Read Some Day the Sun Will Shine and Have Not Will Be No More Online
Authors: Brian Peckford
I have recently raised this issue with Mr. Bourassa, urging him to consider
options for resolving the problems associated with the Upper Churchill
contract and the development of hydro potential in Labrador and for a
process that would encourage both parties to move forward on these issues.
Mr. Bourassa has undertaken, without prejudice, to explore the matter
further and I anticipate that he will be in a position to make his views
known shortly. You should also know that the premier has rejected the idea
of a federal intervener for the time being. I hope that my intervention will
lead to a constructive dialogue on the issues at hand.
Other than this attempt, which, of course, went nowhere, there was little real
sympathy by the federal government or for that matter by Canadians to assist in
having the transmission of electrical energy handled on a national basis as the
transmission of oil and gas was being treated. I travelled the country on the
issue and most people were polite and that was about it. Hence, Quebec would
remain holding Newfoundland hostage. I wonder if a similar situation would have
been allowed to happen anywhere else in Canada. I remember that the well-known
Newfoundland artist and designer of the Newfoundland Flag Christopher Pratt once
suggested to me that there was one way to break this different treatment being
used by Ottawa in the transmission of oil versus electricity, and that was to
put the transmission lines in a pipeline!
After I became minister of Mines and Energy in 1976, I went to Quebec City to
meet with the fairly new Parti Québécois Energy minister, Guy Joron. He was very
friendly and expressed optimism that we could make progress on this file
involving the Upper and Lower Churchill as a package. The meeting was in his
office. Suddenly, who
should enter but René Lévesque himself,
jovial and of course smoking a cigarette. We all had a very upbeat conversation
on the Labrador energy situation, and they would be following up with
Hydro-Québec. Of course, Hydro-Québec saw that nothing materialized.
A very bizarre thing happened in 1978 when one evening I was made aware that
Premier Moores was entertaining the premier of Quebec concerning energy. I was
flabbergasted. I knew nothing of it. I immediately went to the premier's office
to discover a flurry of activity. Vic Young was the premier's chief of staff at
the time, and I was quickly ushered into his office and made aware that a
framework agreement was pending with Quebec concerning the Upper and Lower
Churchill River.
I demanded to see the premier, and after some shuffling about and my anger
visibly rising, I was in the premier's office. He proceeded to give me a broad
outline of what was going on and I listened with incredulity. There was to be a
press conference that very evening to announce the arrangement. I asked a few
questions and found the whole thing to be rushed, and just not enough elements
there to make the deal worthwhile. I told the premier that I would not be able
to support it and would have to make that known publicly. After being rushed
from his office I was once more back in Vic Young's office with Vic (and I think
a couple of Cabinet ministers), where I furiously, with tears in my eyes,
denounced the deal and said this would not stand. I would resign and fight it.
No amount of talk would appease me and I stood firm.
Lo and behold, the press conference was cancelled and the whole thing fizzled.
Lévesque had to return to Quebec empty-handed!
Many years later, Janice Wells of St. John's, formerly of Corner Brook and a
close friend of Frank Moores, wrote a book on the life of Frank. In it she
recounted how Frank had told her how I had scuttled this wonderful deal he had
worked out with René Lévesque. CBC interviewed her on the matter and later
contacted me. I explained to the CBC that this was not at all the way the matter
unfolded and that what was being offered was Quebec once again getting more of
our power to use and sell, now from the Lower Churchill, with no change to the
infamous Upper Churchill contract. If the deal was so
good, why
didn't Frank proceed with it, seeing he had the majority of ministers with him
on the deal? Or, if the deal was so good, it should be able to take a few more
days of scrutiny. It was a rush job and not in the best interests of the
province. Funny, too, that for the many years after Frank left politics, I am
unaware that he ever uttered a word that in any way corroborated Janice Wells's
story. It seems like an attempt by an admirer to try and shed a positive light
on her hero. Additionally, I had met Janice when she was writing the book
(initiated by me when I heard she was writing such a book and I had not been
contacted by her), and at no time during that “interview” did she mention this
Churchill matterâodd, given her revelations in the book. I wrote Janice an email
after that encounter on June 21, 2006:
It was great seeing you again and having a few moments to talk about Mr.
Moores.
I was a little taken aback to learn that he considered me a socialist. I
have some difficulty understanding how he could come to such a conclusion
given my record. Did he ever share with you the reasons for such a
view?
You also mentioned some materials that his administration had prepared to
distribute to the schools and which my administration cancelled. Apparently,
he was upset with this decision. As I mentioned, I vaguely remember the
materials and I cannot remember precisely why the distribution was
cancelled. As I said to you I suspect the decision was made as a result of
advice/recommendation from the Department of Education. I could perhaps find
out for you if you wish.
Any other matters just shoot an email.
Regards,
Brian Peckford
Ms. Wells never replied to this communication.
Without any breakthrough in talks with Quebec, the province embarked on legal
action as well as being open to additional talks with Quebec. The legal action
centred on the lease, a piece of Newfoundland legislation that provided a lease
to Hamilton Falls Corporation, a forerunner of the Churchill Falls Labrador
Corporation, the present owners and operators of the Upper Churchill Falls
development. This lease transferred to Hamilton Falls Corporation the rights to
the waters of the Upper Hamilton (Churchill) River. In Part 1, Section 2 (e) the
leasee had
the right to transmit throughout the province any electric power generated
as the result of the harnessing of the whole or any part of the Upper
Hamilton and to export from the province such power; provided that upon the
request of the Government consumers of electricity in the province shall be
given priority where it is feasible and economic to do so ...
Newfoundland had earlier requested 800 megawatts from the development. With no
adequate response on the request, Newfoundland exercised its legal rights under
the lease to the courts. However, this was to be a long and arduous process with
little chance of immediate to mid-term resolution.
Therefore, once I assumed the premiership in 1979, I assembled a number of
legal experts to see what other options might be available. This legal team
included Cabot Martin, Noel Clarke, Tom Kendell, Keith Mercer, and Edward
Hearne. Our actual presentation to the courts (Newfoundland Court of Appeal and
the Supreme Court of Canada) was handled by Leonard Martin with assistance from
Edward Hearne, Noel Clarke, and David Osborne. We also consulted with legal
experts around the world, including Dr. Geoffrey Marston of Cambridge University
and Dr. William C. Gilmore of the University of Edinburgh. Through the work of
that legal team, a number of options were presented to government; the one that
the team thought had the
best chance of success was a new piece
of legislation entitled the Water Reversion Act. The government accepted this
recommendation and action ensued in the courts. In other words, we decided after
passage of the Act in the legislature that we would refer it directly to the
courts to test its validity, rather than try to implement it with all the
uncertainty this would engender.
The Newfoundland Court of Appeal agreed that the province was within its
legislative competence to pass the Act.
However, the Supreme Court of Canada ruled on May 3, 1984:
In conclusion, having found that the pith and substance of the Reversion
Act is to interfere with the rights of Hydro-Québec outside the territorial
jurisdiction of Newfoundland, it is my opinion that the Act, taken as a
whole, is
ultra vires
of the Legislature of Newfoundland.
Question 9 of the Reference must be answered accordingly. It therefore
becomes unnecessary to answer the other eight questions.
Our hopes were dashed again.
And in 1988 the Supreme Court of Canada upheld the earlier decisions of the
Newfoundland courts that our recall case was also invalid.
Of course, over time there are always those who question whether you have done
all you can on a given public policy issue. And such was the case on my
involvement with the Churchill Falls issues. In 2005, I appeared on a local CBC
radio show and was questioned by Mr. Burf Ploughman, who implied that I had not
done enough to get the Lower Churchill going and that there were buyers in New
York State for the power. This led me to check my sources later and respond more
fully to Mr. Ploughman.
Feb. 21, 2005
Mr. B. F. Ploughman
17Â Pinebud Avenue
St. John's, NL
Dear Mr. Ploughman:
A few weeks ago you called the CBC radio afternoon show and indicated to
the audience that when I was premier I failed to follow through on an
opportunity to develop the Lower Churchill Falls. You quoted a press release
that talked about the Power Authority of the State of New York and how they
and other investors had the money to build the project and buy the power. I
said to you and the audience at the time that I remembered the matter and
that I had travelled to New York and that, notwithstanding the press
release, no deal was able to be made. I then said that I did not remember
any other details. You expressed amazement that I did not remember more
details. Well, I did remember some, but I was not sure that I was completely
correct. For example, I was pretty sure that a group of investors led by
Franklin Roosevelt Jr. was involved and that there was a return visit to
Newfoundland. I did not want to mention names and return visits unless I was
completely sure that I was right.
I have had a chance to check the whole thing. There are no documents with
the Government or Newfoundland Hydro on the matter, at least not now. This
is so because there was no deal and no negotiations were held. I have talked
to people who were in government with me at the time and to hydro people.
All confirm that there was a meeting in New York and a visit to Newfoundland
and that was it because of the impasse with Quebec. And on Friday,
February 18, I have talked directly with Mr. Dyson, the then chairman of the
Power Authority of the State of New York.
If you have read the recent articles in the
newspaper,
The Independent
, you know the rest. Essentially PASNY and the New
York investors, especially PASNY (a big customer of Quebec power) thought
that they would be able to get Lower Churchill power through Quebec. They
soon realized that the Anglo-Saxon route was not economic at that time and
that one of the remaining sources of power lay in Labrador. Mr. Dyson
confirmed this in my conversation and volunteered that PASNY had actually
met with Quebec to try and push the matter. All was for naught, however, as
we know only too well when it comes to dealing with Quebec and Labrador
power.
You may be interested to know that this was not my only effort to try and
develop Lower Churchill. At the time of the PASNY interest, we had also
talked to other eastern U. S. states and to Ontario. A federal-provincial
Lower Churchill Development Corporation was formed. I sought out aluminum
producers and met with Alcoa and several other producers over the years. I
met with Quebec when I was Energy minister and tried to forge a deal, met
with Premier Lévesque, Premier Bourassa, was involved in two court actions
to get a better deal on the Upper Churchill, which could trigger development
of the Lower Churchill and actually spent the people's money in studies
relating to crossing the Strait of Belle Isle. You may remember a First
Ministers Conference that was televised where I mentioned putting wires in a
pipeline to carry Labrador Power through Quebec, a not too subtle reference
to the ability of oil and gas pipelines to move across provincial borders.
And there were endless efforts to try and get the federal government to
allow for the wheeling of power through Quebec, as PASNY tried to do.
Given that you saw fit to very publicly present your views,
you will not be surprised that I will do likewise. I will be sending this to
the CBC afternoon radio open-line show in question and distributing it
widely to all the press in the province and to many citizens of the province
as well.
A. Brian Peckford
To indicate how set against Newfoundland Quebec really was, one has only to
remember that the Parti Québécois had not recognized the Labrador/Quebec Privy
Council decision of 1927 concerning the border between the two. We thought at
the time that this was just political bluster by an Opposition party for local
consumption. After the party became the government in 1976, reality sank
in.