The Grand Alliance (41 page)

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Stafford Cripps with a remark that it was a copy in
substance of a letter addressed to me, dated London,
the second April, 1941, and forwarded to Tokyo.

I wish to express my appreciation for the facilities
with which your Government made efforts to provide
our Ambassador when he wanted to meet me on the
Continent. I was deeply disappointed when I learned
that he could not come. Your Excellency may rest
assured that the foreign policy of Japan is determined
upon after an unbiased examination of all the facts and
a very careful weighing of all the elements of the
situation she confronts, always holding steadfastly in
view the great racial aim and ambition of finally bringing
about the conditions envisaged in what she calls Hakko-ichiu, the Japanese conception of a universal peace
under which there would be no conquest, no oppres-sion, no exploitation of any and all peoples. And, once
determined, I need hardly tell Your Excellency that it
will be carried out with resolution but with utmost
circumspection, taking in every detail of changing
circumstances.

I am, believe me,

Your Excellency’s obedient servant,
YOSUKE MATSUOKA

Matsuoka and his colleagues in the Japanese Government were soon to confront a situation which required such an

“unbiased examination.” On June 28, a week after Hitler’s invasion of Russia, a meeting of the Japanese Cabinet and officials of the Imperial Household was held. Matsuoka found his position irremediably weakened. He had “lost face” because he had not known of Hitler’s intention to attack Russia. He spoke in favour of joining Germany, but The Grand Alliance

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the majority opinion was over-whelmingly against him. The Government decided to adopt a compromise policy.

Armament preparations were to be augmented. Article 5 of the Tripartite Pact was invoked, which stated that the instrument was valid against Russia. Germany was to be informed confidentially that Japan would fight “Bolshevism in Asia,” and the Neutrality Treaty with Russia was cited to justify non-intervention in the German-Russian War. On the other hand, it was agreed to go ahead in the Southern seas and to complete the occupation of South Indo-China. These decisions were not agreeable to Matsuoka. In order to stir up agitation for entering the war on Germany’s side, he had one of his speeches printed as a pamphlet for wide distribution. The copies were suppressed by the Japanese Government. On July 16 he disappeared from office.

But while the Japanese Cabinet were not prepared to follow in the wake of German policy, their policy did not represent a triumph for the moderates in Japanese public life. The strengthening of the Japanese armed forces was pressed forward, and bases were to be established in South Indo-China. This was a prelude to attack on the British and Dutch colonies in Southeast Asia. It seems, from the evidence up till now available, that the leaders of Japanese policy did not expect from the United States or Great Britain any vigorous counter-measures to this projected southward advance.

Thus we see as this world drama marches on how all these three coldly calculating empires made at this moment mistakes disastrous alike to their ambitions and their safety.

Hitler was resolved on the war with Russia, which played a decisive part in his ruin. Stalin remained, to Russia’s bitter cost, in ignorance or underestimation of the blow about to fall on him. Japan certainly missed the best chance – for what it was ever worth – of realising her dreams.

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11

The Desert Flank: Rommel: Tobruk
The Vital Desert Flank — Wavell’s Dispositions —

His Estimate of the Situation of March
2
— Rommel’s Arrival in Tripoli, February
12 —
His Determination to Attack — A Great General — The
Gateway at Agheila — Our Inadequate Resources

— Personal Inspection by Wavell and Dill, March
17 —
My Telegram to Wavell of March
26 —
His
Reply — The Position in Cyrenaica — Rommel’s
Attack upon Agheila, March
31 —
Failure of Our
Armoured Forces — My Telegram of April
2 —

Unexpected German Strength — Evacuation of
Benghazi — Capture of Generals Neame and
O’Connor — Importance of Holding Tobruk
—

Wavell’s Decision — German Mastery of the Air —

My Directive of April
14 —
My Telegram to President Roosevelt, April
16 —
Wavell’s Explanation.

A
LL OUR EFFORTS to form a front in the Balkans were founded upon the sure maintenance of the Desert flank in North Africa. This might have been fixed at Tobruk; but Wavell’s rapid westward advance and the capture of Benghazi had given us all Cyrenaica. To this the sea corner at Agheila was the gateway. It was common ground between all authorities in London and Cairo that this must be held at all costs and in priority over every other venture.

The utter destruction of the Italian forces in Cyrenaica and the long road distances to be traversed before the enemy The Grand Alliance

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could gather a fresh army led Wavell to believe that for some time to come he could afford to hold this vital western flank with moderate forces and to relieve his tried troops with others less well trained. The Desert flank was the peg on which all else hung, and there was no idea in any quarter of losing or risking that for the sake of Greece or anything in the Balkans.

At the end of February the 7th British Armoured Division had been withdrawn to Egypt to rest and refit. This famous unit had rendered the highest service. Its tanks had travelled far and were largely used up. Its numbers had shrunk by fighting and wear and tear. Still there was a core of the most experienced, hard-bitten, desert-worthy fighting men, the like of whom could not be found by us. It was a pity not to keep in being the nucleus of this unique organisation and rebuild its strength by drafts of officers and men arriving trained, fresh, and keen from England, and to send up to them the pick of whatever new tanks or spare parts could be found. Thus the 7th Armoured Division would have preserved a continuity of life and been resuscitated in strength.

It was only after some weeks, marked by serious decisions, that I realised that the 7th Armoured Division did not exist as a factor in the protection of our vital Desert flank. The place of the 7th Armoured Division was taken by an armoured brigade and part of the support group of the 2d Armoured Division. The 6th Australian Division was also relieved by the 9th. Neither of these new formations was fully trained, and, to make matters worse, they were stripped of much equipment and transport to bring up to full scale the divisions soon to go to Greece. The shortage of transport was severely felt and affected the dispositions of the troops and their mobility. Because of maintenance difficulties farther forward, one Australian brigade was held

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back in Tobruk, where also was a brigade of motorised Indian cavalry recently formed and under training.

Our Intelligence reports now began to cause the Chiefs of Staff some concern. On February 27 they sent a warning telegram to General Wavell:

In view of arrival of German armoured formations
and aircraft in Tripolitania the question of defence
commitments in Egypt and Cyrenaica has been considered here. Would be grateful if you would telegraph a
short appreciation.

This drew an important considered reply which included the following:

2 March 41

Latest information indicates recent reinforcements to
Tripolitania comprise two Italian infantry divisions, two
Italian motorised artillery regiments, and German
armoured troops estimated at maximum of one armoured brigade group. No evidence of additional
mechanical transport landed, and enemy must still be
short of transport. Latest air reconnaissance, however,
shows considerable increase in mechanical transport
on Tripoli-Sirte road.

2. Tripoli to Agheila is 471 miles and to Benghazi
646 miles. There is only one road, and water is inadequate over 410 miles of the distance; these factors,
together with lack of transport, limit the present enemy
threat. He can probably maintain up to one infantry
division and armoured brigade along the coast road in
about three weeks, and possibly at the same time
employ a second armoured brigade, if he has one
available, across the desert via Hon and Marada
against our flank.

3. He may test us at Agheila by offensive patrolling,
and if he finds us weak push on to Agedabia in order to

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move up his advanced landing grounds. I do not think
that with this force he will attempt to recover Benghazi.

4. Eventually two German divisions might be employed in a large-scale attack. This, with one or two
infantry divisions, would be the maximum maintainable
via Tripoli. Shipping risks, difficulty of communications,
and the approach of hot weather make it unlikely that
such an attack could develop before the end of the
summer. Effective interference by sea with convoys
and by air with Tripoli might extend this period.

The Italian air threat to Cyrenaica is at present
almost negligible. On the other hand, the Germans are
well established in Central Mediterranean…. German
parachute troops might be landed on our lines of
communication in combination with armoured forces. I
do not anticipate that parachutists will be used with the
scale of attack likely to be developed in near future, but
they are a possible accompaniment of a large-scale
attack at later date.