The Grand Alliance (8 page)

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On top of this now came the menace to the Balkan States, including Greece and Turkey, of being enticed or coerced into the Hitler empire, or conquered if they did not comply.

Was the same hideous process we had witnessed in Norway, Denmark, Holland, Belgium, and France to be reproduced in Southeast Europe? Were all the Balkan States, including heroic Greece, to be subjugated one by one, and Turkey, isolated, to be compelled to open for the German legions the road to Palestine, Egypt, Iraq, and Persia? Was there no chance of creating a Balkan unity and Balkan front which would make this new German aggression too costly to be worth while? Might not the fact of Balkan resistance to Germany produce serious and helpful reactions in Soviet Russia? Certainly this was a sphere in which the Balkan States were affected by interest, and even, so far as they allowed it to influence their calculations, by sentiment. Could we from our strained but growing resources find the extra outside contribution which might galvanise all these states, whose interests were largely the same, into action for a common cause? Or ought we, on the other hand, to mind our own business and make a success of our campaign in Northeast Africa, let Greece, the Balkans, and it might be Turkey and all else in the Middle East, slide to ruin?

There would have been much mental relief in such a clear-cut decision; and it has found its adherents in the books of various officers occupying subordinate positions who have given us their views. These writers certainly have the advantage of pointing to the misfortunes which we sustained, but they had not the knowledge to consider sufficiently what the results of the opposite policy might have been. If Hitler had been able, with hardly any fighting, to bring Greece to her knees and the whole of the Balkans into his system and then force Turkey to allow the passage

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of his armies to the south and east, might he not have made terms with the Soviets upon the conquest and partition of these vast regions and postponed his ultimate, inevitable quarrel with them to a later part of his programme? Or, as is more likely, would he not have been able to attack Russia in greater strength at an earlier date?

The main question which the ensuing chapters will probe and expose is whether His Majesty’s Government by their action influenced in a decisive, or even in an appreciable manner, Hitler’s movements in Southeast Europe, and moreover whether that action did not produce consequences first upon the behaviour of Russia and next upon her fortunes.

We had, as is set forth in the previous volume, already given modest aid to Greece from the time when she was attacked by Italy, and four British air squadrons were operating with some success from Greek airfields. It is at this point worth while seeing what was actually in progress on the German side.

On January 7 Ribbentrop informed the heads of the German mission in Moscow:

Since early in January the movement of strong German troop formations to Rumania has been going on via Hungary. The movement of troops is being carried on with full concurrence of the Hungarian and Rumanian Governments. For the time being the troops will be quartered in the south of Rumania. The troop movements result from the fact that the necessity must be seriously contemplated of ejecting the English completely from the whole of Greece. German troops have been provided in such strength that they can easily cope with any military task in the Danubian region and with any eventualities from any side. The The Grand Alliance

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military measures being carried out by us are aimed exclusively against the British forces getting a foothold in Greece, and not against any Balkan country, including Turkey.

As for instructions for conversations, in general a reserved attitude is to be taken. In case of urgent official inquiries it is to be pointed out, depending on circumstances, that such inquiries are to be made in Berlin. In so far as conversation cannot be avoided an opinion in general terms is to be given.
In so doing our
having reliable reports regarding larger and larger
reinforcements of English troops of all kinds in Greece
may be given as a plausible reason and the Salonika
operation of the last World War may be recalled.
2

Concerning the strength of the German troops, maintenance of the present vagueness is desired for the time being. Later on we shall presumably be interested in making known the full strength of the troops, and, beyond that, in stimulating exaggeration. The cue for that will be given at the proper time.

Also the same day to the German Ambassador in Japan: I request that the Japanese Foreign Minister be personally and confidentially informed that at present rather strong German troop contingents are being transferred to Rumania. The movements are carried on with the full concurrence of the Hungarian and the Rumanian Governments. These troop shipments are being carried out as a security measure for an intervention that may become necessary in Greece if English military forces gain a foothold and necessitate such intervention there.

Schulenburg, the German Ambassador at Moscow, replied on January 8:

Numerous rumours are already circulating here concerning the sending of German troops to Rumania; the number of men in the movement is even estimated at two hundred thousand. Government circles here, the

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radio, and the Soviet press have not yet taken up the matter.

The Soviet Government will take the strongest interest in these troop movements, and will wish to know what purposes these troop concentrations serve, and particularly to what degree Bulgaria and Turkey

[Straits] might possibly be affected by them. Please give me appropriate instructions.

The German Foreign Minister answered the same day.

Ribbentrop

to

8 Jan. 41

Schulenburg

I request you not to broach the question of
increased German troop movements to Rumania with
the Soviet Government.

Should you be approached regarding the matter by
Herr Molotov or some other influential person in the
Soviet Government, please say that according to your
information the sending of German troops was exclusively a matter of precautionary military measures
against England. The English already had military
contingents on Greek soil, and it was to be expected
that they would further increase those contingents in
the immediate future. Germany would not under any
circumstances tolerate England’s gaining a foothold on
Greek soil. Please do not go into greater detail until
further notice.

By the middle of January the Russians were deeply perturbed, and raised the issue in Berlin. On January 17 the Russian Ambassador called at the German Foreign Office and communicated the substance of the following memorandum:

According to all reports, German troops in great numbers are in Rumania, and are now prepared to march into Bulgaria, having as their goal the occupation

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of Bulgaria, Greece, and the Straits. There can be no doubt that England will try to forestall the operations of German troops, to occupy the Straits, to start military operations against Bulgaria in alliance with Turkey, and turn Bulgaria into a theatre of operations. The Soviet Government has stated repeatedly to the German Government that it considers the territory of Bulgaria and of the Straits as the security zone of the U.S.S.R., and that it cannot be indifferent to events which threaten the security interests of the U.S.S.R. In view of all this the Soviet Government regards it as its duty to give warning that it will consider the appearance of any foreign armed forces on the territory of Bulgaria and of the Straits as a violation of the security interests of the U.S.S.R.

On January 21 the Russian Ambassador was called to the German Foreign Office and told that the Reich Government had not received any reports that England contemplated occupying the Straits. Nor did they believe that Turkey would permit English military forces to enter her territory.

However, they were informed that England intended and was about to gain a foothold on Greek territory. It was their unalterable intention not to permit English military forces to establish themselves on Greek territory, which would mean a threat to vital interests of Germany in the Balkans. Certain troop concentrations in the Balkans, which had the sole purpose of preventing the British from gaining any foothold on Greek soil, were therefore in progress. The Reich Government believed that this action was also serving Soviet interests, which would be opposed to England’s gaining a foothold in these regions.
2

There for the moment the matter rested.

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A few days later I addressed myself to the President of Turkey.

Prime

Minister

to

31 Jan. 41

President

Inönü,

Angora

The rapidly growing danger to Turkey and to British
interests leads me, Mr. President, to address you
directly. I have sure information that the Germans are
already establishing themselves upon Bulgarian aerodromes. Hutments are being prepared, and advance
servicing personnel numbering several thousands have
arrived. This has been done with the full connivance of
the Royal Bulgarian Air Force and undoubtedly of the
Bulgarian Government. Very soon, perhaps in a few
weeks, the movement into Bulgaria of German troops
and air squadrons will begin. The air squadrons will
only have to fly from their stations in Rumania to the
bases they are preparing in Bulgaria, and will immediately be able to come into action. Then, unless you
promise the Germans not to march against Bulgaria or
against their troops passing through Bulgaria, they will
bomb Istanbul and Adrianople the same night, and also
dive-bomb your troops in Thrace. No doubt they would
hope either to reach Salonika unopposed or to compel
the Greeks to make peace with Italy and yield them air
bases in Greece and in the islands, thus endangering
the communications between our armies in Egypt and
the Turkish Army. They would deny the use of Smyrna
to our Navy, they would completely control the exits
from the Dardanelles, and thus complete the encirclement of Turkey in Europe on three sides. This would
also facilitate their attacks upon Alexandria and Egypt
generally.

Of course I know, Mr. President, that, confronted
with these mortal dangers, Turkey would declare war.