But Russert proved to be little help. He hadn’t seen the programs, and said he didn’t have any management authority over Matthews. If Russert disliked Matthews, as Matalin had suggested, he gave no sign of it to Libby. Russert was courteous, and suggested Libby call Matthews directly, or one of his producers. He even gave Libby a direct number for Neal Shapiro, the head of NBC News, and alerted Shapiro that Libby might be calling. But Libby asked Adam Levine in the press office to call, since Levine had worked at NBC and knew Shapiro, but Levine didn’t get anywhere.
Late that afternoon Libby went to Karl Rove’s office, hoping to find out what was happening with the Tenet statement. Rove mentioned that he’d gotten a call from Bob Novak, who was writing a column about Wilson. Rove reported that Novak had run into Wilson at the NBC greenroom, and Wilson had “sort of turned him off.” Novak had “concerns” about how Wilson came to be chosen, since he “might have an axe to grind.” And then Novak had told Rove that Wilson’s wife worked for the CIA.
T
he much-anticipated Tenet mea culpa finally emerged on Friday, July 11–days late, in Libby’s view–and too late to make the television evening news broadcasts, which meant it would be relegated to Saturday’s papers. “Legitimate questions have arisen about how remarks on alleged Iraqi attempts to obtain uranium in Africa made it into the president’s State of the Union speech,” Tenet began. “Let me be clear about several things right up front. First, the CIA approved the president’s State of the Union address before it was delivered. Second, I am responsible for the approval process in my agency. And third, the president had every reason to believe that the text presented to him was sound. These sixteen words should never have been included in the text written for the president.”
Tenet then gave his detailed account of the statement, which touched on many of the vice president’s talking points. Tenet dismissed Wilson’s conclusions as not having resolved the issue, and said the report based on Wilson’s findings didn’t get briefed to the president or vice president. Tenet also said that CIA counterproliferation experts had sent Wilson “on their own initiative.”
Tenet concluded, “From what we know now, agency officials in the end concurred that the text in the speech was factually correct–i.e., that the British government report said that Iraq sought uranium from Africa. This should not have been the test for clearing a presidential address. This did not rise to the level of certainty which should be required for presidential speeches, and the CIA should have ensured that it was removed.”
Still, he didn’t shoulder the blame for the broader intelligence failure, and made clear that at various times the CIA had raised questions about the accuracy of the uranium claims. Libby felt the statement “wasn’t all that we had hoped for” but, on balance, was “helpful.”
T
he next day was hot and sunny in Norfolk, Virginia. A crowd of twenty thousand gathered for the festive commissioning of the navy’s newest carrier, the USS
Ronald Reagan
. Former first lady Nancy Reagan issued the traditional command, “Bring her to life,” and the ship’s crew raced up the gangplank. Reagan “came to the presidency with a clear understanding of the tools our navy would need to protect the American people,” Cheney told the crowd, which included most of his staff. Libby brought his two children; it was his young son’s birthday.
It didn’t take long for the Iraq uranium controversy to reassert itself. As they were flying back to Washington on Air Force Two, Libby walked back to the rear of the plane where Martin was seated. “What do you need to talk to me about?” he asked.
Martin reported that Glenn Kessler of the
Washington Post
had called, and Matt Cooper, at
Time
, had sent a detailed e-mail with questions about the vice president’s role in the Wilson mission.
“Well, let me go talk to the boss and I’ll be back,” Libby said. Cheney was sitting in a separate compartment at the front of the plane.
Now that the Tenet statement had been released, Libby had been wanting to discuss with Cheney how they should proceed, and had jotted down on a card a few points to bring up. Cheney said he felt there was still some ambiguity in the Tenet report, and he wanted to make clear that six months after Wilson’s trip, the NIE stated that Iraq was vigorously pursuing uranium in Niger and other African countries. He dictated a statement for Libby to read to reporters that would be on the record, meaning attributed to Libby. This was a rare step, but Cheney thought it would have more impact and be taken more seriously. He didn’t want Cathie Martin to make the calls or read the statement. Libby copied the statement as well as another point, which was to be on “deep background,” referring to Wilson’s report that Iraq had approached Niger officials in 1999.
When the plane landed at Andrews Air Force Base, Libby and Martin asked to borrow a phone and went into an office off the lounge. Libby wanted to make the calls and get home for his son’s birthday party. He called
Time
reporter Matt Cooper and reached him at home. Cooper was not just another
Time
reporter; he was married to Mandy Grunwald, the daughter of legendary Time Inc. editor in chief Henry Grunwald, and a media consultant close to the Clintons, especially Hillary. Still, Cooper was new to the White House beat, so Martin got on the phone and made an introduction. Libby said he had an on-the-record quote for
Time
, and read the statement the vice president had dictated, making the point that the vice president hadn’t asked for or known about Wilson’s mission. “Then why does Wilson keep saying it?” Cooper asked.
Libby was “taken aback” and somewhat annoyed. The director of the CIA had said publicly that Cheney didn’t send him. The vice president’s chief of staff had just said the same thing. So why was Cooper still asking about Wilson? Why didn’t he say, “Oh, I see, the vice president didn’t send him”?
Libby stayed calm. “I don’t know why he keeps saying it,” he said, then went on “background” to speculate that someone at the CIA had given Wilson misinformation. Toward the end of the conversation, they talked briefly about Wilson’s wife. Cooper recalled that he brought it up, asking about whether Wilson’s wife had been involved in sending him to Africa. “I’ve heard that too,” Libby said, or words to that effect. In Libby’s version, he replied, “Off-the-record, reporters are telling us that Ambassador Wilson’s wife works at the CIA and I don’t know if it’s true.” Whatever Libby’s exact words, Cooper didn’t write anything in his notes.
Martin was listening to Libby’s end of the conversation. She didn’t recall hearing him say anything about Wilson’s wife, but she did take another call at one point and could have missed it. When Libby finished with Cooper, Martin suggested they make the rest of the calls from the van taking them back to the capital, which would save time. They reached the
Post
’s Kessler, who was with his family at the zoo, and left a message for Evan Thomas at
Newsweek
. Libby also called Judith Miller, who was en route to her weekend home in Sag Harbor and said she’d call him back. He didn’t say anything further about Wilson’s wife while in the van.
When Libby and Miller did speak that evening, the topic of Wilson’s wife apparently again surfaced. Libby recalled a longer conversation about the Tenet statement and telling Miller that reporters were saying Wilson’s wife worked at the CIA. But by this point Miller’s interest in Wilson had waned, and she didn’t remember much about the conversation. She told Libby she didn’t think her editors at the
Times
were interested, and she wasn’t pursuing the story. Libby’s efforts to use Miller to get the story out had come to nothing.
A
s the furor over Wilson’s op-ed piece intensified, Novak had turned to the question that occurred to him that Sunday on
Meet the Press
, which was how Wilson, of all people, had been chosen for the assignment. As his call to Rove indicated, he’d learned that Wilson’s wife worked for the CIA, which helped solve the mystery. He finished writing his column by noon on Friday, July 11, and went over the editing. That afternoon Novak’s publisher, Creators Syndicate, transmitted the column to a hundred subscribers, including the
Washington Post
. On Monday, July 14, 2003, Novak’s column “Mission to Niger” appeared in print. It dismissed Wilson’s mission as a “low level” operation and stressed that its conclusions never reached the White House, or even Tenet, the CIA director.
It was only in the sixth paragraph that Novak got to the scoop:
Wilson never worked for the CIA, but his wife, Valerie Plame, is an agency operative on weapons of mass destruction. Two senior administration officials told me that Wilson’s wife suggested sending him to Niger. . . . The CIA says its counterproliferation officials selected Wilson and asked his wife to contact him. “I will not answer any question about my wife,” Wilson told me.
That Joe Wilson’s wife, Valerie Plame, worked for the CIA as an “agency operative on weapons of mass destruction,” and suggested her husband for the Niger mission, added little, on the face of it, to the public debate over Wilson’s allegations. Even that was qualified, since the CIA official asserted that the agency chose Wilson, not his wife, and merely asked his wife to contact him. Novak rightly noted that the real issue was whether the administration had ignored facts and misled the public about the justification for war.
Only in the hothouse atmosphere of a White House desperate to salvage its reputation could Novak’s column be seen as a public relations coup, and none seemed more impressed by it than Rove and Libby. Libby later maintained he never considered the column all that important, but others in the White House at the time dispute that. “Karl [Rove] and Scooter [Libby] were like cats who swallowed the canary,” recalled one administration official. “They went around all day, saying ‘look who sent him; look who sent him.’ ”
The column did advance several facts important to Libby and others in the administration: It said it was not Vice President Dick Cheney or anyone else in the White House who asked for such a mission, rendering it more plausible that they wouldn’t have known about it or received any report. And by suggesting that it was Wilson’s wife who chose him, the column raised the possibility that nepotism got him the assignment. This, too, suggested his report wouldn’t have been taken all that seriously. Yet that conclusion seemed something of a stretch, one likely to be made only by those avidly looking for a reason to discredit Wilson, who was, after all, a former ambassador to Africa with experience in Niger. The column seemed the classic kind of inside baseball that obsesses a small group of politicians and journalists in Washington but baffles almost everyone beyond the Potomac.
In the avalanche of coverage that Monday about the Wilson controversy, it’s not surprising that Novak’s column and his scoop about Wilson’s wife attracted little attention.
Time
devoted its cover to the Wilson affair, with the sweeping headline “Untruth and Consequences.” The lead article, “Follow the Yellowcake Road,” with reporting by Cooper, began:
How did a story that much of the national-security apparatus regarded as bogus wind up in the most important speech of Bush’s term? The evidence suggests that many in the Bush Administration simply wanted to believe it.
No wonder Libby was, to put it mildly, disappointed. The CIA director had denied that the vice president was behind Wilson’s mission. Libby had gone on the record at the vice president’s behest, something he almost never did, so that his denial would have the added credibility of attribution. Yet Cooper had used a fragment of the quote to reinforce the perception that Cheney was behind the Wilson mission:
When it got to Washington, the Iraq-Niger uranium report caught the eye of someone important: Vice President Dick Cheney. Cheney’s chief of staff, Lewis Libby, told TIME that during one of his regular CIA briefings, “the vice president asked a question about the implication of the report.” Cheney’s interest hardly came as a surprise: he has long been known to harbor some of the most hard-line views of Saddam’s nuclear ambitions. It was not long before the agency quietly dispatched a veteran U.S. envoy named Joseph Wilson to investigate.
On Tuesday, Libby asked Cathie Martin to call Cooper. She complained that the full quote wasn’t used, so Cooper agreed to insert it into the online version of the story. Cooper also decided to use Libby’s quote in full in another piece, “A War on Wilson?” that he cowrote for
Time
’s website, referring to it as an “exclusive” interview with
Time
. The article appeared on July 17, and did convey the administration’s view of the Wilson trip, including the point Libby had made to Cooper about Wilson’s wife:
And some government officials have noted to TIME in interviews (as well as to syndicated columnist Robert Novak) that Wilson’s wife, Valerie Plame, is a CIA official who monitors the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. . . .
In an interview with TIME, Wilson, who served as an ambassador to Gabon and as a senior American diplomat in Baghdad under the current president’s father, angrily said that his wife had nothing to do with his trip to Africa. “That is bulls__t. That is absolutely not the case,” Wilson told TIME.