The Grand Alliance (66 page)

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18

Syria

Danger in Syria — German Agents and Aircraft
Arrive — Reactions on Egypt and Turkey —

Admiral Darlan Negotiates with the Germans —

Our Strained Resources — My Minute to the
Chiefs of Staff of May
8
— Telegram to Wavell of
May
9 —
Wavell and the Free French — Misunderstanding Between General Wavell and the
Chiefs of Staff — Wavell’s Preparations and
Doubts — Operation “Exporter” — The Defence
Committee

Approve

Wavell’s

Plan

—

My

Telegram to General de Gaulle of June
6
—

Telegram to President Roosevelt of June
7 —
The
Advance Begins — Reinforcements Needed and
Forthcoming — Capture of Damascus — General
Dentz Requests Armistice, July
12 —
Important
Results of the Syrian Campaign.

S
YRIA was one of the many overseas territories of the French Empire which on the collapse of France considered themselves bound by the surrender of the French Government, and the Vichy authorities did their utmost to prevent anybody in the French Army of the Levant from crossing into Palestine to join us. The Polish Brigade marched over, but very few Frenchmen. In August, 1940, the Italian Armistice Commission appeared, and German agents, who had been interned on the outbreak of war, were released and became active. By the end of the year The Grand Alliance

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many more Germans had arrived, and, with ample funds, proceeded to arouse anti-British and anti-Zionist feeling among the Arab peoples of the Levant. By the end of March, 1941, Syria forced itself on our attention. The Luftwaffe were already attacking the Suez Canal from bases in the Dodecanese, and they could obviously, if they chose, operate against Syria, especially with airborne troops. With the Germans in control of Syria, Egypt, the vital Canal Zone, and the oil refineries at Abadan would come under the direct threat of continuous air attack. Our land communications between Palestine and Iraq would be in danger. There might well be political repercussions in Egypt, and our diplomatic position in Turkey and throughout the Middle East would be gravely weakened.

On May 2, Rashid AH appealed to the Fuehrer for armed support against us in Iraq, and the following day the German Embassy in Paris was instructed to obtain permission from the French Government for the transit of planes and war materials across Syria to Rashid Ali’s forces. Admiral Darlan negotiated a preliminary agreement with the Germans on May 5 and 6 by which three-quarters of the war material assembled in Syria under the control of the Italian Armistice Commission was to be transported to Iraq and the German Air Force granted landing facilities in Syria. General Dentz, the Vichy High Commissioner and Commander-in-Chief, received instructions to this effect, and between May 9 and the end of the month about a hundred German and twenty Italian aircraft landed on Syrian airfields.

At this time, as we have seen, the Middle East Command was strained to the limit. The defence of Egypt was dominant; Greece had been evacuated; Crete had to be defended; Malta pleaded for reinforcement; the conquest of Abyssinia was not yet complete; troops had to be provided The Grand Alliance

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for Iraq. All that was available for the defence of Palestine from the north was the 1st Cavalry Division, of excellent quality, but stripped for other needs of its artillery and ancillary services. General de Gaulle pressed for prompt military action by the Free French forces, if necessary unsupported by British troops. But, with the experience of Dakar behind us, it was felt, both by General Wavell on the spot and by all of us in London, that it was inadvisable to use the Free French alone, even to resist a German advance through Syria. It might, however, be inevitable.

Nevertheless, we could not let Syria go without doing our utmost with anything that could be scraped up. Reluctant as we were to add to Wavell’s burdens, it was necessary to press him to do what he could to help the Free French. On April 28 he replied that all he could manage was a single brigade group. On this telegram I minuted: “It seems most necessary that General Wavell should prepare the brigade group and mobile group [he mentions] as far as he can, and have it in readiness on the Palestine border.” Accordingly the Chiefs of Staff sent instructions to Wavell that no definite offer of help should be made to General Dentz, but that if he resisted a German landing, by sea or air, all available British help would be given to him at once.

General Wavell was also told that immediate air action should be taken against any German descent.

The outlook was threatening, and on May 8 I minuted to the Chiefs of Staff:

General Ismay for C.O.S. Committee
I must have the advice of the Staffs upon the Syrian
business available for Cabinet this morning. A supreme
effort must be made to prevent the Germans getting a
footing in Syria with small forces and then using Syria
as a jumping-off ground for the air domination of Iraq
and Persia. It is no use General Wavell being vexed at
this disturbance on his eastern flanks…. We ought to
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help in every way without minding what happens at
Vichy.

I shall be most grateful if the Staff will see what is
the most that can be done.

On May 9, with the approval of the Defence Committee, I telegraphed to General Wavell:

You will no doubt realise the grievous danger of
Syria being captured by a few thousand Germans
transported by air. Our information leads us to believe
that Admiral Darlan has probably made some bargain
to help the Germans to get in there. In face of your
evident feeling of lack of resources we can see no other
course open than to furnish General Catroux with the
necessary transport and let him and his Free French do
their best at the moment they deem suitable, the R.A.F

acting against German landings. Any improvement you
can make on this would be welcome.

On May 14 the Royal Air Force was authorised to act against German aircraft in Syria and on French airfields. On the seventeenth General Wavell telegraphed that in view of the dispatch of troops from Palestine to Iraq the Syrian affair would involve either using Free French alone or bringing troops from Egypt. He felt strongly that the Free French would be ineffective and likely to aggravate the situation; and he concluded by saying that he hoped he would not be burdened with a Syrian commitment unless it was absolutely essential. The Chiefs of Staff replied that there was no option but to improvise the largest force that he could provide without prejudice to the security of the Western Desert, and that he should prepare himself to move into Syria at the earliest possible date. The composition of that force would be left to him.

On May 21 – at the moment of the German attack on Crete

– Wavell ordered the 7th Australian Division, less the brigade at Tobruk, to be ready to move to Palestine, and

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instructed General Maitland Wilson, who early in the month on his return from Greece had assumed command of Palestine and Transjordan, to prepare a plan for an advance into Syria.

At this time a misunderstanding arose between us at home and General Wavell, through his deriving the impression from a telegram of the Chiefs of Staff that we were relying on the advice of the Free French leaders rather than upon his own. He, therefore, telegraphed to the C.I.G.S. that if this was so he would prefer to be relieved of his command.

I hastened to reassure him on the point, but at the same time I felt it necessary to make it clear that we were determined upon the Syrian adventure and to assume the full burden of responsibility for what was, after all, hardly a military proposition.

Prime

Minister

to

21 May 41

General Wavell

Nothing in Syria must detract at this moment from
winning the Battle of Crete or in the Western Desert….

There is no objection to your mingling British troops
with the Free French who are to enter Syria; but, as you
have clearly shown, you have not the means to mount
a regular military operation, and, as you were instructed
yesterday, all that can be done at present is to give the
best possible chance to the kind of armed political
inroad described in Chiefs of Staff message of twentieth.You are wrong in supposing that policy described in
this message arose out of any representations made by
the Free French leaders. It arises entirely from the view
taken here by those who have the supreme direction of
war and policy in all theatres. Our view is that if the
Germans can pick up Syria and Iraq with petty air
forces, tourists, and local revolts, we must not shrink
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from running equal small-scale military risks and facing
the possible aggravation of political dangers from
failure. For this decision we, of course, take full responsibility, and should you find yourself unwilling to give
effect to it arrangements will be made to meet any wish
you may express to be relieved of your command.

Wavell showed by his reply that he fully understood. He explained that the proved inaccuracy of Free French information about the position in Syria made him unwilling to commit himself to military action at a time when Crete, Iraq, and the Western Desert required all available resources.

General

Wavell

to

22 May 41

Prime Minister

This Syrian business is disquieting, since German
Air Force established in Syria are closer to the Canal
and Suez than they would be at Mersa Matruh. The

[Vichy] French seem now wholly committed to the
Germans. I am moving reinforcements to Pales tine,
after full discussion with Cunningham, Tedder, and
Blarney, because we feel we must be prepared for
action against Syria, and weak action is useless. The
whole position in Middle East is at present governed
mainly by air power and air bases. Enemy air bases in
Greece make our hold of Crete precarious, and enemy
air bases in Cyrenaica, Crete, Cyprus, and Syria would
make our hold on Egypt difficult. The object of the Army
must be to force the enemy in Cyrenaica as far west as
possible, to try to keep him from establishing himself in
Syria, and to hang on to Crete and Cyprus. It will not be
so easy, with our resources and those of the air force. I
know you realise all this and are making every effort to
provide requirements, and we are doing our best to
secure Middle East. We have some difficult months
ahead, but will not lose heart.

I replied on the following day:

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Prime

Minister

to

23 May 41

General Wavell

Many thanks for your telegram. These are very hard
times, and we must all do our best to help each other….

Syria. It is your views that weigh with us, and not
those of Free French. You had better have de Gaulle
close to you. Let me know if I can help you with him.

We cannot have Crete battle spoiled for the sake of
Syria. Therefore, inferior methods may be the only ones
open at the moment….

Iraq. We hope Habforce will soon enter Baghdad,
establishing Regent there.

As the hopes of holding Crete diminished, the possible German threat to Syria commanded increasing attention.

On May 25 General Wavell telegraphed his outline plan for

“Exporter,” the code name now allotted to the Syrian operation. General Wilson was preparing to advance northward with a force consisting of the 7th Australian Division, the Free French troops, part of the 1st Cavalry Division, now motorised, and certain other units. Wavell estimated that the earliest date by which he could move would be the first week of June. Although the danger of the establishment of German air bases in the Levant was most serious in its possible consequences, particularly if it synchronised with German land operations through Turkey