The Grand Alliance (178 page)

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Appendix F, Book Two

TANKS FOR THE MIDDLE EAST

Prime Minister to Secretary

11.VIII.41.

of State for War and

Minister of Supply

Out of 1441 infantry and cruiser tanks with the
troops [at home] 391 are “unfit for action.” This is far too
high, and I am sure it is capable of reduction if something like the arrangements for repair introduced into
the air force last year could be provided.

Will you please consult together and make me a
proposal for the more prompt handling of these repairs.

The number of tanks out of action ought never to
exceed ten per cent of those in this country. More
especially is this the case in view of the period of
maximum preparedness which is now approaching.

Prime Minister to Secretary

19.VIII.41.

of State for War

Your minute of July 15, 1941 [about repair of tanks
at home], states a number of requirements which, if
they could all be met, would make life too easy. Everything practicable should be done to meet the various
desiderata, but the main contribution must be a genuine
effort and good management. I am shocked to see that
a month later we still have twenty-five per cent of
infantry tanks out of order, and that out of 400 cruiser
tanks no fewer than 157 are unfit for action. I have no
doubt there can be made plenty of explanations for
such a failure, but failure it remains none the less.

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Pray do not let it be thought that you are satisfied
with such a result. If you simply take up the attitude of
defending it there will be no hope of improvement.

Prime Minister to Secretary

27.VIII.41.

of State for Air

Your minute of August 6 shows that the most
promising weapon at present in sight for aerial attack
on tanks is the Jefferis bomb, and I am pleased to note
that you have ordered fifty thousand of these.

As I understand these weapons go into the ordinary
light bomb container, it should be possible to put them
into use at once, and I should favour postponing further
manufacture of the sticky bomb and a part of the
bombard ammunition in order to obtain immediately an
adequate supply of these aerial bombs. It seems likely
that when the tactics have been worked out and the
pilots have had some practice, considerable improvement in the chance of hitting, as shown in the first trials,
may be expected. We should get immediately a large
supply of dummy bombs and give a selected group of
pilots plenty of practice against ground targets. If the
expected improvement is achieved, we should investigate at once the possibility of sending through the
Mediterranean at an early date in a warship an adequate supply with the pilots who have practised with the
dummy bombs.

It might also be well to consider whether the Russians might be able to improvise these bombs rapidly,
in which case they should be given full details.

(Action this day.) Prime

27.VIII.41.

Minister to Minister of

Supply and C.I.G.S.

We ought to try sometimes to look ahead. The
Germans turned up in Libya with six-pounder guns in
their tanks, yet I suppose it would have been reasonable for us to have imagined they would do something
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to break up the ordinary “I” tank. This had baffled the
Italians at Bardia, etc. The Germans had specimens of
it in their possession taken at Dun-kirk, also some
cruiser tanks, so it was not difficult for them to prepare
weapons which would defeat our tanks.

2. I now try to look ahead for our side, to have
Alpine troops formed for Norway, and to have the
power to spring a surprise in tanks on the enemy in
Libya. Instantly everyone tries to make difficulties, so
that in three or four months, should it be desired to take
action, we shall be confronted with the usual helpless
negation. We ought to have it in our power to place at
least one hundred A. 22’s in a desert-worthy condition
in the field by January or February at latest. To do this it
is necessary to get over all the minor modifications for
desert warfare. Why should this not go forward at the
same time as the final improvements are being made in
the tank itself? The people in Egypt will never believe
the tank is desert-worthy unless they have it tried on
the spot. The various improvements made at home can
be flown out or explained by telegram. Instead of this,
we are to wait till the beginning of 1942, and then send
two tanks out, which are to be then sniffed at and
experimented with, and a whole new lot of faults found
by the Nile authorities.

3. What I have asked is this: That two of these tanks
shall go out now with a certain number of skilled men
and spare parts; that these men shall be kept in close
touch with the improvements made here, and shall at
the same time deal with the “desert-worthy” aspect,
imparting to us the result of any improvements they
make. I would have been willing to have allowed the
double process to go on at home, but if it is going to
take till 1942 anyhow at home, and then have to be
gone over all again in the Middle East, I feel that my
original thought was right.

Pray let me have some help in this matter.

Where is it supposed these tanks will fight in the
spring of 1942, except in the Middle East?

[These two Churchill tanks were shipped to the
Middle East at the end of September, and arrived on
December 12. General Auchinleck had promised to
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give his personal attention to their tests in the Desert,
and I was therefore shocked to receive the following
telegram from him on the 25th:]

“These vehicles were stowed on forward well-deck,
unsheeted and unlocked. In consequence vehicles
were exposed to sea-water, and when received both
tanks had water on floors and showed rust markings
nine inches up the walls.

“Considerable damage to electrical and wireless
gear, requiring fourteen days’ expert attention before
tanks can run. Method of dispatch and stowage most
unsatisfactory. All American tanks are dispatched with
all crevices and doors pasted up with masking tape. ...”

I immediately asked Mr. Justice Singleton to conduct
an inquiry. He reported on March 10, 1942: “The case
discloses mismanagement to an amazing degree.” The
tanks had been loaded on the open deck, un-greased,
their doors unlocked, and not even covered with
waterproof sheets. “The damage,” he said, “was
caused through their not having been prepared for
shipment in the normal way. Much of it could and would
have been avoided if the two fitters had accompanied
the tanks.” This of course was precisely what Lord
Beaverbrook and I had asked should be done and what
the War Office had ordered. Mr. Justice Singleton said
that it was difficult to tell who was responsible, as the
General concerned in the War Office was dead. He
continued as follows: “The arrangement which had
been made was altered under somewhat strange
circumstances which it is not easy to follow. The
managing director of the firm of manufacturers and the
Major-General met at a luncheon party at the Savoy on
September 15, when the former asked if it was not
possible for his fitters to be sent to the Middle East by
air, as they could be usefully employed here and could
keep in touch with improvements. The General then
instructed the Ministry of Supply to arrange for the two
men to be flown to the Middle East rather than that they
should waste several weeks on board ship.”

No one from the firm of manufacturers even saw the
tanks loaded on board. The Ordnance Officer at the
port did not go inside either of them and knew nothing

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of their condition. His staff sergeant entered one and
noticed that it was not properly “greased up,” but
reported the fact to nobody.

[By the time however that the investigation had been
finished, the war had swept on, and on June 1, 1942, I
minuted to General Ismay: “Alas I am too busy to chase
these rabbits as they deserve, and no one else will do
anything.”]

(Action this day.) Prime

21.X.41.

Minister to General Ismay

Please check and point this up for me in time for
tonight’s meeting:

Clarification is needed about the telegrams from
Middle East. General Auchinleck says that the one
hundred and fifty tanks which he had expected in
September only arrivedOctober 4 to 14. Actually they
arrived on October 2, or only one day later than he had
expected. Twelve days were taken in unloading the
whole of these tanks. What happened to them then?

We are told they had to be stripped down to be made
desert-worthy and have their front axles strengthened.

We now know this was not necessary so far as the
axles were concerned, and that the desert-worthy
additions could all have been executed at the unit in a
day or two. We do not know however what Middle East
has done. Have they in fact already pulled these tanks
to pieces and begun splicing the axles? If so the three
weeks’ delay of which they speak may be unavoidable,
even though the process was unnecessary. How was it
no one went out with the tanks to tell the people out
there about them?

2. By other telegrams and discussions it is known
that an armoured brigade or division requires to be a
month with its new vehicles to fire the guns and perform
combined exercises. How far does this apply to the 22d
Armoured Brigade, who were fully trained with these
very tanks when they went out? I suppose they would