The Nixon Defense: What He Knew and When He Knew It (71 page)

Ehrlichman suggested Ziegler voice them instead: “I tell you, Ziegler’s got
a pretty good thing going with him. And they talk, and Ron seems to keep him calmed down.” He went on to explain that the operations of the counsel’s office had come to a halt; he was offering them no guidance, and I was not coming into the office. Ehrlichman was also busy spinning the facts, claiming we had not really talked about Watergate, using his calendar as evidence to establish that we had met infrequently. (He excluded our frequent telephone conversations.) To deal with the problem of the Ellsberg break-in, he wanted the president to get Henry Petersen to advise him about how to invoke executive privilege or national security to keep that information from surfacing. The conversation ended when the president said he was going to go to Camp David “and try to see if I can break my sleeping pattern,” and he invited Ehrlichman and Haldeman to join him to get “a little rest.” He considered inviting Kissinger as well, but then, on second thought, said Henry was “a pain in the ass.”

As the president and his aides flew to the Catoctin Mountain retreat, the Watergate story was bursting at the seams:
The Washington Post
was ready to break a story that somehow involved Magruder, Mitchell and me, not to mention Paul O’Brien and Bill Bittman. Carl Bernstein was pressing Henry Petersen for information about when he was going to indict Mitchell and me. Petersen spoke with the president in the early evening, but the conversation was not recorded, because Nixon had requested that all the recording equipment at Camp David be removed. From later recorded conversations back at the White House, we know that Nixon got quite angry with Petersen and scolded him about investigating matters he considered “national security,” like the activities of the plumbers.
*
From Haldeman’s diary, we also know that he and the president discussed the
Post
piece.
⁷⁶
The
Post
had called the press office to get confirmation but because much of their information was wrong, it was not confirmed so they were holding back on the story. When talking to Petersen, Nixon told him that I had claimed I had been granted immunity by the prosecutors (which I not), and the president chided Petersen for granting it. When Petersen denied the charge, Nixon said he had a tape-recording that proved I was making this assertion.
⁷⁷
Haldeman also noted that the president warned Petersen specifically to stay out of the Ellsberg break-in, which Petersen said he had already learned about from me.
⁷⁸

At 6:30
P.M.
the president met with Haldeman and Ehrlichman, which became a meal that lasted until almost eight o’clock. Haldeman later described the session as “a painful sort of farewell dinner”—“painful” because the president got into “the whole problem of whether John and I should go.” Haldeman said Nixon made three points they needed to consider: one, that Magruder would accuse them in open court; two, if they left would it buy off an indictment; and three, the risk of being destroyed by constant assaults if they remained at the White House. Nixon felt they should move on and devise another strategy: “Get out and fight like hell,” as Haldeman wrote, although the president told them he had not yet made a final decision. Haldeman also noted that Nixon claimed he was not being emotional about all this, when, in fact, Haldeman thought he had been overly emotional. They returned to the White House the next morning.
⁷⁹

After arriving on the South Grounds at 9:28
A.M.
, Haldeman, Ehrlichman and the president went directly to the Oval Office.
⁸⁰
After discussing but reaching no conclusion about my replacement as White House counsel, Ehrlichman reminded the president that they had become involved in the Ellsberg investigation because J. Edgar Hoover had restrained the FBI’s own inquiry. He conceded, however, that the Liddy and Hunt operation was “apparently in excess.”

Nixon again brought up the subject of Haldeman’s and Ehrlichman’s leaving the White House. Haldeman said that Kissinger had called to counsel him not leave “until you’re totally convinced” that a criminal proceeding was inevitable, and then to move to stay ahead of any criminal actions. Haldeman said he thought they had been badly served by a number of people, and though he was not certain who all of them were, he volunteered Mitchell and myself as likely suspects. “I don’t know today,” Haldeman said, “and I don’t believe you do, really, what happened in the Watergate case.” Nixon agreed.

Ehrlichman pointed out that when the president expressed his public confidence in people, it helped boost their morale, and their reputations, so he hoped that Nixon would be very slow in eroding that confidence. He added, “That’s why I say I think we ought to wait and see what develops here. See what Petersen says this morning.” With that the president requested
Petersen come to his office, but he was concerned about their delaying. Nixon felt they were in a “horrible mess.” It all had been extremely hard on him, but “I hope, I think, I will see it through. I can sweat it out,” while still dealing with other problems that confront the president. “[On the] other hand,” he stressed, Haldeman and Ehrlichman had to “face the fact” that there needed to be some way to insulate him. His “official family” was no different that his personal family, so the impact of Watergate was ultimately personal. Add in all his other responsibilities as president, and “the wear and effect of this is enormous, and it may be destructive, it may be fatal.”
*
He told them, “I think you should be aware of that, so I was not really kidding about Agnew,” referring to allowing his vice president to take over the presidency. Nixon continued, “I wonder if this whole thing, whether you stayed or not, is not so destructive that our ability to govern will be totally destroyed.”

Ehrlichman was the first to respond, saying coldly, “I think that depends on how you handle yourself in the next few months. If you take occasions to separate yourself from this, take occasions to condemn the wrongdoers in a way that’s not faultily [
sic
], if you communicate your sentiments in some way or other, as backgrounders or otherwise, I think you can come through this rough water very nicely.” “Absolutely,” Haldeman agreed. “I don’t think it even remotely approaches being fatal.” Nixon had “to hang tough and rise above it, as you do it.”

Ehrlichman shifted the discussion to
New York Times
columnist James Reston’s interesting piece on Mitchell, wondering why Mitchell had not come forward and taken responsibility. Yet Ehrlichman felt Nixon should refrain from reading such stories, spend a week in Florida and delegate calls to others: “Hell, they can’t wreck the country in a week.” Nixon assured them he did not read the newspapers, nor did Bebe give him such information when he was in Florida.

Ehrlichman continued, “But if you could just detach yourself for a week, and then come back from the mountains, so to speak, with a fresh perspective on this, and sit in the sun and listen to some good music, and see some shows, and just take a week off, I just think you’ll come back with an entirely different view of this.” “That’s probably the best advice you’ve gotten,”
Haldeman concurred, and he reminded Nixon that in the past he had dealt with problems by pulling back, stepping away from them, and thinking them through. “We’re assuming a set of events that we don’t know [are] going to take place. We’ve got to be prepared.” Haldeman also reminded the president that Kissinger had argued strongly that he had to cancel the Soviet summit before he started bombing Vietnam, lest the Soviets cancel in response; Nixon had argued the opposite position and had proven to be correct. “Whatever we do,” Nixon replied, “the only man, the only problem we’ve got here is what we do with regard to John Dean, and I think maybe John Dean is going to do it anyway.” The president felt the most powerful force to prevent me from doing anything was to make certain I “did not get immunity and had to look [to Nixon] for amnesty.” Ehrlichman asked if he wanted that leaked to the news magazines, and the president said sure.

When Henry Petersen arrived later that morning, Haldeman and Ehrlichman went up to Ehrlichman’s office for a five-hour session with their attorneys, John Wilson and his partner Frank Strickler. In the Oval Office Nixon got directly to the point with Petersen: “Well, the problem is this, with the Ellsberg case,” he began. He reported that their “dear, departed friend Edgar Hoover” had refused to investigate Ellsberg, who was married to the daughter of a close friend of Hoover’s.
⁸¹
“Under the circumstances, Henry, an investigation was undertaken with a very, very small crew at the White House.” Nixon explained that that was “the Hunt group” and quickly added, “Nothing in terms of break-ins or anything was approved. But seeing what these crazy bastards have done since,” the president suggested, they had acted on their own. “They didn’t do a damn bit of good. I mean, all they got was what appeared in the [news]papers, that Ellsberg had psychiatric problems,” which they learned from Henry Kissinger, who had once had Ellsberg as a student. None of what they obtained in the break-in would help win in the prosecution of Ellsberg. “Then, after that, Hoover got into it,” the president said. “Now when Hoover got into it, you should know he wiretapped.” But Nixon was confused and there had never been an order to wiretap Ellsberg; rather, Ellsberg had been picked up accidentally when wiretapping a former member of Kissinger’s national security council staff, Morton Halpern, when Ellsberg had been a house guest at the Halpern home.

The president explained that his reason for informing Petersen about “the Hunt thing” was “simply to say it was a national security investigation. It is not related in any way to the Watergate thing,” which was untrue for it had
both informed Liddy and Hunt about activities that Nixon’s top aides felt were acceptable and driven the White House’s interest in the cover-up. Petersen understood and asked if there was anything else, because “I can’t stay away from that which I don’t know.” He explained that he did not want to inadvertently get into such matters through Hunt. “Yes, you could get into other things,” the president warned him. “For example, Hunt [was] involved in bugging, apparently. He tried, for example, on one occasion, it was basically during this whole Ellsberg period, this place was leaking like a sieve, and you remember Kissinger’s national security people?” Petersen did, but Nixon did not elaborate any further. Petersen mentioned to the president that the Internal Security Division of the Justice Department had been moved under him, into the Criminal Division, and explained that authority for national security undertakings “runs from you to the attorney general.”

“In the case of the Hunt thing, you should know that when he was at the White House, and he was working in the field of drugs, he worked on this particular activity, and Liddy worked with him, as I understand. But frankly, I really didn’t know this myself until this case came out. I said, ‘What in the name of God is Hunt doing?’ I understand [now] what he was doing, and I would have approved at the time, because we had nothing that we could get out of Hoover.” Nixon added, “I want you to understand that I have never used the word ‘national security’ unless it is.” He assured Petersen that he wanted no stone left unturned regarding Watergate, and proceeded to another matter of importance: “In terms of privilege, any conversations with the president are obviously privileged.” “Yes, sir,” Petersen assured him, “I understand that,” and with his privileges—national security and presidential conversations—firmly established, he moved on.

Pumped for further information, Petersen said they were assessing the credibility of Magruder and Strachan, given the conflicts in their testimony, and they were contemplating giving them both lie detector tests. Strachan had claimed that Haldeman did not get the budget for Liddy’s activities nor the intercepts from the DNC; Magruder said Haldeman received both.

Nixon decided to give Petersen a preemptive version of his March 21 conversation with me, which he introduced as a by-the-way bit of information. He claimed he had asked me what it would cost to support these men, and when I said a million dollars, he was outraged. Nixon said he told me, “You can’t go down this road, John,” and said I’d added that Bittman was demanding attorney’s fees. The president was extremely adept at reading
people, and realizing he had stunned Petersen with this disclosure, he quickly and awkwardly said, “Forget what I just told you.” He then proceeded to personally vouch for Ehrlichman and Haldeman, insisting that neither of them was a liar, but having opened the topic of money for the defendants, the president felt it needed to be given context.

“Now let me say that Ehrlichman, [and] everybody around here, had to be aware of the fact, everybody in town, of the stories to the effect that these defendants were getting something. You know, that they were getting attorneys’ fees, the Mrs. Hunt stories and so forth, when she died. And Dean, on one occasion, did apparently talk to Ehrlichman about the need for that. And Ehrlichman said, frankly, being a very good lawyer, ‘I can’t have anything to do with it.’ That’s a problem you’ll have to work out with the lawyer.” Nixon next told Petersen that Ehrlichman had been the antagonist on all this, for it was he who wanted to let it all hang out. He then described Mitchell as the key figure in the affair. While Nixon said he had never spoken to Mitchell about it, “never asked him, what should have happened after this was that Mitchell should have stepped forward and taken responsibility, say he was not minding the store, and watching these jackasses, and I am very sorry, and pleaded, and get on with the campaign.”

“It would have been much better, Mr. President,” Petersen agreed, at which Nixon noted, “But it’s too late now. There started the tragedy.”

Nixon changed the subject to seek further clarification of the differences in Strachan’s and Magruder’s accounts regarding Haldeman. Nixon said that, as he understood it, Magruder was claiming that Haldeman got the results of the bug, but Strachan was saying they did not recognize them as such. “Awfully hard to make a case on that,” the president observed. “One man against the other, which one do you believe?” He then raised the matter of the money Haldeman had available, which, Petersen said, “may turn out to be the toughest issue.” Nixon mused that John Wilson would have to sort the money matters out.