The Life of the Mind (35 page)

40. 1177b27–33.

41.
Theaetetus,
155d.

42.
Cratylus,
408b.

43. B21a.

44. B54.

45. B123.

46. B93.

47. B107.

48. B32.

49. B108.

50.
The Friend,
III, 192, as quoted by Herbert Read in
Coleridge as Critic,
London, 1949, p. 30.

51. Now together with two later explications, an Introduction and an Epilogue, in
Wegmarken,
pp. 19 and 210.

52. 1714, no. 7.

53.
Critique of Pure Reason,
B641.

54.
Werke,
6. Ergänzungsband, ed. M. Schröter, München, 1954, p. 242.

55.
Ibid.,
p. 7.

56. See the posthumously published
System der gesammten Philosophie
of 1804, in
Sämtliche Werke,
Abt. I, Stuttgart and Augsburg, 1860, vol. VI, p. 155.

57.
Sämtliche Werke,
Abt. I, vol. VII, p. 174.

58.
Ibid.,
Abt. II, vol. III, p. 163. Cf. also Karl Jaspers,
Schelling,
München, 1955, pp. 124–130.

59. Paris, 1958, pp. 161–171.

60. See the
Preisschrift
"Uber die Deutlichkeit der Grundsätze der natürlichen Theologie und der Moral" (1764), 4th Consideration, no. 1,
Werke,
vol. I, pp. 768–769.

61. "Uber den Optimismus,"
Werke,
vol. I, p. 594.

62.
Ecce Homo,
"Thus Spoke Zarathustra," 1.

63.
The Gay Science,
bk. IV, no. 341.

64. 130d, e.

65.
Tusculanae Disputationes,
III, iii, 6.

66.
Ibid.,
III, xiv, 30. Cf. Horace,
Epistolae,
I, vi, 1. Plutarch (in his
De recta Ratione,
13) mentions the Stoic maxim and ascribes it—in Greek translation,
mê thaumazein—to
Pythagoras. Democritus is supposed to have praised
athaumastia
and
athambia
as Stoic wisdom, but seems to have had no more in mind than the "wise man's" imperturbability and fearlessness.

67.
Heget's Philosophy of Right,
p. 13.

68.
L'Oeuvre de Pascal,
Pléiade ed., Bruges, 1950, 294, p. 901.

69.
Differenz des Fichte'schen und Schelling'schen Systems der Philosophie
(1801), Meiner ed., 1962, pp. 12 ff.

70. Trans. J. Sibree, New York, 1956, p. 318.

71.
Ibid.,
p.26.

72. This transformation is especially telling when the borrowing from Greek philosophy is most obvious, as when Cicero says man is destined
ad mundum contemplandum
and then immediately adds:
et imitandum (De Natura Deorum,
II, xiv, 37), which he understands in a strictly moral-political sense, and not scientifically as, centuries later, Francis Bacon would have understood it: "Nature to be commanded must be obeyed; and that which in contemplation is as the cause, in operation is as the rule..." (
Novum Organon,
Oxford ed., 1889, p. 192).

73.
De Rerum Natura,
bk. II, 1174; On
the Nature of the Universe,
Latham trans., p. 95.

74.
Discourses,
bk. I, chap. 17.

75.
Ibid.,
bk. I, chap. 15.

76.
The Manual,
49;
The Stoic and Epicurean Philosophers,
ed. Whitney J. Oates, New York, 1940, p. 482.

77.
Discourses,
bk. I, chap. 1.

78.
The Manual,
8, Oates ed., p. 470;
Fragments,
8, Oates ed., p. 460.

79.
Op. cit.,
V, 7 ff. Author's translation.

80.
De Republica,
I, 7.

81.
Ibid.,
III, 23.

82.
Ibid.,
V, 1.

83. Modeled, of course, on the myth of Er that concludes Plato's
Republic.
For the important differences, see the analysis of Richard Harder, the late eminent German philologist, "Uber Ciceros Somnium Scipionis," in
Kleine Schriften,
München, 1960, pp. 354–395.

84. "Discourses on Davila,"
The Works of John Adams,
ed. Charles Francis Adams, Boston, 1850–1856, vol. VI, p. 242.

85.
Oedipus at Colonnus.

86.
Politics,
1267a 12.

87.
Nicomachean Ethics,
1178a29–30.

88. Frag. 146.

89.
The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire,
Modem Library, New York, n.d., vol. II, p. 471.

90. I, 30; my translation of
hōs philosopheōn gēn pollēn theōriēs heineken epelēlythas.

91. I, 32.

92. The thought content of that saying was fully explicated only in Heidegger's death-analyses in
Being and Time,
which take their methodological cue from the fact that human life—as distinguished from "things," which start their worldly existence when they are complete and finished—is complete only when it
is
no more. Hence, only by anticipating its own death can it "appear" as a whole and be subjected to analysis.

93. E. Diehl, ed.,
Anthologia Lyrica Graeca,
Leipzig, 1936, frag. 16.

94.
Ibid.,
frag. 13,11. 63–70.

95.
Ibid.,
frag. 14.

96.
Charmides,
175b.

97. Hegel's
Encyclopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften,
Lasson ed., Leipzig, 1923, 23: "
Das Denken ... sich als abstraktes Ich als von
aller Partikularität
sonstiger Eigenschaf-ten, Zustände, usf.
befreites
verhält und nur das Allgemeine tut, in welchem es mit allen Individuen identisch ist.
"

98. It is surprising, in examining the literature, often very learned, to see how very little all this erudition has been able to contribute to an understanding of the man. The only exception I have been able to unearth is a kind of inspired profile by the classicist and philosopher Gregory Vlastos, "The Paradox of Socrates." See the Introduction to his carefully selected
The Philosophy of Socrates: A Collection of Critical Essays,
Anchor Books, New York, 1971.

99. 173d.

100. On the Socratic problem, see the short, reasonable account given by Laszlo Versényi as an Appendix to his
Socratic Humanism,
New Haven, London, 1963.

101.
Dante and Philosophy,
trans. David Moore, Harper Torchbooks, New York, Evanston, London, 1963, p. 267.

102.
Ibid.,
p. 273.

103. Thus in
Theaetetus
and
Charmides.

104.
Ueno,
80e.

105. The frequent notion that Socrates tries to lead his interlocutor with his questions to certain results of which he is convinced in advance—like a clever professor with his students—seems to me entirely mistaken even if it is as ingeniously qualified as in Vlastos' essay mentioned above, in which he suggests (p. 13) that Socrates wanted the other "to find ... out for himself," as in the
Meno,
which however is not aporetic. The most one could say is that Socrates wanted his partners in the dialogues to be as perplexed as he was. He was sincere when he said that he taught nothing. Thus he told Critias in the
Charmides:
"Critias, you act as though I professed to know the answers to the questions I ask you and could give them to you if I wished. It is not so. I inquire with you ... because I don't myself have knowledge" (165b; cf. 166c–d).

106. Diehl, frag. 16.

107.
Meno,
80c. Cf. the above-mentioned passage, n. 105.

108.
Memorabilia,
IV, vi, 15 and IV, iv, 9.

109.
Sophist,
226–231.

110.
Apology,
23b.

111.
Ibid.,
30a.

112. Xenophon,
Memorabilia,
IV, iii, 14.

113.
Antigone,
353.

114. The German text, from
Was Heisst Denken?,
Tübingen, 1954, p. 52, reads as follows: "
Sokrates hat zeit seines Lebens, bis in seinen Tod hinein, nichts anderes getan, als sich in den Zugwind dieses Zuges zu stellen und darin sich zu halten. Darum ist er der reinste Denker des Abendlandes. Deshalb hat er nichts geschrieben. Denn wer aus dem Denken zu schreiben beginnt, muss unweigerlich den Menschen gleichen, die vor allzu starkem Zugwind in den Windschatten flüchten. Es bleibt das Geheimnis einer noch verborgenen Geschichte, dass alle Denker des Abendlandes nach Sokrates, unbeschadet ihrer Grösse, solche Flüchtlinge sein mussten. Das Denken
ging
in die Literatur ein.
"

115. G. Humphrey,
Thinking: An Introduction to Its Experimental Psychology,
London and New York, 1951, p. 312.

116. Thucydides, II, 40.

117.
Lysis,
204b–c.

118. Frags. 145,190.

119.
Gorgias,
474b, 483a, b.

120.
Ibid.,
482c.

121.
Ibid.,
482c, 484c, d.

122. Aristode frequently insisted that thinking "produces" happiness, but if so, not in the way that medicine produces health but in the way that health makes a man healthy.
Nicomachean Ethics,
1144a.

123. Diels and Kranz, B45.

124. 254d.

125.
Identity and Difference,
trans. Joan Stambaugh, New York, Evanston, London, 1969, pp. 24–25.

126. 255d.

127.
Sophist,
255e; Cornford,
Plato's Theory of Knowledge,
p. 282.

128. Heidegger,
Sophist
lecture transcript, p. 382.

129.
Theaetetus,
189e;
Sophist,
263e.

130.
Sophist,
253b.

131.
Protagoras,
339c.

132.
Ibid.,
339b, 340b.

133.
Posterior Analytics,
76b22–25.

134. 1005b23–1008a2.

135. No. 36,
Werke,
vol. VI, p. 500.

136. No. 56,
ibid.,
p. 549.

137. "Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten,"
Werke
, vol. 4, pp. 51–55.

138. 304d.

139.
Nicomachean Ethics,
1166a30.

140.
Ibid.,
1166b5–25.

141.
Ethics,
IV, 52; III, 25.

142.
Philosophy
(1932), trans. E. B. Ashton, Chicago, London, 1970, vol. 2, pp. 178–179.

Chapter IV

1.
Symposium,
174–175.

2. Merleau-Ponty,
Signs,
"The Philosopher and His Shadow," p. 174.

3. Quoted from Sebastian de Grazia, "About Chuang Tzu,"
Dalhousie Review,
Summer 1974.

4. Hegel,
Encyclopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften,
465n

5. Ross,
Aristotle,
p. 14.

6.
Protreptikos,
Düring ed., B56.

7.
Physics,
VI, viii, 189a5.

8.
Nicomachean Ethics,
1141b24–1142a30. Cf. 1147al–10.

9.
Critique of Pure Reason,
B49, B50.

10.
Gesammelte Schriften,
New York, 1946, vol. V, p. 287. English translation by Willa and Edwin Muir,
The Great Wall of China,
New York, 1946, p. 276–277.

11. Pt. III, "On the Vision and the Riddle," sect. 2.

12. Vol. I, pp. 311 f.

13. Duns Scotus,
Opus Oxoniense
I, dist. 40, q. 1, n. 3. Quoted from Walter Hoeres,
Der Wille als reine Vollkommenheit nach Duns Scotus,
München, 1962, p. 111, n. 72.

14.
Critique of Pure Reason,
B294 f.

15. "As I Walked Out One Evening,"
Collected Poems,
p. 115.

16. W. H. Auden,
The Dyer's Hand and Other Essays,
Vintage Books, New York, 1968.

17.
Time and Free Will
(1910), trans. F. L. Pogson, Harper Torchbooks, New York, Evanston, 1960, pp. 158,167,240.

18. Romans 7:15.

19.
Encyclopädie,
12.

20.
Of Human Freedom,
Gutmann trans., p. 8.

21.
Critique of Pure Reason,
B172–B173.

The second volume of
The Life of the Mind
will be devoted to the faculty of the Will and, by implication, to the problem of Freedom, which, as Bergson said, "has been to the moderns what the paradoxes of the Eleatics were to the ancients." The phenomena we have to deal with are overlaid to an extraordinary extent by a coat of argumentative reasoning, by no means arbitrary and hence not to be neglected but which parts company with the actual experiences of the willing ego in favor of doctrines and theories that are not necessarily interested in "saving the phenomena."

One reason for these difficulties is very simple: the faculty of the Will was unknown to Greek antiquity and was discovered as a result of experiences about which we hear next to nothing before the first century of the Christian era. The problem for later centuries was to reconcile this faculty with the main tenets of Greek philosophy: men of thought were no longer willing to abandon philosophy altogether and say, with Paul, "we preach Christ crucified, a stumbling-block to Jews and folly to Gentiles," and let it go at that. This, as we shall see, only Paul himself was ever prepared to do.

But the end of the Christian era by no means spells the end of these difficulties. The main strictly Christian difficulty, viz., how to reconcile faith in an all-powerful and omniscient God with the claims of free will, survives in various ways deep into the modem age, where we often meet almost the same kind of argumentation as before. Either free will is found to clash with the law of causality or, later, it can hardly be reconciled with the laws of History, whose meaningfulness depends on progress or a
necessary
development of the World Spirit These difficulties even persist when all strictly traditional—metaphysical or theological—interests have withered away. John Stuart Mill, for instance, sums up an oft-repeated argument when he says: "Our
internal
consciousness tells us that we have a power, which the whole outward experience of the human race tells us that we never use." Or, to use the most extreme example, Nietzsche calls "the entire doctrine of the Will the most fateful
falsification
in psychology hitherto ... essentially invented for the sake of punishment."