Authors: Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
1408.
August 18, 2001, FBI Minneapolis Field Officer Memorandum referenced in Report of the Joint Inquiry into the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001, by the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. Zacarias Moussaoui was later convicted of terrorism-related offenses, and sentenced to life in prison. See Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, “A Review of the FBI’s Handling of Intelligence Information Related to the September 11 Attacks,” dated November 2004, and released publicly in June 2006, among other sources.
See also
other open source records, including November 20, 2007,
Associated Press
article entitled, “Judge in 9/11 Conspirator Moussaoui’s Case Questions Government Evidence in Terrorism Trials.” The article states: Judge “Brinkema said she no longer feels confident relying on those government briefs, particularly since prosecutors admitted last week that similar representations made in the Moussaoui case were false. In a letter made public Nov 13, [2007], prosecutors in the Moussaoui case admitted to Brinkema that the CIA had wrongly assured her that no videotapes or audiotapes existed of interrogations of certain high profile terrorism detainees. In fact, two such videotapes and one audio tape existed.”
1409.
August 25, 2001, CIA Headquarters cable referenced by the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence investigations, as well as the Twelfth Public Hearing on the “National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States,” June 16, 2004.
1410.
January 17, 2002, Federal Bureau of Investigation public release.
1411.
Zacarias Moussaoui was arrested on August 16, 2001. Intelligence indicates Faruq al-Tunisi withdrew from al-Qa’ida operations. Faruq al-Tunisi remains a fugitive █████████████████████████████████████████████████.
1412.
ALEC ████████ (151618Z OCT 03); ████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████.
1413.
Although the operation was disrupted with his arrest, bin Arshad claimed to officers of a foreign government that the operation was halted prior to his detention, specifically, when Richard Reid’s shoe-bomb explosive concealment method was uncovered in December 2001. See DIRECTOR ███████ (270238Z FEB 03).
1414.
See intelligence chronology in Volume 11.
1415.
CIA █████████ █████████████████; ████████████████████████ 65903 ██████████████████; ██████████████████ 65902 ██████████████████; DIRECTOR █████ ███████████████████.
1416.
After bin Arshad was rendered from ██████████ [Country 1] to ███████ [Country 2] for questioning, ██████████████████ [Country 2 officials] acquired a “negligible amount of intelligence” from bin Arshad, and he was eventually ██████████ to ████████ [Country 3]. The cable stated, “██████████ [Country 1 authorities] indicate[d] that [Masran bin Arshad] was the toughest subject they had ever interrogated, including ██████ terrorists.” In anticipation of the release of an August 8, 2002, CIA intelligence report describing new information Masran bin Arshad was providing, the CIA ██████ in ████████ [Country 3] sent a cable to CIA Headquarters, which stated: “In light of the attention that this report is likely to generate among consumers, it probably warrants reiterating that the interrogation methods being used with Masran [by the ████████████████████ Police ███████████████] are somewhat unconventional . . . This has entailed having several [Country 3 officers] spend an enormous amount of time with Masran praying with him, eating with him, earning his trust, listening to him, and eliciting from him. This approach has yielded a significant amount of valuable intelligence.” (See
███████████████
65903
███████████████.
1417.
CIA ███████ ███████████████; ██████████████ 65903 ████████████; ██████████████ 65902 ██████████████.) CIA suspicions that “Tawfiq” may be identifiable with Mohd Farik bin Amin, aka Zaid, aka Zubair, are found in ALEC ████████ (192004Z JUN 03).
1418.
See Second Wave/al-Ghuraba Group intelligence chronology in Volume II, including DIRECTOR ███████ (082328Z JUL 03) and ███████████████.
1419.
See Second Wave/al-Ghuraba Group intelligence chronology in Volume II, including CIA ██████ (22I647Z JUL 02).
1420.
Among other reports, see DIRECTOR ████████ (082328Z JUL 03), ██████████████, CIA (221647Z JUL 02), and ███████ 45325 (051614Z SEP 03). According to KSM, an individual named “Mussa,” which the CIA assessed was KSM’s name for Zaini Zakaria, disappeared after receiving money that was intended for pilot training. Reporting indicates that Zakaria—a Malaysian—was to be the pilot for the group of Malaysian individuals that Masran bin Arshad sought to use in the Second Wave plotting. As noted in the text, Zakaria turned himself into Malaysian authorities on December 18, 2002. Hambali—who was associated with these Malaysians—stated he “did not know why the operation was cancelled,” but surmised it might be because of the September 11, 2001, attacks, or because Zaini Zakaria “got cold feet.” Hambali reported in September 2003 that the head of the operation was Masran bin Arshad and that Zaini Zakaria was the pilot selected to fly the airplane. Hambali corroborated Masran bin Arshad’s reporting that the other members of the group were Mohd Farik bin Amin (aka Zubair), Abd Al-Rahman bin Mustapha Afifi, and Bashir bin Lap Nazri (aka Lillie). By the time of Hambali’s capture, all three were in custody. See DIRECTOR ███████ (042340Z SEP 03)/██████████████.
1421.
███████ 10044 (260718Z AUG 04). See
also
DIRECTOR ███████ (181840Z MAY 07) and “Malaysia Frees Suspected Al Qaeda Pilot-Report,”
Reuters
, dated February 14, 2009.
1422.
As described, on February 9, 2006, in a White House briefing on “the West Coast Terrorist Plot by Frances Fragos Townsend, Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism,” the White House emphasized how “collaboration with our international partners” had “disrupted terrorist networks around the world and serious al-Qaeda plots.” Using the “West Coast” plot as an example, Townsend relayed that: “Khalid Shaykh Mohammed was the individual who led this effort. .. .The cell leader was arrested in February of 2002, and as we begin—at that point, the other members of the cell believed that the West Coast plot had been cancelled [and] was not going forward . . . the lead guy is arrested, which disrupts it in February of ‘02.” When asked about whether this plotting could be credited as a disruption given the belief by some that “it never got far enough to be disrupted,” Townsend stated, “there is no question in my mind that this is a disruption.” See
also
May 23, 2007, White House Press Release, entitled, “Fact Sheet: Keeping America Safe From Attack,” which states “We Also Broke Up Other Post-9/11 Aviation Plots. In 2002, we broke up a plot by KSM to hijack an airplane and fly it into the tallest building on the West Coast.” The CIA’s June 2013 Response acknowledges that operatives involved in the “Second Wave” plot were arrested in 2002. The CIA’s June 2013 Response nonetheless contends that “Hambali remained capable of directing the plot at the time of his arrest,” and that, therefore, the arrest of Hambali “was a critical factor in the disruption of al-Qa’ida’s plan.” There are no CIA records indicating that Hambali took any action in furtherance of the plotting. Further, a November 2003 cable states that CIA interrogators believed Hambali’s role in al-Qa’ida terrorist activity was more limited than the CIA had assessed prior to his capture and that al-Qa’ida members did not consider Hambali “capable of leading an effort to plan, orchestrate and execute complicated operations on his own.” (See ███████████ 1113 (111252Z NOV 03).) The claim in the CIA’s June 2013 Response that the capture of Hambali “resulted in large part from information obtained from” KSM is inaccurate. Details on the capture of Hambali are described elsewhere in this summary and in greater detail in Volume II.
1423.
See ██████████ 10983 (242321Z MAR 03); ██████████ 10972 (241122Z MAR 03); and the KSM detainee review in Volume III.
1424.
██████████████ 11319 (191445Z APR 03), disseminated as ████████████████.
1425.
ALEC █████ (222153Z APR 03).
1426.
████████ 11513 (051120Z MAY 03).
1427.
████████ 12068 (201407Z JUN 03); ████████ 12167 (301747Z JUN 03), disseminated as ███████████████.
1428.
Email from: [REDACTED]; to: [REDACTED], ██████████████, ██████████████, ██████████████, █████, ██████, [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; subject: Highlight for Coord: KSM and Los Angeles Threat Reporting; date: June 23. 2003, at 02:21 PM.
1429.
████████ 112208 (051545Z JUL 03), disseminated as ██████████████.
1430.
████████ 12208 (051545Z JUL 03), disseminated as ██████████████.
1431.
March 2, 2005, Memorandum for Steve Bradbury from ██████████████, ██████ Legal Group, DCI Counterterrorist Center, document entitled, “Effectiveness of the CIA Counterterrorist Interrogation Techniques.” The same representation can be found in multiple documents, including “Briefing for Chief of Staff to the President Josh Bolten: CIA Rendition, Detention, and Interrogation Programs” dated May 2, 2006, as well as “Talking Points for 10 March 2005 DCI Meeting PC; Effectiveness of the High-Value Interrogation (HVDI) Techniques,” dated March 2, 2005. As noted earlier, the CIA’s June 2013 Response acknowledges that the CIA’s representations on how the CIA first learned of the group were inaccurate. See intelligence chronology in Volume II for detailed information on this matter.
1432.
██████████ 15359 ███████████████. As detailed in Volume II, while still in foreign government custody, Hambali stated he had a brother named “Ruswan Gunawan” who attended Abu Bakr University in Karachi and lived in a dormitory on or near the campus. According to Hambali, his brother served as his “primary conduit for communications” with KSM and al-Qa’ida. The information that Hambali provided regarding the true name of his brother was relayed to CIA Headquarters and to CIA personnel in Pakistan and elsewhere on August 15, 2003. The cable stated that, while Hambali was in foreign government custody, the CIA “learned that” Hambali had a 25-year-old-brother at Abu Bakr University in Karachi named “Rusman Gunawan.” According to Hambali, the brother lived in a dormitory near campus. ████████████ responded that this was “actionable intelligence that may help” ████████ locate Gunawan and that ████████████████ would check records of the students at Abu Bakr University for matches to Gunawan. Previous checks for names provided by KSM and other CIA detainees for Hambali’s brother (“Abdul Hadi”) did not result in matches or locational information. The Director of the CIA Counterterrorism Center subsequently authorized the capture and detention of Hambali’s brother based on the information Hambali had provided in foreign government custody. Thereafter, CIA personnel in ███████ began working to facilitate the capture of Gunawan by Pakistani authorities. Days later, a CIA cable referenced information on the probable location of Ruswan Gunawan and described ██████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████ See intelligence chronology in Volume II for details, including ██████████ 87551 (15073IZ AUG 03); ██████████ 87552 (150738Z AUG 03); ██████████ 15108 (161148Z AUG 03); ALEC ██████ (181711Z AUG 03); ██████████ 15173 (251117Z AUG 03); ALEC ██████ (011729Z SEP 03); and ██████████ 15243 (020259Z SEP 03).
1433.
██████████ 15359 ██████████████. The cable closes by stating that Gunawan suggested the interrogators ask Hambali about the 17-member group, “now that we can confront him with [Gunawan] having unmasked the group.” The cable added that the Pakistani government would not allow the members of the student group to depart Pakistan and that “confronting Hambali with [the information on the 17-member group] should also be interesting.”
1434.
██████████ 15359 ██████████████. Records indicate that it was this initial analysis that led the CIA to consider the group part of KSM’s “Second Wave” “cell.” It is unknown if these CIA officers were aware of Masran bin Arshad’s reporting on his team of Malaysian nationals initially tasked with conducting an attack against the “tallest building in California” using shoe-bomb explosive devices to gain access to a plane’s cockpit. See DIRECTOR ██████ (270238Z FEB 03).
1435.
██████████ 15359 █████████████.
1436.
In October 2003, KSM informed the CIA that “he did not yet view the [al-GhurabaJ group as an operational pool from which to draft operatives,” and noted even those who had received military training were not ready to be considered for “ongoing planning.” See ████████████ 10223 (221317Z OCT 03) and ██████████████.
1437.
See intelligence chronology in Volume II, including CIA ██████ ████████████████; ██████████████ 65903 ██████████████; and ██████████████ 65902 ████████████. The four members of the Malaysian cell were not members of the al-Ghuraba group.
1438.
██████████ 15359 █████████████.
1439.
██████████ 15359 ██████████████. As described, the cable closes by stating that Gunawan suggested the interrogators ask Hambali about the 17-member group, “now that we can confront him with [Gunawan] having unmasked the group.” The cable added that the Pakistani government would not allow the members of the student group to depart Pakistan and that “confronting Hambali with [the information on the 17-member group] should also be interesting.”
1440.
See [REDACTED] 45953 (151241Z SEP03) and [REDACTED] 1323 (161749Z SEP 03). CIA cables describe how Hambali was repeatedly questioned on this issue while being subjected to the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques. A CIA cable states: “With the gradual ramp-up of intensity of the session and the use of the enhanced measures, [Hambali] finally stepped over the line and provided the information.” Months later Hambali admitted to fabricating the information provided. A cable explained that Hambali “gave answers that were similar to what was being asked and what he inferred the interrogator or debriefer wanted, and when the pressure subsided or he was told that the information he gave was okay, [Hambali] knew that he had provided the answer that was being sought.” (See ████████ 1142 (November 30, 2003), ████████████ 1144 (010823Z DEC 03).) The CIA represented in the February 2004 Pavitt memo to the CIA Inspector General, among other documents, that “as a result of the lawful use of EITs, Hambali provided information [on the al-Ghuraba group] . . . some of whom had been designated as the pilots” for the Second Wave attacks. The CIA’s June 2013 Response indicates that the CIA continues to assess that multiple al-Ghuraba members had an “interest in aircraft and aviation.” CIA records do not support this assertion. While one member of the al-Ghuraba group was interested in airplanes, ████████████████████ [a specific al-Ghuraba group member, Person 1], intelligence indicates that the interest was unrelated to terrorist activity. (See intelligence chronology in Volume II, including ██████████ 15608 (██████████████), describing █████████████████████████ [Person 1’s] interview while in foreign government custody.) A CIA cable states “after several heart-to-heart chats, ████████ [Person 1] cried and pledged his full cooperation.” Under questioning, ████████ [Person 1] stated that Gunawan encouraged ████████ [Person 1] to pursue his interest in aircraft and “attempted in late 2001 and early 2002 to recruit him for pilot training.” Per the cable, ████████ [Person 1] deflected these requests from Gunawan. Asked about his interest in aviation, ████████ [Person 1] stated that “he was the only member of the Ghuraba study group with an interest in aviation,” and that “since he was about four years old he has ‘been a big maniac for airplanes.’” ████████ [Person 1] told his interrogators that he purchased and read multiple magazines about aircraft from various book stores. A CIA officer wrote, “asked to provide details on the Boeing 747, [Person 1] rattled off an impressive array of facts about the various series of 747s.” ████████ [Person I’s] claims were consistent with other intelligence in CIA databases. See intelligence chronology in Volume II for additional information.