The essential writings of Machiavelli (43 page)

9.
Piero d’Anjou, the brother of King Roberto of Naples. See also
The Life of Castruccio Castracani
, p. 403.

10.
Bertrand de Baux, of the illustrious lords of Baux-en-Provence. He had married Beatrice d’Anjou, the sister of King Roberto, and had recently been given the title of Count d’Andria, hence his nickname “Novello”—“new” or “fresh.”

11.
A town in the province of Perugia in central Italy.

12.
The body of magistrates of Florence’s supreme executive council.

13.
The commanders of the people’s militia, which originated in Florence in the 1250s.

14.
Caterina, daughter of Albert of Habsburg, had married Duke Carlo of Calabria, oldest son of King Roberto of Naples, in 1316.

15.
See
The Life of Castruccio Castracani
.

16.
Ramondo di Cardona was captured and imprisoned in Lucca until Castracani’s death in 1528.

17.
Walter VI de la Brienne (c. 1304–56) was appointed governor of Florence for Carlo of Calabria, an office he held briefly in 1326. He returned to Florence in 1342 when the Florentine ruling classes called upon him to rule the city. Here he showed his “true nature,” his despotic rule ending after only ten months.

18.
In
The Prince
, chapter 9, Machiavelli writes: “In every city there are two opposing humors. This arises from the fact that the nobles want to command and oppress the people, but the people do not want to be commanded or oppressed by the nobles.” See also
Discourses
, Book I, chapter 5: “For without doubt, if one considers the respective aims of the nobles and the populace, one sees in the former a strong desire to dominate, and in the latter merely a desire not to be dominated.”

19.
Duke Galeazzo Maria Sforza’s wife, Bona of Savoy.

20.
“Death is bitter, fame perpetual, the memory of this fact will endure.”

21.
Machiavelli analyzes “the dangers incurred after carrying out a conspiracy” in
Discourses
, Book III, chapter 6, and also in
The Prince
, chapter 19, where Machiavelli further develops why “it is difficult to attack or conspire against one who is greatly esteemed.”

22.
Discourses
, Book III, chapter 6, titled “On Conspiracies.”

23.
In 1466, Piero di Cosimo de’ Medici (the father of Lorenzo and Giuliano, whom Machiavelli discusses in this chapter) had crushed his opponent Luca Pitti.

24.
The chief executive council of Florence.

25.
The purpose of the Council of Eight
(Otto di Guardia)
was to uncover conspiracies against the Florentine government.

26.
Count Girolamo Riario of Imola and Forlì (1443–88) was the nephew of Pope Sixtus IV. Machiavelli also mentions him in
Discourses
, Book III, chapter 6, titled “On Conspiracies.”

27.
Archbishop Salviati had aspired to the archbishopric of Florence and was successfully opposed by the Medici. When he was granted the archbishopric of Pisa in 1474, the Medici and their allies barred him from taking office for three years.

28.
The pope was in favor of the Medici being ousted from power, but was categorically against their assassination.

29.
Lorenzo Giustini, the pope’s governor of Castello.

30.
The son of Gian Francesco Poggio Bracciolini, who was a foremost scholar and calligrapher of the Renaissance (see note 1 above).

31.
See also
Discourses
, Book III, chapter 6: “As a result, the conspirators quickly decided that they would do in the cathedral what they had intended to do in the Medici palace. This threw their entire plan into disarray, because Giovan Battista da Montesecco did not want any part in a murder committed in a church. Every action had to be reassigned to a different conspirator, who did not have time to steady his mind. In the end, the conspirators made so many mistakes that their plot was crushed.”

32.
The Gonfalonier of Justice was an office instituted in the thirteenth century in Florence to protect the interests of the people against the powerful nobles and magnates. The Gonfalonier of Justice was also the most prominent member of the Signoria, Florence’s supreme executive council.

33.
The
Florentine Histories
are dedicated to Giulio de’ Medici, Pope Clement VII, but Machiavelli does not mention him again, the eighth book ending in 1492 at Lorenzo de’ Medici’s death.

P
OLITICAL
E
SSAYS
AND
T
REATISES

These shorter pieces are a selection of discourses, legations, and notes that Machiavelli wrote in response to critical contemporary issues. They range from the “Discourse on Pisa,” which he wrote from his firsthand experience of Florence’s Pisan campaign in 1499, to “A Caution to the Medici,” written in 1512 after the return to power of the Medici that signaled the end of Machiavelli’s illustrious political career and his ruin.

D
ISCOURSE ON
P
ISA

Pisa had belonged to Florence until 1494, when Piero de’ Medici, the ruler of Florence, was compelled to cede Pisa and other territories to the French during Charles VIII’s Italian campaign. Within a year, Pisa had declared independence from French rule. To Florence, however, Pisa provided access to a port and was thus absolutely vital, so the Florentines began an expensive military and diplomatic effort to regain it. Other Italian states initially came to Pisa’s aid against Florence, but their support gradually fell away until Venice, its last ally and Florence’s great commercial rival, engaged Florence in battle at Casentino. In April 1499 the Duke of Ferrara, who was asked to mediate, negotiated Venice’s ceding Pisa to Florence for 180,000 florins. The Venetians retreated from Pisa, but without handing the city over to the Florentines. Machiavelli probably wrote this piece in May 1499, shortly after the Venetian withdrawal from Pisa
.

—

As no one doubts that Florence must regain Pisa if it wants to maintain its independence, I do not feel I need argue the matter with other reasons than those we already know. I will examine only the ways that can or will lead to our regaining Pisa, which are either by force or by love. In other words, either we will besiege Pisa, or Pisa will willingly throw herself into our arms. As the course of love would be more secure, and consequently more desirable, I shall examine whether it is feasible. I propose that if Pisa should throw herself into our arms without our having to march into battle, then she will do so either of her own accord, handing herself over to us, or she will be handed over to us by someone who has taken control of her. Pisa’s current predicament is reason enough to believe that she might want to return to our patronage, as she is alone and weak, lacking all defense, shunned by Milan, turned away by Genoa, frowned upon by the pope, and mistreated by Siena, doggedly waiting in a vain hope for weakness and disunion in Florence and others. Nor have the Pisans—this is how perfidious they are—ever been prepared to accept our emissaries or our slightest sign of goodwill. But though at present they are in such a dire state, they still will not bow their heads: hence we cannot believe that they will voluntarily submit themselves to our dominion. As for Pisa being handed over to us by someone who has managed to take possession of her, we must conjecture that such a man will have entered Pisa at their beckoning, or by force. If by force, we cannot reasonably expect him to hand Pisa over to us, because if he is powerful enough to occupy Pisa he will be powerful enough to defend and keep her for himself, as Pisa is not the kind of city to be voluntarily relinquished by whoever has become her lord. As for our entering Pisa through love, called in by the Pisans themselves—and I base my views on the recent Venetian example—I cannot believe that anyone would deceive Pisa and, under the guise of coming to her defense, betray her and hand her over as a prisoner. The only way another power’s intervention would cause Pisa to come under our jurisdiction would be by that power abandoning Pisa and leaving her to us as prey, the way the Venetians did. For these reasons there does not seem to be any possibility of our reacquiring Pisa without force. As force is necessary, I believe we must now weigh whether it behooves us to use it in such times as these.

O
N
P
ISTOIAN
M
ATTERS

Since the thirteenth century, Pistoia, a wealthy city eighteen miles northwest of Florence, had been under the rule of either the city of Lucca or the city of Florence, and was governed by tyrannical lords such as Uguccione della Faggiuola and Castruccio Castracani (see
The Life of Castruccio Castracani
and
Florentine Histories,
chapters 29 and 30). In 1401 Pistoia finally came under Florentine rule, and as the city began to prosper in the early Renaissance, the clashes and skirmishes between the rivaling Panciatichi and Cancellieri factions grew. As Machiavelli pointed out in
The Prince,
chapter 20, “Our forefathers, and those we thought wise, used to say that Pistoia was to be held by factions and Pisa by fortresses.” But while Florence put all its resources into attacking the “fortresses” of Pisa, it loosened its grip on Pistoia, and the discord between the two Pistoian factions grew into an all-out civil war. This resulted in the Cancellieri exiling from Pistoia the Panciatichi, who then established themselves in strongholds in the villages and hills surrounding the city. This was particularly dangerous for Florence because the factions had supporters and allies both in Florence and throughout northern Italy (the Panciatici, for instance, were pro-Medici, while the Cancellieri had allies in the Florentine anti-Medici faction)
.

Machiavelli wrote this piece in mid-March 1502, titling it in Latin
De rebus pistoriensibus
(“On Pistoian Matters”). Throughout this period, he had been sent to Pistoia on a number of occasions to help negotiate peace and ensure Florence’s reestablishment of its dominion
.

—

It is well known that in August of 1500 the Panciatichi family was expelled from Pistoia by the Cancellieri family, and that slaughter and ruin ensued on both sides. The situation grew worse until our Signoria
¹
lost all control over Pistoia and its territories, so that the Signori,
²
in session last March or April, considered every possible remedy for the situation, convinced that if the matter continued as it was, Pistoia would go the way of Pisa.
³
The Signori convened numerous times with the Collegio and the Otto,
⁴
and decided to send a commissioner with substantial forces to take control of Pistoia and reestablish order. A commissioner was sent last April, around the sixteenth, with a good number of cavalry, a salaried infantry, and a considerable number of regular soldiers, with six pieces of artillery and all the support needed to exercise force if it should be necessary. The commissioner entered the city with these forces and established his rule. The Signori of Florence decided to send two more commissioners with additional forces, who also set out for Pistoia that April, around the twenty-third. The Signoria had concluded and confirmed the particulars of the agreement according to which the commissioners were to act, and in order to institute its provisions, a number of Panciatichi and Cancellieri were brought to Florence and disarmed. The Panciatichi who wanted to return to Pistoia from exile were allowed to do so, and things in Pistoia settled down for a few days. But then Cesare Borgia and his army arrived at the gates of Florence, and the Signoria, no longer able to concentrate on Pistoia, had to withdraw all the forces it had sent there. As a result, the Panciatichi, their numbers already significantly diminished, either fled Pistoia of their own accord or were chased out, resulting in their renewed exile from the city. This was at the beginning of last May. The commissioners then returned to Florence, Pistoia remaining with its two chancellors but without military backing. As a result of this, worse turmoil than before ensued, which gave rise to many grave incidents. The turmoil continued until July and August of 1501.

Then word reached the Signoria of Florence that the Cancellieri and Panciatichi factions were meeting secretly to reach an accord, excluding the Signori or the chancellors. The Signoria doubted that such negotiations would be in Florence’s favor.
⁵
They ascertained who from both factions might be prepared to come to an agreement, and, finding them well disposed, assigned two of the magistrates of the Signoria and two members of the Collegio to oversee the matter. They sent an emissary to the Panciatichi who were stationed outside Pistoia, and another into the city, to ensure that neither party took any action on its own. Finally, after a long discussion by the committee, the articles of peace were agreed to and ratified on the twenty-first of August 1501. Florence then appointed new commissioners, who departed for Pistoia on the fifth of September, and from that day until the twentieth of October they worked on obtaining guarantees from the families and securing peace in accordance with the articles. This was done, and our Signori, wanting to conclude the peace and bring the Panciatichi back into Pistoia, sent a new commissioner with armed forces, and on the twentieth of October last they reinstated the Panciatichi in the city and established a guard, a measure deemed necessary to maintain the Panciatichi there. The situation remained thus until the twenty-third of February 1502.

The reason for the tumult breaking out again has been reported in different ways. It was dealt with in the following manner: The chancellors in Pistoia informed the Florentine Signoria of the outbreak of violence and urged them to send a commissioner. The Signori immediately appointed Tommaso Tosinghi. He left on the twenty-third of February, but in Pistoia he found that the Panciatichi had again been chased out, that there had been injuries, that two of the magistrates and the captain of the infantry had been killed (all three of whom had been of the Panciatichi faction), and certain houses looted and torched. The commissioners took every measure to ensure that the violence would not increase. Then the Signoria, wanting to settle things once and for all, called Tommaso Tosinghi back in order to consult with him. They concluded first that Florence had to take complete control of Pistoia, and after that they would see how to proceed. Consequently our Signori, without tarrying, ordered that by the seventeenth of this month an infantry of seven hundred men will have been gathered and sent to Pistoia along with ninety mounted crossbowmen. Pagolo da Parrano, who is currently in Pescia with forty mounted crossbowmen, has been sent moneys and directed to take orders from the commissioners of Pistoia. Our Signori have ordered all these forces to be ready by the seventeenth of this month, so that once the soldiers receive their pay they will take control of Pistoia, set up guards at strategic points, punish the delinquents, and force the leaders of the two factions to come to Florence. They would also destroy and dismantle all the fortifications, and take from both factions the artillery and as many weapons as they could. The commissioners, as they have the authority, have already accomplished this to a large extent. They have begun punishing the delinquents and have initiated proceedings against them. They have ordered the men from both factions to present themselves in Florence by the twenty-fifth of this month, and a good number of them have already complied. They have taken from the factions all their artillery and other weapons, and have dismantled fortifications.

It now remains for the Florentine Signoria to decide how we should proceed, particularly in the question of reforming the city of Pistoia. All this, as the commissioners have pointed out, is up to us, as none of the Panciatichi or the Cancellieri—more than 150 men, along with other rebels and troublemakers—are in Pistoia now. Hence it will not be difficult to implement any measures that the Signoria will decide upon.

1.
The chief executive council of Florence.

2.
The magistrates of the chief executive council of Florence.

3.
Florence had lost Pisa in 1494.

4.
The Collegio were a special council that convened in emergencies, and the Otto di Pratica a council of eight responsible for Florence’s external affairs.

5.
The Florentine Signoria would have appraised such secret meetings as an attempt by the two factions to join forces to oust Florence from Pistoia, gaining independence for the city.