The Battle of Britain (20 page)

B
efore we can study the air fighting tactics of both sides during the Battle of Britain, we need to look at the state of the art during the high summer of 1940. One of the most important lessons from the air fighting of the Kaiser's War was that the best formation for combat was the open abreast style, with a spacing of 50 or 60 yards (45-55m) between each scout, so that pilots could keep station with each other, fly near their leader without the risk of collision, search the surrounding sky against the possibility of surprise attack, and turn inside each other to face an astern attack. This formula, learned by both British and German pilots under the constant and unforgiving hammer of battle, was recorded in a thousand memoirs and memoranda, and seemingly lost with the cease fire. For when the Messerschmitts began to fight in Spain they flew in close wing-tip to wing-tip formation totally unsuited for combat because of the lack of manoeuvring space and the absence of cross-cover.

However, German fighter pilots like Werner Mölders and Adolf Galland soon realised that their close formations were vulnerable and they adopted a far better style of air fighting. This perfect formation – for it is still flown today – was based on the Rotte, the element of two fighters. Some 200 yards (180m) separated a pair of fighters, and the chief responsibility of number two, or wingman, was to guard his leader from attack;
meanwhile the leader navigated and covered his wingman. The Schwarm, of four fighters, simply consisted of two pairs and was exactly the same abreast pattern as that devised by Oswald Boelcke, the leading tactician of air fighting in World War I, except that the spacing between aeroplanes had increased from about 60 yards (55m), the turning radius of Boelcke's Albatros, to some 300 yards (275m), the turning radius of a Messerschmitt 109.

There was an important difference of principle, however, between the old and new formations, since the number of machines in the former varied between three and six, according to aeroplane serviceability, while in Spain the Messerschmitt pilots found that owing to their increased speeds, greater turning radii and the restricted view from their enclosed cockpits, especially behind, it was essential to build their formations around the smallest fighting unit, the pair, for a lone pilot was more vulnerable than ever before. Flying in this fashion, a Messerschmitt squadron of 12 fighters stretched some mile and a half (2.5km) across the sky, and each Schwarm flew at varying heights, so that the starboard group, deployed down-sun from the leader, could search into the sun and guard the rest from surprise attack. These staggered heights gave cross-cover in all directions, and also made the fighters far less conspicuous in the sky.

The Messerschmitts carried radio telephones and, for the first time, fighter pilots could receive and transmit clear and distinct speech. When he manoeuvred before attacking, Mölders could keep his team fully in the picture – a tremendous improvement over the previous methods when a leader signalled his intentions by rocking his wings or firing coloured lights. So far air fighting had been inarticulate. In Spain it became articulate; this made for better teamwork in the air, and closer control from the ground. For the air fighters it was a big step forward.

Victory for Franco ended the Spanish Civil War, and the Condor Legion returned to Germany, where the lessons of air warfare were carefully studied. The radius of action of the Messerschmitt 109 was considered insufficient, and drop tanks, which could be jettisoned before a fight, were ordered. The three light machine guns were found to be inadequate for modern air combat and the 20mm Oerlikon cannon was developed for the Messerschmitt. Experienced German fighter pilots thought the salient features of the ideal fighter to be (in order of precedence): a high speed and a good climb to engage, manoeuvrability to get out of trouble, fire
power to knock down an opponent in a few seconds, and a good radius of action so that the fighter could be used offensively.

In Spain, for the first time in history, an army and an air force fought to a joint air-ground plan, where centralised control gave the Condor Legion such flexibility that it was able to concentrate its striking power and paralyse the opposing ground forces. General Wolfram von Richthofen, the driving force, had fashioned his command into a highly successful tactical air force and, once back in Berlin, he argued his case for more tactical air forces to fight not in air battles but jointly with the ground forces in air-ground battles. He was opposed by those high-ranking officers of the Luftwaffe who foresaw that more tactical air forces would inevitably mean less resources for the strategic bomber force, but Richthofen so won the day that the Luftflotten were formed, consisting of bomber, reconnaissance, fighter and ground-attack squadrons.

Strategic bombing came to be regarded as a short-term and often short-range affair. Influenced by success in Spain, the German concept of modern war was for bombers to attack enemy airfields and industrial centres as the immediate prelude to air-ground operations, which would consist of great masses of armour rolling deeply into enemy territory, supported by fighters to cope with the remnants of an opposing air force, more fighters to scout ahead of and on the flanks of the armoured columns, dive bombers to reduce the ground opposition and attack all road and rail communications and to terrorise the civilian population, fighter-bombers to quarter and harass the surrounding countryside, taking out practically anything that dared move, paratroops to secure the flanks, and for all these violent, irresistible thrusts to be actively supported by Quislings and a Fifth Column. This was a new type of mechanised war, and it was known by a new and appropriate name – Blitzkreig: Lightning War.

On May 10, 1940, this combination of armour and aeroplane blasted through the Ardennes with such awesome power that Holland surrendered in five days, Belgium in a further ten days and France on June 17.

Now Hitler was master of Europe. German grand strategy depended on Operation ‘Sealion' with which Hitler aimed to conquer Britain within the following few months. There would be massive attacks against the Royal Air Force, the Channel would be a major river crossing, and the German armies well supported by the Luftwaffe would, as before, carry all before them.

By the end of July, the Luftwaffe forces that were deployed to conquer Britain comprised some 2,600 aeroplanes, of which there were 120 bombers, 280 Stukas and 980 fighters, and they were based on operational airfields stretching from Norway to Brittany so that attacks against England could be made from this wide geographical arc. This was a formidable force, manned by experienced aircrews whose morale, flushed by their recent victories, was high. But as we shall see, it had three flaws – lack of a sophisticated radar system on the Channel coast, the very limited range of the Bf 109s and Goering's appalling leadership.

What of its adversary – RAF Fighter Command?

Unfortunately, Fighter Command's tactical training was based on the theory that the air threat to Britain would be hordes of German bombers flying in close formation and not escorted by fighters, since the Messerschmitt 109 could not reach our shores from airfields in Germany. Apparently those who assessed the threat did not take into account either more adjacent airfields becoming available to the Luftwaffe, or that Willy Messerschmitt might double the range of his angular-looking fighter by fitting long-range drop tanks under the fuselage and wings. Dog-fighting was considered a thing of the past, and rigid air fighting tactics were introduced which, by a series of complicated and time-wasting manoeuvres, aimed at bringing the greatest number of guns to bear against the bombers.

The RAF's tactical unit was the tight vie of three fighters and using this as a basis the Air Fighting Establishment worked out six types of formation attacks against unescorted bombers on which training was based. For example, Fighter Command Attack Number Six was the prescribed drill when a squadron of fighters attacked nine bombers.

Having sighted the bombers, the squadron commander ordered ‘Sections astern, GO' and closed to a position about 800 yards (730m) astern and slightly below the bombers. From here he ordered ‘Number Six attack, deploy, GO', whereupon Yellow and Green Leaders took their sections to port of their flight leaders. The squadron commander then ordered ‘Number Six attack, GO' and Red and Yellow Sections simultaneously attacked the starboard and port sections of the bomber formation. Care, said the manual, must be taken not to lose sight of adjacent fighters when firing. At the conclusion of the attack, the squadron commander ordered ‘Break away, GO' whereupon sections dived away outwards from the bombers. Meanwhile, B Flight, having waited patiently in the queue, attacked after A Flight.

Some of the other prescribed attacks were even more complicated and time-wasting than Number Six, and all were based on tight vic formations and opening fire together, so that a wingman found it impossible to keep a good lookout and to watch both his leader and his target.

The rigid, outmoded vic of three was flown by Fighter Command throughout the Battle of Britain. Luftwaffe ace Galland thought that RAF fighters were at a great disadvantage because of their rigid formations. Although some squadrons discarded the time-wasting fighter attacks, my logbook records that in January of 1941, we of 616 Squadron were still practising those wretched attacks. Eventually in the spring of 1941, Fighter Command got back to a sensible style of air fighting, but the last words many a splendid fighter pilot heard were ‘Number . . . Attack, GO'.

In the summer of 1940, Fighter Command had good aeroplanes, a sophisticated radar system, an excellent chain of command and a highly respected leader of impeccable integrity, but our main weakness was our abysmal fighter tactics.

Dowding saw clearly that during the July attacks against shipping, Goering was far less interested in sinking ships than in bringing our fighters to battle and the hitherto invincible Stukas were the bait. But the Commander-in-Chief refused to be drawn by these attacks and only reinforced, when the need arose, our small convoy patrols of two or three fighters from his forward airfields. Indeed (Dolfo) Galland who had hoped for bigger battles over the convoys told me later how elusive our fighters seemed to be. Nevertheless because the sleek 109s, having no air brakes, could not stay alongside the steeply diving Stukas with their extended air brakes, the dive-bombers were very vulnerable when they pulled out of their dives and consequently received some harsh treatment from our fighters, who were always on the alert for a ‘Stuka Party'.

Unhappy with their lot, the Stuka pilots called for more and closer fighter escorts and so, after a month on the Channel coast, both Galland and Mölders were summoned to Goering's estate at Karinhall where they were both decorated; but after this ceremony the Reichsmarschall let them know, in plain terms, that he was not satisfied with the performance of the Fighter Arm escorts and wanted to see a more aggressive spirit.

On August 12 Goering launched the type of attack Britain had most reason to fear when his bombers struck at five radar stations on the south coast. All suffered damage but only one was wrecked, and on the following
day four radars were repaired and helped to identify German bombers at a range of 110 miles (177km).

August 13 saw heavy raids against our southern ports and airfields. The Luftwaffe ‘beehive' attack usually consisted of one bomber wing of between 50 and 80 aeroplanes, escorted by a fighter wing with other fighters free-lancing on the flanks of the bombers. Sometimes two or more bomber wings joined together and, later during the Battle, more than one thousand aeroplanes – the largest formation ever assembled in the history of air fighting – joined together over the French coast and set course for the London Docks. Crossing the English coast this great German legion of bombers, Stukas and fighters formed a phalanx in the sky some 20 miles long, 10 miles wide (32 × 16km) and was stacked-up in layers from 21,000 to 33,000 feet (6,400-10,060m). As Al Deere aptly remarked, ‘It was like looking up the escalator at Piccadilly Circus'.

To try to shield the hard-pressed Stukas, it was decided that the proportion of escorting fighters to bombers should be doubled; in addition, a wing of 109s, called a reception escort, was to patrol in mid-Channel to protect the harassed Stukas, and free-lance fighter sweeps would trail their coats off Dover.

The high summer began to fade: July passed, and during early August it was time for Goering to take stock. Four weeks, sufficient time to conquer half Europe, had gone since the beginning of the Channel fighting and, although his bombers ranged over England almost every night, causing protracted air-raid alarms, some loss of production and a few casualties, Goering must have known that the daytime struggle was not going according to plan. The much vaunted Messerschmitt ‘Destroyer' fighter, the 110, was proving a failure as an escort fighter, being vulnerable to the more manoeuvrable Spitfire and Hurricane, and 109s frequently had to help the twin-engined fighters out of a tight spot.

Visiting the Channel coast the Reichsmarschall could not understand how his all-conquering Luftwaffe, his hitherto shining sword, was losing its cutting edge, and vented his anger on the Kommodoren; the great man wanted closer, and more rigid protection for the bombers and rejected his fighter leaders' thoughts about freedom of action for their fighters. There were more harsh words, but, as time ran short, he grew more amiable and asked the Kommodoren what they would like for their squadrons and, when Galland's turn came, he half-jestingly made his famous and oftquoted remark: ‘I should like an outfit of Spitfires for my group!'

During the following days, Luftflotte 2 attacked airfields in the southeast of England, Luftflotte 3 operated against the south, while Luftflotte 5 spread the RAF defences in the north-east. The majority of these attacks fell on targets within five miles (8km) of the coast, between the Solent and the Thames Estuary, where every airfield was attacked, regardless of whether or not it operated fighters, including heavy raids on the Coastal Command airfield at Gosport and the Fleet Air Arm bases at Ford and Lee-on-Solent. The airfields at Croydon, Detling, Eastchurch, Hawkinge, Lympne, Manston, Martlesham, Thorney Island and West Malling were attacked, sometimes frequently. Occasionally the Luftwaffe ranged well inland and bombed the flying training airfields at Brize Norton and Sealand, near Chester, the bomber airfield at Driffield in Yorkshire, the maintenance airfield at Colerne, and Fighter Command's vital sector stations at Middle Wallop, Tangmere and Biggin Hill.