The Grand Alliance (3 page)

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solved without relation to all the rest. What was given to one theatre had to be taken from another. An effort here meant a risk there. Our physical resources were harshly limited. The attitude of a dozen Powers, friendly, opportunist, or potentially hostile, was unknowable. At home we must face the war against the U-boats, the invasion threat, and the continuing Blitz; we had to conduct the group of campaigns in the Middle East; and, thirdly, to try to make a front against Germany in the Balkans. And we had to do all this for a long time alone. After shooting Niagara we had now to struggle in the rapids. One of the difficulties of this narrative is the disproportion between our single-handed efforts to keep our heads above water from day to day and do our duty, and the remorseless development of far larger events.

We had at any rate a solid foundation in Great Britain. I was sure that, provided we maintained the highest state of readiness at home and the necessary forces, a German attempt at invasion in 1941 would not be to our disadvantage. The German air strength in all theatres was very little greater than in 1940, whereas our air fighter force at home had grown from fifty-one to seventy-eight squadrons, and our bombers from twenty-seven to forty-five squadrons. The Germans had not won the air battle in 1940. They seemed to have little chance of winning it in 1941. Our army in the Island had grown far stronger.

Between September, 1940, and September, 1941, it was raised from twenty-six active divisions to thirty-four, plus five armoured divisions. To this must be added the maturity of the troops and the enormous increase in their weapons.

The Home Guard had risen from a million to a million and a half; and now all had firearms. Numbers, mobility,

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equipment, training, organisation, and defence works were vastly improved. Hitler, of course, had always a superabundance of soldiers for invasion. To conquer us he would have had to carry and supply across the Channel at least a million men. He could by 1941 have had a large though not a sufficient quantity of landing-craft. But with our dominant air force and naval power giving us the command of both elements we had no doubt of our ability to destroy or cripple his armada. All the arguments, therefore, on which we had relied in 1940 were now incomparably stronger. So long as there was no relaxation in vigilance or serious reduction in our own defence the War Cabinet and the Chiefs of the Staff felt no anxiety.

Although our American friends, some of whose generals visited us, took a more alarmist view of our position, and the world at large regarded the invasion of Britain as probable, we ourselves felt free to send overseas all the troops our available shipping could carry and to wage offensive war in the Middle East and the Mediterranean.

Here was the hinge on which our ultimate victory turned, and it was in 1941 that the first significant events began. In war armies must fight. Africa was the only continent in which we could meet our foes on land. The defence of Egypt and of Malta were duties compulsive upon us, and the destruction of the Italian Empire the first prize we could gain. The British resistance in the Middle East to the triumphant Axis Powers and our attempt to rally the Balkans and Turkey against them are the theme and thread of our story now.

The Desert victories cheered the opening days of the year.

Bardia, with more than forty thousand men, surrendered on The Grand Alliance

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January 5. Tobruk seemed certainly within our grasp, and was in fact taken, with nearly thirty thousand prisoners, in a fortnight. On the nineteenth we reoccupied Kassala, in the Sudan, and on the twentieth invaded the Italian colony of Eritrea, seizing the railhead at Biscia a few days later. On that same day the Emperor Haile Selassie re-entered Abyssinia. But all the while the reports accumulated of the German movements and preparations for a Balkan campaign. I drew up for the Chiefs of Staff an appreciation upon the war as a whole, with which I found them in general agreement.

Prime

Minister

to

6 Jan. 41

General Ismay, for C.

O.S. Committee

The speedy destruction of the Italian armed forces in
Northeast Africa must be our prime major overseas
objective in the opening months of 1941. Once the
Italian army in Cyrenaica has been destroyed, the Army
of the Nile becomes free for other tasks. We cannot yet
tell what these will be.

2. The fall of Bardia should enable an advanced
base to be established there for the capture of Tobruk.

With Bardia and Tobruk in our hands it should be
possible to drop the land communications with Alexandria almost entirely and to rely upon sea transport for
our further westward advance. Every plan should be
made now to use Tobruk to its utmost capacity.

3. The striking force to be maintained west of Bardia
and Tobruk need not be large. The 2d and 7th British
Armoured Divisions, the 6th Australian Division, the
New Zealand brigade group, soon to become a
division, with perhaps one or two British brigades,
comprising not more than 40,000 to 45,000 men,
should suffice to overpower the remaining Italian
resistance and to take Benghazi. The distance from
Tobruk to Benghazi by the coastal road is not much
above 250 miles, compared with about 370 from
Alexandria to Tobruk.
1
Thus, once Tobruk is estab-The Grand Alliance

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lished as the base and our land communications begin
from there, no greater strain should be thrown upon the
land transport than at present, and it should be possible
to start afresh from Tobruk as if Tobruk were Alexandria, and to maintain the moderate but adequate
striking force required. With the capture of Benghazi
this phase of the Libyan campaign would be ended.

4. The question is, how long will this take? Having
regard to the very heavy Italian losses in their best
troops and in their vehicles and equipment, and to the
fact that we have the command of the sea, the collapse
in Cyrenaica might be very rapid. Indeed, all might go
with a run at any time. The need for haste is obvious. It
would, however, suffice for our general strategy if
Benghazi and everything east of it were effectively in
our possession and occupied as a military and naval
base at any time during March.

5. The aforesaid Libyan operations need not,
therefore, at all affect the simultaneous pushing of the
campaign against the Italians in Abyssinia. General
Wavell has already withdrawn the 4th Indian Division.

The 5th Indian Division is also available, and it should
be possible to carry out the Kassala operation and to
spread the revolt in Abyssinia, while at the same time
the Kenya forces press northward by Lake Rudolf. At
any time we may receive armistice proposals from the
cut-off Italian garrison in Abyssinia. This army must
have been buoyed up with hopes of an Italian conquest
of the Delta and of the Canal, enabling communications
to be restored and supplies to reach them by the Nile
and the Red Sea. These hopes are already dead. On
the other hand, the vast size of Abyssinia, the lack of all
communications, especially sea communications, and
the impossibility of nourishing large forces may bring
about an indefinite delay. It is, however, not an unreasonable hope that by the end of April the Italian army in
Abyssinia will have submitted or been broken up.

6. The moment that this is apparent the northward
movement of all the effective forces in Kenya, as well
as those in the Sudan and Abyssinia, will become
possible. These forces will thenceforward become a
reserve available for operations in the Eastern Mediter-The Grand Alliance

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ranean. If we take the present total strength of the
armies in the Middle East at about 370,000 (including
convoys W.S. 5 and 6), it might be reasonably
expected that the equivalent of ten divisions would
stand in the Nile Valley, together with two additional
divisions from home, a total of twelve, after providing
the necessary garrisons and security troops for
Abyssinia, Cyrenaica, Egypt, and Palestine. These
twelve divisions should thus be free (apart from new
distractions) by the end of April.

II

7. To invade and force a way through Spain to the
Straits of Gibraltar against the will of the Spanish
people and Government, especially at this season, is a
most dangerous and questionable enterprise for
Germany to undertake, and it is no wonder that Hitler,
with so many sullen populations to hold down, has so
far shrunk from it. With the permission of the Spanish
Government it would, of course, be a short and easy
matter for the Germans to gain control of Lisbon and of
the Algeciras and Ceuta batteries, together with appropriate airfields. According to Captain Hillgarth [our
Naval Attaché in Madrid], who has lived long in Spain
and is fresh from contact with our Ambassador, it is
becoming increasingly unlikely that the Spanish Government will give Hitler passage or join the war against
us. General Wavell’s victories in Libya have played,
and will play, an important part in Spanish opinion. If
the Germans are refused permission it is most unlikely
that they will try to force their way into and through
Spain before the month of April. From every point of
view this delay is helpful to us. We have the use of
Gibraltar; we have the time for our strength in the
Middle East to accomplish its task there and again to
become free; above all, there is the possibility of events
taking a favourable turn in France and at Vichy.

8. We must now be most careful not to precipitate
matters in Spain, or set the Spanish Government
against us more than it is already, or provoke Herr
Hitler to a violent course towards Spain. All these
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matters are highly speculative. There can be no certainty about them. But the fact that Hitler has not acted
through Spain as we feared, when conditions, both
political and climatic, were more favourable to him,
makes it on the whole a reasonable working assumption that any German adventure in Spain will at least
wait for the spring.

III

9. The probabilities of delay in Spain until the spring
give rise to the hope that the Vichy Government, under
German pressure or actual German incursion, may
either proceed to North Africa and resume the war from
there, or authorise General Weygand to do so. If such
an event could be brought about before the Straits of
Gibraltar fell into German control, we should have a
very good chance of resisting a German attempt
against the Straits indefinitely. We could move troops
into Morocco by the Atlantic ports; we should have the
use of the French air bases in North Africa. The whole
situation in the Mediterranean would be completely
revolutionised in our favour. The position of any Italian
forces remaining in Tripoli would become impossible.

We might well be able to open the Mediterranean for
supplies and reinforcements for the Middle East.

10. We have, therefore, thought it right to assure
Marshal Pétain and General Weygand that we will
assist them with up to six divisions, substantial air
forces, and the necessary naval power from the
moment they feel able to take the all-important step we
so greatly desire. We have also impressed upon them
the danger of delaying their action until the Germans
have made their way through Spain and become
masters of the Straits and of Northern Morocco. We
can but wait and see what Vichy will do. Meanwhile we
enforce the blockade of France fitfully and as naval
convenience offers, partly to assert the principle, partly
to provide a “smokescreen” of Anglo-French friction,
and especially not to let the Vichy Government feel that
if they do nothing life will be tolerable for them so far as
we are concerned. It is greatly to our interest that
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