Authors: Elliott Abrams
On March 22, Israel retaliated by assassinating the Hamas leader Sheikh Yassin, one of the organization's founders. Rice viewed this as a great error; Yassin was 67 and confined to a wheelchair by paralysis. Kofi Annan and Tony Blair, among many others, publicly condemned the killing. The official U.S. position was that we were “deeply troubled,” but at the United Nations, the United States vetoed a resolution condemning Israel on the grounds that the text did not also condemn Hamas terrorism. Rice and
Weissglas had an angry shouting match over the assassination of Yassin, which she told him was
a terrible mistake; her criticism outraged the Israelis. But Sharon and
his team also noticed the different tone Bush himself took: “There needs to be a focused, concerted effort by all parties to fight terror. Any country has a right to defend itself from terror. Israel has the right to defend herself from terror. And as she does so, I hope she keeps consequences in mind as to how to make sure we stay on the path to peace.”
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This was perhaps the first time the Sharon team noted a gap between the president and Rice on such issues.
The continuing terrorism, and the Israeli responses to it, did not deter the Sharon and Bush teams from continuing negotiations on the goal we shared: giving Sharon the political support he needed to pull off the disengagement and to include withdrawal from some part of the West Bank in it. A Likud referendum on disengagement was scheduled for May 2, and we knew we needed to act before then. On March 31, Hadley and
I headed back to Jerusalem, with Assistant Secretary Bill Burns, this time to negotiate the text of what became known as the April 14 letter. In hour after hour of meetings with Weissglas and
Tourgeman, the draft began to take shape. At a meeting with Abu Ala'a, Hadley was frank about the failure to advance reform and reduce Arafat's powers: You've missed an opportunity, he said, and the president is disappointed. At meetings with the Jordanians and Egyptians on this trip, Hadley explained, in general terms, what was coming: some words from President Bush that would assist Sharon in winning his internal battles and proceeding with disengagement. We asked Egyptian officials what would happen in Gaza after the Israelis left, and they told us not to worry: However strong Hamas might be there, Egypt would never allow Hamas to take over Gaza. If need be, Egypt had police and armed forces that could be used – and would be. That was a last resort, to be sure, something to be avoided, but Egypt's national interests and its security were at stake, so they would act if they had to. Egypt's powerful intelligence chief, Omar Soliman, pounded on the table as he assured Hadley and me of Egypt's control of Gaza. (Events in 2007, when Hamas took over Gaza while Egypt did nothing, proved how far off the mark these comments were.)
When we met with Sharon, he pleaded again for U.S. help and support. There was a nasty and energetic campaign against him and his plans. If what the president says isn't clear, he told us, I won't be able to win the battle in Likud. And that would be the end of disengagement, he added; if he could not pull it off, no one could. The left can't act, and the right won't act, he said. That would be the end of his own political career, but never mind that; it would mean no progress for years. And he reminded us that while his plan was unilateral, it did not foreclose future options: If at some point Arafat was pushed aside and a new Palestinian leadership was acting against terror and ready to negotiate, nothing he had done under his disengagement plan would make it harder to move forward.
That was increasingly the White House view. The president wanted to help Sharon achieve disengagement. The opposition Sharon was facing only deepened his desire to help because Bush was always impressed above all by courageous political leaders – Sharon, Blair, John Howard in Australia, Koizumi in Japan – people who did not get themselves elected only to then spend their time worrying mostly about reelection. He was willing, indeed eager, to assist Sharon in meeting the challenges and getting disengagement done. After all, not only was it the only game in town in 2004 but we felt it was also a strong basis for the future. If Sharon would pull entirely out of Gaza and do something as well in the West Bank, he was laying the foundation – as Weissglas and others told us, and as many on the Israeli right feared – for further moves in the West Bank.
If in subsequent years Sharon withdrew to the security fence line, removing settlements beyond it, he and Bush would leave office with the Israeli-Palestinian situation transformed. There had been no such move since 1967; although Israel had removed settlements in Sinai under Begin, no such withdrawal had ever been made with respect to the Palestinians. If such a withdrawal was made, Bush could look ahead to a second term where, even if Arafat remained in power, there would be substantial change on the ground, an achievement that had eluded Clinton and every other predecessor who had tried to push for an Israeli-Palestinian agreement. Sharon's unilateralism could be the path toward peace, and as Sharon had accurately told Hadley and
me, it did not in any way preclude a return to the Roadmap, to direct negotiations, should a new Palestinian leadership arise that fought terror. By the time we left Jerusalem, Sharon had agreed to move on the West Bank: Four very small settlements in the north, in Samaria, would go. A visit to Washington for Sharon was arranged for mid-April.
The calendar already showed a mid-April visit to the ranch in Crawford by President Mubarak, but that was no problem: Bush would receive Mubarak, then return to the White House to see Sharon a day or two later. This proved to be a mistake with a lasting impact because Mubarak stayed in the United States for several days after his Crawford visit and felt upstaged and embarrassed by the Sharon visit and then the announcement of the April 14 letter. But the conversations at the ranch went well enough, and U.S. officials explained to Mubarak about the forthcoming Sharon visit and the release of the letter. Mubarak's position was that any withdrawal would be welcome but should be the product of negotiations. In response, Powell told him there would be no negotiations; once Arafat had pushed Abu Mazen out, there was no responsible Palestinian partner left with whom to negotiate. We all learned a lesson from what Clinton went through, Bush added. We were dead in the water, said Rice. Now, this is the first withdrawal since 1967 except for Sinai, and it is a sea change, and we all have to keep our eyes on the big picture and recognize what is happening. This is a precedent for future withdrawals. They then explained to Mubarak that in a letter to Sharon, to be announced when he visited the White
House, there would be strong language about Palestinian refugees: They would be expected to settle in the Palestinian state, not “return” to Israel. Mubarak said an issue like that should be left to negotiations, but Bush pushed back: We are now in favor of creating a Palestinian state, we changed the policy, and we have to say why. Why create a Palestinian state? This is the answer – it is a place for the refugees to go. Sharon needs something from us, and he'll get a statement. Later, Mubarak would complain that he had not been told what was coming, but that was false. He had to claim ignorance, we at the NSC thought, to escape any accusation that he had been fully informed but indifferent or insufficiently influential to stop Bush.
By the time Sharon arrived, the text of the April 14 letter was nearly complete, as was the letter we demanded of Sharon. When they met, Bush did not negotiate details with Sharon; he was more interested in learning how Sharon the political leader had come to the decision to disengage. He still believed the Roadmap was the way to go in the long term, Sharon replied, but in the previous year he had seen a stalemate and a vacuum develop. There was no one with whom to negotiate. It was dangerous, so he decided to try something new: I’m an old soldier, I tried the Roadmap, it didn't move, so I decided on a detour. As he had said in Aqaba, Israel should not be ruling millions of Palestinians. Disengagement is the beginning of a process, not the end of the Roadmap, he said; we can always go back to the Roadmap later. The Arabs are saying that we will start in Gaza and end in Gaza, but that's not my intention, Sharon told Bush. Once the Palestinians start fighting terror, and Arafat is gone, we can continue with the Roadmap. (Bush then reminded Sharon of his repeated insistence to the Israelis that they absolutely not assassinate Arafat, whatever the provocation. In Bush's view, such a move would only inflame Arab opinion and lead to demonstrations and rioting across the Arab world, some of which would be aimed at imagined American complicity in the killing.) I am insisting that disengagement isn't part of the Roadmap, Sharon continued, because I don't want anyone to say we've abandoned the Roadmap now. You haven't abandoned it and this may be the way to jump-start it, Bush replied; this is real leadership.
The president was aware, as were we all, of the accusations that Sharon was playing this “peace card” to escape police investigations at home. We were also aware of another cynical interpretation of his actions: that he had no intention to move forward in Gaza and was simply buying time. We did not buy these theories; we thought Sharon would move in Gaza and that only Sharon could do so. We also thought that the speeches at the UN and elsewhere about moving forward now on the Roadmap and starting negotiations were foolish. If there was cynicism, it was from those who preferred to repeat old formulas rather than face the reality that they had failed.
The April 14 letter had elicited much nervousness on the international scene, not least in Jordan and in Britain. What exactly would Bush say? How far would he go, and would American allies be able to follow him there? And would
Sharon say what we needed? There were many drafts, as words, phrases, and paragraphs came in and out and shifted position; my own notes, stored in the Bush Library, show the hourly changes.
Sharon's letter to Bush recommitted himself and Israel to the June 24, 2002, vision of a two-state solution and to the Roadmap. In fact, Sharon hugged the Roadmap tight, emphasizing its “correct sequence” and calling it “the sole means to make genuine progress.” He repeated this sentiment several times:
We are committed to this formula as the only avenue through which an agreement can be reached. We believe that this formula is the only viable one.…Progress toward this goal must be anchored exclusively in the roadmap and we will oppose any other plan.…This initiative, which we are not undertaking under the roadmap, represents an independent Israeli plan, yet is not inconsistent with the roadmap.…The execution of the Disengagement Plan holds the prospect of stimulating positive changes within the Palestinian Authority that might create the necessary conditions for the resumption of direct negotiations.
Sharon unsurprisingly reiterated the need to end terror and jumped on the bandwagon for Palestinian reform: “As you have stated, a Palestinian state will never be created by terror, and Palestinians must engage in a sustained fight against the terrorists and dismantle their infrastructure. Moreover, there must be serious efforts to institute true reform and real democracy and liberty, including new leaders not compromised by terror.”
Sharon explained that given the current impasse, “I have decided to initiate a process of gradual disengagement,” which he described in terms meant to reassure Israelis (but that would equally offend European and Palestinian audiences):
The Disengagement Plan is designed to improve security for Israel and stabilize our political and economic situation. It will enable us to deploy our forces more effectively until such time that conditions in the Palestinian Authority allow for the full implementation of the Roadmap to resume.…The Disengagement Plan will create a new and better reality for the State of Israel, enhance its security and economy, and strengthen the fortitude of its people.
Then came the “meat” of the plan: “The State of Israel intends to relocate military installations and all Israeli villages and towns in the Gaza Strip, as well as other military installations and a small number of villages in Samaria.” Thus, Sharon was announcing that the West Bank would be included but was not giving a final decision on pulling the IDF out of the Philadelphi road area on the border with Egypt: Note that he said “military installations,” not “all” military installations.
On the security barrier, at our request Sharon, repeated that “[t]he fence is a security rather than political barrier, temporary rather than permanent, and therefore will not prejudice any final status issues including final borders.” And at our request he also added, “The route of the fence, as approved by our Government's decisions, will take into account, consistent with security needs, its impact on Palestinians not engaged in terrorist activities.” On settlements and
outposts, he acknowledged “the responsibilities facing the State of Israel. These include limitations on the growth of settlements [and] removal of unauthorized outposts.” The limitations on settlement growth were those negotiated by us with Weissglas, but of course Sharon's phrasing – limitations on settlement growth, not an end to it – suggested that a complete freeze “including natural growth” was not in the cards. (On removing the outposts, Sharon never fulfilled his pledge, which he acknowledged and for which he apologized face to face with the president a year later.)
So we had gotten what we needed from Sharon: a complete pullout from Gaza (and later, perhaps unwisely, he included the Philadelphi road border with Egypt); withdrawal from four very small settlements in the West Bank, proving this was not “Gaza only”; and a recommitment to the Roadmap and
to direct negotiations for Palestinian statehood. Then in return he got what he needed from Bush.