The Grand Alliance (45 page)

11. The use of the Royal Air Force against the
enemy’s communications, or concentrations of fighting
vehicles, is sufficiently obvious not to require mention.

All this was easier to say than do.

I kept President Roosevelt fully informed.

Former Naval Person

6 April 41

to President Roosevelt

I cannot tell what will happen in Greece, and we
have never underrated the enormous power of the
German military machine on the mainland of Europe.

I am personally not unduly anxious about the Libyan-Egyptian position. We estimate Germans have one
colonial armoured division and perhaps the whole of
one ordinary armoured division, comprising, say, 600 to
650 tanks, of which a good many have already been
destroyed or have broken down. There are no German
infantry yet in Cyrenaica, except the few battalions
comprised

in

the

German

armoured

divisions.

The Grand Alliance

273

Difficulties of supply of petrol, food, water, and ammunition must be severe, and we know from prisoners of the
strain under which these audacious formations are
working. We are naturally trying to bring our own
armoured forces, which were largely refitting at the time
of the attack, into action, and are reinforcing Egypt from
all parts of the Middle East, where we have nearly half
a million men. Tobruk I regard as an invaluable bridgehead or sally-port. We do not feel at all outmatched at
present in the air, and are growing stronger constantly.

The whole power of the Mediterranean Fleet, which is
being strongly reinforced, will be used to cut the sea
and coastal communications. There are, of course,
Italian forces besides the Germans, and we believe the
Germans are now sending, or trying to send, a third
armoured division from Sicily.

The repulse of the German attacks on Tobruk on the
14th/15th seems to me important, as this small, fierce
fight, in which the enemy lost prisoners, killed, and
tanks, together with aircraft, out of all proportion to our
losses, is the first time they have tasted defeat, and
they are working on very small margins. Meanwhile our
efforts to turn off the tap have met with a noteworthy
success in the Central Mediterranean. Four destroyers
from Malta in the early hours of this morning, sixteenth,
caught a German-Italian convoy of five large ships
loaded with ammunition and mechanical transport and
escorted by three Italian destroyers. The whole convoy
and all its escort were sunk. We lost one destroyer in
the fight. We are keeping the strength of our forces
secret for the present.

The beating-in of our Desert flank while we were full-spread in the Greek adventure was, however, a disaster of the first magnitude. I was for some time completely mystified about its cause, and as soon as there was a momentary lull I felt bound to ask General Wavell for some explanation of what The Grand Alliance

274

had happened. It was not till April 24 that I burdened him with this request.

We still await news of the actions at Agheila and Mechili which resulted in the loss of the 3d Armoured Brigade and the best part of a motorised cavalry brigade. Evidently there was a severe defeat, and it is essential to our comprehension of your difficulties, as well as of our own, that we should know broadly what happened, and why. Were the troops outnumbered, outmanoeuvred, or outfought, or was there some mistake, as is alleged, about premature destruction of petrol store? Surely the reports of the survivors should have made it possible to give us a coherent story of this key action. I cannot help you if you do not tell me….

Wavell replied on the twenty-fifth. He pointed out that as practically all the senior officers concerned were missing and could give no account of their actions or motives care must be taken not to prejudice them unfairly.

Characteristically he took the responsibility upon himself.

His summary followed the same day. In this he said that he had been aware that the headquarters of the 2d Armoured Division and 3d Armoured Brigade would take some time to become skilful in desert conditions and desert warfare. He had hoped that they would have a period of minor skirmishing on the frontier for at least a month or so before a serious attack developed, and that this would give them time to adapt themselves. Actually the attack took place before they had settled down, and was launched at least a fortnight before his Staff had calculated on a time and space basis that it was possible, but in approximately the strength he had anticipated. He had expected a limited advance to Agedabia, and captured documents and prisoners’ statements had since confirmed that this was the enemy’s intention. The subsequent exploitation by the enemy of his initial success, which, it is now known, came

The Grand Alliance

275

as a complete surprise to him, was made possible only through the early and unfortunate disappearance of the 3d Armoured Brigade as a fighting force. There was complete evidence to prove that the enemy’s advance from Agedabia was hastily improvised in eight small columns consisting of both German and Italian units, several of which outran their own maintenance and had to be supplied by aircraft.

Our 3d Armoured Brigade was an improvised organisation containing one regiment of cruiser tanks in poor mechanical condition, one regiment of light tanks, and one regiment armed with captured Italian medium tanks. In view of the state of the armoured fighting vehicles at the end of the Cyrenaican campaign, it was the best he could produce if any armoured force was to accompany the troops to Greece. If it had been at full strength and had had more time to settle down as a fighting formation, it should have been capable of dealing with the opposition expected.

The Grand Alliance

276

I did not become aware till just before the German attack of the bad mechanical state of the cruiser regiment, on which we chiefly relied. A proportion of these tanks broke down before reaching the front, and many others became casualties from mechanical defects during the early fighting. The same seems to have occurred with the other cruiser regiment of the 2d Armoured Division, which went to Greece. Our light tank was powerless against German tanks, which were all armed with guns. Regiment armed with [captured]

Italian tanks had not had time to get accustomed to them.

Instructions to armoured division were to withdraw gradually if attacked by superior strength, so as to maintain force in being until difficulties of supply weakened enemy and gave opportunity for counter-stroke.

These were my instructions.

As matters turned out, this was mistaken policy.

Immediate counter-stroke would at least have inflicted serious losses on enemy and delayed him considerably. It might have stopped him altogether. As it was, 3d Armoured Brigade practically melted away from mechanical and administrative breakdowns during the retreat, without much fighting, while the unpractised headquarters of the 2d Armoured Division seems to have lost control. This was partly due to inexperience of signal personnel….

When I visited the front after the first day’s action, I felt need of a commander experienced in desert warfare, and telegraphed for O’Connor to come and assist Neame. Both these generals were captured during the withdrawal by patrol from the enemy column which penetrated to Derna.

Such is the outline of disastrous episode, for which main responsibility is mine. Obviously mistakes were made in the handling of the headquarters 2d Armoured Division and 3d Armoured Brigade during the withdrawal, but I hope that judgment on this will be reserved until those mainly concerned can give full account and reasons for actions. Their difficulties were considerable.

The Grand Alliance

277

Fighting spirit of troops even in retreat and disorganisation seems to have been excellent, and there were many instances of cool and determined action.

I replied:

Prime

Minister

to

28 April 41

General Wavell

Thank you very much for your general outline of
what occurred on the western frontier. We seem to
have had rather bad luck. I expect we shall get this
back later. Every good wish.

The Grand Alliance

278

12

The Greek Campaign

Naval Victory off Matapan, March
28
— Our
Expedition to Greece — Disappointing News from
General Papagos — The R.A.F. Outnumbered —

The Germans Attack — Shattering Blow at the
Piraeus, April
6
— Yugoslavia Overrun — And
Capitulates — Danger to Our Left Flank — General Papagos Suggests Evacuation — The Retreat
to Thermopylae — My Telegram to Wavell of April
17
— Suicide of the Greek Prime Minister — My
Directive of April
18
— The Enemy Kept at Bay —

Hope of a Stand at Thermopylae — Decision to
Evacuate, April
21
— Final Greek Surrender, April
24
— Namsos Over Again — Disaster at Nauplion

— Achievement of the Royal Navy — Four-Fifths
of Our Forces Rescued — Greek Martial Honour
Undimmed — President Roosevelt’s Gracious
Appreciation — My Reply to Him of May
4
— My
Broadcast, May
3.

T
OWARDS THE END of March it was evident that a major movement of the Italian Fleet, probably towards the Aegean, was impending. Admiral Cunningham decided temporarily to move our convoys out of the way, and himself left Alexandria after dark on March 27 in the
Warspite
with the
Valiant
and
Barham
, the carrier
Formidable
, and nine destroyers. Light forces, comprising four cruisers and four destroyers, under Vice-Admiral The Grand Alliance

279

Pridham-Wippell, then at Crete, were ordered to join the Commander-in-Chief next day south of the island. At dawn on the twenty-eighth an aircraft from the
Formidable
reported four enemy cruisers and six destroyers on a southeasterly course. At 7.45 A.M. these same ships were in sight from the cruiser flagship,
Orion.
The Italian force included three eight-inch-gun cruisers, whereas all the British were six-inch-gun ships. But after half an hour’s inconclusive action the enemy retired, and the British cruisers turned in pursuit. Two hours later the
Orion
sighted an enemy battleship – the
Vittorio Veneto –
which opened fire on her at a range of sixteen miles. Once more the roles changed, and the
Orion
and her cruisers again retired towards the British battle fleet, then approaching at full speed and about seventy miles away. An air striking force launched by the
Formidable
now arrived on the scene and attacked the Italian battleship, which at once withdrew to the northwest.