, I would re-emphasize my grave concern over the three
specific initiatives to which I have referred and urge that the process of
implementation of these initiatives be suspended until
such time as more extensive consultations can take place, and we have the
benefit of the findings of the Royal Commission presently examining the
Newfoundland fishery. Moreover, I would urge you that any proposals for such
fundamental change in the fishery be subjected to a process of public
hearings before decisions are finally taken and that any such decision, when
taken, be reasoned in light of the evidence presented.
Seven years later little had changed, even though we had our Conservative
brethren as the government in Ottawa. On October 8, 1987, I was forced to write
the following to John Crosbie, our Newfoundland representative in the Cabinet,
concerning Canada's actions with France and the fishery:
The Government of Canada has offered non-surplus 2J3KL [northern cod] to
France. The Government of Canada offers this non-surplus fish without any
commitment from France to stop overfishing in 3PS [another fishing zone off
Newfoundland]. How can you argue that you are safeguarding Newfoundland and
Labrador's interests when you agree to give France non-surplus cod, when our
inshore fishery has failed four years in a row, when most of our fish plants
are only open for three or four months of the year, when we have the highest
unemployment in Canada? Giving away more of our fish only ensures that UIC
[EI] dependence will persist and our chances of longer-term employment for
our people will diminish.
Parenthetically, we were also sent a bill by the Canadian embassy in Paris when
our delegation had eaten there when we were “allowed”
to be
observers at some of the meetings with the Europeans. Lucien Bouchard was then
the Canadian ambassador. Needless to say, we didn't pay it but informed Ottawa
of the insult. Our own Joe Clark was the minister of External Affairs at the
time.
Yet, notwithstanding all of this, we almost succeeded in our constitutional
quest on the fishery. Most of the provinces were on board and it looked like we
could see a breakthrough. However, the federal government remained stubborn on
the issue, and with the prime minster's unilateral efforts at patriation, such
issues as the fishery became secondary as the provinces fought to ensure that
the prime minister's folly at unilateralism would fail, which thankfully the
Supreme Court confirmed.
Through all of this, three of the major fish companies operating in the
province ran into financial difficulty, and after delicate talks with the
federal government it was agreed that a new entity would be formed, Fishery
Products International, taking the assets from the three failing companies and
merging them into this new entity, plus around $110Â million. This company became
a success and traded on the Toronto Stock Exchange. The management of the
company, headlined by the highly competent Victor Young, ran an efficient
operation, and had established a productive relationship with the communities
where it operated. A special piece of legislation was passed in the legislature
giving effect to all this and with provisions protecting Newfoundland's
interests. Sadly, success in the fishery seems to infect us with some sort of
suicidal virus, as interests from outside and inside the province vied for
control of the company, and with a passive, if not willing provincial
government, the provisions to protect the province's interests were dissolved
and these interests succeeded in taking over the company. And while it is true
now that many of the assets are now owned by Newfoundland interests, the
grand entente
between the government and local business interests,
given the unique nature of the inshore fishery, has been lost and that is to the
detriment of rural Newfoundland.
To add insult to injury, it was not long before the fears we expressed
in 1980 and the warnings of many fishermen became a reality with the
collapse of the ground fishery and its closure, heralding an
end to rural Newfoundland as we knew it.
Our fight to gain some say or control was not universal in Newfoundland, which,
of course, did not help our case with Ottawa, with the provincial Liberals being
ambiguous at best. The Fishermen's Union, in its conflicted position of
representing offshore trawlermen, inshore fishermen, and fish plant workers, and
having their own contacts in the federal bureaucracy, were not
co-operative.
Of course, just about everyone agrees now that the province should be more
involved in fisheries management. Only one problemâthere isn't any northern
cod.
Dr. Leslie Harris, in his report (
Northern Cod Review Panel
, March,
1990) on the northern cod disappearance, highlighted a number of issues that the
province had been advocating for years and decades regarding foreign fishing,
extending national jurisdiction, joint management, and the principal of
adjacency.