The End of Christianity (50 page)

EXCEPTIONS PROVE THE RULE

There are two proposed exceptions, the analysis of which only verifies the conclusion that universal moral facts exist. First, an argument can be constructed (and I construct one in
Sense and Goodness
, 326–27) that to a high probability all naturally evolved extraterrestrial species who establish civilizations will share in common with humans a subset of needs and interests and ways and means that will entail at least a higher order of universal morality. In other words, we will have two moral truths overlapping (in the middle being a set of moral facts equally true for us both), or in fact overlapping completely (that is, with all the same moral facts obtaining for each of us). However, since it is still possible for a sentient species to exist that shares nothing in common with us that would establish that even a higher order of universal morality applies to them (this species might evolve, at least rarely, or be created, such as through genetic engineering or the development of AI; see Carrier,
Sense and Goodness without God
, 342–43), it follows that the universal morality I have just proved must necessarily exist is not
cosmically
or
metaphysically
universal but contingent on a certain pattern of construction or evolution (which is nevertheless highly probable).
⁴³
Thus, strictly speaking, the universal morality that does exist is still a subset of moral relativism, but only in a trivial way. Moral facts must necessarily be relative to certain facts being true about an agent's fundamental nature. But even Christianity is morally relativistic in that sense (as its morals would also change if God sufficiently changed our fundamental nature or even his own), and arguably every credible moral theory must be.
⁴⁴

Second, universal moral facts must necessarily consist of covering laws whose particular application will always differ by individual and circumstance. An individual must choose what they individually ought most to do, a choice that will be a moral imperative for them but not necessarily for anyone else—even in that same situation—since the controlling circumstances include the agent's ways and means (e.g., someone who can't swim ought not to attempt to save someone drowning; someone who must eat ought not to consume food to which they are allergic; etc.). But everyone will agree that if they were that person it would then be the right thing for them to do. Similarly, all cases of inaccessible knowledge: “sufficiently informed” can never mean “fully informed,” and thus moral imperatives follow only from knowledge available to us at the moment. For instance, a “fully informed” person would by definition know how to swim, but a “sufficiently informed” person knows only that they do not yet know how to swim, thus all moral imperatives for them must follow from the actual fact of their ignorance, and not from information they “could” but don't and can't then have.
⁴⁵
Likewise morally acceptable preferences: that you like one kind of employment more than another will differ from what others like, but a moral imperative to attend to your happiness and financial security by seeking employment will not entail that everyone ought to pursue exactly the same job.

Hence all these different outcomes do not constitute different moral facts but universal rules adapted to particular conditions, just as for the unalterable environmental conditions discussed earlier. For example, a covering law for the allergy example would be “You ought not to eat food to which you are allergic” (if you don't have to), which derives in turn from the more general law “You ought not to bring upon yourself pointless harm” (so far as you can reasonably know). These laws are true for everyone, even people without allergies. The fundamental instrumental desire is still in this case the same for all human beings. Hence an allergy is not a biological difference that has any effect on our greatest fundamental desires, which in this case are “to eat” and “to avoid pointless harm.” Being presented with toxic food is simply another difference of circumstance.

Carried to its logical conclusion, this would encompass even the aliens with nonhuman moralities, for whom we would agree, were we them, we ought to behave as they do. But of course, we aren't them, so that conclusion is of no consequence to us (except insofar as we need to predict and react to what they will do). Thus the fact that we define universal morality according to species is really only a matter of practical convention. We simply don't need to know about other moralities, because there is only one rational species we are dealing with (at least so far), and when it comes to asking how
we
ought to behave, there is only one species that pertains (our own).
⁴⁶

Thus the exceptions actually prove the rule: as human beings share all the same primary biological desires (which are not limited to the so-called base desires for, say, food and sex but include, as science has demonstrated, desires for love and companionship and joy and fulfillment and more, ordered in similar hierarchies of ultimate and instrumental necessity), and only such desires can ever rationally entail (in conjunction with knowledge) an informed conclusion about what we most want, it follows that we will all (when rational and equally informed) desire most the very same things (when in the same circumstances), which logically entails that the same moral facts will be true for us all. Therefore, universal moral facts must necessarily exist.
⁴⁷

CONCLUSION

Any rational attempt to argue that Christianity is needed for moral facts to exist ends up exposing the fatal flaws in Christianity as a moral system. Christians can't establish the key premises necessary for that moral system:
which
moral behaviors or attitudes result in
which
fates. This divorces Christian morality from the facts, which is why Christians can invent almost any morality they want and thus why there have been so many divisions in Christianity over what is and isn't moral. Anyone can
claim
that “morality
x”
will make our lives better in the long run. But that claim is only rationally believable if we can verify in actual evidence that it's true.

Only science has the methods and tools for discovering which morality will make all our lives better in the long run, as that is a question of material fact: which behaviors have which actual consequences, and for whom and when. As in surgery or car maintenance or the engineering of bridges, only science can reliably answer such questions of cause-and-effect. Christianity cannot do so, because it has no evidence to back its claims of which causes have which effects, and it has of itself no reliable methods for gathering that evidence. Thus Christianity must either promote the wrong morality, a morality that actually harms us all in the long run, or prevent us from discovering the real reason we should all be moral and thus prevent us from discovering the only evidence that can
actually
inspire moral progress. Or both.

Like voodoo medicine, prescribing Christianity to cure immorality is just another unverified pseudoscience. Only
genuine
science can discover what
actually
cures immorality, just as only science could discover what actually cures disease. And just as only genuine science could discover what actually
constitutes
disease in the first place (such as finding that demonic possession doesn't exist or that homosexuality is not an illness but a healthy and natural human condition), so only science can discover what actually constitutes immorality. Christianity should thus be abandoned as a basis for any moral system, and science should be deployed instead to ascertain which moral system is
in actual fact
best for us.

Accordingly, I have demonstrated that if there are
any
true moral facts, then science can discover them by discovering what actually connects any particular behavior with any particular result, and by discovering what result we really all would want in common for ourselves once we are sufficiently informed and reasoning coherently. These are both empirically discoverable facts whose difficulty of ascertaining is precisely
why
science is the most equipped to discover them. And not only have I shown that moral facts are empirically discoverable, but I have further demonstrated that such moral facts must necessarily exist.
⁴⁸

Since Christianity fails to connect its moral claims to any verifiable facts, produces no agreement on which moral claims are true, has no significant effect in improving people morally, and stunts moral growth and progress by distracting us from endeavoring to discover the truth—whereas science alone can discover any truth in which there can be no rational disagreement—we should all be promoting not Christianity but the scientific discovery of genuine moral facts. Once anyone truly realizes this, they will abandon Christianity as unprovable and irrelevant to building a moral society. And having no longer any such function, Christianity will come to an end.

ARGUMENT 1: THAT IF THERE IS A TRUE MORAL SYSTEM, IT IS THAT WHICH WE HAVE A SUFFICIENTLY MOTIVATING REASON TO OBEY OVER ALL OTHERS

Definitions:

m
= a moral system.

s
= a system of imperatives that supersede all other imperatives.

v
= what we ought to obey over all other imperative systems (whether they are labeled moral or not).

B
= that which we have a sufficiently motivating reason to obey over all other imperative systems.

T
= the true moral system.

M
= the moral system that, in actual fact, we ought to obey.

Argument:

1.1. If there is
m
, then
m
is
s
.

1.2. If
m
is
s
, then
m
is
v
.

1.3.
v
is
B
.

1.4. Therefore, if there is
m
, then
m
is
B
.

1.5.
m
is
T
iff
m
is
M
.

1.6.
M
is
B
.

1.7. Therefore,
m
is
B
, and
m
is
B
iff
m
is
M
; and
m
is
M
, iff
m
is
T
. (i.e., if 1.4,1.5, and 1.6, then 1.7)

1.8. Therefore,
T
is
B
. (i.e., if 1.6 and 1.7, then 1.8)

1.9. Therefore, if there is
m
, then there is
T
. (i.e., if 1.4 and 1.8, then 1.9)

1.10. Therefore, if there is
m
, then there is
T
, and
B
is
T
.

Therefore, if there is any moral system at all, then that which we have a sufficiently motivating reason to obey over all other imperative sytems is the true moral system
.

ARGUMENT 2: THAT WE (IN ACTUAL FACT) WILL OBEY TRUE HYPOTHETICAL IMPERATIVES OVER ALL OTHER IMPERATIVES WHEN RATIONAL AND SUFFICIENTLY INFORMED

2.1. By definition, for any individual, to want
_p
one thing more than another is to prefer that one thing over the other (for whatever reason and in whatever way).

2.2. Therefore, for any individual, to want
_p
one thing more than anything else (i.e., to want
_p
that one thing most) is to prefer that one thing over every other thing.

2.3. By definition, every rational and sufficiently informed individual always chooses the thing that they prefer (when they can choose at all).

2.4. Therefore, any rational and sufficiently informed individual who prefers one thing to another will always choose that one thing and not the other (if they can choose at all and cannot choose both).

2.5. Therefore, any rational and sufficiently informed individual who prefers one thing to every other thing will always choose that one thing (if they can choose at all).

2.6. If when rational and sufficiently informed you will want
_p
X
more than ~
X
, and you believe
X
will result only if
x
is done, then you will want
_p
to do
x
more than ~
x
.

2.7. Therefore, if when rational and sufficiently informed you want
_p
to do
x
more than ~
x
, by definition you prefer to do
x
to ~
x
. [per 2.1]

2.8. Therefore, if when rational and sufficiently informed you prefer to do
x
to ~
x
, by definition you will always choose
x
(when you can choose at all). [per 2.3 and 2.5]

2.9. Therefore, if when rational and sufficiently informed you want
_p
x
(i.e., the consequences of
x
) more than ~
x
(i.e., the consequences of ~
x
), then by definition you will always choose
x
(when you can choose at all).

2.10. If it is always the case that “if when rational and sufficiently informed you want
_p
x
(i.e., the consequences of
x
) more than ~
x
(i.e., the consequences of ~
x
), then by definition you will choose
x
,” then it is always the case that you will obey the hypothetical imperative “if when rational and sufficiently informed you want
_p
X
(i.e., the consequences of
x
) more than ~
x
(i.e., the consequences of ~
x
), then you ought to choose
x
.”

2.11. Therefore, it is always the case that you will obey the hypothetical imperative “if when rational and sufficiently informed you want
_p
x
(i.e., the consequences of
x
) more than ~
x
(i.e., the consequences of ~
x
), then you ought to choose
x
.” [per 2.9 and 2.10]

2.12.
Therefore, you will always obey a hypothetical imperative over all other imperatives
.

ARGUMENT 3: THAT THERE IS A TRUE MORAL SYSTEM FOR ANY INDIVIDUAL (WHO IS COMMITTED TO BEING RATIONAL)

Definitions:

L
= [a] given individual.

D
= [the condition when] what anyone wantsp is to be rationally deduced from as many true facts as they can reasonably obtain regarding all their preferences and the total outcome of every possible behavior for them in the same circumstances at that time.

W
= a behavior whose outcome
L
wantsp more than any other outcome.

B
= that which we (when we are L) have a sufficiently motivating reason to obey over all other imperative systems (i.e., that behavior that we [when we are L] have a sufficiently motivating reason to undertake over all other behaviors recommended).

C
= an available outcome or set of outcomes that
L
wantsp more than any other available outcome.

Argument:

3.1. For any
L
, if there is
W
, then if
D
obtains, then
W
is
B
.

3.2. If
D
obtains, then there is
C
.

3.3. If there is
C
, then there is
W

3.4. Therefore, if
D
obtains, then there is
W
.

3.5. Therefore, if
D
obtains, then there is
B
. (i.e., if 3.1 and 3.4, then 3.5)

3.6. If there is B, then there is
T
. (i.e., if 1.8, then 3.6)

3.7. Therefore, for any L, if D obtains, then there is T.

Therefore, for any given individual, if what they want is to be rationally deduced from as many true facts as they can reasonably obtain regarding all their preferences and the total outcome of every possible behavior for them in the same circumstances at that time, then there is a true moral system for that individual
.

ARGUMENT 4: THAT THERE IS A TRUE MORAL SYSTEM FOR VERY NEARLY ALL HUMAN BEINGS

Definitions:

Argument:

4.1. If
D
obtains, then
C
is either
CH
or ~
CH
. (and from 3.2, if there is
D
, then there is
C
)

4.2. If
C
is
CH
, then
T
_L
is
T
_H
. (and from 3.7, if
L
and
D
, then
T
_L
)

4.3. If
T
_L
is
T
_H
, then there is
U
.

4.4. Therefore, if
C
is
CH
, then there is
U
.

4.5. If
C
is ~
CH
, then either
BD
or ~
BD
.

4.6. If ~
BD
, then if
D
obtains, then
C
is
CH
.

4.7. Therefore, if ~
BD
, then if
D
obtains, then there is
U
. (i.e., if 4.4 and 4.6, then 4.7)

4.8. If
BD
, then
EXC
.

4.9. If
EXC
, then
VNB
.

4.10. If
VNB
, then if
D
obtains, then
VNA
is
CH
.

4.11. If
VNA
is
CH
, then M
_VNA
is
M
_H
.

4.12. If
M
_VNA
is
M
_H
, then there is
U
.

4.13. Therefore, if
D
obtains, then if
BD
, then there is
U
. (i.e., If
BD
, then
EXC
; and if
EXC
, then
VNB
; and if
VNB
, then if
D
obtains,
VNA
is
CH;
and if
VNA
is
CH
, then
M
_VNA
is
M
_H
and if
M
_VNA
is
M
_H
, then there is
U
; therefore, if
BD
and
D
obtains, then there is
U
)

4.14. Therefore, either
C
is
CH
or
C
is ~
CH
; if
C
is
CH
, then there is
U
; and if
C
is ~
CH
, then either
BD
or ~
BD
; and if ~
BD
and D obtains, then there is U; and if
BD
and D obtains, then there is U; therefore, if ~
CH
and D obtains, then there is U; therefore, if D obtains and C, then there is U.

4.15. Therefore, if D obtains, then there is U. (i.e., if 3.2 and 4.14, then 4.15)

Therefore, when what anyone wants is rationally deduced from as many true facts as they can reasonably obtain regarding all their preferences and the total outcome of every possible behavior for them in the same circumstances at that time, there is approximately a universal moral system
.

ARGUMENT 5: THAT SCIENCE CAN EMPIRICALLY DISCOVER THE TRUE MORAL SYSTEM

5.1. There is
T
if there is
B
and
D
and
W
(i.e., if 1.8,3.2,3.3, and 3.7, then 5.1)

5.2. Therefore,
T
for any
L
is fully entailed by the “true facts” regarding “all their preferences” and the “total outcome” of “every possible behavior for them in the same circumstances at that time” and what “behavior whose outcome they want
_p
more than any other outcome,” as far as “they can reasonably” then know.