Authors: Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
1583.
████████ 13758 ███████████████; FBI information later relayed in ALEC █████ ███████████████; and information provided to the Committee by the FBI on November, 30, 2010.
See
FBI case file ███████████████.
1584.
████████ 13758 ███████████████████.
1585.
████████ 13758 ███████████████████.
1586.
████████ 137565 ███████████████████.
1587.
████████ 13785 ███████████████████.
1588.
████████ 137585 ███████████████████.
1589.
For additional information,
see
intelligence chronology in Volume II.
1590.
ALEC █████ (071757Z MAR 03).
1591.
██████ 10752 (102320Z MAR 03); DIRECTOR █████ (122101Z MAR 03).
See also
███████████████.
1592.
█████ 10858 (170747Z MAR 03).
1593.
█████ 10858 (170747Z MAR 03).
1594.
Memorandum for: ███████████████ [REDACTED]; from: [REDACTED],OFFICE: █████/[DETENTION SITE BLUE]; subiect: Baltimore boy and KSM; date: 15 March 2003, at 07:08:32 PM.
1595.
Email from: ███████████████ to: [REDACTED]; cc: [REDACTED]; subject: Re: Baltimore boy and KSM; date: March 15, 2003, at 2:32 PM; ALEC █████ (152212Z MAR 03).
1596.
Having read reporting from the interrogations of Majid Khan, one of KSM’s debriefers at the CIA’s DETENTION SITE BLUE, deputy chief of ALEC station ██████████ requested the photographs to “use with Ksm [sic] et al.” (
See
Memorandum for ██████████, [REDACTED]; from [REDACTED], OFFICE: ██████/[DETENTION SITE BLUE]; subject: Baltimore boy and KSM; date: 15 March 2003, at 07:08:32 PM.) The photographs were sent to DETENTION SITE BLUE shortly thereafter.
See
ALEC █████ (152212Z MAR 03).
1597.
█████ 10865 (171648Z MAR 03), disseminated as █████████████; ███████ 10866 (171832Z MAR 03); █████ 10870 (172017Z MAR 03).
1598.
████████ 10866 (171832Z MAR 03). KSM explained that Majid Khan was married to Maqsood Khan’s niece, and that “another Maqsood Khan relative was a truck driver in Ohio.” KSM stated that he had met him “on at least one occasion” at the home of Maqsood Khan in Karachi in approximately l999 or 2000. This information was also sent on March 18, 2003, in ALEC █████ (180200Z MAR 03).
See also
████████████.
1599.
ALEC █████ (261745Z MAR 03).
1600.
████████ 10886 (182219Z MAR 03); ALEC █████ (180200Z MAR 03). In assessing the session for CIA Headquarters, personnel at DETENTION SITE BLUE wrote that “KSM will selectively lie, provide partial truths, and misdirect when he believes he will not be found out and held accountable.” On the other hand, they wrote that “KSM appears more inclined to make accurate disclosures when he believes people, emails, or other source material are available to the USG for checking his responses.
See
█████ 10884 (182140Z MAR 03).
1601.
See
WHDC █████ (242226Z MAR 03), which discusses information obtained by FBI officials on March 20, 2003; and FBI case file ███████████████.
1602.
CIA Office of Inspector General interview of ████████████. Chief of the █████ Branch of the UBL Group at CTC, by █████████████, Office of the Inspector General, July 30, 2003. The interview report states: “CIA initiated the lead (not from detainees) to an individual believed to live in Baltimore — Majid Khan. He was believed to be in contact with a nephew of [KSM]. The FBI initiated trash coverage (using their special authorities to tap e-mail) on the Baltimore residence where Khan had lived and family members still lived. Meanwhile, using ████████████████ FISA coverage ████████████████████ the Agency, with the help of [a foreign government], located [Majid] Khan. The Baltimore house placed a call to Ohio (to Iyman Faris) which became another FBI lead. When the FBI approached Faris he talked voluntarily.”
1603.
See
FBI case file ██████████; WHDC █████ (211522Z MAR 03) and WHDC █████ (242226Z MAR 03). Faris described Maqsood Khan as “the ‘right foot’ of Usama bin Ladin (UBL).”
1604.
See
WHDC █████ (242226Z MAR 03); and WHDC █████ (211522Z MAR 03) (discusses information obtained by FBI official March 20, 2003).
1605.
ALEC █████ (261745Z MAR 03). A senior CIA counterterrorism official, who had previously served as chief of the Bin Ladin Unit, commented on the intelligence obtained from Iyman Faris on the Brooklyn Bridge plotting, stating: “i guess we have to take these guys at their word, but if these are the types of attacks ksm was planning, [KSM] was more of a nuisnace [sic] than a threat and you have to wonder how he ever thought of anything as imaginative as the 11 sept attacks, i wonder if he had two tracks going: ops like 11 sept and a whole other series half-baked, secular palestinian-style ops like those majid khan, faris, and the other yahoos are talking about. perhaps he believe [sic] if we caught the yahoos, we would relax a bit and they would be better able to hit us with an effective attack? the other alternative, is that ksm himself is a yahoo. strange stuff.” (
See
email from: ██████████ to: ██████████ ██████████ ██████████ ██████████, [REDACTED]; subject: attacks in conus; date: March 25, 2003, at 6:19:18 AM, referencing cable WHDC █████ (242226Z MAR 03), with the subject line, “EYES ONLY: Majid Khan: Imminent al-Qa’ida Plots to Attack NYC and WDC Targets Aborted by KSM Capture.”) In a separate email, the senior official wrote: “again, odd. ksm wants to get ‘machine tools’ to loosen the bolts on bridges so they collapse? did he think no one would see or hear these yahoos trying to unscrew the bridge? that everyone would drive by and just ignore the effort to unbolt a roadway? and what about opsec: ‘yup, we were just going to recruit a few of the neighbors to help knock down the brooklyn bridge.’”
See
email from: ████████; ██████████ ██████████ ██████████ ██████████ date: March 25, 2003, at 6:35:18 AM.
1606.
ALEC █████ (261745Z MAR 03). During this period, the CIA was receiving updates from the FBI debriefings of Iyman Faris.
See
TRRS-03-03-0610, referenced in ███████ 10984 (242351Z MAR 03). On March 20, 2003, KSM confirmed that he had tasked “the truck driver . . . to procure machine tools that would be useful to al-Qa’ida in its plan to loosen the nuts and bolts of suspension bridges,” but stated he had “never divulged specific targeting information to the truck driver.” (
See
███████ 10910 (202108Z MAR 03).) A CIA cable from March 24, 2003, noted that KSM’s CIA interrogators were “reviewing latest █████ readout on Majid Klian debriefs [who was in foreign government custody] and FBI [intelligence reports] from debriefings of the truck driver Faris Iyman [sic],” and that the CIA team was therefore “focused entirely on sorting out the information on Majid’s claim . . . as well as truck driver details on the threat.” (
See
█████ 10984 (242351Z MAR 03).) According to another cable, KSM indicated that while the original plan was to sever the cables, he determined that it would be easier to acquire machine tools that would allow the operatives to “loosen the large nuts and bolts of the bridges.” (
See
█████ 10985 (242351Z MAR 03).) The disseminated intelligence report from this interrogation added that KSM stated his last communication with Iyman Faris was shortly before his capture on March 1, 2003, and that he (KSM) was “severely disappointed to learn that Iyman had not yet been successful in his mission to purchase the necessary materials.” (
See
DIRECTOR █████ (25111Z MAR 03).) Later, on April 10, 2003, a CIA cable stated that KSM told CIA interrogators that al-Qa’ida members had “cased” the Brooklyn Bridge and that KSM had discussed attacking suspension bridges with other senior al-Qa’ida operatives.
See
HEADQUARTERS █████ (100928Z APR 03).
1607.
See
FBI case file █████████ ALEC █████ (261725Z MAR 03), and Department of Justice release dated October 28, 2003, entitled, “Iyman Faris Sentenced for Providing Material Support to Al Qaeda.” During these interviews Iyman Faris provided detailed information on a variety of matters, including his ongoing relationship with Maqsood Khan; the aliases he used in Pakistan (“Mohmed Rauf and “Gura”); how he became acquainted with KSM and al-Qa’ida; as well as his interaction with the Majid Khan family. Iyman Faris further provided information on his initial meeting with UBL and how he helped Maqsood Khan obtain supplies “for usage by Usama Bin Ladin” when he was in Pakistan.
1608.
ALEC █████ (022304Z APR 03); ALEC █████ (030128Z APR 03); ALEC █████ (022304Z APR 03); WHDC █████ (011857Z APR 03).
See also
ALEC (261725Z MAR 03); ALEC (010200Z APR 03); ALECBP(261933Z MAR 03).
1609.
WHDC █████ 232240Z APR 03).
1610.
See
Department of Justice comments in “The Triple Life of a Qaeda Man,”
Time Magazine
, June 22, 2003.
1611.
See
FBI case file ████████████████████.
1612.
See
Department of Justice release dated October 28, 2003, entitled, “Iyman Faris Sentenced for Providing Material Support to Al Qaeda.”
1613.
“Khalid Shaykh Muhammad’s Threat Reporting — Precious Truths, Surrounded by a Bodyguard of Lies,” IICT, April 3, 2003.
1614.
Note on CIA records related to U.K.-based “Issas”: Two United Kingdom-based al-Qa’ida associates, Dhiren Barot and Sajid Badat, were known by the same common aliases, Issa, Abu Issa, Abu Issa al-Britani (“[of] Britain”) and/or Issa al-Pakistani. Both individuals were British Indians who had been independently in contact with senior al-Qa’ida leaders in Pakistan. Reporting indicated that the Issas were located in the United Kingdom and engaged in terrorist targeting of the U.K. The investigation into their true identities was a U.K.-led operation. As a result, the CIA sometimes had limited insight into U.K.-based activities to identify and locate the Issas. Senior CIA personnel expressed frustration that the U.K. was not sharing all known information on its investigations, writing in August 2003 that “[the FBI is] clearly working closely with the [U.K. service] on these matters and [the CIA is] at the mercy” of what it is told. In June 2003, the CIA informed the FBI that the CIA had “no electronic record of receiving any transcripts or summaries from your agency’s interviews with [Richard] Reid, and would appreciate dissemination of summaries of questioning for the purposes of [CIA] analysis.” Until the arrest of one of the Issas, Sajid Badat, on November 27, 2003, the U.S. Intelligence Community and U.K. authorities often confused the two al-Qa’ida associates. As a result, the quality and clarity of detainee reporting on the Issas (including reporting from detainees in the custody of the CIA, U.S. military, Department of Justice, and foreign services) varied. CIA personnel █████████████████ reported in September 2003 that there were “two (or three) Abu Issas” in intelligence reporting and that because of their similarities, it was often “unclear which Issa the detainees [were] referring to at different stages.” Once detained in the United Kingdom in November 2003, Sajid Badat (one of the Issas) cooperated with U.K. authorities and provided information about the other “Issa.” Badat stated that “people often asked [Badat] about [the other] Issa, as they were both British Indians.” According to Sajid Badat, “anyone who had been involved with jihad in Britain since the mid-90s” would know Issa al-Hindi (aka Dhiren Barot), to include Babar Ahmed, Moazzem Begg, Richard Reid, Zacarias Moussaoui, and KSM. The other Issa, Dhiren Barot, arrested on August 3, 2004, was found to have been especially well-known among the U.K.-based extremist community, having written a popular book in 1999 expounding the virtues of jihad in Kashmir under the alias, “Esa al-Hindi.” CIA records include a reference to the book and a description of its author (“a brother from England who was a Hindu and became a Muslim… [who] got training in Afghanistan…”) as early as December 1999 (disseminated by the CIA on 12/31/99 in █████████████. The ██████████[foreign partner] would later report that Dhiren Barot “frequently” appeared “in reporting of terrorist training” and had “involvement in Jihad in occupied Kashmir, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Malaysia, throughout the 1990s.” The Committee Study is based on more than six million pages of material related to the CIA’s Detention and Interrogation Program provided by the CIA. Access was not provided to intelligence databases of the CIA or any other U.S. or foreign intelligence or law enforcement agency. Insomuch as intelligence from these sources is included, it was, unless noted otherwise, found within the CIA’s Detention and Interrogation Program material produced for this Study. It is likely that significant intelligence unrelated to the CIA’s Detention and Interrogation Program on Sajid Badat and Dhiren Barot exists in U.S. intelligence and law enforcement records and databases.
See
intelligence chronology in Volume II, including: ALEC █████ (112157Z JUN 03); █████ 19907 (231744Z APR 04); █████ 99093 (020931Z SEP 03); ALEC █████ (212117Z AUG 03); CIA WASHINGTON DC █████ (162127Z JUN 03); and a series of emails between ██████████ and ██████████ (with multiple ccs)on August 22, 2003, at 9:24:43 AM.
1615.
Among other documents,
see
█████ 19760 (251532Z JUN 02); █████ 80508 (081717Z AUG 02); CIA █████ (311736Z OCT 02), ██████████████████; and █████ 99093 (020931Z SEP 03). The CIA’s June 2013 Response states that “KSM’s reporting also clearly distinguished between, and thereby focused investigations of, two al-Qa’ida operatives known as Issa al-Britani.” As detailed in the KSM detainee review in Volume III, KSM did discuss the two operatives, but he did not identify either by name (or, in the case of Dhiren Barot, by his more common
kunya
, Issa al-Hindi), and provided no actionable intelligence that contributed to the eventual identification of, or locational information for, either individual.