Authors: Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
1632.
█████ 13165 ███████.
1633.
The CIA’s June 2013 Response maintains that “KSM was the first to tell [the CIA] there was a second shoe bomber and that he remained at large.” The Committee found this statement to be incongruent with CIA records. There were multiple reports that Richard Reid had an unidentified partner prior to the provision of any information from KSM (captured on March 1, 2003). The CIA’s June 2013 Response addresses only one of two documented efforts by the FBI in January 2002 to inform the CIA that Richard Reid had “an unidentified partner who allegedly backed out of the operation at the last minute.” The CIA’s June 2013 Response acknowledges that this FBI information was provided to senior CIA leadership in writing, but states that, on one of the two days the information was provided, “the Reid investigation came on page 10 of 15 pages of updates that day,” and that the information did not “exist in any searchable CIA data repositories.” The CIA’s June 2013 Response also does not address the CIA’s own source reporting on “another operative” who existed alongside Richard Reid. In April 2002, a reliable CIA source—who had warned of the Richard Reid shoe-bomb attack weeks before it occurred—reported that, in addition to Richard Reid, “another operative existed.” The source stated that, instead of an airliner departing from Paris, as had Richard Reid’s flight, “this attack would occur against an airliner originating from Heathrow International Airport in London.” Once captured, Sajid Badat would confirm this reporting. Despite acknowledging evidence to the contrary, and without further explanation, the CIA stated in meetings with the Committee in 2013 that the CIA stands by its representations that “KSM was the first to tell [the CIA] there was a second shoe bomber and that he remained at large.”
1634.
See
Volume II, including FBI WASHINGTON DC █████ (160429Z JUL 02). The CIA’s June 2013 Response acknowledges that there was intelligence reporting that Sajid Badat was involved in terrorist activities and “targeting American interests,” but defends its past assertions highlighting the effectiveness of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques in obtaining otherwise unavailable intelligence by asserting that, at the time of this reporting, there “was nothing at the time on Badat to lead [the CIA] to prioritize him over others.”
1635.
The CIA’s June 2013 Response states: “KSM was the first person to provide—in March 2003, after having undergone enhanced interrogation techniques in CIA custody—a detailed and authoritative narrative of al-Qa’ida development of and plans to use shoe bombs operationally.” The CIA’s June 2013 Response does not acknowledge intelligence acquired by the Intelligence Community on these matters prior to any reporting from KSM and does not address the significant amount of fabricated reporting KSM provided.
See
Volume II for additional information.
1636.
See
Volume II for additional information.
1637.
The FBI information was provided to the CIA.
See
CIA Headquarters document, entitled, “OPERATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS AGAINST GLOBAL SUNNI EXTREMIST TERRORISM,” dated, “14 January 2002 1630 Hours.” The CIA’s June 2013 Response acknowledges the existence of this CIA document and that the information in the document was “compiled . . . for counterterrorism seniors at CIA.” The CIA’s 2013 Response nonetheless states that “[t]here is no reference to this possibility [of a possible second operative] in official communications between FBI and CIA, nor did it exist in any searchable CIA data repositories prior to KSM’s reporting.” The CIA expressed concern that the FBI was not sharing information from the debriefings of Richard Reid. Additional FBI information about Sajid Badat, including any information obtained from Richard Reid, was not available to the Committee.
See
CIA WASHINGTON DC █████ (162127Z JUN 03).
1638.
See
intelligence chronology in Volume II, including U.S. military detainee reporting detailed in CIA Headquarters document, entitled, “OPERATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS AGAINST GLOBAL SUNNI EXTREMIST TERRORISM,” dated, “9 April 2002 1630 Hours.” This CIA document included reporting from a CIA source who stated that, in addition to Richard Reid, “another operative existed” who was planning an attack “against an airliner originating from Heathrow International Airport in London.” The same source had provided reporting on an “attack . . . against an airliner originating in France, Germany, or Britain, with the use of explosives concealed in shoes” just prior to Richard Reid’s attempted use of explosives concealed in shoes on December 21, 2001. Despite corroborated intelligence reporting acquired prior to the provision of information from CIA detainees, the CIA represented, as late as October 2007, that “[m]ost, if not all, of the intelligence acquired from high-value detainees in [the CIA] program would likely not have been discovered or reported in any other way,” crediting CIA detainees with “the discovery of an operative who was preparing another attack like that attempted by ‘shoe bomber’ Richard Reid.”
See
CIA fax from CIA employee [REDACTED] to U.S. Senate Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Defense, with fax cover sheet entitled, “Talking points,” sent on October 26, 2007, at 5:39:48 PM. Document faxed entitled, “Talking Points Appeal of the $███ Million reduction in CIA/CTC’s Rendition and Detention Program.”
1639.
FBI WASHINGTON DC █████ (130706Z JUL 02).
1640.
FBI WASHINGTON DC █████ (160429Z JUL 02).
1641.
CIA █████ ██████████; DIRECTOR █████, █████████████████.
1642.
FBI WASHINGTON DC █████ (130706Z JUL 02); FBI WASHINGTON █████ (290315Z AUG 02); █████ 13165 █████████.
1643.
See
████ [foreign partner] summary of the Sajid Badat investigation and █████ 13165 █████.
1644.
██████████ [foreign partner] authorities relayed to the CIA that there were “two (or three) Abu Issas” in terrorist threat reporting who were described as from the U.K. and engaged in suspected al-Qa’ida terrorist operations. CIA Headquarters informed ███████ in August 2003 that “there are (at least) two/two important fugitives known as Issa and carrying UK passports (those both are known at times as Issa al-Britani), and both have strong links to KSM.”
See
intelligence chronology in Volume II for additional details.
1645.
Among other documents,
see
█████ 19712 ███████████; █████ 19744 ███████; and █████ 19780 ██████████.
See also
April 4, 2003, cable from the CIA █████ (ALEC ██████████) providing information on a U.K. “Issa” in which the CIA acknowledges █████ investigation already underway, writing “we realize that Abu Issa is [a subject of interest] of interest [your government].” Abu Zubair al-Ha’ili is also known by the variant, Abu Zubayr al-Ha’ili. Abu Zubair al-Ha’ili was never in CIA custody.
1646.
See
intelligence chronology in Volume II.
1647.
█████ 24237 ████████.
1648.
Email from: █████████; to: █████████ (multiple ccs); subject: “Re: Meeting with █████ date: August 17, 2003, at 1:04PM. The CIA’s June 2013 Response states that “[t]he fact that the [foreign partner] as late as August 2003 was only able to locate a poor quality photo of Sajid Badat belies the notion that Badat was well on his way to being identified as important and disrupted in advance of KSM’s reporting. However, the Committee found when CIA officers received what they described as a “crummy” photo of Sajid Badat from the the ███████████, they nonetheless wrote, “it sure looks to me like Sajid is the shoe bomber Issa,” noting the body of intelligence compiled to date and the fact that “the photo [of Sajid Badat] looks an awful lot like the sketches of ‘Issa al-Britani/Pakistani’” the CIA had obtained from the detainee in foreign government custody, Abu Zubair al-Ha’ili. Of note to CIA officers was that al-Ha’ili “was asked, ‘what is Abu Issa’s most striking feature or features?’” Abu Zubair replied, “his eyes, thick frame eye glasses, and Pakistani hat.” Abu Zubair stated that Issa always wore a unique, irregularly shaped checkered hat that has the front center cut out of it and is only worn in Pakistan. In a discussion of the photo of Sajid Badat, a CIA officer wrote: “Sajid appears to have the same goofy hat on that Zubair went to lengths to describe.”
See
email from: ██████████ to: [REDACTED] (multiple ccs); subject: “Re: photo of Sajid badat, suspected as iden with Issa al-Hindi: some possible confusion”; date: August 15, 2003, at 7:20:40 PM.
1649.
███████ 12679 (181124Z AUG 03). Khallad bin Attash and Abu Zubaydah were also shown the picture of Sajid Badat. Both detainees stated they did not recognize the person in the photo.
1650.
Series of emails, including email from: ██████████; to: ██████████ (multiple ccs); August 22, 2003, at 9:24:43 AM. The CIA’s June 2013 Response states, “no one had suggested Badat could be a candidate for this Issa until KSM’s reporting.” CIA records indicate that KSM never identified Sajid Badat by name. Moreover, on March 20, 2003, while being subjected to the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques, KSM inaccurately identified Richard Reid’s U.K. associate as “Talha.” (
See
████████ 10912 (202110Z MAR 03), disseminated as ████████████.) On May 11, 2003, a month and a half after the CIA ceased using its enhanced interrogation techniques against KSM, KSM stated that Talha was actually “Issa,” and that he had provided the name Talha under pressure and had now remembered the right name — Issa — after he had time to think about the question.
See
███████ 11585 (111753Z MAY 03); DIRECTOR █████ (121729Z MAY 03).
1651.
█████ 12713 (231932Z AUG 03).
1652.
Ujaama had pled guilty to terrorism-related charges on April 14, 2003, and had agreed to continue cooperating with FBI officials on terrorism investigations. Earnest James Ujaama entered a guilty plea to a charge of conspiracy to provide goods and services to the Taliban on April 14, 2003.
See
U.S. Department of Justice press release dated April 14, 2003, and entitled, “Earnest James Ujaama Pleads Guilty to Conspiracy to Supply Goods and Services to the Taliban, Agrees to Cooperate with Terrorism Investigations.”
1653.
ALEC █████ (212117Z AUG 03). CIA records state that sometime prior to August 21, 2003, the FBI had entered Sajid Badat, with the correct identifying information, into ███████████████ databases.
1654.
███████ 99093 (████████████).
1655.
DIRECTOR ████ (█████ SEP 03)/████████████ [REDACTED].
See also
CIA █████ ██████ DEC 03), which includes a “Comment” that “during a 9 September 2003 interview of [Feroze Ali] Abassi at Guantanamo Bay, Abbasi identified Badat as a participant in the ‘information gathering course’ at al-Faruq” terrorist training camp, about which Abassi had previously provided detailed information.
1656.
See
██████ 12806 (I019I0Z SEP 03) and ████████ 54986 (300927Z OCT 03). The CIA’s June 2013 Response acknowledges that a U.S. military detainee first identified Sajid Badat, but argues that CIA representations on the effectiveness of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques in producing otherwise unavailable intelligence in this case were nonetheless accurate. The CIA’s June 2013 Response states that KSM “did provide unique intelligence,” and that “KSM’s identification of Badat [in the ███ photo] was more important than others who also recognized the photograph—including one who identified the photo a day before KSM did—because only KSM at the time had characterized this Issa as a partner to Reid and as a would-be shoe bomber.” As detailed in this summary and in greater detail in Volume II, the CIA’s 2013 Response is incongruent with internal CIA records. After the arrest of Sajid Badat, U.K. authorities described their investigation of Sajid Badat ███████████████████. The United Kingdom highlighted information from a ███████ [specific U.K. intelligence collection on Sajid Badat] not further identified in CIA records. The U.K. record of investigation makes no reference to KSM’s photo identification, but rather states: “reporting on 9 September 2003 confirmed that a U.S. military detainee had positively identified Sajid Badat as Abu Issa. We assess that Sajid Badat is identical with both Sajid and Abu Issa the shoebomber.”
See
███████ 13165 ██████ NOV 03); DIRECTOR █████ (████ (█████ SEP 03) ████████████; [REDACTED]; CIA ████ (█████ DEC 03).
See also
the intelligence chronology in Volume II.
1657.
ALEC ████ █████████; █████ 13120 █████████.
1658.
█████ 13120 ██████████.
1659.
█████ 13165 █████ NOV 03). The ███ [foreign partner] report highlights how the “[a named foreign government] reported that on the 13 September 2001 Nizar [Trabelsi] was arrested for his alleged involvement in planning a terrorist attack against the American Embassy in Paris” and how Trabelsi was connected to a phone card “recovered from Richard Colvin Reid” but found to have been used by Sajid Badat. The report references a larger U.K. investigation, stating that Badat was found to be “a member of Babar Ahmad’s group” and to have “attended a jihad training camp in Afghanistan.” The ███ [foreign partner] report closes by stating: “Further reporting on 9 September 2003 confirmed that a U.S. military detainee had positively identified Sajid Badat as Abu Issa. We assess that Sajid Badat is identical with both Sajid and Abu Issa the shoebomber.”
1660.
Email from: █████████; to: [REDACTED], with multiple ccs; subject: “Re: Profile on Saajid Badat for coord by 6pm, 19 October 2005; date: October 19, 2005, at 3:14:29 PM.
1661.
See
open source reporting, including “Secret Life of Shoe Bomb Saajid Badat Funded By The Taxpayer,” U.K.
Telegraph
, dated April 23, 2012; “US court hears Bin Ladin testimony from UK bomb plotter,”
BBC News
, dated April 24, 2012; “Operative Details Al Qaeda Plans to Hit Planes in Wake of 9/11,”
CNN
, dated April 25, 2012; and “‘Convention’ of Convicted Terrorists at NY Trial,”
NPR News
, dated April 24, 2012.