The essential writings of Machiavelli (23 page)

CHAPTER THIRTY
O
N THE MEANS A PRINCE OR REPUBLIC MUST EMPLOY TO AVOID THE VICE OF INGRATITUDE, AND ON WHAT A GENERAL OR CITIZEN MUST DO NOT TO FALL VICTIM TO IT

To escape the need of living in constant suspicion or being ungrateful, a prince must himself go out on military expeditions, as the Roman emperors initially did and as the Turk does in our times.
¹⁰¹
This is what skillful princes have done and still do, because when the prince is victorious, the glory and the conquest is entirely his. But if he is not there the glory belongs to another, and the prince feels he cannot profit from the conquest if he does not extinguish the general’s glory, a glory which the prince did not know how to gain for himself. Such princes become ungrateful and unjust, and without doubt they lose more than they gain. If through negligence or lack of prudence the prince remains idly at home and sends a general to war, the only course of action I could suggest to the prince is the one he would be following anyway. But as the general will not be able to escape the sting of the prince’s ingratitude, I would advise the general to do one of two things: Either leave the army immediately after his victory and put himself in the hands of his prince, being careful not to commit any insolent or ambitious act, so that the prince has no reason to suspect him and every reason to reward him, or at least not harm him; or, if this does not seem the prudent thing to do, energetically take the opposite course, and consider all the means by which he can make what he acquired in battle his own, and not his prince’s. He must secure the goodwill of soldier and subject, forge new alliances with neighbors, occupy the fortresses with his men, bribe the commanders of his army, and take measures against those he cannot bribe. By these means he must punish his prince for the ingratitude the prince would otherwise show him. There are no other alternatives, but, as I have mentioned previously, men do not know how to be entirely evil or entirely good.
¹⁰²
And it is always the case that immediately after a victory, generals do not want to leave their armies, cannot show modesty, and do not know how to adopt means that are violent and create respect. Indecisive at this crucial moment, trapped by their own indecision and uncertainty, they are crushed.

A republic that wants to avoid the vice of ingratitude cannot use the same remedy as the prince—go to battle itself and not send someone else—as it is obliged to send one of its citizens. It is fitting, however, for me to suggest that the republic adopt the same solution the Roman Republic did, in other words, that of being less ungrateful than other republics. Rome’s solution arose from its system of government. As the entire city was involved in war—nobles and commoners alike—there existed in Rome throughout its history so many exceptional men crowned by numerous victories that the populace had no reason to doubt any of them; since there were many exceptional men, they checked one another. Moreover, these men remained loyal and careful not to show even a shadow of ruthless ambition or other reason for the populace to harm them, so that when these men were elected dictator, they gained the more glory the sooner they accomplished their duties and stepped down.
¹⁰³
As this conduct could not cause suspicion, it did not generate ingratitude either. Hence, a republic that does not wish to have reason to be ungrateful must act as Rome did, and a citizen who wishes to escape the sting of ingratitude must observe the limits observed by the Roman citizens.

101.
Machiavelli is referring to the Ottoman sultans, who in the sixteenth century still led their armies into battle. See
The Prince
, chapter 14, in which Machiavelli argues in the opening line that a prince must “have no other thought or objective, nor dedicate himself to any other art, but that of war with its rules and discipline, because this is the only art suitable for a man who commands.”

102.
See chapter 27 above, “On the Rarity of Man Being Entirely Good or Entirely Bad.”

103.
The Roman dictator was a chief magistrate with absolute power, elected in periods of emergency for up to six months. Livy gives examples throughout his
Histories
of dictators who within a few days resolved emergency situations and ended their dictatorship.

CHAPTER THIRTY-TWO
O
N HOW A REPUBLIC OR PRINCIPALITY MUST NOT WAIT FOR DIFFICULT TIMES TO OFFER BENEFITS TO ITS POPULACE

Rome was successful in its generosity to its populace, and overcame the danger when Porsena invaded Rome to restore the Tarquin kings to power.
¹⁰⁴
And yet the Senate, uncertain whether the populace might not prefer living under the kings to living through a war, lifted the tax on salt and all other duties, declaring that the poor were doing enough for the public good by feeding their children. It was for these benefits that the Roman populace was prepared to bear a siege, hunger, and war. But no ruler should rely on this example and wait for dangerous times in order to win over the populace, because he will never manage to do what the Romans did. In the eyes of the populace, it will not be that ruler who grants them their new benefits, but his enemy, and they will have every reason to fear that once the adversity has passed, their ruler will take back what he was forced to give. Consequently, the populace will not feel bound to him in any way. The reason the Senate’s action turned out well was that the Roman Republic was new and not yet stable, and the populace had seen laws being made that benefited them in times of peace, such as the right of appeal. They could be persuaded, therefore, that the assistance granted them during Rome’s adversity had been granted more because of the Senate’s disposition to benefit them than because of the advent of the enemy. Furthermore, the memory of the kings who had oppressed them in many ways was still fresh. But such circumstances are rare, and it is also rare for such policies to work. A state, whether it is a republic or a principality, must try to foresee what adversity might befall it and which men it might need in such times, and then treat these men in a fitting way. A state which acts otherwise, whether a principality or a republic—but particularly a principality—and then believes that during perilous times it can win back the populace with benefits is deceiving itself. Not only will such a state not win over the populace, but it will bring about its own ruin.

104.
Livy (Book II, chapters 8 and 9) describes how the Etruscan king Porsena unsuccessfully attempted to regain the throne for the last king of Rome, also an Etruscan. “The Tarquin king had now fled for refuge to Lars Porsena, king of Clusium, [who] considered that Rome should have a king, and one of an Etruscan line, and so marched upon Rome with his army.” Throughout this chapter, Machiavelli closely paraphrases Livy’s text.

CHAPTER THIRTY-THREE
W
HEN A PROBLEM WITHIN A STATE OR AGAINST A STATE HAS GROWN, IT IS BETTER TO BIDE ONE’S TIME THAN TO TACKLE IT WITH FULL FORCE

As the Roman Republic grew in reputation, strength, and dominion, its neighbors, who at first had not foreseen how much harm the new republic might do them, recognized their error too late. They wanted to remedy what they had not remedied from the start, and so forged an alliance of some forty peoples against Rome.
¹⁰⁵
As a result, the Romans created the institution of dictator, along with the other measures they usually resorted to in times of grave danger, giving full power to a single man who could reach decisions without consulting anyone, and implement these decisions without anyone’s having the right of appeal. This solution, which was useful at the time, and the reason the Romans prevailed over the dangers I have just mentioned, invariably proved most useful in the problems which the Roman Republic encountered as it expanded its domains.

But first we must discuss how, when a problem arises within a state or against it, whether triggered by internal or external causes, and becomes so grave that it begins to alarm everyone, it is a far more secure course of action to bide one’s time than to try to eliminate it. Those who try to eliminate the problem in fact increase it, and so amplify the evil that was expected. Such problems in a state are more often brought about by internal causes than external ones, such as when a citizen is allowed to gain more power than is reasonable, or a law that is at the root of the free state begins to be corrupted, and these errors have been allowed to grow to an extent that makes it more harmful to attempt a remedy than to let them continue. In fact, it is more difficult to recognize these problems when they arise, since man tends to favor the introduction of new enterprises, and will usually prefer enterprises that have mettle and are advanced by young men. If, for instance, a young nobleman of unusual skill emerges in a state, the eyes of all citizens turn toward him as they rush blindly to honor him. And if he has even a grain of ruthless ambition, the combination of these circumstances and the favors nature has granted him quickly enables him to attain such a position that by the time the citizens recognize their error, they have recourse to only a few remedies and, in attempting to use them, they in fact increase his power.

One could cite many examples, but I would like to limit myself to one from Florence. Cosimo de’ Medici,
¹⁰⁶
to whom the House of Medici owed its rise to power in our city, achieved such standing through his prudence and the ignorance of the Florentines that the government began to fear him. The Florentines judged it dangerous to attack him, but even more dangerous to leave him as he was. Niccolò da Uzzano, a contemporary who was considered an expert in civic affairs, made the first error in not perceiving the dangers that could arise from Cosimo de’ Medici’s growing power. But throughout his life Niccolò da Uzzano was resolved not to permit the Florentines to commit the second error, in other words to attempt to eliminate Cosimo, as he deemed that this would lead to the destruction of the state. After his death, da Uzzano was in fact proved right, because the Florentines did not follow his advice and joined forces against Cosimo, chasing him from Florence. As a result, Cosimo de’ Medici’s faction, resenting this action, managed to bring him back soon after and made him the prince of the state, a rank he could never have attained without this manifest opposition.
¹⁰⁷
The same thing happened in Rome with Caesar, whose skill and prowess assured him the favor of Pompey and others. But this favor soon turned to fear, as Cicero testified when he said that Pompey had begun to fear Caesar too late.
¹⁰⁸
This fear made Pompey’s faction seek solutions, but these solutions hastened the fall of the Roman Republic.

Consequently I would like to suggest that since it is difficult to recognize these evils when they arise, a difficulty caused by their deceptiveness in their early stages, it is a far wiser course once they are recognized to bide one’s time than to fight them. If one bides his time, they will either fade on their own, or at least be postponed to some time in the future. Princes who plan on eliminating these difficulties, or forcefully countering them, must keep their eyes open so as not to exacerbate the evil instead of diminishing it, under the impression that they are pushing it away by dragging it behind them, as one might drown a plant by overwatering it. The power of the disease must be carefully gauged, and if you see yourself capable of curing it, you must apply yourself with determination. Otherwise, you must let the disease run its course and not try in any way to intervene, because you will suffer the fate of Rome’s neighbors I mentioned above: Once Rome had become very powerful, it would have been a better tactic to attempt to placate it by peaceful means, and so keep it in check, than forcing it through war to invent new institutions and new defenses. The only thing that the scheme of Rome’s neighbors accomplished was to make the Romans more united and more courageous, and to invent new means by which the Romans could increase their power in the shortest possible time. Among these new means was the creation of the institution of dictator, through which Rome overcame the immediate danger and averted the infinite evils that the Roman Republic would have incurred without this remedy.

105.
Livy (Book II, chapter 18) writes that “some thirty Latin peoples were conspiring against Rome.”

106.
Cosimo de’ Medici (1389–1464) was the founder of the Medici dynasty.

107.
Cosimo de’ Medici had been exiled from Florence in 1433, and returned as its ruler exactly one year later.

108.
Machiavelli is quoting from Cicero’s letter to Tiro (Cicero,
Letters
, XVI, 11).