The Grand Alliance (22 page)

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reasonable hope, you should still retain power to
liberate Greeks from any bargain and at the same time
liberate ourselves. Evidently you and we have a few
days in which to make our final decision. Meanwhile all
should proceed as arranged.

Our efforts to warn the Yugoslavian Government must now be described. The whole defence of Salonika depended on their coming in, and it was vital to know what they would do.

On March 2 Mr. Campbell, our Ambassador at Belgrade, met Mr. Eden in Athens. He said that the Yugoslavs were frightened of Germany and unsettled internally by political difficulties. There was a chance, however, that if they knew our plans for aiding Greece they might be ready to help. Mr.

Eden and the Greeks feared lest the enemy should find out.

On the fifth the Foreign Secretary sent Mr. Campbell back to Belgrade with a confidential letter to the Regent. In this he portrayed Yugoslavia’s fate at German hands, and said that Greece and Turkey intended to fight if attacked. In such a case Yugoslavia must join us. The Regent was to be told verbally that the British had decided to help Greece with land and air forces as strongly and quickly as possible, and that if a Yugoslav staff officer could be sent to Athens we would include him in our discussions. The defence of Salonika would depend on Yugoslavia’s attitude. If she gave way to Germany the consequences would be obvious.

She was urged instead to join us and have a British army to fight by her side. Our effort in Greece would be a vigorous one, and we had a good chance of holding a line.

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On March 1 the German Army began to move into Bulgaria.

The Bulgarian Army mobilised and took up positions along the Greek frontier. A general southward movement of the German forces was in progress, aided in every way by the Bulgarians. On the following day Mr. Eden and General Dill returned to Athens from Angora and military conversations were resumed. As the result of these Mr. Eden sent a very serious message.

Mr. Eden and C.I.G.

5 March 41

S. to Prime Minister

On arrival here we found a changed and disturbing
situation and the atmosphere quite different from that of
our last visit.

2. General Papagos had on the last occasion
insisted strongly that the withdrawal of all troops in
Macedonia to the Aliakhmon line was the only sound
military solution. We had expected that this withdrawal
to the Aliakhmon line had already begun. Instead we
found that no movement had in fact commenced,
Papagos alleging that it had been agreed that the
decision taken at our last meeting was dependent on
the receipt of an answer from Yugoslavia as to their
attitude….

3. Papagos now proposed to hold the line of fortifications near the Macedonian frontier with four divisions,
although he thought they could not hold out for long,
and also simply to remain where he was on the Albanian front. This seemed an admission of despair, as he
himself practically admitted.

4. He proposed that British troops should, as they
arrived, be moved up piecemeal to the Macedonian
frontier line, although it was unlikely that they could
arrive in time. We naturally refused to accept this
proposal, which was so entirely different from the
conditions under which we had agreed to send our
forces. We telegraphed to the Commander-in-Chief
Middle East to come to Athens for discussion. He
arrived March 3, and discussions have been practically
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continuous. As attitude of Papagos was unaccommodat-ing, we had to enlist the aid of the King, who was
throughout the very trying discussions which followed
calm, determined, and helpful.

5. We were finally offered three Greek divisions….

6. We were thus faced with following alternatives:
(a) To accept the plan of Papagos, to which he constantly returned, of attempting to dribble our forces
piecemeal up to Macedonian frontier. (b) To accept
three Greek divisions offered for Aliakhmon line, the
equivalent of about sixteen to twenty-three battalions,
instead of thirty-five we had been led to expect on our
previous visit, and to build up our concentration behind
this. (c) To withdraw our offer of military support altogether.

7. We were agreed that course (a) could only lead to
military wavering, while course (c) seemed equally
disastrous….

8. We therefore agreed, after some misgivings, to
solution (b), but with the proviso that the command and
organisation of the whole Aliakhmon line was entrusted
to General Wilson as soon as he was in a position to
take it over. This was agreed to.

9. Our military advisers did not consider it by any
means a hopeless proposition to check and hold the
German advance on this line, which is naturally strong,
with few approaches. At the worst it should always be
possible to make fighting withdrawal from this line
through country eminently suitable for rearguard
action….

14. We are all sure that we have in a very difficult
situation arrived at correct decision. These two days
have been indescribably anxious, but now that decision
has been taken there is a marked improvement in the
general atmosphere on Greek side. The hard fact
remains that our forces, including Dominions contingents, will be engaged in an operation more hazardous
than it seemed a week ago. You will no doubt decide
on any communications to be made to the Dominions
Governments….

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A marked change now came over our views in London. The Chiefs of Staff recorded the various factors developing unfavourably against our Balkan policy, and particularly against sending an army to Greece. They first emphasised the main changes in the situation: the depression of the Greek Commander-in-Chief; the omission of the Greeks to carry out their undertaking of twelve days earlier to withdraw their troops to the line we should have to hold if Yugoslavia did not come in; the fact that thirty-five Greek battalions were to have helped us hold this line, and that now there were to be only twenty-three at most, all newly formed, untried in battle, and lacking in artillery. In addition it had been expected that the Greeks would be able to withdraw some divisions from their Albanian front. “General Papagos now says that this cannot be done, as they are exhausted and outnumbered.”

Turning to our own difficulties, the Chiefs of Staff pointed out that they had always expected that Rhodes would be captured before, or simultaneously with, the move to Greece; instead, this could not now be done till the move was over. This would mean that instead of our being able to concentrate our air forces against the German advance we should now have to conduct “considerable” air operations against Rhodes in order to protect our lines of communication to Greece. Finally, the Suez Canal was for the moment completely blocked by mines, and was not expected to be cleared until March 11. Half the ships carrying motor transport were north of the Canal and all the personnel ships south of it. Time, moreover, was running short. The Chiefs of Staff estimated that the Germans could concentrate two divisions on the Aliakhmon line by March 15 and three more by the twenty-second. One of these

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would be armoured. Assuming that the Greeks could only delay them in front of this line for a short time, the best we could hope for would be to have one armoured and one New Zealand brigade against the first two German divisions.

“The hazards of the enterprise,” they concluded, “have considerably increased.” They did not, however, feel that they could as yet question the military advice of those on the spot, who described the position as not by any means hopeless.

After reflecting alone at Chequers on the Sunday night upon the Chiefs of Staff paper and the trend of discussion in the War Cabinet that morning I sent the following message to Mr. Eden, who had now left Athens for Cairo.

This certainly struck a different note on my part. But I take full responsibility for the eventual decision, because I am sure I could have stopped it all if I had been convinced. It is so much easier to stop than to do.

Prime

Minister

to

6 March 41

Mr. Eden, Cairo

Situation has indeed changed for worse. Chiefs of
Staff have presented serious commentary, which
follows in my next. Failure of Papagos to act as agreed
with you on February 22, obvious difficulty of his
extricating his army from contact in Albania, and time-table of our possible movements furnished by Wavell,
together with other adverse factors recited by Chiefs of
Staff – for example, postponement of Rhodes and
closing of Canal – make it difficult for Cabinet to believe
that we now have any power to avert fate of Greece
unless Turkey and/or Yugoslavia come in, which seems
most improbable. We have done our best to promote
Balkan combination against Germany. We must be
careful not to urge Greece against her better judgment

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into a hopeless resistance alone when we have only
handfuls of troops which can reach scene in time.

Grave Imperial issues are raised by committing New
Zealand and Australian troops to an enterprise which,
as you say, has become even more hazardous. We are
bound to lay before the Dominions Governments your
and Chiefs of Staff appreciation. Cannot forecast their
assent to operation. We do not see any reasons for
expecting success, except that, of course, we attach
great weight to opinions of Dill and Wavell.

We must liberate Greeks from feeling bound to
reject a German ultimatum. If on their own they resolve
to fight, we must to some extent share their ordeal. But
rapid German advance will probably prevent any
appreciable British Imperial forces from being engaged.

Loss of Greece and Balkans is by no means a major
catastrophe for us, provided Turkey remains honest
neutral. We could take Rhodes and consider plans for