Read The essential writings of Machiavelli Online
Authors: Niccolò Machiavelli; Peter Constantine
Tags: #Machiavelli, #History & Theory, #General, #Political, #Political ethics, #Early works to 1800, #Philosophy, #Political Science, #Political Process, #Niccolo - Political and social views
CHAPTER THIRTEEN
O
N HOW THE
R
OMANS MADE USE OF RELIGION TO REFORM THEIR STATE, CONDUCT THEIR CAMPAIGNS, AND PUT A STOP TO TURMOIL
I do not think it inappropriate for me to cite several instances of how the Romans used religion to reform their state and conduct their campaigns. Livy provides many examples, but I believe that the few I shall mention here will suffice. The Roman populace had created tribunes with consular powers who, with one exception, were all plebeians.
63
There had been a plague and a famine that year, and miracles had occurred which the nobles seized on in electing new tribunes. They claimed that the gods were angry because Rome had misused the dignity of its government, and that the only way to please them was to restore the election of tribunes to the way it had been done before. The plebeians were awestruck when religion was made an issue, and they elected tribunes who were all nobles.
64
The conquest of the city of Veii shows how the Roman generals used religion to induce their soldiers to continue the campaign. The soldiers were weary of the long siege and wanted to return to Rome. But Lake Albanus had miraculously risen that year, and the Romans discovered that Apollo and certain haruspices had said that Veii would be defeated the year that Lake Albanus rose and overflowed its shores. This made the soldiers willing to endure the hardship of the siege, since they now had hope of conquering the city, and they agreed to continue the campaign. Camillus was then made dictator of Rome, and Veii was captured after it had been under siege for ten years.
65
So religion, used well, aided in the taking of the city and the restitution of the tribunes to the nobility. Without religion, neither the one nor the other would have been possible.
I would like to offer another example. Much turmoil erupted in Rome when the tribune Terentillus proposed a certain law for reasons I will discuss later.
66
Religion was among the first means the nobility used to counter him. They did this in two ways. First they had the Sibylline Books consulted,
67
and had them respond that Rome, because of sedition, was in danger of losing its liberty that year. Though the tribunes exposed this ruse, it still put so much fear in the hearts of the plebeians that they were no longer as eager as they had been to follow the tribunes. The second way the nobility used religion was when a certain Appius Herdonius occupied the Capitol one night with a crowd of exiles and slaves numbering four thousand men. This created such turmoil in Rome that there was concern that if the Aequi and the Volsci, age-old enemies of Rome, were to attack the city, they would conquer it with ease.
68
Despite this, the tribunes maintained that the possibility of an attack was a mere fabrication and so did not cease demanding that Terentillus’s law be enacted. Consul Publius Valerius, a solemn and authoritative man, came out of the Senate, and in words that were at times amicable, at times menacing, laid out for the plebeians the untimeliness of their demands and the dangers that these demands brought upon the city. He compelled them to swear that they would stand by their consul, upon which the obedient plebeians retook the Capitol by force. But as Publius Valerius was killed during the attack, Titus Quinctius was immediately made consul again.
69
He did not want the plebeians to have time to catch their breath or turn their minds to Terentillus’s law, so he commanded them to march from Rome on a campaign against the Volsci, declaring that the plebeians, by the oath they had sworn to stand by the consul, were now obliged to obey him. The tribunes opposed this, arguing that the oath they had sworn had been to the dead consul and not to him, but Livy shows how the plebeians, through fear of religion, preferred to obey the consul rather than follow the tribunes, and writes the following words in favor of the ancient religion: “The negligence toward the gods that prevails in our time did not yet exist, nor did people put an interpretation on oaths and laws that suited their own practice.”
70
The tribunes feared they would lose power, and so formed an allegiance with Consul Titus Quinctius, agreeing that they would obey him and not bring up the Terentillus’s law for a year, while both consuls agreed that they would not send the plebeians to war for a year. This was how religion helped the Senate overcome difficulties it could never have overcome on its own.
63.
Livy (Book IV, chapter 13) describes the growing tension between the plebeians and the patricians as the plebeians tried to expand their political power. A tribune was an official appointed to protect the rights of the plebians. The institution of the tribunes had existed since the fifth century
BCE
, and became increasingly powerful in the later years of the republic.
64.
Livy (Book V, chapter 14) writes: “[The voters] were impressed not only by the dignity and pomp of the candidates, but by the religious argument. As a result they elected all the consular tribunes from among the patricians.”
65.
Livy describes this incident in Book V, chapter 15. See also notes 35 and 60 and chapter 55 on Marcus Furius Camillus.
66.
Terentillus, tribune of the plebeians, proposed (c. 460
BCE
) the creation of military tribunes with consular power. Livy discusses this incident in Book III, chapter 9.
67.
The Sibylline Books contained the prophecies of the Cumaean Sibyl and were kept in the Temple of Jupiter on the Capitoline Hill. They were consulted only when Rome was in a state of emergency.
68.
Livy describes this incident in Book III, chapter 15.
69.
Livy mentions Lucius Quinctius, not Titus.
70.
Machiavelli quotes Livy (Book III, chapter 20) in Latin:
Nondum haec quae nunc tenet saeculum neglegentia deum uenerat, nec interpretando sibi quisque ius iurandum et leges aptas faciebat.
CHAPTER SIXTEEN
I
F SOME INCIDENT SHOULD FREE A POPULACE ACCUSTOMED TO LIVING UNDER A PRINCE, THEY WILL BE ABLE TO MAINTAIN THIS FREEDOM ONLY WITH DIFFICULTY
In the annals of ancient history there are countless examples that demonstrate the difficulty a populace that is accustomed to living under a prince have in conserving their freedom should they by some chance obtain it, as the Romans did after the Tarquins were expelled. This difficulty is to be expected, because such a populace is not unlike a wild animal, which might be fierce and feral by nature but has been raised in captivity and servitude. If this animal is released into the open, not used to feeding itself or knowing where to take shelter, it will fall prey to the first man who seeks to chain it up again.
The same thing happens to a populace who are accustomed to living under the government of others without knowing how to reach decisions in matters of public defense or offense. Not understanding the new rulers or being understood by them, this populace quickly end up under a yoke that is often heavier than the one they had managed to shake off. Although their nature is not corrupted, the populace find themselves in this difficulty because a people that is corrupted through and through cannot live in liberty for even a short period, as I shall discuss in the following two chapters. Therefore our discourse will concern peoples in whom corruption has not spread too widely, and in whom there remains more of the good than the corrupted.
Added to this difficulty is that a state which becomes free creates hostile factions, as opposed to factions that are on its side. All those who took advantage of the previous tyrannical state and fed off the wealth of the prince become hostile factions. Having lost the opportunity of partaking of the tyrant’s wealth, they cannot live contentedly in the new state, and will try to restore the tyranny so they can regain their power. Nor will this new state acquire friendly supporters, as I have already said, because a free state can offer honors and prizes on only a few honest occasions, beyond which it will offer neither prizes nor honors to anyone. For once a man has secured the honors and benefits he thinks he deserves, he no longer feels obligated to those who rewarded him. Furthermore, the common benefit that results from living in freedom is not recognized by people while they possess it: In other words, being able to enjoy one’s possessions freely and without fear, not having to worry about the honor of one’s women or sons, or to fear for oneself. In fact, no one will ever admit to owing an obligation to someone who does not harm him.
But, as I have said above, a state that is free and newly created inevitably has hostile factions and not friendly ones. To resolve this problem, and the turmoil created by the difficulties I mentioned above, there is no stronger remedy or one more valid, secure, and vital, than killing the sons of Brutus.
71
These, as history shows, were driven to conspire with other Roman youths against their city for no other reason than that they did not enjoy the same status under the consuls as they had under the kings.
72
In their eyes, the liberty of the people had brought about their own slavery.
Whoever undertakes to govern a multitude, either by means of liberty or by means of a principality, and does not secure himself from those who are hostile to the new order, is creating a state that will be short-lived. In fact, I consider those princes unfortunate who are compelled to secure their state by exceptional means because the populace is their enemy, for he who has as his enemy the few can secure himself easily and without much turmoil, but he who has the whole populace as his enemy can never secure himself. And the more cruelty he employs, the weaker his principality becomes. Hence the best remedy is to seek to make the populace his friend.
73
My discussion here might deviate from what I have written above, as I am speaking here of princes and there of republics, but I would nevertheless like to mention this matter briefly so that I will not have to return to it again. Should a prince wish to win over a populace hostile to him—I am speaking of princes who have become tyrants of their own cities—he has to weigh what the people desire. He will find that they always want two things: first, to avenge themselves against those who are the cause of their becoming enslaved, and second, to regain their liberty. The first desire the prince can fulfill entirely, the second partially. I can offer a perfect example of how a ruler can fulfill the first desire: Clearchus, the tyrant of Heraclea, was in exile when there was a clash between the people and the nobles of Heraclea.
74
Realizing that they were at a disadvantage, the nobles turned to Clearchus for support and, conspiring with him, put him in power against the will of the people, taking away their liberty. Clearchus, finding himself caught between the arrogance of the nobles, whom he could neither curb nor satisfy, and the anger of the populace, who could not endure having lost their freedom, he decided to free himself from the ballast of the nobles and win over the people in a single stroke. A good opportunity arose and he seized it, massacring all the nobles, to the great satisfaction of the populace. By this means he fulfilled one of the populace’s desires, that of vengeance. But as for their second desire—to regain their liberty—the prince, unable to fulfill it, would have to examine the reasons that made them want liberty. Here the prince will find that a small part of the populace desire liberty so they can rule, but that all the rest, who are innumerable, desire liberty only so that they can live securely. In all states, regardless of how they are organized, the ranks of command are never attained by more than forty or fifty citizens. As this is a small number, the prince can easily protect himself, either by getting rid of these few citizens or by heaping them with so many honors that, depending on their status, they will for the most part be happy. The rest of the citizenry, desiring merely to live securely, can easily be satisfied with institutions and laws that protect both the prince’s power and public safety. When a prince does this, and the populace see that he will not break those laws under any circumstances, they will soon enough begin living securely and happily. We have the example of the kingdom of France, which exists securely for no other reason than that its kings are bound by innumerable laws that also ensure the security of all their subjects. The founder of the French state intended these kings to act as they pleased in military and financial matters, but in all other things under their jurisdiction they had to do as the laws specified. The princes or republics that do not secure themselves at the beginning must do so as soon as they can, as the Romans did. The ruler who lets the opportunity slip by will later regret that he did not do what he should have done.
As the Roman populace was not yet corrupted when they regained their liberty after the death of Brutus’s sons and the elimination of the Tarquin kings, they managed to maintain it through the means and institutions I have already discussed. Had the Roman populace been corrupted, there would have been no effective way for them to keep their liberty, as I will show in the following chapter.
71.
According to Roman tradition, Lucius Junius Brutus, a legendary figure of the sixth century
BCE
, ousted the last Tarquin king of Rome in 509, founding the Roman Republic. He condemned his own sons to death when they joined in a conspiracy to restore the Tarquins. See also Book III, chapter 3 above.
72.
Livy (Book II, chapter 3) writes: “[The youths] missed their former freedom to do as they pleased, and complained that the liberty others enjoyed had turned into slavery for them.”
73.
See
The Prince
, chapter 9: “A prince who obtains a state with the help of the people maintains his position with less difficulty than a prince who acquires it with the help of the nobility, because in the latter case he is surrounded by men who consider themselves his equals and whom he therefore cannot command or govern as he pleases.”
74.
Clearchus (d. 353
BCE
) was tyrant of Heraclea, a Greek city on the Black Sea. Machiavelli closely follows the incidents described by Justin in
Epitome of the Philippic History of Pompeius Trogus
(Book XVI, chapters 4 and 5).