The essential writings of Machiavelli (25 page)

CHAPTER FORTY-TWO
O
N THE EASE WITH WHICH MEN CAN BE CORRUPTED

It is also worth noting, concerning the Decemvirate, how easily men can be corrupted and made to assume an altogether different nature, no matter how good or educated they might be.
¹¹⁷
Consider how the young men with whom Appius surrounded himself became supporters of his tyranny for the scant benefits it brought them, or how Quintus Fabius, one of the second group of Decemvirs and an excellent man, was blinded by ambition and persuaded by Appius’s evil ways, turning from good to bad and becoming like him.
¹¹⁸
Were lawgivers in republics or kingdoms to examine this matter carefully, they would be more ready to put a check on men’s appetites and deprive them of the hope of transgressing without punishment.

117.
In 449
BCE
, the Decemvirs were forced to abdicate, as they had become tyrannical.

118.
Livy (Book III, chapter 41) writes: “The foremost among the Decemvirs were Quintus Fabius and Appius Claudius. […] Fabius’s character was deficient in soundness and integrity rather than actively evil. In fact this man, formerly distinguished at home and on the battlefield, was so changed by the Decemvirate and his colleagues that he chose to be like Appius rather than be himself.”

CHAPTER FORTY-THREE
O
N HOW MEN WHO FIGHT FOR THEIR OWN GLORY ARE GOOD AND FAITHFUL SOLDIERS

Another issue to be considered concerning the matter discussed above is the difference between an army that is content and fights for its own glory and an army that is discontented and fights for the ambition of others. While the Roman armies tended to be victorious under the consuls, they were invariably defeated under the tyranny of the Decemvirs.
¹¹⁹
This example also indicates to some extent why mercenary soldiers are of no use, since the meager salary they are paid is the only motive they have to keep fighting.
¹²⁰
This is not enough of a reason, nor can it be, to make them loyal to you, nor so much your friend that they will want to die for you. In an army whose soldiers do not have the kind of love for the man they are fighting for to make them his devoted supporters, there can never be enough skill and valor to resist an enemy who is even moderately skillful. And because such love and fervor cannot be inspired in anyone but one’s subjects, it is necessary, in order to sustain a government or to maintain a republic or kingdom, to arm oneself with one’s own subjects. All those who had their own armies had great success. The Roman armies under the Decemvir tyranny had the same skill as previous Roman armies, but because they did not have the same disposition, they did not achieve the same results. The moment the Decemvirs were abolished and the Roman soldiers once again fought as free men, their former valor returned. The result was that their campaigns became as successful as they had been before.

119.
Livy (Book III, chapter 42) writes: “The soldiers, determined that nothing anywhere should prosper under the leadership and auspices of the Decemvirs, allowed themselves to be defeated.”

120.
See
The Prince
, chapter 12, titled “Of the Different Types of Armies, and of Mercenaries.”

CHAPTER FORTY-SIX
O
N HOW MEN PROGRESS FROM ONE AMBITION TO ANOTHER, AND HOW THEY SEEK TO AVOID BEING HARMED BUT READILY HARM OTHERS

Once the Roman populace had regained its liberty
¹²¹
and become as it had been before—except that now the populace was in an even better position, as it had created many new laws guaranteeing its own power—it seemed reasonable to expect that within a short period calm would be restored. But quite the opposite happened, with new turmoil and discord breaking out every day. Livy cogently points out the reason for this, so it seems fitting to use his exact words when he says that either the populace or the nobility always became insolent when the other was humiliated: When the plebeians were happy enough to remain quietly within their station, young noblemen took to attacking them. Nor could the tribunes take any measures as they too were under attack. The nobility, on the other hand, even though they thought their young men too violent, still felt that if the line was to be crossed it should be by their faction and not by the plebeians.
¹²²
And so in its desire to defend its own liberty each faction strove to oppress the other, because men in their quest to live without fear will attempt to instill fear in others. The harm they dispel they impose on others, as if the only way to prevail is either to harm or be harmed. Here can be seen one of the ways in which republics disintegrate, and how men progress from one ambition to another. The words that Sallust puts in Caesar’s mouth are very true: “For all bad examples arise from good beginnings.”
¹²³
As I have already mentioned, the first thing a ruthlessly ambitious citizen of a republic will seek to do is guard himself from being harmed, not only by private citizens, but by magistrates as well. To do this he will seek allies, which he acquires by means that appear honest enough, either by offering money or by offering to defend the allies from those in power. This seems honest, so it easily fools everyone and is not remedied. Soon enough the ambitious citizen, continuing along his course without encountering any obstacles, reaches a position where private citizens are afraid of him and magistrates respect him. And once he has attained this position, he is at a point where it is extremely dangerous to counter him. I have already discussed the danger of trying to deal with a problem within a state when the problem has grown too great:
¹²⁴
In a nutshell, one must seek either to eliminate it and run the danger of immediate ruin, or let it run its course and feign servitude until a death or some other incident frees you. Once citizens and magistrates are frightened of offending the powerful man and his allies, he does not have to do much more to have the magistrates pass rulings or attack others as he dictates. Consequently, a state must have institutions and laws that will hinder a citizen from doing evil under the guise of doing good, thus ensuring that he can develop only the kind of standing that will benefit and not harm liberty, as will be discussed in its proper place.

121.
In 449
BCE
, when the Decemvirs were forced to abdicate.

122.
Machiavelli is quoting Livy, Book III, chapter 65.

123.
Machiavelli quotes
Bellum Catilinae
, 51, 27, in Latin:
in Latin: Quod omnia mala exempla bonis initiis orta sunt
. Regarding
Bellum Catilinae
, see note 250 to Book III, chapter 6, below.

124.
In chapter 33 above, titled “When a Problem Within a State or Against a State Has Grown, It Is Better to Bide One’s Time Than to Tackle It with Full Force.”

CHAPTER FIFTY
O
N HOW A SINGLE COUNCIL OR MAGISTRATE SHOULD NOT BE ABLE TO BLOCK THE PROCEEDINGS OF A STATE

When Titus Quinctius Cincinnatus and Gnaeus Julius Mento were consuls in Rome they were always at odds, and this brought all the proceedings of the republic to a halt.
¹²⁵
As a result, the Senate decided to create a dictator to do what the consuls were unable to do because of their constant wrangling. The consuls, however, though they disagreed about everything else, did agree on one thing: They did not want a dictator. So the Senate had no other recourse than to turn to the tribunes for help. The tribunes, with the backing of the Senate, forced the consuls to obey. This demonstrates the usefulness of the office of tribune, which was valuable not only in keeping the ruthless ambition of the powerful against the plebeians in check, but also the conflict of the plebeians among themselves. It demonstrates too that one should never establish an institution in a state that will enable the few to block a decision that might be vital in keeping the state from harm. For example, if you give a council power to distribute honors and rewards, or give a magistrate the power to direct an affair, it makes sense either to impose a stipulation that will compel these authorities to act in all circumstances, or to set things up in such a way that if they do not want to act, someone else can and will. Otherwise such an institution is defective and dangerous, as it would have been in Rome had the power of the tribunes not been able to oppose the obstinacy of the consuls. In the Republic of Venice, it is the Greater Council that distributes the honors and rewards. There were times, however, when members of this council, out of contempt or false conviction, did not appoint successors to magistrates and those who administered Venice’s empire. This led to great turmoil, because suddenly Venice and its foreign dominions lacked legitimate judges. Nor could anything be done unless all the members of the Greater Council were satisfied or dissuaded from their false conviction. This problem would have brought Venice to a bad end if prudent citizens had not made provision for it. When the opportunity presented itself, they passed a law that no Venetian magistrate inside or outside Venice could vacate his post unless a successor had been appointed. This removed the possibility of the council impeding public actions and so endangering the republic.

125.
In 431, during the wars with the Volsci and Aequi, Titus Quinctius Cincinnatus and Gnaeus Julius Mento were elected consuls. Livy (Book IV, chapter 26) writes: “The consuls’ perverse discord and constant wrangling in the Senate greatly alarmed the Romans.”

CHAPTER FIFTY-ONE
O
N HOW A REPUBLIC OR PRINCE MUST MAKE A SHOW OF DOING OUT OF GENEROSITY WHAT HE MUST DO FROM NECESSITY

Prudent men know how to make a merit of each of their actions even when necessity forces them to take these actions. The Roman Senate was prudent in this way when it chose to pay men in military service out of public funds even though the men had always been accustomed to supporting themselves. The Senate realized that otherwise it would be impossible to wage war over long periods and that the Roman armies would be unable to lay siege to cities or dispatch the soldiers far from Rome. The Senate saw that it was necessary to be able to do both, and so decided that salaries would be paid to the soldiers, but in such a way that made a merit of what in fact necessity was forcing it to do. The plebeians so welcomed this gift that all Rome went wild with happiness, and regarded the Senate’s decision as a great benefit that they could never have hoped for or sought on their own.
¹²⁶
The tribunes did their best to abolish this resolution, arguing that as the plebeians would have to pay taxes in order to cover the military salaries, it would burden them, not provide relief, but the tribunes did not manage to convince the plebeians. The Senate even managed to increase the plebeians’ enthusiasm in the way it distributed taxes, by imposing the heaviest and largest taxes on the nobility, taxes which would have to be paid first.

126.
Livy (Book IV, chapter 60) writes: “It is told that nothing was ever welcomed by the plebeians with such rejoicing They flocked to the Senate, grasped the senators’ hands as they emerged, saying that they were rightly called ‘Fathers,’ and proclaiming that now no man, while he had any strength left, would spare his body or blood for such a generous state.”