The Real Chief - Liam Lynch (18 page)

Deasy maintained that De Valera had no illusions and had stated that a military victory was not possible. ‘Once De Valera saw that Lynch and his men had to burn Fermoy barracks and aban­don the vast territory he told me that he could not see any hope of a military victory.'

Deasy also maintained that Seán Hyde was extremely enthusiastic about the position of the anti-treaty forces and could not understand the meaning of the word defeat and it was his belief that Hyde's enthusiastic reports to Liam Lynch ‘did much to en­courage and strengthen Liam in his determination to carry on the fight. This, despite the fact, that the edifice seemed to be crumbling around us.' (Hyde was in the south – Lynch was in Dub­­lin at that time.)
21

Lynch resisted all demands for a meeting of the Executive. In a letter of 22 January to the members of the Army Council he stated: ‘It was impossible for the Executives to meet' as he was con­vinced it would be dangerous if they were all together in one place. In this letter he asked that the council would continue to report on any developments, and freely express their views.

Tom Barry and Tom Crofts went to Dublin and on 6 Feb­ruary requested that an Executive meeting should be called and they stressed the importance of Lynch's attendance. P. J. Rutt­ledge was also convinced of the need for an Executive meeting. He wrote to De Valera saying, ‘It is absolutely essential that the Army Executive meet to review the situation and decide, when conversant with all circumstances and conditions, as to the pro­se­cution of the war or otherwise.'
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Barry and Crofts returned to the First Southern Division headquarters near Ballyvourney on 9 February 1923, and held a division council meeting at Cronin's in Gougane Barra on 10 February. The following day they drafted a letter to Lynch and repeated their request for a meeting of the Executive. In this they were supported by Hump­hrey Murphy and Seán McSwiney. Lynch had intended leaving Dublin for the south on 9 February, but replying to correspon­dence delayed him until the thirteenth.

In the early days of 1923 Lynch sent for Todd Andrews. ‘I'm going to pull the south together,' he said, and suggested taking Andrews with him as his adjutant. Following some questions by Lynch, Andrews told him that the situation throughout the coun­try was anything but hopeful. However, Lynch discounted his pessimism and was cheered by Andrew's account of condi­tions in south Wexford which in general were rather hopeful. Though Lynch was disappointed at Deasy's surrender appeal he told An­drews that he felt sure he could restore the situation from a base in the south. ‘I pointed out, rather timidly, that we didn't seem to have any coherent plan of action either at local, brigade or divisional level.' Todd Andrews said that in February, De Valera brought back Document No. 2 and this angered Lynch who re­sponded:

Your publicity as to sponsoring Document No. 2 has had a very bad effect on the army and should have been avoided. Generally they do not understand such documents. We can arrange a peace with­out referring to past documents.
23

De Valera responded in a long letter making no apologies for his opinions: ‘Many good men have come to the conclusion that we have long ago passed the point at which we should have regarded ourselves as beaten so far as actually securing our objective is con­­­­cerned ...'
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Lynch was now going to meet the men ‘on the ground' and was confident he would prove De Valera wrong.

Before leaving Dublin Liam said goodbye to Madge Clifford. It was as if he might have had a premonition of his death. His part­ing words were, ‘You may never see me again!' He had a great family grievance to bear. His brother, Jack (Seán) had been ar­rested and was in Maryboro jail, listed with so many others, for execution.

Commandant Paddy Brennan, O/C South Dublin brigade, arranged transport and protection for Dr Con Lucy and Lynch to Templeogue and on to Ballymore Eustace and then to Borris where they were joined by Todd Andrews and John Dowling. Tra­velling mainly at night, very often with the car lights switched off, they occasionally changed to a pony and trap and continued on their journey southwards. It was a slow, tedious nerve-wreck­ing journey to Kilkenny where they met Martin McGrath, then on to Foskins in Mooncoin where they stayed for a few days.

During this journey Andrews got to know Lynch well and at night-time the two discussed the country's position. According to Andrews, Lynch often spoke of his former comrades and it was with ‘a countenance more in sorrow than in anger'. He found it in­­explicable, Andrews said, how Collins, of all people, could have started the Civil War which would bring the nation ‘under the sovereignty of the British Crown or how he could have accepted partition'. Requests had often been put to Lynch to allow Free State soldiers armed or unarmed to be shot as reprisals for the exe­cutions which the Free State government was conti­nuing to pursue, but this was something Lynch refused to counte­nance. ‘Liam thought that shooting prisoners was immoral; he wondered how as Christians the Free Staters justified such to their own con­sciences.' According to Andrews, ‘Lynch was a simple, un­com­plicated man, believing deeply in God, the Blessed Virgin and the Saints, and in loving Ireland as he did he had dedicated his life to her under God.' Throughout it all he felt no bitterness to­wards his opponents in the Provisional Government, nor the Free State army, only sadness that they had dishonoured Ireland. ‘To the end he believed that had Collins taken the lead events would have followed a different course.'
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It was cold and continuously wet during the ten days of their journey south. Lynch, Con Lucy and Andrews had been travel­ling mainly by night. In a pony and trap they forded the Tar River and were lucky to escape drowning as the pony stumbled several times. While in Araglin (22 February) they met David Kent, brother of the Kent boys who had resisted the British in 1916. (This incident had given Liam Lynch his first inspiration to join the volunteers.)

The men now had to travel mainly on foot and because Lynch had been confined so long at Tower House, Dublin, his physical fitness had deteriorated somewhat so he rested at Ara­glin, his old brigade area for only a short period. On receipt of a dispatch from West Cork stating that there was a move towards peace, Lynch could wait no longer. Determined to put an end to the peace talks, he gave Todd Andrews a dispatch telling him to go to Con Moloney and inform him of his (Lynch's) decision – that he wished to add new life to his forces.

Andrews cautiously crossed the Galtee Mountains to dis­cover that Con Moloney had been arrested, but he met Dan Breen who informed him that the situation in the south ap­peared to be deteriorating. Andrews felt it was imperative to get back imme­di­ately with the news to Lynch.

Following a meeting of Cork No. 2 brigade council, Lynch had resumed his hazardous journey to the First Southern Division headquarters near Bally­vourney. With Con Lucy, Lynch crossed the Blackwater at Killa­vullen and continued through Donogh­more and on towards Lehanes of Bal­lingeary where they arrived on 26 February 1923. The First South­ern Division council meet­ing was reconvened at James Moyni­hans, in Coolea, on 26 Febru­­ary and lasted for al­most three days – eighteen officers attended, and only three were absent. Four members who were present – Tom Barry, Tom Crofts, Humphrey Murphy and Seán McSwiney demanded that a meet­ing of the army Executive be held which had been en­dorsed by the general council (at its meeting on the tenth.) The proposal was put for­ward again at this meeting and Lynch said that he ‘alone was re­sponsible for not calling it.' He felt that there was no point in calling a meeting as the present Exe­cutive had no power to make peace or war because the impris­oned mem­­bers would have to be released in order to produce a com­­prehensive decision. ‘If he thought he could not carry on suc­cess­fully he would not allow the war to continue for a moment longer and would put the matter to the [Republican] govern­ment.'
1

Each of the eighteen officers of the Southern Division at this three-day council meeting openly expressed their opinion on the military situation. The division O/C reported:

... We are fought to a standstill, and at present we are flattened out ... The men are suffering great privations, and their morale is going ... These men have been continually going for years back ... quite satisfied to carry on until Executive meeting when he [O/C] will satisfy himself on the following points: (1) What are we fighting for? (2) Can we win militarily?... The majority, while believing that military victory was no longer a possibility expressed a willingness to continue the struggle though, ‘the present forces against us will cripple us eventually, and we cannot hope to last against them'.
2

They emphasised that because of reduced strength, diminished ammunition supplies and the difficulty of their position they would have to operate on a smaller scale with fewer units.

Lynch, listening to the men who had the pulse of the situ­ation, was receiving a much more realistic view of the position than he could have visualised from headquarters in Dublin. He was aware, he told the meeting, that the southern counties were opposed by the heaviest concentration of Free State troops in the country; it was his view also that the peace offensive would be made mainly against the south. The relative strength of their forces was discussed, and Tom Barry emphasised strongly that in the entire country their strength did not exceed 8,000.
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This number was opposed by the Free State authorities with a build up force of at least 38,000 combat troops, with the extra facilities of barracks, armoured cars and artillery. Lynch felt that a meeting of the Executive could be risky. But, as he listened to the out-spoken opinion of men whom he knew well for their loyalty and fighting quality, he became more convinced that they were in a crisis situation, therefore it was imperative that an Executive meeting should be held.

When the conference ended he wrote to Con Moloney ex­pressing his resentment of action taken on the part of some offi­cers who were inclined to work independently of GHQ. ‘What they mean by acting on their own views I cannot understand. However, I hope we are now done with it.'

It emerged from this meeting that Lynch was determined the fight should go on, despite the fact that some of the members of the First Southern Division were beginning to lose confidence. He was convinced that eventually the Free State government would be forced to enter into some form of negotiations as em­phasised in a long letter, which he wrote to Con Moloney, dated 29 March: ‘I still have an optimistic view of the situation; if we can hold the army fast all will be well.'
4
However, instead things began to take a turn for the worse.

A tragic sequence of death and captures were to follow. Denny Lacey, O/C Tipperary, had been killed on 18 February 1923 in the Glen of Aherlow. Con Moloney was wounded and captured after a fight in the Glen. His brother Jim, intelligence officer of the Southern Command and Tom Conway O/C communica­tions, who were wounded in that fight, were also taken prisoners. (Tom Derrig replaced Con Moloney as adjutant general and Lynch himself temporarily took over the duties of the command O/C.) In Knocknagoshal, Co. Kerry when three Free State offi­cers and two men were killed in a mine trap, nine Republican prisoners were taken from Tralee jail as a reprisal, they were tied together and placed over a mine at Ballyseedy on 7 March. When the mine was exploded, eight of the prisoners were shat­tered and one was blown over a tree to a nearby field and so es­caped; on the same day five prisoners taken from Killarney jail were bru­tally treated and four died. A few days later four priso­ners on the way to jail were taken from the lorry and shot in a field. On 12 March, five prisoners met a similar fate. The conflict was now de­teriorating into a bitter attack, such atro­cities were unmatched by anything previously seen in an Irish conflict.

‘Liam was nauseated by the news,' according to Todd An­drews. ‘He seemed to live with the irradicable belief that Irish men, particularly if they had served in the pre-truce IRA, were born without the stain of original sin.'
5

On 2 March, Lynch had directed the adjutant general (Con Moloney before capture) to call a meeting of the Executive for 9 a.m. on Thursday 15 March in the Second Southern Division area. Northern members were to assemble at Rathgormach, west­ern members at the Glen of Aherlow and southern members at Araglin on the same date. It had been decided that all mem­bers would eventually go to the vicinity of Goatenbridge. How­ever, because of continuous Free State activity in the area, arrange­ments had to be cancelled and the meeting was post­poned until 23 March. De Valera had meanwhile written to Con Moloney (5 March) stating his disappointment that Lynch, ‘has sent no report. His silence seems ominous to me. I think the former O/C Second Southern Division should proceed to that area and in­vestigate the condition there.'
6

During this period, while arrangements were being made for the holding of the Executive meeting, a proposal for the cessa­tion of hostilities was being mooted by the archbishop of Cashel Dr Harty. A letter as well as a number of other pro­posals were mooted by priests and laymen who had contacted Tom Barry requesting that Republican leaders should be in­formed of the contents of the letter which was issued on 2 March.
7

The idea behind the letter was to bring the sides together and ‘end the present deplorable state of affairs in Ireland ...' Under three points there was a call for ‘the immediate cessation of hostilities ... the dumping of arms ...' and ‘subsequent to a General Election the arms and munitions to be handed over to the elected Government of the country.'
8

Fr Tom Duggan was one of the main instigators in preparing the peace proposals and, at his request, Tom Barry agreed to cir­culate the document. On 15 March, Lynch, Barry and other offi­cers of the First Southern Division were in the Ballyvourney district when Fr Duggan called on them and again spoke of some ‘peace formula'. Lynch stuck to his views as set out in previous docu­ments. Fr Duggan, still hopeful, left two days later for Dub­lin to meet Archbishop Byrne and W. T. Cosgrave, head of the Free State government. According to Todd Andrews, ‘Barry was much more flexible; but Lynch made it clear to all that he was not willing to compromise in any way. There was a strongly word­ed letter to Barry which I saw, in which Lynch ordered him to discontinue further involvement in peace talks.'
9

Lynch and Andrews were in bed one night when the bed­room door was suddenly kicked open. A figure appeared in the doorway holding a lighted candle in one hand and a sheet of paper in the other. Both men jumped up believing ‘that we are at the mercy of the Staters.' Then Liam recognised Tom Barry.

Barry waved the piece of paper. ‘Lynch, did you write this?' he shouted angrily.

‘Yes,' Liam replied.

‘A tirade of abuse followed from Barry, mainly directed at asserting the superiority of his fighting record.' The paper in Barry's hand was Liam's order to withdraw from peace feelers. Liam did not respond to Barry's abuse, but waited until ‘having emptied himself of indignation, Barry withdrew slamming the door ...'

At night time, Lynch, who spoke little by day, would chat about the day's events or newspaper items which, according to Andrews, had become mere propaganda sheets for the Free State government. Lynch specifically resented the term ‘irregulars' which was used by the Provisional Government and others to describe the anti-treaty forces. ‘He often adverted to his beliefs that if we accepted the treaty we would become a mere province of Britain.' Andrews once ventured to suggest what a misfortune it was that the country had not given De Valera full control and stood by him in his rejection of the treaty. ‘Liam didn't altoget­her agree with this view; even Document No. 2 would have been too much for him willingly to accept. Liam had not been at all in favour of the IRA setting up an alternative government; he be­lieved that De Valera would make a compromise peace and he opposed the holding of a meeting of the Executive for the same reason'.
10

Lynch, accompanied by Todd Andrews, left Gurteenflugh on 17 March for the Executive meeting which was to be held in Bliantas at the foot of the Monavullagh mountains. At Carriganimma they were joined by Tom Crofts, Tom Barry, Humphrey Murphy and a number of other men.
11

They were taken by lorry to Bweening, from there they tra­velled by pony and trap. ‘Tom Barry immediately took com­mand,' said Todd Andrews. ‘We drove into the night and it was easy to see why Barry was probably the best field commander in the IRA. Before approaching any cross roads he dismounted, cover­ing the passage of the lorry with the bodyguards. The opera­tion he was commanding was not complicated, but his air of con­fidence and authority impressed me. One felt safe with Barry in charge.'
12
Around midnight they arrived outside Kil­worth hav­ing decided previously to abandon the lorry and con­tinue on foot towards Araglin. Feeling thirsty they decided to call on a pub, had one round, and moved off in three pony and traps provided by the local company to pre-arranged billets organised by these North Cork men.

Apparently ‘the boys' had some days previously acquired a lorry-load of bacon and distributed it to the people around the area. Lynch, Barry and the others had a wholesome meal before trudging twenty miles over the Knockmealdowns to Ballinamult for the all-important Executive meeting – the meeting which the members had waited months for Lynch to convene.
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