However, parallel to this semantic broadening, there has been an inverse movement of lexical differentiation operating at the heart of the concept of homophobia. Because of the specificity of attitudes towards lesbianism, the term “lesbophobia” has been introduced into theoretic discourses, a term which brings to light particular mechanisms that the generic concept of homophobia tends to overshadow. With one stroke, this distinction justifies the term “gayphobia,” since much homophobic discourse, in reality, pertains only to male homosexuality. Similarly, the concept of “biphobia” has also been proposed in order to highlight the singular situation of bisexuals, often stigmatized by both heterosexual and homosexual communities. Moreover, we need to take into consideration the very different issues linked to transsexual, transvestite, and transgendered persons, which brings to mind the notion of “transphobia.”
Another distinction has been proposed in order to clarify the political uses of the notion of homophobia. According to sociologist Eric Fassin,
The actual use hesitates between two very different definitions. The first emphasizes the phobia in homophobia: it is the rejection of homosexuals and of homosexuality. We are at the level of an individual psychology. The second sees a certain heterosexism in homophobia. It is the inequality between sexualities. The hierarchy between heterosexuality and homosexuality returns us to the collective level of ideology.
To this, he adds, “perhaps in this case, using the distinction between misogyny and sexism as an example, it would be clearer to distinguish between ‘homophobia’ and ‘heterosexism’ in order to avoid the confusion between the psychological and ideological meanings. That, for my part, is what I propose and practice.” In these terms, regarding subjects such as same-sex marriage or adoption rights, those who do not believe themselves to be the slightest bit homophobic, while refusing equal rights to others in the name of some religious, moral, anthropological, or psychoanalytical privilege reserved for heterosexuals, will have to at least recognize that this is, technically speaking, a heterosexist attitude; such a recognition could constitute a first step.
That being the case, these semantic evolutions, extensions, or distinctions enrich, albeit considerably complicate, the debate. And the political stakes are quite real, since more and more citizens, associations, and politicians have become conscious, notably in France during the battle for PaCS (Pacte civil de solidarité; Civil solidarity pact), of the necessity to resist and even penalize homophobia in the same manner as racism or anti-Semitism. In effect, after the passing of homosexuality from the criminal law code to the civil law code, homophobia could, contrarily, pass from civil society, where is still remains, to criminal law, where it is not yet contained. Shifting the focus from homosexuality to homophobia constitutes, as correctly noted by Daniel Borrillo, “a change that is not only epistemological, but political as well.” But for the time being, in the fight against homophobia much remains to be done.
In order to fight homophobia, it is necessary to determine its real causes. Homophobia’s deep origin is, without a doubt, to be found in heterosexism, that compulsory rule of heterosexuality that feminist writer and poet Adrienne Rich criticized. This regime tends to construe heterosexuality as the only legitimate sexual experience possible, or even thinkable, which explains why so many people go through life without ever having considered the homosexual reality. Better than a norm—which would require explication—heterosexuality becomes, for those it has conditioned, the
non thought
of their particular psychic makeup and the apriorism of all human sexuality in general. Far from being self-evident, this transparency of self, which is a forced exclusion of the other, constitutes one of the fundamentals of social learning. In its rigidity, it ends up as, and not only for heterosexuals, a model by which to perceive the world, individuals, and gender. In these conditions, it becomes difficult to imagine not only homosexuality, whose simple existence risks shaking the foundations of universal beliefs, and consequently values, but also heterosexuality, which, being the usual point of view on the world, is nonetheless that point of view’s blind spot.
In fact, by not evaluating all the horror that homosexuality can represent, we expose ourselves to not understanding homophobia—as much as we
can
understand it—in its more radical form. The general and convulsive feeling of hatred that Copernicus aroused when he dared knock the Earth off its epistemological pedestal might give us an approximate idea. The concept of heterocentrism, fashioned after geocentrism, may be described as a world view circling a self-proclaimed center of reference, in this case heterosexuality. From this perspective, other sexualities may not be anything other than strange galaxies, obscure nebulae, or, at the very least, extraterrestrial life forms. Whether the earth was, or was not, at the center of the universe changed very little in everyday life; however, the necessity to objectively rethink God’s order, which was in fact Man’s order, aroused a veritable subjective fury whose reasoning went beyond strict religious belief, which was fundamentally never put into question by the theories of either Copernicus or Galileo.
Thus, for those individuals who are strongly conditioned by heterosexism, the simple existence of homosexuals—who, objectively speaking, pose no threat— subjectively constitutes a threat against a valued psychological construct built on exclusion. This allows us to understand how fear—and even more the resulting hate—can lead to the most brutal violence. Clearly, this fear could never constitute mitigating circumstances, even less justification, for homophobic murders. And when claims are made in American courts, sometimes successfully, by individuals who go to cruising areas, baseball bats in hand to “bash some queers,” the notion of
sex panic
appears to be the height of dishonesty and cynical cruelty. Nonetheless, it is the deep origin of extreme reactions, linked to heterosexist conditioning, that dictates the male identity as based on the more or less “gentle” control of women and the more or less harsh repression of homosexuality.
For theories—be they theological, moral, legal, medical, biological, psychoanalytical, anthropological, et cetera—are never more than concocted reasons to justify, after the fact, obviously unjustifiable personal convictions aligned with the status quo. Thus, during the fight for PaCS, arguments based on theology and religious morality were not well received, so the Catholic Church did not hesitate to resort to more fashionable psychoanalysis, whose theories the Church had not so long ago condemned as being obscene and permissive. Similarly, it is generally useless to explain to those who see homosexuality as a type of defect or pathology that their beliefs have long been invalidated by medical science itself. Far from being the cause of their homophobia, the obsolete medical argument is nothing more than the occasional manifestation of homophobia and, at most, its confirmation. Thus, belief can both precede and obstinately survive the theories upon which it is seemingly based, theories that were, in fact, nothing more than a contextual formulation and justification.
Truth be told, the theories themselves matter very little; they are often interchangeable. The divine, natural, moral, public, symbolic, or anthropological orders are nothing but the decline of the one and the same concept, though diversely constructed, invoked to legitimize a condition that is profoundly inegalitarian. We must use all means necessary to change this. From all evidence, the theories or arguments set forth are nothing more than a conjectural means set in motion by generic homophobia, whose conscious origin must be sought deep within this thought, or rather this heterosexist non thought, which contains the stigmatization of all homosexuals. However, this respectable heterosexism does not always lead, thankfully, to murderous violence. Therefore, it remains to be understood why homophobia arises or resurfaces more violently during certain periods, areas, and conditions.
Beyond everyday manifestations, it seems that large waves of homophobia generally obey opportunist motivations and history is rife with lessons. In the first years of the communist revolution, homosexuality was relatively “tolerated.” In the Soviet Union, after the abolition of the penal code of 1832, the crime of sodomy was not reintroduced in the codes of 1922 or 1926. And in its first edition in 1930, the
Great Soviet Encyclopedia
asserted quite clearly that homosexuality was neither a crime nor a sickness. Likewise, in Cuba, at the beginning of the New Revolution, homosexuals enjoyed a short-lived yet real liberty, as witnessed by writer Reinaldo Arenas, however, the instant political difficulties appeared, they were systematically hunted and locked away in camps. Similarly in the USSR, the difficulties in the regime and the ascension of Stalin contributed to a hardening of living conditions. Homosexuality was once again penalized in 1933, soon became a crime against the state, a sign of bourgeois decadence, and, even worse, a fascist perversion to be harshly condemned. But, as Daniel Borrillo notes, “by a sad irony of history, at the same time, Nazi Germany put into place a plan to persecute and exterminate homosexuals by putting them in the same category as communists.”
These examples clearly show that heterosexism’s latent and inherent homophobia can suddenly be reawakened by a serious crisis that justifies the search for a scapegoat. Accused of all evils, homosexuality can become sufficient reason for purges perceived as necessary. That is why, depending on the historical moment considered, it is adjusted to each particular situation and projected upon an adversary who is to be stigmatized or eliminated. Thus, likened to Bulgarian heresy during the Middle Ages, sodomy was regularly used as the main charge in the fight against religious “deviancy,” such as the charge against the Knights Templar. Similarly, during the French Religious Wars, homosexuality became a Catholic vice according to the Huguenots, and a Huguenot vice according to the Catholics. During the same period, it was ascribed to Italian morals, in the sense that the French Court seemed to be submerged by Italian culture; then to English morals, when the British Empire was at its pinnacle; to German morals, at the time when the Franco-German rivalry was at its peak; to Jewish cosmopolitanism, whose alleged aims were so worrisome to the nation; to American communitarianism, whose principles threatened, we are told, the French Republic. While a bourgeois vice to the proletariat of the nineteenth century, it was considered by the bourgeois to be a phenomenon of the immoral working classes, or of the necessarily decadent aristocracy. In the Near East, India, China, or Japan, it is perceived as a Western practice; in Black Africa, it is, of course, a white phenomenon.
In short, homosexuality constitutes a symbolic protean component, typically characteristic of an adversary or enemy, be it a rival nation, a particular social group, or an individual on the street. It is the simplest and most certain means to disqualify another, and it is why it finds such a favorable ground in areas where social, religious, racist, xenophobic, or anti-Semitic hate is already deeply rooted. It is the strange common denominator of various resentments that rally around the same cause. That is, in a heterosexist culture, crises and difficult circumstances favor the formation of homophobic sentiments and practices, which offer an opportunity for any “charismatic” leader in search of popular support. Under such conditions, it is not surprising that homosexuality is so often the designated target for regimes who, at least in appearance, are not only dissimilar, but in polar opposition. As soon as any cloud darkens the sky, the mobilization of homophobic discourse is a useful method to divert attention from real problems, while guaranteeing support of the moralists. And often, that which was nothing more than an opportunistic pretext becomes an end in itself, justified by sentiments most acceptable to the public. It is the end making a virtue out of necessity.
However, it remains necessary to examine the numerous methods used by homophobia. It is not so much a question of putting together a
catalogue raisonné
—a grim and fastidious task—as it is of analyzing its complex workings. Methods are often ambiguous and it is difficult to classify these diverse forms of violence, be they formal, i.e. practiced under government authority (death penalty, forced labor, whipping, chemical or physical castration, clitoridectomy, incarceration, internment), or informal (terrorism, assassination, punitive rape, beating, physical or verbal assault, harassment). Moreover, this distinction itself is subject to caution in the sense that, in certain countries, informal violence benefits largely from the approval—if not the outright complicity—of authorities who are supposed to condemn it. And even where homosexual practices are not penalized, legal detours may be used in order to incriminate these practices with other charges, as fantastic as they may appear to be: unlawful meeting, conspiracy, blasphemy, mutual assault and battery, even if it occurs in a private home. Since the roles played by authorities are rather ambiguous, the line between formal and informal violence is often difficult to trace.
Beyond this more or less state-sanctioned homophobia, the more widespread social homophobia is practiced everywhere: in families, school, army, workplace, politics, media, sport, prison, et cetera. These types of physical violence or moral coercion are often less understood, and those who suffer from them—sometimes simultaneously—often refuse to denounce them. The fear of having their homosexuality revealed and the fear of reprisals—especially when these acts are committed within a group setting, barracks, or team—compels to silence those victims who are the most vulnerable.
But it is in the symbolic order that everyday homophobia is best practiced. Beyond even the acts, attitudes, and discourses that are clearly homophobic, society’s framework constitutes a structure in which daily violence is, doubtless, difficult to imagine for those whose experience is organized in accordance with that framework. As Eribon notes, no matter how racist the area in which he is born, a black child has every chance to grow up in a family that will allow him to construct his identity with a sense of relative legitimacy. However, in heterosexual families in which the majority of gay youth grow up, the developing consciousness of their desire constitutes, generally, a trial that is even more difficult in the fact that it must remain secret. The shame, the solitude, the despair of never being loved, the pure panic of one day being discovered locks away the spirit in a sort of interior prison that pushes the individual to sometimes overestimate the negative attitudes expressed by his or her social circle. Thus, we see tearful parents who are incapable of comprehending their gay child’s suicide; of course they would have accepted his or her difference; moreover, they had never said anything against homosexuality. The problem is that they had never said anything in its favor, either. They cannot understand, but the general silence surrounding this taboo subject, the absence of images and dialogue were, for their son, for their daughter, the strongest condemnation.