For all the shame and humiliation of the precipitate American flight from North Korea in the winter of 1950, the simple truth remains that the very speed of the retreat saved many units from annihilation, and left Eighth Army with forces that could be rebuilt to fight another day. It was plainly, bitterly apparent that where the Chinese could catch American troops at that time, they could almost invariably defeat them. But American mobility was not entirely useless. It enabled many thousands of men, who would not otherwise have done so, to outrun their pursuers and escape to fight better another day.
Yet nothing could diminish the dismay both in Korea, and in the capitals of the West, about the performance of Eighth Army in the retreat from the Yalu. After the winter battles, the British General Sir Robert Mansergh, C-in-C in Hong Kong, visited Korea, and delivered a devastating secret report to the British Chiefs of Staff upon the situation that he discovered there.
I doubt whether any British really think that the war in Korea will be brought to a successful conclusion. The reason for this is primarily because of the American lack of determination and their inability, up to the time of my visit, to stand and fight. Most Americans sooner or later bring the conversation around to an expression of the view that the United Nations forces ought to quit Korea. The British troops, although sympathetic to the South Koreans in their adversity, despise them and are not interested in this civil war . . . I would judge the American morale as low, and in some units thoroughly bad. They appear to think that the terrain is unfavourable for American equipment and methods . . . It must be remembered that many thousands of the Americans joined the army for the purpose of getting a cheap education after their service and that they, at no time, expected to fight. Their training is quite unsuited to that type of country or war and, in spite of lessons learnt, they will not get clear of their vehicles . . . Their rations, supplies, and welfare stores, are on such a scale as to be comic if they were not such a serious handicap to battle . . . Regular American officers have been a high proportion of those lost. As a result, the problems of replacement of men with experience is becoming very difficult.
. . . They have never studied or been taught defence. They appear only to have studied mechanised and mechanical advances at great speed. They do not understand locality defence in depth or all-round defence. They do not like holding defensive positions. They have been trained for very rapid withdrawals. Americans do not understand infiltration and feel very naked when anybody threatens their flank or rear.
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Mansergh expressed respect for American artillery, whose gunners the British had also found more courageous than the infantry, and for the performance of the US Marines. But he was highly critical of the staff work within Eighth Army.
They do not understand the importance of reconnoitring ground. Units in action almost invariably overestimate the enemy against them, the casualties inflicted, and the reasons for their rapid withdrawal; this I have known in our own units in war, but it appears worse here and more frequent. At night, main headquarters blazed like gin palaces . . . Roadblocks, car parks, dumps etc were as crowded as Hampstead Heath on a bank holiday.
20
Mansergh summarised his conclusions about the problems of the US Army in Korea: ‘a) training on wrong lines b) bad staff organisation c) low quality infantry d) disinterest in the war in general e) weak and inexperienced commanders at all levels’. The general’s views must certainly have been influenced by those of
Brigadier Basil Coad, commanding the British 27 Brigade in Korea since September. Coad at about this time submitted an unhappy report of his own, citing the lack of liaison with American higher commanders, and the general inadequacy of direction:
Since the withdrawals started, the behaviour of some senior staff officers and Formation HQs was, at times, quite hysterical and resulted in the issues of impossible orders which, if obeyed without question, would have resulted in unnecessary loss of life. American commanders frankly tell me that they have never taught defence in any of their military schools. The American soldier did not like being attacked, especially at night, and with exceptions will not stand and fight. I think their [the British contingent’s] attitude to the American infantry is largely one of contempt.
21
‘Standards of discipline in the US Army in Korea, never very high, are now lower than I have ever known them,’ wrote the military assistant to the British Ambassador that December. ‘Officers told me quite openly that it is useless ordering their troops to attack, because they simply won’t go. The US Army is still roadbound, and it is very difficult to describe their tactics, since it seems that tactics in the normal sense of the word do not exist. In an advance, motorised columns headed by a few tanks are sent up the roads making use of what is described as “prophylactic fire”. This seems to consist of everyone who has a weapon blazing away on either side of the column into the blue.’
22
In assessing the justice of these British opinions, it is necessary to discount something for the chronic scepticism of one nation towards another’s methods of making war. Throughout the twentieth century, there has been a measure of jealousy in the British Army, traditionally accustomed to fight on short commons, towards the vast weight of resources available to the Americans. Yet the evidence of such able American professionals as John Michaelis and Paul Freeman supports the British view of US performance in the winter of 1950. Matthew Ridgway himself, on his
arrival, wrote of the remarkable difference between the demeanour of the American and British troops under his command. A problem which was already familiar from World War II reasserted itself in Korea, as it would again in Vietnam: the disproportionately low percentage of the nation’s best manhood which served the infantry regiments of the United States.
23
Because the American instinct for war favours a technological, managerial approach, far too many of the ablest men are diverted to technical and managerial functions. At the time of Korea, indeed, overwhelmingly the most talented section of America’s young manhood remained in colleges at home, as a result of the workings of the Selective Service Act. Yet in this war, as in every war, it was upon the infantry that the greatest burden of battle, and of casualties, fell. As in America’s other major Asian war a generation later, terrain and the circumstances of the enemy made it difficult to employ technology and firepower anywhere near as effectively as upon a European battlefield, against a European enemy. From beginning to end in Korea, the United States Army laboured under grave disadvantages in fitting itself to meet the enemy on favourable terms.
It is well-nigh impossible for any man to retain a vision of United Nations action in Korea as a great and essential experiment in international relations [wrote a British correspondent on 27 December, in a private report to the War Office in London] should he be subjected for long to the atmosphere of Korea. Inefficiency and squalor among the civil population make some contribution to the overall feeling of disillusionment. But the major fault lies with the morale of the armed forces. Men of the United States Army so completely dominate the scene, numerically, that their attitude is all-important. It can be very simply expressed: ‘How soon can we get t’hell out of this goddam country?’ That is the one question in the minds of every GI and almost every officer up to the rank of colonel encountered in Korea. Half has no thought beyond the single objective of escape. Of the remainder, a few felt that crossing the 38th Parallel was a mistake, either tactical or moral. But far more took the view that the United States should stop consulting anybody, and should use the atomic bomb. They did not wish it employed against the North Koreans, or even, to any great extent, against the Chinese communists. Their emotional reaction to the whole problem was that the Russian is solely responsible, and that therefore the logical thing to do is to atom bomb Moscow . . . Offensive thinking amongst junior officers and men was confined almost entirely to the Marines. It was prompted mostly by a drive for revenge for the losses inflicted on them at the Chosin reservoir, and was accompanied by a distrust and contempt for higher leadership almost more frightening than the lack of fibre of their army compatriots. There can be few occasions in history when officers and men of a fighting force have expressed themselves so freely and violently, in public, on the subject of their commanding officers.
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Dear Folks [PFC James Cardinal of the 3/5th Cavalry wrote home to his parents in the Bronx on 7 January 1951] . . . We are now about 60 miles NW of Taegu, holding a mountain pass thru which the entire 8th Army is moving headed south. It looks like the beginning of the end. The Chinese are kicking hell out of the US Army, and I think we are getting out, at least I hope so. I think they are going to evacuate all UN troops from Korea soon, as it’s impossible to stop these Chinese hordes. There’s just too many of them for us to fight in Korea. If the big wheels in Washington decide to fight here it will be the biggest mistake they ever made, as I don’t think we can hold the Chinks. Anyway, let’s hope they decide to evacuate us.
When you get complaining and bitching letters from me, remember every soldier over here feels that way. The troops over here are mad, mad at America, Americans and America’s leaders. We all feel we’ve been let down, by our incompetent blundering leadership, from the White House down. It seems to me to be – to hell with the troops in Korea. If we must fight communism, let’s do it in Europe which is the cradle of western culture and our own civilisation. It seems to me that’s more worth fighting for than some barren oriental wasteland, with uncountable hordes of savage warriors. It’s about time that all of you back home awakened to the truth of the matter, and let your voices be heard thru letters to your congressmen. That’s the only way to get direct action. Well, folks, that’s all for now. I’m in the best of health and spirits and hope that you all and the rest of the family are too. Love, Jimmy.
25
The American army had reached its lowest point of the Korean War. Corporal Robert Fountain, late of Task Force Smith, gazed around the schoolhouse at Chonan in which he found himself sheltering in the depths of the retreat, and recognised the very same building in which he had taken shelter in July, in the midst of the first traumas of the war. It was too much to bear: ‘We had fought all the way south, and all the way north. I thought – “Look what we have suffered, and we are back where we began. I have nothing in this country, and I never will.” ’
26
Corporal Fountain was not alone in his dismay. Defeat on the battlefield had also provoked a crisis of confidence among statesmen and politicians at home which now threatened, for a time, to escalate the Korean War into a nuclear conflict.
2. Washington and Tokyo
On the morning of 28 November, Truman informed his personal staff in his office at the White House: ‘General Bradley called me at 6.15 this morning. He told me a terrible message had come in
from General MacArthur . . . The Chinese have come in with both feet’. This was the day, he wrote later, ‘when the bad news from Korea had changed from rumours of resistance into certainty of defeat.’
27
At the meeting of the National Security Council later that day, the President, Marshall and the Joint Chiefs agreed that all-out war with China must be avoided. Acheson said he believed that if the United States bombed China’s airfields in Manchuria, the Russians would come into the war. Yet none of this caution prevented Acheson from denouncing Peking’s action the following day as ‘an act of brazen aggression . . . the second such act in five months . . . This is not merely another phase of the Korean campaign. This is a fresh and unprovoked aggressive act, even more immoral than the first.’ Dean Rusk declared, at the 28 November meeting of the National Security Council, that the Chinese intervention ‘should not be on our conscience, since these events are merely the result of well-laid plans, and were not provoked by our actions’. To a remarkable extent, Washington still failed to consider exclusively Chinese motives for intervention, and focused upon Russian reasons for inciting Chinese action, and the new interpretation that must be placed upon Moscow thinking. The CIA predicted that the Russians would give the Chinese maximum support. Bedell Smith said there was now ‘a much better case than they previously thought for believing Russia plans for war soon . . . They probably do not plan on war now, but are willing to have it if they can bog us down in Asia.’
28
MacArthur now issued a desperate plea for reinforcements. But Frank Pace, the Army Secretary, said that the only available unit was the 82nd Airborne Division. MacArthur again demanded to be allowed to use men of Chiang Kai Shek’s Nationalist army. His request was once more refused. He also wanted more air and sea power, and some additional forces were dispatched. All the senior soldiers were now increasingly bitter about the political restriction upon bombing beyond the Yalu. Bradley wrote on 3 December:
‘We used to say that an attack on a platoon of United States troops meant war. Would anyone believe that now if we don’t react to the Chinese attack?’
29
No one wanted war with China, he said, but if Eighth Army was driven out of Korea, the United States should retaliate by hitting China’s cities.