The Nixon Defense: What He Knew and When He Knew It (74 page)

“Oh, boy,” Nixon exclaimed, as Haldeman added that the
Post
was trying to reach Haldeman for comment. Haldeman said that Ziegler had called me about the story, and “Dean’s first comment was, ‘Oh, fuck.’ And then he said, ‘I have a pretty good suspicion who it is, and he’s got things scrambled. I never mentioned Haldeman. I just said “higher up,” and he drew that conclusion, apparently.’ And he [Dean] said [to Ron], ‘Why don’t you call the
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and tell them the story’s not true before they run it.’ Dean said, ‘Well, Ron, there’s some fact and some fiction in it,’” which was followed by a discussion between Ron and me about how to get the story corrected.

Haldeman told Nixon that Ron was trying to reach the
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to inform them that the story was not accurate. “Ron’s afraid that Dean cleverly waited until nine-thirty to tell him that so that it would be too late to change the story,” he added. As they discussed this situation, Haldeman said, “Dean’s obviously got other people playing his game now, people who are tougher than he intends.” Nixon speculated that it was my lawyer, and Haldeman agreed. The discussion turned to plans for the upcoming Easter weekend. “What we might do, if it’s okay, is go up to Camp David for a day or two. We’ve got reporters camping on the door here now,” Haldeman said,
referring to his home. The president thought it was an “excellent idea,” adding, “Oh, Christ, yes, go up to Camp David, Bob.”

The president reminded Haldeman to be sure to attend the cabinet meeting the following morning, and when Nixon suggested he come to Haldeman’s defense at the meeting, Haldeman advised, “I don’t think you should. Look, there are so many weird bounces in this, if one of us gets a bad bounce at some point,” it could redound on the president.

When Haldeman arrived in the Oval Office for his first meeting, at 8:15
A.M.
, Nixon expressed concern about his morale, which Haldeman assured him was fine. Nixon asked if the Dean story in the
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had run as predicted. “He’s saying there were higher-ups and lower-downs also included,” Haldeman reported, adding, “He’s determined he’s not going to be alone. The
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modified the story. Originally they were saying Haldeman engineered the cover-up. Now they said Haldeman and others in the White House were involved in the cover-up, which at least is not quite as [bad].” This discussion did not proceed very far before Nixon said, “Let me ask you about one conversation. The only thing that troubles me about this is my own recollection of a conversation with Dean, where you were with him, when he said that Bittman had stated that he needed money for [Hunt’s] attorney fees.” More specifically, the president wanted to know if Haldeman remembered the million-dollar conversation and whether he had encouraged me to get the money. Haldeman said he could not find any notes for that meeting, which he incorrectly thought had occurred in the evening, and though he did recall being present, he did not remember my saying we had to get the money. Haldeman did think, however, that the president had said, “We ought to be able to get the money.” Haldeman characterized the conversation as Nixon’s “running out the string.” In response to further questions from Nixon, Haldeman explained how Mitchell had later reported the money for Hunt had been paid.

Haldeman had by now adopted Ehrlichman’s view of this conversation, assuring Nixon, “I don’t see that you have any problem at all.” As he now misrepresented the situation, “In the first place, at the time you were investigating the case. You were probing, you know, all directions with everybody you could, and everything you could get, with no obligation to move in any
fixed time, only an obligation to work this thing out. The other factor is that what was clearly, distinctly a threat was relayed, [and it] was related to national security. Because Hunt specifically said he needed this or he was going to spill the beans on the stuff he did for Ehrlichman, and that, as you instantly knew, anything he did for Ehrlichman was involved in the national security project over here.” “And we couldn’t pay blackmail for that,” Nixon added, to which Haldeman replied, “And we didn’t.”

They speculated about whether this conversation would ever come up. “I don’t think Dean’s going to do that,” Haldeman said. “I don’t think it’s going to come out at all. It’s a privileged conversation, that’s for sure.” Nixon agreed, and Haldeman continued, “Whatever was done, it was done by Mitchell.” They proceeded to agree again that Nixon had been investigating, and “at that point had no reason to believe” anything I had told him, “because, you now have found, he was lying on various things.” Haldeman was pushing the new defense beyond credibility even for Nixon, who noted, “Well, we say he was lying, [but] in our fairness to him, we have to say [it was] for us that he was doing it. Because I had told him on several occasions, ‘You’ve sure done a hell of a job here. You’ve done a good job.’” But Haldeman had an answer for this: “But now you point out that he was playing a double game, apparently.”

“Let’s get a line on this money thing,” Nixon urged. “I’d rather be on the offensive on that. Say, if you can, just say, ‘Yes, money was raised.’ Obviously the money was raised, so why did they put it on the doorstep? ‘Well, that’s the way it was given to Mrs. Hunt. That was the way she handled it. Raised the cash for that purpose.’” Haldeman said they had to separate authorizing Kalmbach from the $350,000 itself; they would claim that they did not know what Kalmbach was doing and merely wanted to return the $350,000 to the reelection committee.

They rehashed Mitchell’s problems, which could become their problems as well, and the fact that he had attended three meetings regarding Liddy’s plans, and while he could claim nothing was approved during the first two, Haldeman noted that “Magruder still has that story of going down to Key Biscayne.” He thought, though, that Mitchell might be able to deal with that meeting, because “Dean wasn’t at [it].” He then enthusiastically added, “See, they had Liddy over there yesterday, and he wouldn’t talk.” The president, surprised, asked, “Is that right?” and Haldeman replied, “In spite of your signal.” Cynically Nixon added, “I did my job. And that’s why Dean wanted
me to get [Liddy] to talk. I did my job, and the U.S. attorneys know. I’m glad I did.”
⁹²
This conversation ended with Haldeman assuring the president that they would figure out how to handle the money and “get out ahead of it, get a line on it.”

The cabinet meeting that morning focused on energy and its influence on foreign affairs, and not a word was said about Watergate.
⁹³
After it ended, George Bush, chairman of the Republican National Committee, asked the president if he might have a minute with him, and they spoke for twenty minutes in the Oval Office.
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Bush had just returned from a trip to California, where he had met with Governor Ronald Reagan. It was Bush who raised Watergate, telling the president, “I’m feelin’ for ya on this other stuff.” Bush had raised Watergate because he said he had his own problem: a fellow named Ken Rietz, who had been involved in the Nixon campaign and been sent up to the RNC, where he had “worked in the dirty trick department,” doing some “espionage on Muskie and stuff like that.” Bush had told Rietz they had to figure out how to get him out of the RNC without jeopardizing any of his rights, and Nixon agreed that if there was a problem, Rietz should be let go. Bush said that if he could help Nixon in some way other than by wringing his hands, he was willing to do so. Nixon urged him to just keep saying that the president has taken charge, and as he walked Bush to the door, assured him it would soon pass.

When Bush departed, Nixon requested that Haldeman return to the Oval Office, where he told Haldeman the gist of the conversation with Bush.
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Haldeman thought the situation had arisen because Magruder was still “lashing out” and pulling others in to get a better deal for himself. But Haldeman cautioned that people like Rietz had to be careful, because Magruder had exaggerated his activities.

Nixon, sounding relaxed and thoughtful, wanted to consider Haldeman’s problems again, and he pointed out that whatever they decided, it would not be sufficient for some people. Haldeman gave an example: “One of the columns this morning made the point that they’re not going to settle for scapegoats. You can’t get away with trying to blame this on Magruder and Dean, which I think is probably true. And then they said you have to move it up to Haldeman, and they totally ignore Mitchell. And because you have to move to someone who was high enough to have had the responsibility, that’s the dilemma that you have. If you move to Haldeman, then there’s no way the president escapes responsibility.”

“Wonder when will Dean start crashing on Ehrlichman?” the president soon asked. Haldeman thought maybe I had effectively done so in the information given the
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regarding “people higher up” and “people lower down” being involved without actually having named names. He reported that Ziegler said I had been totally surprised by the
Post
story. In addition, he also speculated that Ehrlichman had more problems with me than he did, for I had met with Ehrlichman on Watergate more often than I had with Haldeman. He added that the president had no problem with me, because he had been investigating at that time, and he had given me no orders to do anything. Nixon corrected him—the million-dollar conversation was now weighing heavily on his mind, and he recalled telling me, “I guess we can get that.” But Haldeman, although he had not been present, claimed he had warned that they dared not start down that track, and the president had agreed. “You agreed that, you know, you won’t get anywhere. That doesn’t accomplish anything.” The president wanted to know who had called Mitchell to come down. “I don’t know. I don’t have any idea. I don’t know that anybody did,” Haldeman replied.
*
He said that he did not think Ehrlichman had made the call because “John Ehrlichman wasn’t the least bit concerned about [Hunt’s threat].”
*

When Haldeman departed, Nixon called Henry Petersen, and after a brief chat about leaks got to the reason for his call—the latest update.
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You have Mitchell today?” Nixon asked. “Yes sir, he’s in the grand jury now,” Petersen replied, and said he thought Mitchell would be out today. He also reported that Magruder had taken a lie-detector test successfully, and that Strachan was scheduled to follow. “How about Dean?” the president asked. Petersen said they were “still in arm’s-length negotiations,” noting that I hadn’t “really decided to be a witness yet.”
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The president sought Petersen’s assurance that my conversations, as well as Haldeman’s and Ehrlichman’s, with the president were privileged, as well as subject to “national security.” “I understand,” Petersen tacitly agreed. He also reported that Kleindienst had talked with Jeb Magruder’s new boss, the secretary of commerce, after
the cabinet meeting that morning, and Magruder had tendered his oral resignation, which could be accepted by the commerce secretary whenever he wanted it. Petersen said he was suggesting that the resignation be put in writing in case Magruder had any second thoughts. The president said that there was no change in the status of anyone at the White House, and Petersen agreed they were in a different position than Magruder. Nixon reported that he was heading for Florida, but if Petersen had anything Nixon should know, he could call him. “But otherwise don’t bother me.”

Kissinger soon arrived in the Oval Office.
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Nixon observed that what he was going through with Haldeman and Ehrlichman was not as difficult as some of the life-and-death decisions they had made regarding “Cienfuegos, Jordan or Cambodia.”
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Still, he faced a conundrum: If he did nothing, he would be criticized; he did not want to do anything to harm his aides, but then if he did have to let them go, people would call him “a God damn fool” for keeping them so long. “How could I have been misled for nine months?” Nixon asked plaintively, and Kissinger replied that it had been his understanding that the president had not been misled, and this was all about public posturing. Nixon said it was a question of how best to do what had to be done and whether taking action would remove any of the poison. With increased bitterness, he said, “Mitchell was the culprit,” and he ended the conversation by complaining that the fight ahead was pure politics.

Shortly after noon, while waiting for his helicopter to arrive on the South Grounds, the president asked Haldeman, Ehrlichman and Kissinger to the Oval Office, though Kissinger would only remain for a minute. It had originally been planned that Haldeman and Ehrlichman would accompany the president to Florida over the Easter holiday, but he had decided to go alone, because he wanted private time to think.
¹⁰⁰
Ehrlichman indicated that they had just come from another session with their lawyers, who were now getting down to serious business and wanted Haldeman and Ehrlichman to have an informal session with the prosecutors, if requested.
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The president told them that George Bush was letting Rietz go. Ehrlichman was aware that Rietz had paid the expenses of the spy they had working for presidential candidate senator Edmund Muskie as a chauffeur. “Well, nothing wrong with that,” the president said. Ehrlichman thought Bush, whom Haldeman called “Mr. Clean,” was overreacting.

The president reported that he had raised with Petersen Ehrlichman’s hope about speeding up the grand jury, but Petersen said that was a problem,
because each person talked about others who were involved, and not only were they running out leads, but they had to study the record, so all of it was taking time. “Well, I understand,” Ehrlichman said, clearly not happy with this news, “but I think it would be just a matter of letting him know you were in a hurry, and then periodically keeping the heat on him. The thing to fear here is that Silbert will deliberately try to stretch this thing out, hoping for some kind of apple to fall off the tree.” That, Haldeman added, was what their attorneys were convinced he was doing.