The Battle of Britain (22 page)

And so the great battle was fought and won over the Channel, over the fields of Kent and Sussex, over the wolds of Hampshire and Dorset, over the flat marshes of Essex and the sprawling mass of London. Unlike the previous battles of destiny – Waterloo, Trafalgar, the terrible roar and devastation of the Somme bombardments – there was little sound or fury. People on the ground went about their business with little idea of what was taking place high in the sky. They saw a pattern of white vapour trails, slowly changing form and shape. Sometimes they saw the contestants as a number of tiny specks scintillating like diamonds in the splendid sunlight of those often cloudless days. The skilful parries of the defence continued throughout those long days of the late summer. Had they not done so London would have suffered the fate of Warsaw and Rotterdam.

T
he period known officially as the Battle of Britain lasted just 114 days, from July 10 to October 31, 1940. Like all battles, the events in it are confused, and tracing its course is not made easier by the apparent lack of a master plan by the Luftwaffe High Command. This notwithstanding, four distinct phases are discernible, although considerable overlap exists between them, and they are not clear cut.

The initial German aim was to gain air superiority over the English Channel and southern England in order to give Operation Sealion, the proposed invasion of the British mainland, a chance of success. Later in the Battle, it seemed that the Germans hoped that England would capitulate to air power alone, thus rendering invasion unnecessary.

The first phase consisted of probing attacks designed to test and weaken the defences while the main body of the Luftwaffe deployed into position to mount an all-out assault. Mostly they consisted of attacks on British convoys around the south and east coasts, coupled with massive fighter sweeps over south-eastern England. The convoys, which made up the bulk of the targets during this early period, were vital to the British economy of the period. Mainly they carried coal and bulk raw materials. They could not be withdrawn without placing an unacceptably heavy load on the vulnerable rail network. The convoys had to be defended, but if the
German fighter sweeps could be identified in time, they were not intercepted; the attrition inevitably attendant upon such operations worked in favour of the British at no risk to themselves.

The second phase commenced during the second week in August, with heavy bombing attacks on airfields and radar stations in the south of England. These were intended to destroy RAF Fighter Command as an effective force.

The third phase came when the main weight of the German assault was switched to London on September 7, with the twofold intention of forcing the British fighters into the air, and of cowing the civilian population. Major daylight attacks on the metropolis continued until the end of the month. At the same time, heavy night raids on London commenced, adding to those already in progress against major industrial centres and ports, such as Liverpool, in the north-west of England.

The fourth phase commenced after Operation Sealion had been cancelled late in September. The main weight of the assault was switched to the night bombing offensive, which continued long after the Battle was officially over. Daylight activity during this final period was, with a few exceptions, confined to fighter sweeps and fighter-bomber raids.

The Battle officially opened on July 10, 1940. The month had started with a few German probing attacks and reconnaissance sorties. Then, on July 4, the Germans started to get into their stride with major attacks on convoys, and the naval base at Portland, on the south coast. German fighter sweeps over south-eastern England were also started on this day.

Operations during the first nine days of the month were hampered by poor weather, with heavy cloud and thunderstorms. This was a bad period for British squadron commanders; Sqn Ldrs Cooke of No. 65 and Joslin of No. 79 were both killed, while Sqn Ldr George Lott of No. 43 was wounded.

The first major raid of the official Battle of Britain took place during the morning of July 10, when the convoy codenamed ‘Bread' was detected by a reconnaissance Dornier Do 17P of 4(F) 121 when rounding the North Foreland in Kent. Six Spitfires of No. 74 Sqn (Hornchurch) intercepted at about 1100hrs, but were outnumbered by the Luftwaffe escort, an entire Gruppe (20 + aircraft) of Bf 109s (I/JG 51). The Dornier crash landed at Boulogne heavily damaged. Two Spitfires were hit and force
landed, one at Hornchurch, the other at Manston. A little later, Bf 109s in Staffel strength (between 8 and 12 aircraft) swept over the Dover area. Spitfires of No. 610 Sqn intercepted, but scored no victories. Sqn Ldr Smith was hit in this encounter and force landed at Hawkinge.

Then, at 1350hrs, over 70 German aircraft were sighted approaching the convoy. This force was composed of about 24 Do 17Zs of I/KG 2, escorted by some 24 Bf 110s of ZG 26, and two dozen Bf 109s of I/JG 3 and JG 51. About 30 British fighters intercepted – Hurricanes of Nos. 32 (Biggin Hill), 56 (North Weald operating from Manston) and 111 Sqns (Croydon), and Spitfires of No. 74 Sqn. These were joined in the closing phase of the action by six Spitfires of No. 64 Sqn (Kenley). While No. 56 tackled the 109s, No. 111 opened with what was to become its trademark during the Battle, a squadron strength head-on pass at the bombers.

A confused dogfight ensued. German losses were three Dorniers shot down or crash landed and one damaged; three 110s shot down and two damaged; and three 109s shot down or crash landed and one damaged. British losses during this action were one Spitfire which crash landed at Lympne, one Hurricane lost in a collision with a Dornier, two more crash landed, one of which was a writeoff, and two damaged. One British pilot was lost in this action. This rate of exchange was very acceptable to Fighter Command, but it would not always be maintained. More significant, although less spectacular, was the fact that only one ship in the entire convoy was sunk.

In the West, Luftflotte 3 had been active. At much the same time, Ju 88s of KG 51 raided both Swansea and Falmouth. The attacks were not intercepted, and a munitions factory at Swansea was hit. At this time No. 10 Group of Fighter Command did not yet exist; it was inaugurated in late July.

Poor weather conditions restricted activity during the next week, although a few convoy attacks were mounted. It improved on July 19, by which time there were no fewer than nine convoys at sea. The day started with the usual Luftwaffe reconnaissance snoopers, one of which was shot down off the coast near Brighton. Just after 0800hrs, four Do 17s of an unidentified unit attacked the Rolls-Royce aero engine works at Glasgow, causing heavy damage. They were not intercepted.

No. 141 Defiant Squadron had moved south a few days earlier and, operating from Hawkinge, was patrolling in mid-Channel off Folkestone in the early afternoon when attacked by Bf 109s from III/JG 51. The
unwieldy British turret fighters were outclassed and six were shot down, with the loss of 10 crewmen killed and two wounded. JG 51 lost just one aircraft and pilot. The disaster might have been complete had it not been for the arrival of No. 111 Squadron, who fought an inconclusive engagement with the Messerschmitts.

Several other actions were fought on this day, and more casualties were suffered by Nos. 1, 32, 43, 64, 145 and 603 Squadrons. Eleven British fighters were lost and four damaged against German air combat losses of two 109s shot down and two damaged, and a Heinkel He 111 and a Dornier 17P shot down. This was a black day for Fighter Command.

A quiet few days followed, thunderstorms all over southern England developing on July 20. Then three nights later a seemingly small but very significant event took place. Flying Officer Ashfield and his crew, Pilot Officer Morris and radar operator Sergeant Leyland, flying a radar-equipped Blenheim of the Fighter Interception Unit, shot down a Do 17Z of I/KG 3 at night. This was the first ever interception made using airborne radar.

Better weather on July 20 and 25 signalled the return of hard, if relatively small-scale fighting. Dorniers attacked a convoy in the Straits of Dover during the morning of July 24. They were intercepted by six Spitfires of No. 54 Sqn, who succeeded in spoiling the bombers' aim but little else. In return, three Spitfires were damaged, one of which force landed: the effectiveness of the German air gunners is often underrated.

Later in the morning, 18 more Dorniers, this time escorted by about 40 Bf 109s of II and III/JG 26, approached another convoy in the Thames Estuary. Spitfires of Nos. 54 and 65 Squadrons were scrambled to intercept; at the same time No. 610 Sqn was ordered to patrol the Dover area to cut off the retreat. A sharp clash ensued, JG 26 losing three aircraft, including that of the II Gruppe Kommandeur, Hauptmann Noacke. No. 54 Sqn lost one Spitfire shot down, with eight-victory ace Johnny Allen killed; another force landed but was later able to return to base, three were damaged, and one written off after a forced landing out of fuel.

As JG 26 withdrew at low level, a sweep by III/JG 52 coming in to cover it was bounced by No. 610 Sqn. In the fracas that followed, JG 26 lost four Bf 109s including those of the Kommandeur, Hptmn von Houwald, and Oblt Erlich, the Staffelkapitaen of 8 Staffel, who it is believed fell to the guns of Colin Gray of No. 54 Sqn. This was a bad time for German fighter leaders, as just four days earlier Major Riegel, the
Gruppe Kommandeur of I/JG 27 had been killed, while in the next four days casualties included Oblt Keidel, Staffelkapitaen of 8/JG 52, and the Luftwaffe's leading scorer. Major Werner Mölders, the Geschwader Kommodore of JG 51, was shot down and severely wounded by Flt Lt John Webster of No. 41 Sqn on July 28. He spent a month recovering from his injuries.

Meanwhile the weather worsened. Heavy thunderstorms on the afternoon of the 27th curtailed operations. So severe were they that the fighter airfields at Westhampnett and Martlesham Heath were flooded and put out of action for two or three days. The summer of 1940 was far from the endless sunshine of legend, but the storms cleared the air for the next few days and convoy attacks resumed.

Dover was raided during the early morning of July 29, the German force consisting of 48 Ju 87 dive bombers from IV (Stuka)/LG 1, II/StG 1, and II/StG 4, escorted by the Bf 109s of JG 51, about 80 strong. Eleven Spitfires of No. 41 Sqn were scrambled from Manston to intercept, and a dozen Hurricanes of No. 501 Sqn from Hawkinge. Four of the Stukas were shot down; one crash landed and one was damaged, while JG 51 lost two fighters, plus another which crash landed in France. One Spitfire was shot down, while no fewer than four others crashed on landing back at Manston, fortunately without injury to the pilots. A 501 Sqn Hurricane suffered relatively minor damage, the others were unscathed, but No. 56 Sqn, which joined the fray later, lost one Hurricane and a second was damaged. Two British pilots were killed in this action.

One of the two convoys in the area was attacked by a low level force of either Dorniers or Ju 88s, or it may have been a mix of both, from KG 76, while the other, which was off Harwich, was attacked by the fighter-bomber trials unit, Erprobungsgruppe 210, making its operational début. This unit, which was to carry out some of the most spectacular raids during the next few months, was not very successful on this occasion, claiming just two ships hit, and returning with one Bf 110 damaged by a Hurricane of No. 151 Sqn. Its escort, Bf 110s of II/ZG 26, damaged two of No. 151's Hurricanes, which force landed safely.

August commenced quietly, with adverse weather hampering operations. On the first day of the month, Air Chief Marshal Dowding increased the establishment of pilots by beefing-up the notional strength of each squadron, thus creating a paper deficiency of 134. Had he not done this, the pilot deficiency would have been just 40 on this date. With the benefit
of hindsight, this was a very shrewd move, as it gave him leverage to demand the transfer of pilots from other Royal Air Force commands.

So quiet were these opening days of August that the only Fighter Command combat casualties during the first four days were a Hurricane of No. 145 Sqn shot down by a Henschel Hs 126, and a Spitfire of No. 616 Sqn damaged by return fire from a Ju 88, both on August 1. The Germans were not so lucky, losing four He 115s, one Hs 126, three Ju 88s, two Do 17Zs, one Do 17P and one He 111. Several others force landed after operational missions. A few skirmishes took place on August 5 but, in spite of good weather, no major attack developed. The Luftwaffe was conserving its strength for Adler Tag, or ‘Eagle Day', provisionally set for August 10. During this period, both sides lost more aircraft and crewmen in flying accidents than in combat.

The pot started coming to the boil on August 8. Fighter sweeps by elements of JGs 3, 26, 51, 53 and 54 during the late morning were engaged by Spitfires of Nos. 41, 64, 65 and 610 Sqns. Honours were roughly even; four Spitfires being shot down and three pilots killed, a fifth force landed and a further two were damaged. A Blenheim of No. 600 Sqn was also lost. German losses were a single Bf 109 shot down, four more that crash landed in France, and a sixth badly damaged.

Meanwhile, convoy ‘Peewit', consisting of 29 vessels including Royal Navy escorts, and protected by its own balloon barrage, was attacked by small units of Stukas during the morning as it sailed westward in the Channel. A heavy cloud base at 2,500 feet (760m) combined with the balloons to thwart the attackers, and patrolling British fighters held them at bay with no loss to either side.

Further down the Channel the weather was clearer: Luftflotte 3, which had already been in action against another convoy near Weymouth, launched a mass attack on ‘Peewit' as it neared the Isle of Wight. Fifty-seven Ju 87s of StG 2, 3 and 77, escorted by 20 Bf 110s of V(Z)/LG 1 and about 30 Bf 109s from II and III/JG 27 were detected by Ventnor radar and intercepted before reaching the ships by 30 Spitfires and Hurricanes drawn from Nos. 145, 257 and 609 Sqns. An intense dogfight took place, joined in its later stages by the Hurricanes of No. 238 Sqn, They were unable to prevent the Stukas attacking the convoy, which scattered, thus reducing the balloon cover, and took heavy losses in consequence.