Authors: Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
2025.
Emphasis in original.
2026.
The CIA’s June 2013 Response states that “[i]n some of the
early
representations, we incorrectly stated al-Tayyar fled the United States in response to the FBI investigation, although he had in fact already departed the United States by this time” (italics added). As noted, this representation was made by the CIA as late as January 2009, to President-elect Obama’s national security team.
2027.
Emphases in original. CIA Briefing for Obama National Security Team - “Renditions, Detentions, and Interrogations (RDI)” including “Tab 7,” named “RDG Copy- Briefing on RDI Program 09 Jan. 2009.” Referenced materials attached to cover memorandum with the title, “D/CIA Conference Room Seating Visit by President-elect Barrack [sic] Obama National Security Team Tuesday, 13 January 2009; 8:30–11:30 a.m.” The briefing book includes the previously mentioned “Briefing Notes on the Value of Detainee Reporting” dated 15 May 2006, which provided the same intelligence claims in the document of the same name, but dated April 15, 2005.
See
“RDI Key Impacts.”
2028.
ALEC ███████ (210218Z MAR 03). Extensive open source records include “Pursuit of al-Qaeda keeps coming back to Fla.,”
USA Today
, dated June 15, 2003; “Broward Man Sought as Terror Suspect,”
Miami Herald
, dated March 21, 2003; and “A Hunt for ‘The Pilot,’”
U.S. News and World Report
, dated March 30, 2003. The FBI confirmed for the Committee that Adnan el-Shukrijumah departed the United States in May 2001.
See
DTS #2013- 0391.
2029.
Email from: █████████████; to: █████████████ [REDACTED]; cc: █████████████, █████████████; subject: Padilla Breaks; date: May 1, 2003, at 08:51 AM; CIA “Briefing Notes on the Value of Detainee Reporting” faxed from the CIA to the Department of Justice on April 15, 2005, at 10:47 AM; ALEC ███████ (210218Z MAR 03).
2030.
███████████; DIRECTOR ███████ (210549Z SEP 04); ███████ 24533 (171207Z SEP 04).
See also
████████ 14425 ██████████, describing reporting on Jaffar al-Tayyar from the interrogation of Ammar al-Baliichi in foreign government custody.
2031.
███████████ 11368 █████████████.
See also
██████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████ (HEADQUARTERS ███████); ██████████████ █████████████.
2032.
██████████████ and Federal Bureau of Investigation Documents pertaining “to the interrogation of detainee Zayn Al Abideen Abu Zabaidah” and provided to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence by cover letter dated July 20, 2010, (DTS #2010-2939).
See also
████████████ 10092 (211031Z APR 02); ████████ 10022 (121216Z APR 02); ██████████; █████████ 10321 (231427Z MAY 02); █████████████; ███████████████.
2033.
See
HEADQUARTERS ████████ (250239Z JAN 03); ████████████; ████████████████. For example, in January 2003, a CIA cable stated that Abu Zubaydah repeated that al-Tayyar studied in the United States. The only new information provide by Abu Zubaydah was that al-Tayyar’s nickname, “the pilot,” did not necessarily mean that al-Tayyar could fly an airplane. Abu Zubaydah explained to CIA officers that the term “the pilot” also means someone who is righteous.
2034.
ALEC ██████████ (111551Z SEP 02).
2035.
CIA █████████ (072303Z NOV 02).
See
“Khalid Shayk Muhammad’s Threat Reporting - Precious Truths, Surrounded by a Bodyguard of Lies,” IICT, April 3, 2003. For more on the letters that were seized during the September 11, 2002 raids in Pakistan,
see
ALEC ███████ (110154Z JAN 03).
See also
DIRECTOR ████████ (172117Z SEP 02).
2036.
See
████████ 22507 ████████████; █████████ 22508 █████████████; █████████ 20744 ██████████.
2037.
CIA ███████ (072303Z NOV 02).
2038.
April 3, 2003, Intelligence Community Terrorist Threat Assessment regarding KSM threat reporting, entitled “Khalid Shaykh Muhammad’s Threat Reporting—Precious Truths, Surrounded by a Bodyguard of Lies.”
2039.
See
KSM detainee review in Volume III.
2040.
ALEC ██████ (072215Z MAR 03).
2041.
ALEC ██████ (1102097 JAN 03).
2042.
ALEC ██████ (072215Z MAR 03).
2043.
ALEC ██████ (072215Z MAR 03). For more on the letters that were seized during the September 11, 2002, raids in Pakistan, and Abu Zubaydah’s reporting,
see
ALEC █████ (110154Z JAN 03); DIRECTOR ███████ (172117Z SEP 02); ███████ 10092 (21103IZ APR 02); ███████ 10022 (121216Z APR 02); ██████████; ██████████ 10321 (231427Z MAY 02); ██████████; ██████████; Federal Bureau of Investigation documents pertaining “to the interrogation of detainee Zayn Al Abideen Abu Zabaidah” and provided to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence by cover letter dated July 20, 2010 (DTS #2010-2939).
2044.
████████ 10741 (100917Z MAR 03).
2045.
████████ 10741 (100917Z MAR 03); █████████ 10740 (092308Z MAR 03), disseminated as ████████.
2046.
Among other open source news reports,
see
“Father denies son linked to terror.”
St. Petersburg Times
, published March 22, 2003.
2047.
████████ 10884 (182140Z MAR 03).
2048.
████████████████████ 42247 (210357Z JUL 03); email from: ██████████████; to: [REDACTED], █████████████, ██████████████, ██████████████, ██████████████, [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; cc: [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; subject: RATHER PROFOUND IMPLICATIONS... Ammar al-Baluchi’s Comments on Jaffar al-Tayyar--If Ammar is Correct, then KSM Appears to Have a Focused Us on Jaffar in a Extended Deception Scheme—and His Deception Capabilities are Not Broken Down; date: 07/21/03, at 11:24 AM.
See also
CIA ███████ (072303Z NOV 02) and “Khalid Shaykh Muhammad’s Threat Reporting - Precious Truths, Surrounded by a Bodyguard of Lies,” IICT, April 3, 2003.
2049.
████████ 10741 (100917Z MAR 03); █████████ 11377 (231943Z APR 03), disseminated as █████████████.
2050.
████████ 10778 (12I549Z MAR 03), disseminated as ██████████; █████████ 10883 (182127Z MAR 03), disseminated as █████████ l1717 (201722Z MAY 03), disseminated as ████████████.
2051.
████████ 10894 (191513Z MAR 03); ████████ 10902 (201037Z MAR 03).
2052.
████████ 10959 (231205Z MAR 03); ██████10950 (222127Z MAR 03).
2053.
████████ 10787 (1307I6Z MAR 03).
2054.
████████ 10863 (171028Z MAR 03). It is unclear if KSM made the comparison in the first instance, or if the March 13, 2003, cable provided an inaccurate account of KSM’s statements. The CIA’s June 2013 Response states that”KSM did not call al-Tayyar ‘the next Muhammad Atta.’” The CIA’s June 2013 Response characterizes the inaccuracy as “an imprecise paraphrase of KSM.”
2055.
Note for: [REDACTED]; from: [REDACTED], OFFICE: [DETENTION SITE BLUE]; Subject: JAFAR REQUEST; date: March 18, 2003, at 08:16:07 PM.
2056.
Email from: [REDACTED]; to: [REDACTED]; subject: Re: JAFAR REQUEST; date: March 18, 2003, at 03:49:33 PM.
2057.
████████ 10902 (201037Z MAR 03); ████████ 10959 (231205Z MAR 03); █████████ 10950 (222127Z MAR 03); █████████ 11377 (231943Z APR 03), disseminated as ███████████.
2058.
“Briefing Notes on the Value of Detainee Reporting” faxed from the CIA to the Department of Justice on April 15, 2005, at 10:47AM. On March 21, 2003, CIA records state that a photograph of Gulshair El Shukrijumah’s son was obtained from the FBI and shown to KSM, Ramzi bin al-Shibh, and Abu Zubaydah, who all identified the photograph as that of al-Tayyar.
See
ALEC █████ (210218Z MAR 03).
2059.
Email from: ███████████; to [REDACTED]; cc: [REDACTED]; subject: Re: REISSUE/CORRECTION: CT: COMMENTS OF KHALID SHAYKH MUHAMMAD ON IMMINENT THREATS TO U.S. TARGETS IN THAILAND, INDONESIA, AND THE PHILIPPINES; date: March 12, 2003, at 9:36:57 AM.
2060.
“Khalid Shaykh Muhammad’s Threat Reporting - Precious Truths, Surrounded by a Bodyguard of Lies,” IICT, April 3, 2003.
2061.
██████████████ 42247 (210357Z JUL 03); email from: ███████████; to: [REDACTED], ██████████, ███████████, ██████████, ██████████, [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; cc: [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; subject: RATHER PROFOUND IMPLICATIONS; subject: RATHER PROFOUND IMPLICATIONS... Ammar al-Baluchi’s Comments on Jaffar al-Tayyar--If Ammar is Correct, then KSM Appears to Have Focused Us on Jaffar in a Extended Deception Scheme-and His Deception Capabilities are Not Broken Down; date: 07/21/03, at 11:24 AM.
2062.
National Counterterrorism Center, REFLECTIONS, “Ja’far al-Tayyar: An Unlikely Al-Qa’ida Operational Threat,” 22 December 2005. While NCTC’s “mainline analytic group” disagreed with the Red Team’s analytical conclusions, records do not indicate that the Red Team’s account of the contrary detainee reporting was challenged Draft MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE from the Office of the Director of National Intelligence General Counsel; SUBJECT: █████████████████████████.
2063.
See
CIA memorandum to the CIA Inspector General from James Pavitt, CIA’s Deputy Director for Operations dated February 27, 2004, with the subject line, “Comments to Draft IG Special Review, ‘Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Program’ (2003-7123-IG),” Attachment, “Successes of CIA’s Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Activities, dated February 24, 2004.
2064.
███████████, Memorandum for the Record, subject: Meeting with Deputy Chief, Counterterrorist Center ALEC Station; date: 17 July 2003; and CIA Office of Inspector General, Special Review - Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Program, (2003-7123-IG), May 2004.
2065.
CIA Office of Inspector General, Special Review - Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Program, (2003-7123-IG), May 2004.
2066.
██████████ 41351 █████████.
2067.
Information on ALI SALEH M K AL-MARRI, provided by the FBI to the Committee, March 26, 2002 (DTS 2002-1819).
2068.
On July 16, 2003, informed the OIG that KSM’s information “helped lead to the arrest of al-Marri. (
See
██████████, Memorandum for the Record; subject: Meeting with Deputy Chief, Counterterrorist Center ALEC Station; date: 17 July 2003). Two days later, ████████ wrote an email with information intended for CIA leadership that stated, accurately, that al-Marri “had been detained on a material witness warrant based on information linking him to the 911 financier Hasawi.” (
See
email from ███████████; to: ██████████, ██████████, [REDACTED], █████████, [REDACTED], █████████, █████████,[REDACTED], █████████, █████████, █████████; subject: value of detainees; date: July 18, 2003, at 2:30:09 PM).
2069.
The January 2004 draft OIG Special Review included the inaccurate information provided by ██████████, that KSM “provided information that helped lead to the arrests of terrorists including . . . Saleh Almery, a sleeper operative in New York.” (
See
CIA Inspector General, Special Review, Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Program (2003-7123-IG) January 2004). CTC’s response to the draft Special Review was likewise prepared by ███████, who wrote: “KSM also identified a photograph of a suspicious student in New York whom the FBI suspected of some involvement with al-Qa’ida, but against whom we had no concrete information.” After describing KSM’s reporting, ███████ wrote, “[t]his student is now being held on a material witness warrant.” (
See
email from: ███████████; to: ███████████; cc: ███████████, [REDACTED], [REDACTED], ███████████; subject: re Addition on KSM/AZ and measures; date: February 9, 2004.) DDO Pavitt’s formal response to the OIG draft Special Review included this representation, adding that the information was provided “as a result of the lawful use of ElTs.” Pavitt’s memo to the OIG did not acknowledge that the “student now being held on a material witness warrant” had been arrested more than a year prior to the capture of KSM. Nor did it correct the inaccurate information in the OIG’s draft Special Review that KSM’s information “helped lead to the arrest” of al-Marri.
See
memorandum for Inspector General from James Pavitt, Deputy Director for Operations; subject: re (S) Comments to Draft IG Special Review, “Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Program” (2003-7123-IG); date: February 27, 2004; attachment: February 24, 2004, Memorandum re Successes of CIA’s Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Activities.
2070.
CIA Office of Inspector General, Special Review - Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Program, (2003-7123-IG), May 2004.
2071.
In its May 30, 2005, memorandum, the OLC wrote, “we understand that interrogations have led to specific, actionable intelligence,” and “[w]e understand that the use of enhanced techniques in the interrogations of KSM, Zubaydah and others . . . has yielded critical information” (Memorandum for John A. Rizzo, Senior Deputy General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, May 30, 2005, Re: Application of United States Obligations Under Article 16 of the Convention Against Torture to Certain Techniques that May be Used in the Interrogation of High Value Al Qaeda Detainees (DTS #2009-1810, Tab 11), citing IG Special Review at 86, 90-91.
2072.
The CIA’s June 2013 Response states: “CIA mistakenly provided incorrect information to the Inspector General (IG) that led to a one-time misrepresentation of this case in the IG’s 2004 Special Review. The CIA’s June 2013 Response states that “[t]his mistake was not, as it is characterized in the ‘Findings and Conclusions’ section of the Study, a ‘repeatedly represented’ or ‘frequently cited’ example of the effectiveness of CIA’s interrogation program. The Committee found that, in addition to the multiple representations to the CIA OIG, the inaccurate information in the final OIG Special Review was, as noted above, provided by the CIA to the Department of Justice to support the Department’s analysis of the lawfulness of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques. The OIG Special Review was also relied upon by the Blue Ribbon Panel evaluating the effectiveness of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques, and later was cited in multiple open source articles and books, often in the context of the “effectiveness” of the CIA program.
2073.
Email from: █████████; to █████████; cc: █████████, [REDACTED], [REDACTED], ████████; subject: re Addition on KSM/AZ and measures; date: February 9, 2004. Memorandum for: Inspector General; from: James Pavitt, Deputy Director for Operations; subject: re (S) Comments to Draft IG Special Review, “Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Program” (2003-7123-IG); date: February 27, 2004; attachment; February 24, 2004, Memorandum re Successes of CIA’s Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Activities.
2074.
ALEC ███████ (292319Z APR 03).
2075.
The laptop contained files and Internet bookmarks associated with suspicious chemicals and chemical distributors, as well as computer programs typically used by hackers.
See
WASHINGTON ███████ (122314Z MAR 03); ALEC ███████ (292319Z APR 03).
2076.
CIA WASHINGTON DC ███████ (260018Z MAR 03).
2077.
Prior to the capture of KSM, Abd al-Rahim Ghulam Rabbani told the FBI that al-Marri had called KSM and had been seen with KSM at an al-Qa’ida guesthouse. In addition, email accounts found on a computer seized during the raid that captured KSM revealed links to accounts associated with al-Marri.
See
ALEC ███████ (292319Z APR 03); WASHINGTON ███████ (122314Z MAR 03); ALEC ███████ (031759Z MAR 03); ALEC ███████ (052341Z MAR 03).
2078.
The FBI information included that al-Marri’s brother “traveled to Afghanistan in 1997-1998 to train in Bin-Laden camps.” It also indicated that al-Marri’s computer revealed bookmarks to websites associated with religious extremism and various criminal activities, as well as hacking tools (
See
FBI document on Ali Saleh MK Al-Marri, provided to the Committee, March 26, 2002 (DTS #2002-1819)). Despite the extensive derogatory information on al-Marri in the possession of both the CIA and FBI, the CIA’s June 2013 Response repeats previous CIA representations that prior to KSM’s reporting, the CIA had “no concrete information” on al-Marri. The CIA’s June 2013 Response also states that the previously obtained information was “fragmentary,” and that while the CIA and FBI were aware of al-Marri’s links to al-Qa’ida and “strongly suspected him of having a nefarious objective,” “both agencies… lacked detailed reporting to confirm these suspicions….”