The Final Move Beyond Iraq: The Final Solution While the World Sleeps (11 page)

Shahroudi went from that meeting to confer with Hezbollah leader Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah to lay the groundwork for the next step in the holy war against both Israel and the United States, or what Ayatollah Khomeini in 1979 called the “occupier Zionist regime.” With Hezbollah firmly entrenched in Lebanon, al-Assad could be assured of having a tactical partner well-positioned to play a primary role in exporting terrorism to Israel.

Another in line to visit al-Assad was the president of North Korea’s Supreme People’s Assembly. His interest in Syria was basically one of economics. North Korea was a prolific purveyor of technology and information to both Syria and Iran. Such staples as the various stages of the Shahab missiles were produced in North Korea and exported to Iran and Iraq. A steady stream of North Korean technology was also instrumental in Iran’s quest for nuclear arms. Iraq, Iran, Syria, and North Korea pledged among themselves to defend against a pro-Western Iraq and determined to do everything possible to prevent such a turn.

North Korea made its presence known in the equation when, in December 2002, the
So San
was boarded in the Arabian Sea by sailors from American and Spanish ships. When Navy SEALs searched the ship, they discovered that underneath a supposed cargo of cement bags lay the real payload: fifteen complete Scud missiles, fifteen conventional warheads, twenty-three containers of nitric acid fuel, and eighty-five barrels of unidentified chemicals.
¹⁰
Intelligence sources speculated that the ship, bound for Yemen as its next port, would ultimately finish its voyage in Iraq.

One unidentified spokesperson said that if the United States invaded Iraq, the Iraqis would strike military targets, while the United States would be accused of targeting civilians. I’m reminded of a comment that professor Alan Dershowitz made during my recent interview with him:

Overtures of an alliance between Iraq and Iran began to surface in 2002. Saddam Hussein’s son Qusay took a delegation of upper-echelon Iraqis to Tehran on a weapons-buying mission. Of particular interest to them was the acquisition of Iran’s staple, the Shahab-3. The group also hoped to induce the Iranians to return dozens of military aircraft, including a number of F-1Es, captured during the Iran-Iraq War. So desperate were the Iraqis for war materials that they ultimately offered to buy and then return the aircraft to Iran when no longer needed to battle the United States.

A major concern of Iran was that the aging weapons sold to Iraq would be turned against them at some point later. As part of the agreement, Iraq pledged safe passage for military equipment across its country to Iranian proxies in Syria and Lebanon. The outcome of Qusay Hussein’s trek to Iran was a pledge of ammunition and spare parts only.

The one thing the Hussein regime may have overlooked was the tendency of the Shiite population of Iraq to side ideologically with Iran against Saddam. Of course, the Iranians could easily see how Saddam’s removal by the U.S. military could benefit their plan for regional domination. Tehran would be prepared for the eventuality with trained infiltrators ready to slip into Iraq when the opportunity arose. Shiites already living in Iran were natural allies in Iran’s postwar plan. Among the first infiltrators across the border were card-carrying members of the Islamic revolutionary Guard Corps under the direction of Iranian colonel Hosni Merza Khalil. This either went unnoticed by Iraq or Saddam turned a blind eye to the incursion by his former enemy in appreciation for the help against the United States.

Iran’s preparations for what was a certain invasion of Iraq by American and coalition troops were ongoing. In what had the appearance of a politician in a cross-country stumping trip, Iranian Revolutionary Guard commander Yahya Rahim-Safavi visited al-Assad in Syria to review that country’s preparations for a U.S. attack on Hussein’s regime. From there, he met with Hezbollah and Hamas representatives in Lebanon.

Safavi then met with Fatah to discuss Yasser Arafat’s plans to extract payment from Israel for the invasion—even though Israel was once again not permitted to participate in the military exercise against Iraq. Israel was targeted by Saddam during the first Gulf War in retaliation for the coalition attack. There was no reason to believe that it would escape Hussein’s wrath during another incursion.

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As it became more obvious that war would be the result of Saddam Hussein’s defiance, radical Islamists began to assemble in Iraq training camps in preparation for attacks against nations, both Western and Arab, that joined the coalition to unseat the Iraqi dictator. Both Iran and Syria funneled terrorists from Palestine, Jordan, and other Arab countries. Part of their audacious plan was to create situations that would force Israel into a confrontation with both Syria and Lebanon. (This plan came to fruition when Hezbollah crossed into Israel in July 2006, kidnapped Israeli soldiers, and began lobbing Katyusha rockets into Northern Israel.) The fear was also that Iran would be surrounded by pro-American regimes in Afghanistan and Iraq, a notion that frightened the controlling mullahs. The response of the leaders in Tehran was to plan a series of saber-rattling war games designed to impress the Americans with their ability to repel any imminent threat from that quarter. An American presence in Iraq was perceived by the tyrannical Tehran mullahs to be an obvious threat to the survival of Iran’s theocratic government.

In a move designed to take the spotlight off Tehran, two Iranian proxies—Hezbollah and Hamas—planned an all-out intifada against Israel if called upon to launch such an attack. The plan was welcomed by Nasrallah in Lebanon and by Arafat in the Palestinian Authority, who was particularly eager to forestall any attempts by the United States to democratize the PA. Arafat reportedly founded a new terrorist organization comprised of his most elite to bolster Iraq.

Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage was among the seemingly few that readily recognized the threat imposed by Hezbollah. In an interview with
60 Minutes,
Armitage expressed his concern: “Hezbollah may be the ‘A-Team of Terrorists,’ and maybe Al Qaeda is actually the ‘B’ team. And they’re on the list and their time will come.”
¹²
According to the CBS report, Florida Democrat Bob Graham believed that Hezbollah had a global network of radical Islamic supporters, with enough operatives in the United States to pose a terrorist threat here. Said Graham, “It has a significant presence of its trained operatives inside the United States waiting for the call to action.”
¹³
Graham, aware that Hezbollah’s funding came from Iran and Syria, mentioned the “blood debt” dating back to the bombing of the Marine barracks in Beirut in 1983.

In March 2002, Bashar al-Assad made his intentions toward Israel perfectly clear in a television address:

By October 2002, Syria and Iran had an organized plan of attack to disrupt any significant U.S. progress in Iraq should President Bush go ahead with plans for an invasion. The DEBKA
file
reported that:

Although the two countries were apparently taking every precaution to prevent a second war in Iraq, neither was proactive at the outset of the actual conflict. However, both countries soon made their presence felt as pipelines for terrorists flooding into Iraq from Arab nations around the world. Iran would go a step further and provide military-grade improvised explosive devices (IEDs) to the terrorists.

Also on the drawing board was an alliance between Iran, Syria, and Hezbollah. The “Party of Allah” was to bear the primary responsibility for causing interference with what stability there might be in the region. Nasrallah, the prime instigator of trouble in South Lebanon, would see his clout increase to a more provincial role. His cooperation with Iran and Syria was paramount in intensifying the current jihad and taking it to the next level.

Following directives from their mentors, Iran and Syria, Hezbollah terrorists repeatedly tested Israel’s resolve and defenses. Katyushas were fired into Northern Israel from outposts in Southern Lebanon, roadside bombs targeted Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) patrols inside Israel, attempted kidnappings were regular occurrences, Israeli Arabs were kidnapped and interrogated to obtain information about Israel, sniper attacks were common, and Israeli civilians were murdered.
¹⁶
Hezbollah had no lack of armaments made available by Iran and Syria: heavy artillery as well as thousands of missiles and rockets, including the longer-range Fajr-3 and Fajr-5. The Fajr rockets are manufactured in Syria, thus eliminating the possibility that Syria could claim ignorance in the jihad against Israel. Supplies transported into Lebanon also included the Zelzal-2 with a range that would allow attacks on Tel Aviv. Not only did the rockets have longer-range capabilities, the warheads were larger. There was also an influx of Revolutionary Guard–trained fighters and longtime Al Qaeda members.

Syria and Iran were ready should the United States attack Iraq—not to join in the immediate fray but to step in and create chaos and confusion following the removal of Saddam Hussein. The plan to humiliate the United States and drive coalition forces out of Iraq would allow Syria to carve out the Sunni region for itself and Iran to take possession of the Shiite region and either to overrun the Kurds or allow them self-governance. Given their past hatred of one another, the question of how to turn an Iraq devastated by war into a pro-Iranian entity would still be a challenging one. In preparation for such an eventuality, three Iraqi opposition leaders met in Tehran in December 2002. Massoud Barzani of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), Ahmad Chalabi of the
INC
(INC), and Ayatollah Mohammad Baqer al-Hakim of the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) held meetings with each other and with top Iranian leaders.
¹⁷
Chalabi’s overtures to the Iranians were a surprise for the Bush administration, as they had initially handpicked him as the Iraqi leader to replace the soon-to-be ousted Saddam Hussein.

In discussing how to fashion a postwar Iraq into a country that would most benefit Iran and Syria, Supreme Ayatollah Seyyed Ali Khamenei and then Iranian president Mohammad Khatami determined that a government in Iraq must be easily persuaded to support Iran’s regional interests. The two reached one conclusion: Iraq was unsuitable for a Khomeini-type upheaval and a Shiite-dominated theocracy. In
The Secret History of the Iraq War
, Yossef Bodansky wrote at length about Khamenei’s rhetoric leading up to the Iraq confrontation. Khamenei was certain that:

Bodansky says, “In mentioning ‘neighboring nations,’ Khamenei for the first time alluded to Iran’s direct role in confronting the United States [in Iraq].”
¹⁹

Apparently, the two Iranians were convinced that Ahmad Chalabi would implement Iran’s plan for a speedy election in Iraq once the United States had disposed of its archenemy, Saddam Hussein. It would be in Iran’s best interests to have a pro-Iranian Shiite such as Chalabi in a position of power. In fact, according to a
Newsweek
report:

Chalabi, the golden boy, became tarnished and would, ultimately, be investigated for fraud. Charges were later dropped due to lack of evidence.

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