The Real Chief - Liam Lynch (15 page)

Provisional Government (treatyite) forces took Tipperary town on 30 July. On that same day, Harry Boland was shot by armed men who burst into his hotel in Skerries; he died two days later. Carrick-on-Suir was captured by treatyite forces on 2 August, Kilmallock on 5 August and Clonmel on 8 August. On 2 August troops landed in Fenit. From there they pushed on to Tralee and during the following days, they occupied Castleisland, Listowel and Farranfore. Limerick was already in their hands. On 8 August the landing at Passage West, though vigorously op­posed by Republicans, opened the way for occupation of Cork. Other land­­ings at Youghal, Glandore, and Kenmare laid most of Cork open to occupation by Provisional Government forces. Though larger towns and villages were occupied, substantial areas of the country still remained in Republican hands. It was a return to the old type guerrilla warfare, a warfare with which many of the Republi­cans and Provisional Government forces were not un­familiar.

During the first month of the war over 1,000 Republican prisoners were taken. It was now a ‘war of brothers' where friends fought against friends, neighbours against neighbours and broth­ers against brothers: the civilian population were no longer be­hind those who wanted to continue to fight. On 10 August 1922, Lynch wrote to Ernie O'Malley requesting a daily report:

Do your utmost to order doing of line and wires and also all road communications. Limerick agreement means O'Hannigan and Bren­nan divisions are adopting neutral attitude. This is glorious if they stand by their signatories.

God bless our arms.
10

After the occupation of Waterford the line from there to Lime­rick was subjected to pressure at many points. Golden was taken by treatyite forces in a surprise attack; they took Carrick-on-Suir after a three-day struggle and Republicans had to evacuate Tip­perary. Broken at many points, the Republican line collapsed. The O'Hannigan/Brennan/Lynch agreement was overturned. The forces defending the line formed into columns and unsuccessfully be­gan to harass the garrisons.

On 11 August Lynch evacuated Fermoy barracks and burned it. This was the last post to be held by Republican forces. It was a sad Liam Lynch who took his personal belongings and valuable papers to walk out into the streets where he had issued his first challenge to the British military almost three years earlier. Once more the Chief of the IRA was without barracks, base stores, or supply service. Siobhán (Creedon) Langford recalls being with Liam and his men as they evacuated:

A group of officers stood with Liam Lynch in the barrack square It was a heart-breaking moment. Suddenly Dan Mulvihill's fine voice rang out in the popular aria from Verdi's
Ill Travatore
, ‘Home to our Mountains'. Appreciation of Dan's performance flashed on every face, and the dejection of the hour was somewhat lightened.

As Liam Lynch looked back at the burning building he pon­dered and asked what would the next chapter be for him. He did not expect an answer. The first phase of the Civil War had ended and a new one was about to begin.
11

After the evacuation of Fermoy on 11 August 1922 the adjutant general, Con Moloney, had established headquarters in the Glen of Aherlow. He also acted as adjutant to the Southern Com­mand. (Both headquarters were in the Glen but Lynch did not move into that area until 25 September.) The change over to guerrilla warfare cost the Republican forces time and effort and produced a series of new problems. Morale, which had been high during the fight against the British, was now considerably set back. Peace negotiations were formulated by persons who were neutral in the Civil War.

On 28 July 1922 at a meeting in Fermoy, Frank Daly and Professor O'Rahilly, put two specific questions to Liam Lynch: (1) Would he agree to cease hostilities if the other side did? and (2) in the event of the second Dáil meeting, would he recognise its authority?

The following day Lynch replied:

… when the Provisional Government cease their attack on us, defensive action on our part can cease ... If the Second Dáil, which is the Government of the Republic or any other elected assembly carry on such Government I see no difficulty as to allegiance of the army.
1

Lynch's reply was sent to Michael Collins, together with two queries asking if he was prepared ‘to arrange such a cessation of hostilities as General Liam Lynch intimates he is prepared to accept', and also if he would ‘agree to call forthwith a meeting of the Second Dáil.'

Collins replied on 4 August:

... So far as the army is concerned I am merely obeying the orders of my Government and all the general staff and soldiers of the army merely carrying out the instructions given in accordance with such orders. This Government has made it fully clear that its desire is to secure obedience to proper authority. When an expression of such obedience comes from the irregular leader I take it there will no longer be any necessity for arms conflict. When the irregulars – leaders and men – see fit to obey the wishes of the people, as ex­pressed to their elected representatives, when they will give up their arms and cease their depredations on the persons and pro­perty of Irish citizens, there would be no longer need for hostility.
2

Collins made it clear that this was an ‘official answer as pre­su­mably your communication was meant to be addressed to the Government' and went on to refer to the form which prisoners, taken in the recent conflict, had been asked to sign and which most of them had refused. He therefore inferred from it that these men intended to take up arms again against the Provisional Government. ‘If this is the spirit which animates Liam Lynch then I am sure your body will agree that it is very little good en­deavouring to talk about terms.'
3
In this letter Collins referred to the duties of the government and to the fact chat the time for face-saving had passed. ‘The choice is definitely between the re­turn of the British and the irregulars sending in their arms to the People's Government to be held in trust for the people.'
4
These were certainly strong words from a former friend and comrade.

On the same day, Arthur Griffith replying to two specific points, stated that the actions of the anti-treatyites were in­cor­rectly described as being defensive and could therefore not be tolerated. He also stated that the functions of a second Dáil came to an end on 30 June 1922. In the letter Griffith insisted that the military action undertaken by the government was necessary to enforce obedience to parliament, which action would cease only when there was the surrender of arms, the restoration of seized property, and the restoration of bridges and roads which had been mined or made otherwise impassable.

The tone of these two letters indicate that the Provisional Government's intention to end the conflict was only through the absolute defeat and destruction of the anti-treaty forces. It should be noted that the Republican forces were, at this point, in a strong­er position to negotiate than at any subsequent period. Though many favoured peace at almost any price, a large section of opinion disliked the fact that the Dáil had not continued to assemble, and they did not like the stand taken by the Pro­visional Govern­ment.

The situation, which Lynch envisaged, was an ideal one. He did not, however, take into account that the large majority of the people in Ireland wanted an end to the warfare. On 19 August 1922 he had directed, ‘our troops will now be formed in ASU's [Active Service Units] and operate in the open'.
5
He stated that ‘the strength of columns should not exceed thirty-five all ranks and that where a number of columns were operating in the same locality they should co-ordinate their security measures, afford each other mutual protection and act in combination when necessary.'
6

During these months of the early part of the Civil War, Lynch had kept the progress of the conflict under review at fre­quent staff meetings: it could be said that the complete con­trol of the Republican forces rested with him in so far as it was possible for any one man to exercise authority in the face of such a con­flict. Lynch's optimistic nature was now strongly tinged with sad­ness. In a letter to his brother Tom on 16 September he wrote:

The disaster of this war is sinking into my very bones, when I count the loss of Irish manhood and the general havoc of Civil War. Who could have dreamt that all our hopes could have been so blighted.

However, he had set out on a course and he was determined to see it through. He felt that nobody on the Republican side had any responsibility for carrying on the war except the Executive. De Valera expressed a desire to meet members of the army Exe­cu­tive, but Lynch was reluctant to hold an Executive meeting, unless ‘the military situation improved considerably ... I would, however, be only too pleased to have your views, at any time on the general situation, and matters arising out of it, and they will receive my earnest consideration.'
7

From the outset De Valera disagreed with the army split on the treaty. Therefore, he was anxious that the members of the Executive would consider seriously the view that a military vic­tory was not only impossible but virtually improbable. During the months from July to September, De Valera urged the leaders to try to end the conflict. This view was not now shared by Lynch.

On his way to meet Liam Deasy in West Cork, De Valera called to Lynch at Fermoy. As soon as Dev left, Lynch sent a dis­patch to Deasy: ‘Dev's mission was to try to bring the war to an end. Give him no encouragement.'

On the evening of 22 August 1922, Michael Collins, com­mander-in-chief of the army, who had been on an inspection tour of military barracks in West Cork, was returning to the city when he was shot dead at Beal-na-mBláth. Republican officers had gathered in the area for a meeting to determine future strategy. Collins was in a military convoy that passed through the locality that morning. He was recognised. As this was an enemy convoy passing through Republican held territory, they decided to set up an ambush. The following day Liam Deasy sent a dis­patch to Liam Lynch giving just an outline account of what hap­pened. Lynch acknowledged Deasy's correspondence as follows:

Irish Republic Army,

Field General Headquarters,

Department C/S,

C/O 1st Southern Division

22 August 1922

A Chara,

1. Yours of the 24th inst. reporting attack on the enemy at Beal-na-mBláth to hand yesterday.

2. Considering the very small number of men engaged this was a most successful operation, and they are to be complimented on the fight made under such heavy fire, and against such odds.

3. Considering you were aware of the fact that the convoy contained an armoured car, it is surprising you had not mines laid to get this.

4. Nothing could bring home more forcibly the awful unfor­tunate national situation at present than the fact that it has be­come necessary for Irishmen and former comrades to shoot such men as M. Collins who rendered such splendid service to the Re­public in the late war against England. It is to be hoped our pre­sent enemies will realise the folly in trying to crush the Republic before it is too late.

Mise le Meas

Liam Lynch C/S.
8

It was Paddy O'Brien's belief that, ‘when Collins, the one man on the other side prepared to negotiate, was gone, Liam became more determined. He knew the others were not prepared to com­promise, therefore it became a fight to the finish.'
9

Liam Deasy was convinced that the tragedy of the Civil War was that the anti-treatyites' protests did not end with the fall of the Four Courts. (It is, of course, easy to accept this view with hind­sight, but the inter-action of that time did not lend itself to such an idealistic situation.) Deasy was, at this juncture in August, pul­led between De Valera's call for peace, and Lynch's ‘faith that somehow the Staters would have to surrender.'
10

On 30 August Very Rev. Monsignor O'Hagan, Rector of the Irish College in Rome who was in Ireland, wrote to Richard Mul­cahy requesting a meeting between Liam Mellows, Rory O'Con­nor, Oscar Traynor and Tom Barry, then in jail. Richard Mulcahy agreed to the meeting in Mountjoy Jail. O'Connor and Mellows, having received a copy of the letter, jointly wrote stating that they welcomed ‘any efforts promising to end this new and un­natural attack on the independence of the country'. Copies of both letters were sent to Lynch who was still in the south.

Monsignor O'Hagan met Ernie O'Malley in Dublin and some proposals were put forward. Lynch's comment was ‘that they were not worth much consideration by us'.

In the period following Collins' death Emmet Dalton in Cork worked in association with Tom Ennis to find a peace formula.
11
Deasy told Liam Lynch about this, stating ‘that intermediaries were trying to make contact.' Lynch's response was ‘that these men were undoubtedly acting on Government orders, and he asked why didn't they contact him directly.'

‘Is anyone foolish enough to believe that either of them [Ennis or Dalton] would negotiate without orders of Govern­ment? Then why not direct negotiations?'
12

Is this the key that would have opened the door to peace? Did Lynch feel slighted because he was not approached directly? After all, a meeting was arranged and held near Crookstown on 13 October between Tom Ennis and Charlie Russell on the Pro­visional Government side and Liam Deasy and Tom Barry on the Republican side. (Dalton had dropped out of the negotiations.)

It was confirmed that General Dalton was acting on definite instructions from the minister for defence (Mulcahy) and was anxi­ous ‘to make an effort towards ending the present needless strife on the basis of an unconditional surrender'.
13
It was Ernest Bythe's belief that ‘Lynch was totally uncompromising. He was determined to fight it to the end; but so were we.'
14

Prior to the Civil War, Todd Andrews found Liam Mellows rather critical of ‘Liam Lynch for placing too much trust in Co­l­lins and Mulcahy's good intentions. Frank Aiken pleaded with both Mulcahy and Lynch to resist from hostilities, as he himself was determined that there was not going to be a Civil War – at least not in his division …'

Andrews was aware that ‘from as early as August, De Valera was convinced of the impossibility of winning the war and wanted to call it off, but Liam Lynch made it clear to him that any public action to this end would be repudiated by the Exe­cutive and the fighting would continue.' Emmet Dalton wanted the Civil War to end, especially following Collins' death. ‘I was really sick of it all when as the months progressed and I saw the turn events were taking.'

But why didn't he make contact with Liam Lynch? ‘My efforts even with Tom Barry and Deasy did not get very far,' responded Dalton. Wasn't Dalton's demand ‘an unconditional surrender'? ‘This was, after all, the superior military stage which we had reached. The discussions with Liam Lynch could follow if there was some platform of agreement.'
15

By September 1922 De Valera was extremely anxious to bring both sides together and to pursue his aim through political means. According to Mulcahy, De Valera explained to him that he [De Valera] was not responsible for what the leaders of his side be­lieved, nor was he able to get them to understand his point of view. He was endeavouring to find a basis for peace and won­dered if there was any method in which the treaty decisions could be re­vised. But Mulcahy, who met Dev, informed him that the treaty was not negotiable. By this time, it was quite clear that the con­trol of the anti-treatyites was totally outside De Valera's influ­ence, and as time progressed Liam Lynch was the man in com­mand, so De Valera was compelled to do as Lynch suggested.

Rev. Fr Wall, Broadford, wrote to Lynch on 13 October point­ing out that Mulcahy's response to Monsignor O'Hagan was that he and his army were carrying on ‘a defensive war' which would cease if the anti-treatyites ceased firing on his men. Lynch took a cold look at Mulcahy's ‘defensive attitude' which he stated ‘is only quibbling with the situation. What a defensive action to first attack our GHQ and other positions all over the country! When he ceases to attack us in our efforts to maintain the Re­public, then there will be peace.'

He continued by insisting on more definite proposals. ‘The fight must go on until there is no question of forcing Ireland into the British Empire, by the enemy, foreign or domestic.'
16

Towards the end of September 1922 casualties had mounted to over 300 killed or wounded and there were over 6,000 Re­publican prisoners either in jails or internment camps. The arms' position was by this time reasonably satisfactory and guerrilla warfare seemed to be working fairly well.

The Provisional Government issued a proclamation giving effect to a decision to set up military courts with powers to inflict the death penalty; the decision had been carried by eighty votes to eighteen in the Provisional parliament on 27 September.
17
A Free State document, 7 October 1922 stated: