The Final Move Beyond Iraq: The Final Solution While the World Sleeps (14 page)

Sadly, President Bush’s attempts to gain unilateral Arab support for its liberation of Iraq by tossing out another two-state carrot were met with disdain. The Muslim world recognized long ago that a two-state solution was not the real answer to the “Jewish problem.” The only answer that would suffice would entail pushing the Jews into the Mediterranean, or, as President Ahmadinejad would later opine, wiping Israel “off the map.”

T
HE
H
OPE FOR
P
EACE

Coalition forces spent the summer of 2003 still searching for the remnants of the Iraqi government, including Hussein’s two sons, Uday and Qusay, who were killed in gunfire on July 22. In the months following the cessation of major combat, more than two hundred top Baath Party officials were either killed or captured. Saddam himself was eventually found hiding in a spider hole near Tikrit on December 13. Again, many thought these were signs that victory and Middle East peace were well within reach.

However, the months that followed would paint the war as far from over.

How was it that the butcher of Baghdad, the rebuilder of Babylon, the supreme leader of Iraq was found cowering in a spider hole in Iraq? Apparently Saddam had set up a meeting with two trusted allies, the brothers al-Omar. Saddam was to meet them and be taken to his next safe house. At the designated spot, Hussein was either taken captive or drugged, then deposited in the spider hole, where he was later discovered by American troops.

In the perfect “how the mighty are fallen” scenario, the cringing dictator had been unceremoniously dumped into a six-foot-deep hole in the ground with no sanitation and barely room to move about. His hole was well supplied, however, with $750,000 in one hundred dollar bills and stacks of documentation on the Iraqi resistance. For all of his money, he had little food, few clothes, and no way to communicate with the outside world.

What led the American troops to an isolated farmhouse looking for Saddam Hussein? Days before his capture, army intelligence sources had captured a senior security officer from Hussein’s retinue. After interrogation, the officer, Mohammed Ibrahim Omar al-Musslit, revealed Hussein’s whereabouts. Operation Red Dawn was launched with a convoy of more than thirty armored vehicles and six hundred troops. Special Forces groups searched the two farmhouses indicated by al-Musslit, only to come up empty-handed. They were preparing to depart when a soldier noticed a crack in the ground. Quick reconnaissance revealed the hiding place of the most wanted man in all of Iraq, Saddam Hussein.

Islamic radicals quickly responded to Hussein’s capture by jockeying for positions of importance in Iran. Al Qaeda was the first to jump on the “Saddam is gone, and we’re taking over” bandwagon. Bin Laden was eager to let the Americans know that he was responsible for the murderous suicide attacks throughout Iraq. He wanted bragging rights for the numbers killed and wounded. He wanted the credit for the anti-American guerrilla warfare that was so rampant in the country. Bin Laden’s lieutenant, Ayman al-Zawahiri, was quick to add that American soldiers were cowards and that Al Qaeda would pursue them even into the United States.

The Iraqi resistance movement was next to step up to the plate to alert the Iraqi people that the capture of Saddam Hussein was simply a photo op to ensure President Bush’s reelection. The Baathists invited all Iraqis to join in the struggle to repel the American invaders. All of the groups urged that the resistance against the U.S. occupation continue in full force. However, it was not the urging of the jihadists that encouraged Iraqis under the umbrella of the radical Islamists; it was the deep dissatisfaction with the political process, the lack of basic services, and the failure to stop the murder and mayhem in the streets of the cities. Faced with what might best be described as anarchy, Washington continued to paint a rosy picture on events in Iraq, going so far as to reiterate that Iraqi resistance was ebbing.

An announcement that the United States would begin withdrawing from Iraq in mid-2004 was met with skepticism, especially when it was made clear that troops would remain in Iraq for some time. The problem for the coalition leaders would be how to ensure that Iraq didn’t immediately fall into the hands of the Shiite majority, rather than become a democratic government for all the people. As soon as the discussions began, Ayatollah al-Sistani issued yet another fatwa calling for a one-man/one-vote system. The resulting stalemate threatened the entire political process for which the United States–led coalition had fought.

One London correspondent summed up the situation in Iraq very succinctly when he wrote:

As the fledgling democracy of Iraq entered 2004, it was obvious that, far from ebbing, the resistance was becoming a flood that threatened to consume everything in its path. Shiites, Sunnis, Kurds, Turkmen, and Islamic terrorists from around the world were overtly or covertly planning ways to achieve their goals. The reaction from the Iraqi tribes and sects was a surprise to Washington. Far from welcoming the Americans as liberators, the Iraqis welcomed the deposing of Saddam Hussein and then quickly wanted the “infidels” out of their country. It was apparent that a Bush strategy to respond unilaterally when threatened, or even preventatively, would not be welcomed with open arms.

The Bush administration never questioned that it would be able to put together a strike force that would be totally successful against Hussein. The hope that a democratic Iraq would become a certainty was slowly becoming a battered dream. What no one took into account was the ideology behind the Muslim culture. Americans are born with freedom of choice; it is difficult to understand how a person steeped in the tradition and mores of Islam would be reluctant to embrace democracy and freedom of choice. Washington was unprepared to deal with the harsh truth that was found in Iraq. Like a child caught in the throes of the terrible twos, unable to understand the meaning of the word no, the Washington intelligence community forged ahead despite obvious signs that the majority of the Iraqi people were not eager to accept Westernization. Therefore, President Bush was not sufficiently warned about the prospect of failure.

It is apparent that the Bush administration vastly underestimated the enemy—no, not Saddam Hussein, but the government in Iran. With the challenge of “Bring ’em on” issued by President Bush, the jihads worldwide did just that.

When the president attempted to negotiate with the Sunni Arabs on controversial issues regarding federalism and the removal of the Baathist influence, he was thanked politely. He was severely handicapped by not having been prepared in advance for the idiosyncrasies of the Muslim ideology. The Bush administration really did not understand the various divisions in the Muslim society and was working at a great disadvantage.

It was not the president but his ambassador to Iraq, Dr. Zalmay Khalilzad, who was responsible for bartering an agreement between the Kurds and Shiites that would prove to be the foundation of Iraq’s new constitution. Khalilzad was immediately faced with the challenge of finding common ground among the Shiites, Kurds, and Sunni Arabs. The Kurds feared losing their independence, the Shiites wanted a more self-serving constitution, and the Sunnis objected to everything proposed by the Shiites and the Kurds.

The Sunni delegation had been infiltrated by members of Hussein’s Baath Party, which further complicated matters for Khalilzad. The spokesman for the group, Saleh al-Mutlaq, was the former translator for Saddam Hussein and a Sunni Arab, and, as such, offended the Kurds and Shiites.

By insisting that this particular group be included in the formulation of the constitution, and although its adherents did not participate in the general election, the Bush administration conferred authenticity upon them.

The Shiites wanted an Islamic state—Sharia law to replace the secular civil code—that would lead to rule by Shiite ayatollahs recognized by the constitution and a constitutional court based on Islamic law. Such a court would be able with impunity to overrule civil laws enacted by the parliament and government. This was in line with the authority that had been conferred upon Grand Ayatollah Khomeini as the Supreme Leader in Iran. Secular Arabs recognized the path down which such an arrangement would take Iraq; the Bush administration seemed to be in a state of denial.

According to the resulting constitution, Iraq is a moderate Islamic state. Officially, Islam is the state religion and
a
basic source of legislation, not
the
basic source desired by the Shiites.

To the secular Arabs in Iraq, all the factional divides are incomprehensible. Religion had never before been a big factor in politics in Iraq, and, indeed, that aspect may take a backseat in time. That remains to be seen. I certainly feel that as long as Iran has a direct influence on the Shiites in Iraq, it will continue to stir civil strife between the Shiites and the Sunnis. The drive for a democratic Iraq has released emotions in the nation that had long been suppressed. Only time will tell whether or not the various sectarian groups will be able to hammer out a viable working relationship.

Not only was President Bush misinformed regarding the ideology of the Muslim culture, he was misinformed about the presence of quantities of WMDs in Iraq. As far back as 1998, a task force comprised of members of the House released a paper, “The Iraqi WMD Challenge: Myths and Reality.” The paper outlined the inequities between the production of and the possession of WMDs. It indicated that Hussein possessed small quantities of WMDs and even had the means to disburse the chemicals. However, it outlined the fact that production had been delegated to Sudan, Libya, and Algeria, a fact that escaped many in the intelligence community in Washington. The evidence that Iraq had the capability to deliver WMDs via unmanned aircraft was the deciding factor for some who voted to pursue Operation Iraqi Freedom.

The question remains: where are the WMDs, tanks, armored vehicles, jet fighters, and gunships that Saddam was so eager to display in giant parades and was willing to risk his dictatorship to protect? Like the battalions of soldiers that just melted away before the U.S. invasion, so it seems did his armaments. The most logical explanation offered is that they have been secreted below ground in massive bunkers or exported to Syria and Iran. The Bush administration miscalculated the wiliness of Saddam Hussein. Were his delaying tactics simply to insure that his war matériel was moved to safer locations? Perhaps Hussein is the only one with all the pieces to the puzzle, and of course, he’s not sharing that information with anyone now.

I see the threat posed to the United States and Israel as the beginning of a one-hundred-year war. You can call it World War III. You can call it the beginning of a new type of warfare…. I would rather not use analogies to World War I and World War II and just think of this as a new kind of warfare that the West is clearly disadvantaged by. The asymmetry of morality makes it very hard for us to fight groups that have no morality.
¹

—A
LAN
D
ERSHOWITZ

We are in dire need of you…. The field of jihad can satisfy your scientific ambitions, and the large American bases [in Iraq] are good places to test your unconventional weapons, whether biological or dirty, as they call them.
²

—A
BU
A
YYUB AL
-M
ASRI
,
leader of Al Qaeda in Iraq,
in a call for experts in the fields of
“chemistry, physics, electronics, media and all other
sciences—especially nuclear scientists and explosives experts”
to join the terror group’s holy war against the West

N
ear the beginning of 2006, in addition to targeting coalition and, in particular, American troops, the tactics again seemed to take a new direction. A new level of violence began arising between the Shiites and the Sunnis. On February 22, 2006, two bombs exploded in the Shiite Al Askari mosque, severely damaging its golden dome and interior. The mosque is powerfully significant to Shiite Muslims because it is the burial place of Ali Al-Hadi and his son, Hassan Al-Askari, the Tenth and Eleventh Imams. They are the immediate predecessors of the Twelfth, or Hidden, Imam, Muhammad Al-Mahdi, the one known as
the
Mahdi for whom al-Sadr’s Mahdi army is named, who disappeared down a well in Iran in the tenth century and would one day return to triumphantly spread Islam to the world. It is believed his apocalyptic return from a well in Jamkaran, Iran, will bring the world under control of a new Muslim caliphate that will lead Islam to world supremacy.

One of those responsible for this bombing had been wearing an Iraqi military uniform. Shiites responded by attacking and destroying Sunni mosques. Several Sunni imams were summarily executed by al-Sadr’s Shiite militia. Shiite mobs in other Iraq cities stormed jails and executed inmates. In retaliation, groups of Sunnis attacked Shiites, dragging them from vehicles to be murdered. As many of the U.S.-trained and armed Iraqi police force looked on in fear, others simply joined the assailants. Not even a curfew imposed on Baghdad could stop the slaughter. Bodies were dumped on Baghdad streets, handcuffed, and shot execution-style. In all, 184 Sunni mosques either lay in rubble or were vandalized, and more than one thousand Shiites and Sunnis were murdered.

In the ensuing months, sectarian death squads roamed the streets killing thousands. Someone was trying to sow the seeds of ethnic violence in the hope of starting a civil war.

D
ESCENT
I
NTO
A
NARCHY

With cries that the resistance would not end until the infidels were driven from Iraq, new recruits joined daily. Intelligence sources indicate a new cooperation among heretofore antagonistic factions. Some Shiite groups are consorting with Sunni groups; Baathist brigades work alongside the fedayeen (Arab commandos) to take out coalition troops and bring down American aircraft. The United States is caught in the crosshairs of every terrorist organization in operation in Iran, Iraq, and Syria and can do little to stop the resulting bloodshed. The disorganized Baathist forces that fell so rapidly under the initial assault are regrouping as guerrilla warriors with only one intention: to strike the coalition forces at every turn.

The Muslim world did not see this as a war to curb Saddam Hussein’s terror activities, but rather as another attack by “Crusaders” against Islam. One of the most respected analysts in the Arab world, Abdul Bari al-Atwan, made a further comparison:

To a seriously affronted Muslim world, the infidels—this time American soldiers rather than Mongols—had again ridden into Baghdad to pillage and humiliate the Iraqi people. Osama bin Laden issued the call to jihad against the invaders. And now, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has donned the mantle of Ayatollah Khomeini, taken up bin Laden’s call, and is fostering an Islamic revolution that is aimed at the bloodiest clash of religious ideologies the world has ever seen between Islam, Judaism, and Christianity.

In the rush to prepare for certain invasion by American and coalition troops, Saddam Hussein set out to cover his tracks and eliminate all threats. In a move designed to prevent the coalition forces from interrogating one of the world’s most brutal and prolific terrorists, Hussein’s elite troops entered an Iraqi upper-class stronghold in Baghdad and assassinated Abu Nidal along with four of his henchmen. Nidal was responsible for the deaths of hundreds in terror attacks worldwide. Although Hussein had ordered the murder of Nidal, he was reacting to pressure from Hosni Mubarak in Egypt and Yasser Arafat, who did not want Nidal’s secrets exposed to Western scrutiny. With intelligence supplied to Hussein by Russian leader Vladimir Putin, Nidal had received overtures from the CIA and was considering disclosing confidential information in exchange for asylum. Hussein made sure that didn’t happen.
⁴

Perhaps the biggest challenge for the United States is the renewed battle against Saddam’s secret weapon: the parallel underground force trained by North Korea in the art of carrying out a prolonged guerrilla war. To provide further safeguards for himself, Hussein established a parallel government with outposts around Iraq as a firewall against a U.S. invasion. The warriors inside this parallel Saddam Hussein–induced network were trained to create civil upheaval and insurrection against invading forces. To facilitate the fighters, Hussein engaged China and North Korea to build a series of underground bunkers almost completely undetectable from the air. These bunkers were thought to house his stockpile of weapons, including the elusive WMDs.

It was no wonder that as Operation Iraqi Freedom advanced, coalition troops found themselves under constant bombardment from a variety of terror cells and networks hard at work to create civil strife. With Syria’s help—as a backer of terror activities and a shelter for terrorists, as well as an open pipeline for incoming jihadists—it was no wonder that the United States was finding it more and more difficult to police Iraq. And, although they had no formal agreement to cooperate, Syria became a recruiting ground for Iran to enlist the aid of Hezbollah fighters in and around Baghdad.

U.S. forces found it increasingly difficult to identify friend from foe among the Iraqis. As Lt. Col. Eric Schwartz told a
New York Times
reporter:

Spurred on by influential ayatollahs whose Friday sermons were filled with anti-American, hate-filled oratory and the offering of food and spending money, young Muslims in surrounding Arab countries—Syria, Saudi Arabia, and Palestine, among others—were eager to join the fight to expunge the infidels from Arab land. It didn’t hurt the cause that there was also a promise of paradise and young virgins, should a recruit become a suicide bomber.

One of the most vocal proponents of the rebellion has been Moqtada al-Sadr, who has made no secret of his ties with Iran. During the height of resistance in July 2003, al-Sadr made a four-day visit to Iran for meetings with Rafsanjani, the former Iranian president, and senior leaders in Ayatollah Khamenei’s office. There he received an appointment as an official emissary of Iran’s Ayatollah Haeri. Al-Sadr committed to pursue the Iranian plan for Iraq: a theocratic government that wed the political and the religious. It was his assignment to denigrate Ayatollah al-Sistani in Iraq, to undertake assassinations, and to foment resistance in any way possible. In return, he would be supplied with expert assistance from Hezbollah and the elite Qods force of Iran.
⁶

Al-Sadr’s mentor eased the way for success for his protégé by issuing a fatwa aimed at Saddam’s Baath Party members. He decreed that they were open targets for Moqtada’s death squads, thus giving him a permit to murder. Even as al-Sadr was issued his license to incite rebellion, a decree was issued to Iranian-supported cells to engage British troops near Basra, as they were thought to be easier targets for cells trained in Iran. A group of pro-Iranian militant agitators whipped a local group in Majar al-Kabir into a killing frenzy. The result was the mob killing of six Royal Military Police troops. A second attack targeted the British 1st Battalion of the Parachute Regiment. The third British detachment to come under fire was the crew of a Chinook helicopter while attempting to rescue a detail of British soldiers under small arms and grenade fire. Iran was determined to do the very thing that it chastised the United States for doing: interfering with the government in Iraq.

In July, al-Sadr introduced his Mahdi army to the people of al Najaf. His announcement was made to a group of followers garbed in shrouds, ostensibly to indicate their readiness to die as martyrs. Their rallying cry was reminiscent of that introduced by Khomeini: “Death to America” and “Death to Israel.”

Al-Sadr was confident of the support that he would receive from his Iranian sponsors. He had at his fingertips a network of terrorists, some from Lebanon and others from Iran and Syria. Their only purpose was to kill the invaders and anyone associated with them. Iran’s noose was tightening on Iraq. The path of the jihadists was crowded with those willing to be martyred for the resistance.

With so many willing to take on the Americans and their colleagues, attacks against the troops escalated to as many as twenty-five daily. The weapons of choice grew more sophisticated. Missile launchers and hand grenades, as well as rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs) and military-grade IEDs, became the norm.

C
IVIL
W
AR?

What was published early on as a decisive victory in Iraq has rapidly descended into anarchy, with the various factions warring against each other and against the coalition troops. Death squads roam the streets of Baghdad, Sunnis fight Shiites, ayatollahs fight ayatollahs for predominance, and, in the background, Iran continues to arm and support groups loyal to Tehran.

Local militia groups sometimes open fire on police or coalition forces, resulting in gunfights that last for days. Offensives have been mounted to disarm and drive out these militants. In these bloody street battles, it is often hard to tell civilians from rebels, and slowly the surgical-accurateness of the U.S. attacks has begun to be called into question. Due to protests from the newly formed Iraqi Governing Council and media pressure, assaults are halted short of their goals and truces are negotiated. For every two steps forward, it seems U.S. efforts are forced to take three back.

Ambushes, suicide bombings, kidnappings, and murders have become the order of the day during the occupation. Roadside bombs using IEDs target anyone who happens to get in the way. Suicide bombers attack coalition checkpoints and other gathering places with regularity. Of the explosive devices used to kill U.S. personnel, retired Navy captain Charles Nash noted that they had changed in recent months, though were still coming from the same source:

This “latest threat” in that IEDs have significantly upgraded near the end of 2005 also proves Iran is more openly supporting the insurgents.

By the end of 2006, a new name was being given to these devices: EFPs, which stands for “explosive-formed penetrators.” Unlike regular roadside bombs, EFPs remain intact as they explode. The steel tubes with curved metal seals form a kind of super-shrapnel that can go directly through a tank’s or Humvee’s armor. The explosion turns the caps into molten jets of metal. Other than keeping a low profile, U.S. troops have little defense against these better-engineered booby traps. Again, evidence suggests these are being smuggled across the Iranian border.
⁸

In a recent interview with former CIA director James Woolsey, he said this of Iran’s involvement in Iraq:

One thing has become abundantly clear: those we are fighting are not a ragtag band of disgruntled Iraqis; we are facing a professional, full-frontal assault by well-armed terrorists. Iraq is headed down the slippery slope toward civil war, and at present the United States seems impotent to halt the slide.

R
EBUILDING THE
I
NFRASTRUCTURE

It was obvious to all the American leaders in Iraq that Saddam had not spent his oil money on the infrastructure in his country. In what would become another finger pointed at U.S. inefficiency, it had failed to restore public utilities to the major cities, to stop looting, to prevent rampant crime in the streets of Baghdad, to halt sabotage to oil facilities, and to provide basic protection to peaceful citizens. This differed widely from what the Iraqis saw as the United States providing for its own military and civilian staff. The United States was criticized for grabbing the best buildings and for quickly providing amenities to their own. This only led to further disillusionment, as well as fueling the rumors that the Americans were there to stay, not to relinquish control to the Iraqis as soon as possible.