Authors: Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
1867.
DIR ████ ██████████; Interview of [REDACTED], by [REDACTED], 14 October 2004, CIA Oral History Program; ████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████; ████████████████████.
1868.
Interview of [REDACTED], by [REDACTED], 14 October 2004, CIA Oral History Program; Interview of [REDACTED], by [REDACTED], 3 December 2004, CIA Oral History Program.
1869.
Interview of [REDACTED], by [REDACTED], 14 October 2004, CIA Oral History Program.
1870.
Interview of [REDACTED], by [REDACTED] 14 October 2004, CIA Oral History Program; Interview of [REDACTED], by [REDACTED], 14 September 2004, CIA Oral History Program; Interview of [REDACTED], by [REDACTED]; 24 November & 15 December 2004, CIA Oral History Program; Interview of [REDACTED], by [REDACTED], 30 November 2004.
See
████████ 41034 ████████.
1871.
Interview of [REDACTED] by [REDACTED], 3 December 2004, CIA Oral History Program; DIRECTOR ████ █████████.
1872.
Interview of [REDACTED] by [REDACTED], 14 October 2004, CIA Oral History Program.
1873.
Interview of [REDACTED] by [REDACTED], 14 October 2004, CIA Oral History Program; Interview of [REDACTED] by [REDACTED], 3 December 2004, CIA Oral History Program; ██████████ 41490 ██████████); Interview of ███████, by [REDACTED], 25 October 2004, CIA Oral History Program; Interview of [REDACTED], by [REDACTED], 14 September 2004, CIA Oral History Program.
1874.
Interview of [REDACTED] by [REDACTED], 14 October 2004, CIA Oral History Program; Interview of [REDACTED] by [REDACTED], 3 December 2004, CIA Oral History Program; ██████████ 41490 (██████████).
1875.
Interview of [REDACTED] by [REDACTED], 14 October 2004, CIA Oral History Program; Interview of [REDACTED] by [REDACTED], 3 December 2004, CIA Oral History Program; ██████████ 41490 (██████████).
1876.
██████████ 41490 (██████████).
1877.
Interview of [REDACTED], by [REDACTED], 14 September 2004, CIA Oral History Program.
1878.
██████████ 41351 ██████████; ████████ 41490 ██████████; ALEC ██████████████████████████████████████ 41490 ██████████).
1879.
See
█████████ 10983 (242321Z MAR 03); █████████ 10972 (241122Z MAR 03); and the KSM detainee review in Volume III.
1880.
Interview of John E. McLaughlin, by [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], Office of the Inspector General, September 5, 2003; █████, Memorandum for the Record; subject: Meeting with Deputy Chief, Counterterrorist Center Al-Qa’ida Department; date: 28 July 2003; Interview of █████, by ████, Office of the Inspector General, August 18, 2003.
1881.
████, Memorandum for the Record; subject: Meeting with Deputy Chief, Counterterrorist Center ALEC Station; date: 17 July 2003.
1882.
CIA Inspector General, Special Review, Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Program (2003-7123-IG), January 2004.
1883.
Memorandum for: Inspector General; from: James Pavitt, Deputy Director for Operations; subject: re (S) Comments to Draft IG Special Review, “Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Program” (2003-7123-IG); date: February 27, 2004; attachment: February 24, 2004, Memorandum re Successes of CIA’s Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Activities.
1884.
CIA Office of Inspector General, Special Review—Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Program, (2003-7123-IG), May 2004.
1885.
Memorandum for John A. Rizzo, Senior Deputy General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, May 30, 2005, Re: Application of United States Obligations Under Article 16 of the Convention Against Torture to Certain Techniques that May be Used in the Interrogation of High Value Al Qaeda Detainees, pp. 10–11, citing CIA Office of Inspector General, Special Review, pp. 85–91.
1886.
CIA Memorandum for the Record, “Review of Interrogation Program on 29 July 2003,” prepared by CIA General Counsel Scott Muller, dated August 5, 2003; briefing slides entitled, “
CIA Interrogation Program
,” dated July 29, 2003, presented to senior White House officials.
1887.
See
briefing slides entitled, “
CIA Interrogation Program
,” dated July 29, 2003, presented to senior White House officials. Those attending the meeting included Vice President Richard Cheney, National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice, White House Counsel Alberto Gonzales, Attorney General John Ashcroft, Acting Assistant Attorney General Patrick Philbin, and counsel to the National Security Council, John Bellinger.
1888.
The CIA’s June 2003 Response states that “CIA mistakenly provided incorrect information to the Inspector General (IG) that led to a one-time misrepresentation of this case in the IG’s 2004
Special Review
.” The CIA’s June 2013 Response adds that, “[t]his mistake was not, as it is characterized in the ‘Findings and Conclusions’ section of the
Study
, a ‘repeatedly represented’ or ‘frequently cited’ example of the effectiveness of CIA’s enhanced interrogation program.” The CIA’s June 2013 assertion that this was a “one-time misrepresentation” is inaccurate. As described, the inaccurate information was provided numerous times to the Inspector General, in multiple interviews and in the CIA’s official response to the draft Special Review. Afterwards, the CIA relied on the section of the Special Review that included the inaccurate information on the capture of Majid Khan in obtaining legal approval for the use of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques from the Department of Justice. This information was also provided by the CIA to the CIA’s Blue Ribbon Panel for their review of the CIA’s Detention and Interrogation Program. The CIA also included the inaccurate representation about the identification of Majid Khan and his family to the National Security Council principals on multiple occasions. Further, as noted, the inaccurate information in the CIA OIG Special Review was declassified and has been used in multiple open source articles and books, often as an example of the effectiveness of the CIA program.
1889.
Memorandum for the Record; subject: CIA Interrogation Program; September 27, 2003 (OGC-FO-2003-50088). Slides, CIA Interrogation Program, 16 September 2003. John B. Bellinger III, Senior Associate Counsel to the President and Legal Advisor, National Security Council; Memorandum for the Record; subject: Briefing of Secretaries Powell and Rumsfeld regarding Interrogation of High-Value Detainees; date: September 30, 2003.
1890.
Scott W. Muller; Memorandum for the Record; Interrogation briefing for Jack Goldsmith; date: 16 October 2003 (OGC-FO-2003-50097).
1891.
For additional details,
see
Volumes II and Volume III.
1892.
See
FBI 302 on FBI case file █████████████, and ████ 88793 ███████.
1893.
ALEC ████ (160141Z JAN 03).
1894.
██████ 13571 (260330Z FEB 03).
1895.
ALEC ███ (040329Z MAR 03).
1896.
█████ 13658 (050318Z MAR 03); █████ 13659 (050459Z MAR 03); DIRECTOR ███ (050459Z MAR 03).
1897.
Memorandum for: ██████, [REDACTED]; from: [REDACTED], OFFICE: ████/[DETENTION SITE BLUE]; subject: Baltimore boy and KSM; date; 15 March 2003, at 07:08:32 PM.
1898.
ALEC Station sent DETENTION SITE BLUE photographs for use with KSM and other detainees. They included Majid Khan, Muhammad Khan, Sohail Munir, Iyman Faris, Majid Khan’s cousin (Mansour), Fayyaz Kamran, Aydinbelge, Khalid Jamil, and Aafia Siddiqui.
See
ALEC ████ (152212Z MAR 03).
1899.
████ 10865 (171648Z MAR 03); ████ 10886 (182219Z MAR 03); ████ 10870 (172017Z MAR 03).
1900.
See
“CIA Validation of Remarks on Detainee Policy,” drafts supporting the September 6, 2006, speech by President George W. Bush acknowledging and describing the CIA’s Detention and Interrogation Program, as well as an unclassified Office of the Director of National Intelligence release, entitled, “Summary of the High Value Terrorist Detainee Program.” In October 2007 CIA officers discussed a section of the President’s speech, which was based on CIA information and vetted by the CIA, related to Camp Lemonier. Addressing the section of the speech that states, “[t]errorists held in CIA custody have also provided information that helped stop the planned strike on U.S. Marines at Camp Lemonier in Djibouti,” a senior CIA officer highlighted that the plotting had not been stopped, but in fact was ongoing. The officer wrote: “I have attached the cable from Guleed that was used to source the Sept ‘06 speech as well as a later cable from a different detainee affirming that as of mid-2004, AQ members in Somalia were still intent on attacking Camp Lemonier... As of 2004, the second detainee indicates that AQ was still working on attacking the base.” The CIA officer explained that the “reasoning behind validation of the language in the speech—and remember, we can argue about whether or not ‘planning’ consistitutes [
sic
] a ‘plot’ and about whether anything is ever disrupted—was that the detainee reporting increased our awareness of attack plotting against the base, leading to heightened security.” (
See
email from: ██████; to: █████; subject: “More on Camp Lemonier”; date; October 22, 2007, at 5:33 PM). The President’s reference to Camp Lemonier in the context of “this vital program” came immediately after the passage of the speech referencing the use of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques against KSM and immediately before statements about the thwarting of the Karachi and Heathrow Airport plots, both of which have been explicitly attributed by the CIA to the use of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques. The disruption of the Camp Lemonier plotting was also referenced as an intelligence success in the context of the March 2008 presidential veto of legislation that would have effectively banned the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques.
See
“Text: Bush on Veto of Intelligence Bill,”
The New York Times
, dated March 8, 2008, which states, the “main reason this program has been effective is that it allows the CIA to use specialized interrogation procedures... limiting the CIA’s interrogation methods to those in the Army field manual would be dangerous....”
1901.
Italics added. Unclassified Office of the Director of National Intelligence release, entitled, “Summary of the High Value Terrorist Detainee Program.” CIA records indicate that the CIA had intelligence that al-Qa’ida affiliated individuals were targeting Camp Lemonier with an “explosives-laden truck” in early 2003. The CIA sought to detain Gouled because of the intelligence already collected, indicating that in 2003—at the likely behest of Abu Talha al-Sudani—Gouled was conducting casings of Camp Lemonier. Once captured, and prior to being transferred to CIA custody, Gouled confirmed that he cased Camp Lemonier for a potential terrorist attack. Despite the use of the term “revealed” in the 2006 document, the CIA’s June 2013 Response states: “We did not represent that we initially learned of the plot from detainees, or that it was disrupted based solely on information from detainees in CIA custody.” The CIA’s June 2013 Response further states that the CIA “agree[s] with the
Study
that [the CIA] had threat reporting against Camp Lemonier prior to the March 2004 detention and rendition” of Guleed Hassan Dourad.
1902.
Emphasis in original.
See
CIA Talking Points dated October 30, 2007, entitled, “DCIA Meeting with Chairman Murtha re Rendition and Detention Programs” and attachments.
1903.
The CIA’s June 2013 Response states: “We did not represent that we initially learned of the plot from detainees, or that it was disrupted based solely on information from detainees in CIA custody.” The CIA’s October 30, 2007, talking points for the chairman of the House Defense Appropriations Subcommittee, John Murtha, make no reference to the CIA receiving intelligence on the Camp Lemonier plotting from other intelligence sources prior to CIA detainee reporting. Nor do the talking points indicate that the CIA detainee initially provided information on the plotting prior to being transferred to CIA custody. In addition, as described, an Office of the Director of National Intelligence public release on the CIA’s Detention and Interrogation Program from September 6, 2006, states that “the CIA designed a new interrogation program that would be safe, effective, and legal;” and that “al-Qa’ida facilitator Gouled Hassan Dourad revealed” that he had been sent to “case the US Marine base Camp Lemonier.”
1904.
See
CIA Talking Points dated October 30, 2007, entitled, “DCIA Meeting with Chairman Murtha re Rendition and Detention Programs” and attachments. The talking points further state that the “Presidentially-mandated detention program is critical to our ability to protect the American homeland and US forces and citizens abroad from terrorist attack.” The attachment to the document, labeled “points from CTC,” further asserts that while CIA rendition activities “did yield intelligence, it did not do so in a timely, efficient, and thorough way, raising unacceptable risks,” and that the CIA “experience has shown that exclusive control by CIA, in an Agency designed, built, and managed facility, allows us complete oversight and control over all aspects of detention, to include conditions of confinement, approved interrogation activities, humane standards, medical treatment, detainee engagement, security, hygiene, and infrastructure.” The document references a U.S. House of Representatives Appropriations bill providing a reduction in funding for the Covert Action CT Program and states: “Had the mark been directed against the rendition and detention programs specifically, the CIA would have recommended a Presidential veto. In its appeal, CIA detailed the impact of a $██ million cut to the CA CT Program. The Agency also made it clear that it would continue the rendition and detention program because of the high value of these activities.”