The Final Move Beyond Iraq: The Final Solution While the World Sleeps (17 page)

If Iran is to be stopped before this, the United States must act decisively in 2007. If we wait until 2008, elections will be too distracting to Congress to be able to rally support for such an effort—an effort that may necessitate military action. With the Bush administration’s policies and plans concerning the war on terror already under tremendous fire at home, it is unlikely those vying for political office will have the courage to do what is right in the face of Iran’s nuclear threat.

Lt. Gen. Ya’alon is only one of many who have cried, “Danger, America! Danger!” And, like young Will Robinson, the decision to act to protect our nation and our families is ours to make, and the plan is ours to execute. The safety of future generations is in our hands. The questions now are: What will we do with this deadly knowledge? How much time do we have to act? Do we have the resolve to win the war on terror regardless of what it takes? Or do we allow ourselves to be swallowed up in the tsunami of terrorism that is certain to engulf the shores of America if the Islamofascists are not stopped?

Ayatollah Khomeini will “eventually be hailed as a saint.”
¹

—UN
AMBASSADOR
A
NDREW
Y
OUNG

Khomeini is a “Gandhi-like” figure.
²

—W
ILLIAM
S
ULLIVAN
,
U.S. ambassador to Iran

T
he lavish 2,500th anniversary celebration in 1970 of the founding of the Persian Empire from the time of Cyrus the Great, with its $200 million price tag, was the single most breathtaking display of how seemingly out of touch the shah was with the people of Iran. Many mark it as the beginning of the end of his reign. The occasion succinctly symbolized the Western leanings of the shah that infuriated the Shiite Muslim majority of Iran, few of whom gained any benefit from the millions collected from Iran’s oil revenues—something that only fueled their hatred of him all the more when they saw hundreds of millions spent on foreigners for the three-day anniversary celebration.

The oil boom of 1974 did nothing to alleviate this, either, as instead of Iran again becoming the great civilization Shah Pahlavi promised Iranians it would become through his progressive programs—it was his dream to make Iran the fifth most powerful nation in the world before he died—Iranians experienced alarming inflation and could only sit by as the gap between rich and poor grew all the more exaggerated. The black market thrived as bureaucracy, bottlenecks, shortages, and inflation hampered legitimate businesses. Meanwhile, tens of thousands of jobs went to foreign workers. Many of these were to help operate the expensive, high-tech U.S. military equipment the shah bought to bolster his army and dream of becoming a world power.

One of the organizing forces in this growing dissatisfaction with the shah’s Western leanings—and one that was greatly underestimated—was Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, who had been exiled in 1964 for his opposition to the shah’s White Revolution, a series of reforms to modernize Iran, including, among many other modernizations, voting rights for women, land reforms abolishing feudalism, changes in the laws to allow the election of religious minorities, and civil code changes that gave women legal equality in marital issues—a move that would break up property owned by some Shiite clergy.

Khomeini had begun his career as a respected religious figure in the Iranian city of Qom. After Khomeini went public with his criticisms and personal attacks against the shah, he was arrested on June 5, 1963. A three-day riot broke out in protest and ended with Khomeini being kept under house arrest for eight months and then released, only to attack the Pahlavi government again. In November of 1964, he was arrested a second time and deported to Turkey in exile. He was later allowed to move to Iraq, where he spent the next thirteen years of his life. In 1978, Khomeini ran afoul of then vice president of Iraq Saddam Hussein and was forced to flee. From Iraq, the ayatollah traveled to Neauphle-le-Château in France.

During these years Khomeini refused to be silent and continued his influence in Iran by building a formidable support network through the power of the spoken word. His weapon of choice was not the sword, the gun, or the suicide bomber at that time, but simple cassette tapes of his recorded sermons. The tapes were smuggled into Iran by pilgrims returning from pilgrimages to the holy city of al Najaf in Iraq. The tapes were duplicated over and over and passed among the masses that were eager to see the shah deposed. He, among others, fueled Muslims’ disdain for what was called
Gharbzadegi
, “the plague of Western culture,” and teachers like Khomeini found many willing to embrace their more leftist interpretations of the Shiite faith. Khomeini’s influence grew as the Pahlavi dynasty waned. At the same time, the United States became a symbol of the West that mullahs and clerics felt was corrupting Iran because of the shah’s close ties and obsequiousness to it.

D
EMOCRACY
U
NDERMINED

It is worth noting here that the shah was not only seen as a Western puppet because of his friendliness with the United States, but also because it was the 1953 coup by the United States and Great Britain that first propelled him into a position of power. During the first half of the twentieth century, Iran (still known to the West as Persia until 1935) became increasingly important on the international stage because of the discovery of oil there under the Qajar dynasty in May of 1908. As industrialization gripped the globe, the discovery of this coveted commodity would prove to be one of Iran’s greatest bargaining chips on the world market, both in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries.

In 1921, Reza Khan, Pahlavi’s father (also known as Reza Pahlavi and later as Reza Shah), a military leader, staged a coup d’etat against the Qajar ruler. He marched his troops into Tehran and seized the capital almost unopposed. His demand that the government resign was met, and his cohort, Seyyed Zia’eddin Tabatabaee, was declared prime minister of Iran. Reza Khan was named commander of the army and took the name Reza Khan Sardar Sepah.

In 1923, Reza Khan was officially named prime minister by Ahmad Shah Qajar before he was exiled to Europe. The
Majlis
(Iranian parliament) declared Reza Khan the shah of Persia on December 12, 1925. His son, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi—the man Khomeini would help depose in 1979—was named crown prince.

It was at that time Reza Khan adopted the title of Reza Shah, and he ruled Iran for more than sixteen years. His accomplishments were many. Under his leadership, the Trans-Iranian Railway from Tehran to the Caspian and Persian Seas was completed. He also set about to improve the educational system. Between 1925 and 1940, Reza Shah expanded the education budget in Iran from $100,000 to $12 million. To encourage studies, he exempted secondary school students from military service. He founded Tehran’s university in 1934
³
and many other universities in the years following. He also sought to diminish the power and influence of traditional religious schools. He instituted a law of uniform dress, which made European-style attire for every man mandatory, with the exception of religious students. Religious students had to take a government examination before they could exercise this exemption. Numerous Iranian students received European educations because of his progressive programs.

During most of this time, the world at large still referred to the lands governed by Reza Shah as Persia, which came from the Greek name
Persis
. On March 21, 1935, the shah requested that the public worldwide henceforth use “Iran” as the official name of the nation.

World War II brought a change in leadership for Iran but not a change in the ruling house. Fearing that Reza Shah’s refusal to allow British troops to be stationed in Iran would lead to an alliance with Nazi Germany, the UK and the USSR joined hands to force Reza Shah to abdicate the Peacock Throne. His son, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, assumed the throne on September 16, 1941. Reza Shah went into exile first to the Island of Mauritius, then to Johannesburg, South Africa. He died there in 1944.

Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi began his reign apparently with every intention of following the dictates of a constitutional monarchy (the form of democratic government in Great Britain and the form Iran had taken in 1906). Though he was the monarch, the shah took a hands-off approach to domestic politics and generally yielded to the wishes of the Iranian parliament. Pahlavi predominately occupied himself with the affairs of state and either openly defied the prime ministers or impeded the legislative process in such matters. Prone to indecision, however, Pahlavi relied more on manipulation than on leadership. He concentrated on reviving the army and ensuring that it would remain under royal control as the monarchy’s main power base.

In 1951 a strong rival to Pahlavi’s power emerged when Mohammed Mossadegh, a nationalist, was elected prime minister of Iran. In spite of Pahlavi’s British connections, Mossadegh secured the votes necessary in parliament to nationalize the British-controlled Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC) in what became known as the Abadan Crisis. This cut off British profits from and control of Middle Eastern oil. In response, Great Britain decided to depose Mossadegh and his cabinet and solidify power in Pahlavi. When they asked Harry Truman to help with the coup in 1951, he refused, but when they asked Dwight Eisenhower shortly after his election in 1953 for U.S. support and help in their plans, Ike agreed.

So it was that a military coup headed by former minister of the interior and retired army general Fazlollah Zahedi, with covert support by British intelligence and the CIA (code-named Operation Ajax), finally forced Mossadegh from office on August 19, 1953. Zahedi became the new prime minister, authority was pulled from the democratically elected wing of the government and redeposited in the throne of the shah, and Mossadegh was tried for treason. In return, the shah agreed to let an international consortium of 40 percent British, 40 percent American, 14 percent Dutch, and 6 percent French companies run Iranian oil production for the next twenty-five years. Profits were to be split fifty-fifty with Iran, but Iran was never allowed to audit the books to see if this was done fairly, nor were any Iranians allowed to be on the board of directors of any of these companies. It was at this time that the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company became the British Petroleum Company, one of the root companies of British Petroleum (BP) today.

It was the first time in history that the United States had helped to undermine a democratic government—a decision we would pay for in 1979 when the United States made another costly mistake in turning our backs on the very shah we had first brought to power.

E
NTER
J
IMMY
C
ARTER

When Jimmy Carter entered the political fray that was the 1976 campaign, America was still riding the liberal wave of anti-Vietnam emotion. In fact, a group labeling itself the Institute for Policy Studies (IPS) was determined to inject liberal politics into every arena. Their network included many of what were labeled “alternative media outlets.” The IPS-controlled liberal Left was determined that Democratic front-runner Jimmy Carter would adopt the platform written by Marcus Raskin, one of the founders of IPS. Raskin and his henchmen were able to wrest a promise from Carter that he would, if elected president, cut spending by the military and contest the production of the B-1 bomber, among other things.

Iran was an early bone of contention among Carter’s staff selections. In truth, Carter’s transition team asked for an in-depth report on Iran even before he assumed the reins of government. In reevaluating the Carter presidency, John Dumbrell wrote that Walter Mondale and his aide, David Aaron, had links to the Iranian resistance based in the United States. They were persuaded that the shah was not entitled to rule Iran and determined he needed to be restrained. Others in Mondale’s periphery simply wanted the ruler removed from the throne. According to Congressman David Bower, “Opportunists in the State Department were trying to out-Carter Carter.”
⁴
Once in office, the president’s liberal Left supporters felt justified in redoubling efforts to remove the shah from the Peacock Throne.

When James Earl Carter took office in January 1977, he inherited the well-ingrained policies of Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger. During the five years preceding Carter’s inauguration, the shah had purchased some $10 billion in U.S. military matériel. Nixon and Kissinger had set in motion an agenda for the next several decades. The U.S. government’s presence in the Persian Gulf region and its supply of oil from that area were contingent on the good will of the shah. The United States looked to the shah for the economic survival of Western industry, and the shah relied on the United States for the arms and assistance to implement his vision for Iran’s future. Failure on the part of either entity could cause unimagined economic and political upheaval.

In the mid-70s, the shah had morphed from an insecure young leader to one who was fully in control of the bureaucracy in Iran, who was working to bring the country into the twentieth century, and who was not looking for advice or direction, not even from his mentor, the United States government. When Jimmy Carter arrived in Washington DC, he was the recipient of the years-earlier Richard Nixon–Henry Kissinger arms sales policies that placed the security of one of the world’s richest regions in the hands of a monarch whose determination to bring social and economic change to Iran did not take into account the smoldering fires of Islamic unrest.

The shah had enjoyed a prolonged political association with the Republican administrations of Nixon and Gerald Ford. He was understandably wary of Carter, whose campaign platform stressed both human rights issues and reduced arms sales. This was a major concern, as the shah’s regime had been criticized for the actions of its secret police, the SAVAK, and had a long-standing relationship with U.S. arms suppliers.

Pahlavi’s personal confidant, Asadollah Alam, wrote in his diary about the shah’s concerns over Carter’s election: “Who knows what sort of calamity he [Carter] may unleash on the world?”
⁵
In September of 1976, Alam met with Uri Lubrani, Israel’s representative in Iran, and asked for his assistance to help improve the shah’s image with the American people.

In that same year that Jimmy Carter was inaugurated, Islamic leader Ali Shariati died, and a huge potential rival to Ayatollah Khomeini was removed, thus solidifying Khomeini’s support in Iran more than ever. In October of that year, Khomeini’s son Mostafa died of what was apparently a heart attack, but antigovernment forces pointed the finger at SAVAK and Mostafa was proclaimed a martyr. While there were various factions opposing the shah’s regime—leftists, the People’s Mujahedin of Iran (MEK), communists, and other groups—Khomeini had suddenly become the most popular opponent to Pahlavi’s rule.

At the same time, with the hope of improving the image of the United States as the benevolent superpower to the post-Vietnam world, Jimmy Carter created a special Office of Human Rights, and the shah emerged high on the agency’s list. Washington put pressure on the shah to relax his control and allow more political freedom. This prompted the release of more than three hundred political prisoners, relaxed censorship, and overhauled the court system, which had the unforeseen side effect of allowing greater freedom for opposition groups to meet and organize.