Authors: Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
2454.
Email from: ████████████; to ████████████; bcc: Jose Rodriguez; subject: Re: immediate coord; date: September 6, 2002.
See also
ALEC █████ (101607Z SEP 02).
2455.
Email from: Jose Rodriguez; to: ████████████; subject: Re: immediate coord; date: September 6, 2002, at 2:52 PM.
2456.
DIRECTOR ██████ (252018Z OCT02).
2457.
Email from: Stanley Moskowitz; to: John Moseman, Scott Muller, James Pavitt; subject: Graham request for oversight into interrogation; date: December 4, 2002, at 05:58:06 PM; Stanley Moskowitz, Memorandum for the Record, February 4, 2003, “Subject: Sensitive Notification.”
See also
email from: Scott W. Muller; to: John A. Rizzo; cc: [REDACTED]; date: December 19, 2002.
2458.
Email from: ███████████; to: ██████████ and █████████████; subject: Sensitive Matters for the SSCI Quarterly CA Briefing; date: November 19, 2002. This email included the text of the CIA cables documenting the September 4, 2002, briefing to HPSCI leadership.
See
ALEC ██████ (101607Z SEP 02), and the September 27, 2002, briefing to SSCI leadership, DIRECTOR ██████ (252018Z OCT02).
2459.
Email from: Stanley Moskowitz; to: John Moseman, Scott Mueller, James Pavitt; subject: Graham request for oversight into interrogation; date: December 4, 2002, at 05:58:06 PM; email from: Stanley Moskowitz; to: John H. Moseman; cc: Scott Muller and James Pavitt; subject: [attached document] Re: Graham request on interrogations; date: December 9, 2002, at 05:46:11 PM.
2460.
Memorandum of December 26, 2002; FOR: Director of Central Intelligence; FROM: Scott W. Muller, General Counsel; SUBJECT: Disposition of Videotapes.
2461.
Memorandum to: Stanley Moskowitz; from: Steven A. Cash; subject: Briefing; Interrogation and Debriefing of individuals in custody related to counterterrorism operations, January 2, 2003 (DTS #2003-0266); Lotus Notes dated January 2 – January 3 between OCA, ODDO, CTC personnel; email correspondences between [REDACTED], [REDACTED], ████████████████; subject: “SSCI’s Request for Staff Briefing on Terrorism Interrogation/Debriefing Techniques.”
2462.
Moskowitz Memorandum for the Record, February 4, 2003, “Subject: Sensitive Notification.”
2463.
Moskowitz Memorandum for the Record, February 4, 2003, “Subject: Sensitive Notification.” For information on Senator Roberts’s objections,
See
“Destroying C.I.A. Tapes Wasn’t Opposed, Memos Say,” by Scott Shane,
The New York Times,
dated February 22, 2010.
2464.
Transcript of CIA briefing for the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, March 5, 2003 (DTS #2003-1156); Transcript of “Intelligence Update,” April 30, 2003 (DTS #2003-2174); Transcript of Senate Select Committee on Intelligence briefing, September 3, 2003 (DTS #2004-0288); email from: ██████████████ to: [REDACTED]; subject: Re: EYES ONLY Re: Question Regarding Interrogations from SSCI Member Briefing on KSM Capture; date: March 17, 2003.
2465.
CIA Interrogation Program: DDO Talking Points, 04 September 2003.
2466.
For example, the talking points included inaccurate data on the waterboarding of Abu Zubaydah and KSM; stated that two unauthorized techniques were used with a detainee, whereas ‘Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri was subjected to numerous unauthorized techniques; and inaccurately stated that the offending officers were removed from the site. The talking points also stated that the use of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques “has produced significant results,” and that the “[i]nformation acquired has saved countless lives . . . .”
See
CIA Interrogation Program: DDO Talking Points, 04 September 2003.
2467.
Because the Committee was not informed of the CIA detention site at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, no member of the Committee was aware that the U.S. Supreme Court decision to grant certiorari in the case of
Rasul v. Bush,
which related to the
habeas corpus
rights of detainees at Guantanamo Bay, resulted in the transfer of CIA detainees from the CIA detention facility at Guantanamo Bay to other CIA detention facilities.
See
HEADQUARTERS ██████ ████████████, subject “RESTRICTED ACCESS TO [DETENTION SITE COBALT] AND [DETENTION SITE ORANGE]”; email from: ██████████; to ███████████; cc: Jose Rodriguez, [REDACTED], ████████████, [REDACTED], ████████████, [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; subject: guidance to ████gitmo; date: May 14, 2004; forwarding final cable: HEADQUARTERS █████ (141502Z MAY 04), subject “Possible Brief to US Senator”; email from: Stanley Moskowitz; to: [REDACTED]; cc: [REDACTED]; subject: Re: guidance to █████gitmo; date: May 14, 2004; CIA responses to Questions for the Record, March 13, 2008 (DTS #2008-1310); “CODEL Roberts to Miami/Guantanamo, 7-8 July 2005,” dated 5 July, █████ 902860.
2468.
Transcript of hearing. May 12, 2004 (DTS #2004-2332); Transcript of hearing, September 13, 2004 (DTS #2005-0750).
2469.
Transcript of Senate Select Committee on Intelligence hearing, May 12, 2004 (DTS #2004-2332). Muhammad Rahim, the CIA’s last detainee, was transferred to U.S. military custody on March 13, 2008.
See
████████ 3445 █████████████; ██████████ 9754 █████████████; ██████ 8405 █████████████; █████ 8408 █████████████.
2470.
Handwritten notes of SSCI Minority Staff Director Andrew Johnson (DTS #2009-2077); CIA notes (DTS #2009-2024, pp. 92–95); CIA notes (DTS #2009-2024, pp. 110–121).
2471.
Email from: ██████████; to: [REDACTED]; subject: Re: Priority: congressional notification on Janat Gul; date: July 29, 2004.
2472.
Handwritten notes of SSCI Minority Staff Director Andrew Johnson (DTS #2009-2077); CIA notes (DTS #2009-2024, pp. 92–95); CIA notes (DTS #2009-2024, pp. 110–121).
2473.
February 3, 2005, letter from Senator Rockefeller to Senator Roberts on “the Committee’s upcoming agenda,” (letter incorrectly dated February 3, 2004).
2474.
Sametime message discussion between ████████████ and [REDACTED], March 3, 2005.
2475.
The notes indicate that CIA briefers provided inaccurate information. For example, the notes indicate that “[w]e screen carefully
all
people who might have contact with detainees” (emphasis in the Vice Chairman’s notes) and that “positive incentives” are used prior to “coercive measures.” In a reference to the waterboard, the notes state, the detainee “thinks he’s drowning, even though they are breathing.”
See
handwritten notes of then-Committee Minority Staff Director Andrew Johnson (DTS #2009-2077, Image 1) and handwritten notes of Senator Rockefeller.
2476.
Letter to Senator Roberts from minority SSCI members, March 10, 2005 (DTS #2005-1126); Letter to Vice President Cheney from Vice Chairman Rockefeller and Representative Harman, March 11, 2005; Letter from Senator Rockefeller, March 11, 2005.
2477.
Sametime communication, between John P. Mudd and ███████████, April 13, 2005, from 19:23:50 to 19:56:05.
2478.
See
email from: CIA Inspector General John Helgerson; to: ██████████; subject: this afternoon’s briefing; date: April 13, 2005. There is no Committee transcript of the briefing. CIA records state that the briefing covered “updates on the half dozen key abuse cases,” ghost detainees, and renditions. The notes do not reference the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques. In response to a question from Vice Chairman Rockefeller, Helgerson explained that the CIA was “preparing a comprehensive briefing” on detention and interrogation activities for the Committee.
2479.
Compartmented Classified Annex to Report No. S. 109-142, Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006, as Reported by the Select Committee on Intelligence (DTS #2005-4028).
2480.
See
Letter from John A. Rizzo to John Rockefeller, August 16, 2005 (DTS #2005-3522). The DNI, pursuant to the advice of former ███████ CTC Legal, █████████████, supposed the CIA’s proposed limitations on Committee access to the documents (email from: █████████████; to: Michael Leiter; cc: David Shedd, ██████████ and others; subject: Review of Documents Requested by Senator Rockefeller; date: December 16, 2005; Letter from David Shedd to Andy Johnson, January 5, 2006 (DTS #2006-0373)).
2481.
Letter from David Shedd to Andy Johnson, January 5, 2006 (DTS #2006-0373); email from: ██████ █████████; to: Michael Leiter; cc: David Shedd, █████████████ and others; subject: Review of Documents Requested by Senator Rockefeller; date: December 16, 2005.
2482.
According to an email from John Rizzo, the subject of one such meeting was “how the current version of McCain potentially undercuts our legal position.” (
See
email from: John A. Rizzo; to: █████████████, █████████████; cc: [REDACTED], [REDACTED], █████████████, [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; subject: IMMEDIATE HEADS UP; VP Meeting with Appropriations Committee Leadership Tomorrow re McCain Amendment; date: October 17, 2005, at 10:49:39 AM; email from: John Rizzo; to: █████████████; cc: [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], █████████████, [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], █████████████, [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; subject: Re: IMMEDIATE: Re: Sen. Frist req for briefing on impact of McCain Amendment; date: October 31, 2005, at 10:53:16 AM.
2483.
Email from: John A. Rizzo; to: █████████████, █████████████; cc: [REDACTED], [REDACTED], █████████████, [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; subject: IMMEDIATE HEADS UP: VP Meeting with Appropriations Committee Leadership Tomorrow re McCain Amendment; date: October 17, 2005, at 10:49:39 AM.
2484.
Email from: John Rizzo; to: █████████████; cc: [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], █████████████, [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], █████████████; [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; subject: Re: IMMEDIATE: Re: Sen. Frist req for briefing on impact of McCain Amendment; date: October 31, 2005, at 10:53:16 AM; ███████████ Talking Points for OVP Sponsored Meeting with Sen McCain; Impact of McCain Amendment on Legal Basis for CTC’s HVD Detention and Interrogation Program, 20 October 2005.
2485.
Email from: John Rizzo; to: █████████████; cc: [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], █████████████, [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], █████████████, [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; subject: Re: IMMEDIATE: Re: Sen Frist req for briefing on impact of McCain Amendment; date: October 31, 2005, at 10:53:16 AM.
2486.
Email from: John Rizzo; to: █████████████; cc: [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], █████████████, [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], █████████████, [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; subject: Re: IMMEDIATE: Re: Sen Frist req for briefing on impact of McCain Amendment; date: October 31, 2005, at 10:53:16 AM; email from: John A. Rizzo; to: David R. Shedd; cc: [REDACTED]; subject: Re: BRIEF READOUT: 31 OCT FRIST BRIEFING; date: November 1, 2005, at 2:53:40 PM.
2487.
Email from: John A. Rizzo; to: [REDACTED]; cc: ████████████, [REDACTED], [REDACTED], ████████████; [REDACTED]; subject: Re: Senator Cornyn; date: November 30, 2005, at 12:50:11 PM.
2488.
On October 31, 2005, John Rizzo wrote an email stating that “Sen. Levin’s legislative proposal for a 9/11-type outside Commission to be established on detainees seems to be gaining some traction, which obviously would serve to surface the tapes’ existence.” Rizzo then added that “I think I need to be the skunk at the party again and
See
if the Director is willing to let us try one more time to get the right people downtown on board with the notion of our [sic] destroying the tapes.” █████████████, a senior CIA attorney who had viewed the videotapes, responded, “You are correct. The sooner we resolve this the better.” ██████████CTC Legal, █████████████, also agreed that “[a]pproaching the DCIA is a good idea,” adding, “[c]ommissions tend to make very broad document production demands, which might call for these videotapes that should have been destroyed in the normal course of business 2 years ago.”
See
email from: John A. Rizzo; to: ████████████; [REDACTED], [REDACTED], ████████████, [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; subject: Re: principals want PR plan to publicly roll the CTC program in some fashion; date: October 31, 2005, at 10:37 AM; email from: █████████████; to John A. Rizzo; cc: [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], █████████████; subject: Re: principals want PR plan to publicly roll the CTC program in some fashion; date: October 31, 2005, at 12:32 PM; email from: █████████████; to: John A. Rizzo; cc: [REDACTED], [REDACTED], █████████████, [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; subject: Re: principals want PR plan to publicly roll the CTC program in some fashion; date: October 31, 2005, at 11:45 AM.
See also
interview of █████████████, by [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], Office of the Inspector General, June 17, 2003.
2489.
See
Senate Roll Call Vote #00309, November 8, 2005, 5:37pm, on Amendment #2430.
2490.
[REDACTED] 27089 (090627Z NOV 05).
2491.
A review of the Committee record of this briefing indicates much of the information provided by the CIA was inaccurate. For example, according to the Committee’s Memorandum for the Record, CIA briefers stated “the plan divorces questioning from coercive measures.” CIA records indicate, however, that questioning and the use of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques were combined in practice. According to Committee records, CIA officials stated that Khalid al-Masri had and maintained connections to al-Qa’ida, and that he was released “when the CIA reached a point in debriefings that required [foreign government] assistance,” which was not forthcoming. The CIA Inspector General would later determine that when CIA officers questioned al-Masri, “they quickly concluded that he was not a terrorist,” and that there was “insufficient basis to render and detain al-Masri.” CIA officers referenced the captures of Hambali, Sajid Badat, Jose Padilla, and Iyman Faris, as well as the disruption of the West Coast/Second Wave plotting, the Heathrow Airport plotting, and the Karachi plotting. As detailed in this summary, the CIA consistently provided inaccurate representations regarding the plotting and the capture of the referenced individuals. CIA briefers also compared the program to U.S. military custody, stating that “the CIA can bring far more resources – debriefers, analysts, psychologists, etc. – per detainee than is possible at large scale facilities such as Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.” As described, the chief of Base at DETENTION SITE BLACK complained of “problem, underperforming” and “totally inexperienced” debriefers almost a year prior to this briefing. As further described, an inspector general audit completed three months after the briefing described the lack of debriefers at CIA detention facilities as “an ongoing problem.” (Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Memorandum for the Record, “CIA Briefing on Detention Program,” March 8, 2006 (DTS #2006-1182).).