Authors: Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
2605.
Janat Gul’s CIA interrogators wrote: “Team does not believe [Gul] is withholding imminent threat information, however team will continue to press [Gul] for that during each session.” (
See
██████████ 1574 (██████████04).) The interrogation of Janat Gul is described in this summary and detailed in Volume III.
2606.
The CIA’s assessment of Ghailani’s knowledge of terrorist threats was speculative. As one CIA official noted, “[a]lthough Ghailani’s role in operational planning is unclear, his respected role in al-Qa’ida and presence in Shkai as recently as October 2003 may have provided him some knowledge about ongoing attack planning against the United States homeland, and the operatives involved.”
See
email from: ██████████, CTC/UBLD ██████████████ (formerly ALEC ██████████████); to: [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; subject: derog information for ODDO on Talha, Ghailani, Hamza Rabi’a and Abu Faraj; date: August 10, 2004.
2607.
As noted above, the credibility of the source implicating Sharif al-Masri, Janat Gul, and Ghailani’s connection to a pre-election plot was questioned by CIA officials prior to the application of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques against the detainees. The source was later determined to have fabricated the information.
2608.
Five days after interrogators began using the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques against Sayyid Ibrahim, interrogators cabled CIA Headquarters requesting information that would “definitively link [Ibrahim] to nefarious activity or knowledge by [Ibrahim] of known nefarious activities of al-Qa’ida members, if this is possible.” (
See
██████████ 1324 ███████ FEB 04).) Without receiving a response, they continued using the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques against Ibrahim. CIA Headquarters, which rejected an assessment from two CIA debriefers that Ibrahim was, “at best . . . a low-level facilitator,” would later indicate that it was “uncertain” he would meet the requirements for U.S. military or foreign government detention. (See HEADQUARTERS ██████ ████████████; HEADQUARTERS ██████ ██████████.) Other detainees, Abd al-Karim and Abu Hazim, were subjected to the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques “in an attempt to more rapidly assess [their] knowledge of pending attacks, operational planning, and whereabouts of UBL.” See ████████████████ 36843 ██████████████: ████████████████ 36908 ███████.
2609.
The OLC defined a High-Value Detainee as “a detainee who, until time of capture, we have reason to believe: (1) is a senior member of al-Qai’da or an al-Qai’da associated terrorist group (Jemaah Islamiyyah, Eqyptian[sic] Islamic Jihad, al-Zarqawi Group, etc.); (2) has knowledge of imminent terrorist threats against the USA, its military forces, its citizens and organizations, or its allies; or that has/had direct involvement in planning and preparing terrorist actions against the USA or its allies, or assisting the al-Qai’da leadership in planning and preparing such terrorist actions; and (3) if released, constitutes a clear and continuing threat to the USA or its allies” (Memorandum for John A. Rizzo, Senior Deputy General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, May 10, 2005, Re: Application of 18 U.S.C. Sections 2340-2340A to Certain Techniques That May Be Used in the Interrogation of a High Value al Qaeda Detainee (DTS #2009-1810, Tab 9); Memorandum for John A. Rizzo, Senior Deputy General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, May 30, 2005, Re: Application of United States Obligations Under Article 16 of the Convention Against Torture to Certain Techniques that May be Used in the Interrogation of High Value Al Qaeda Detainees (DTS #2009-1810, Tab 11)). Memorandum for John A. Rizzo, Acting General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant AttorneyGeneral, Office of Legal Counsel, July 20, 2007, Re: Application of the War Crimes Act, the Detainee Treatment Act, and Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions to Certain Techniques that May Be Used by the CIA in the Interrogation of High Value al Qaeda Detainees (DTS #2009-1810, Tab 14) (“The CIA informs us that it currently views possession of information regarding the location of Osama bin Laden or Ayman al-Zawahiri as warranting application of enhanced techniques, if other conditions are met.”).
2610.
Ridha Ahmad al-Najjar (████████ 11542 ████████████; ALEC ███████ ███████████████; Ghairat Bahir ██████████████████ 31118 ███████████████; ‘Umar ‘Abd al-Rahman aka Asadullah (CIA ████████████████████; ██████████████ 40471 ████████████████; ██████████ 10673 ██████████████; DIRECTOR ██████ ██████████████████; ██████████ 10673 ██████████████; ████████ 10732 ███████████████; Adnan al-Libi ██████████████████ 1478 ███████████████; ████████████████████ 1758 ██████████████; Majid Bin Muhammad Bin Sulayman Khayil aka Arsala Khan ████████████████████ 1370 ████████████████; Sayyid Ibrahim (██████████ 1294 ███████████████.
2611.
Similar representations had been made by Director Hayden on September 6, 2006. Senator Bayh: “I was impressed by your statement about how effective the [CIA’s enhanced interrogation] techniques have been in eliciting important information to the country, at one point up to 50 percent of our information about al-Qa’ida. I think you said 9000 different intelligence reports?” Director Hayden: “Over 8000, sir.” Senator Bayh: “And yet this has come from, I guess, only thirty individuals.” Director Hayden: “No, sir, 96, all 96” (Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Briefing by the Director, Central Intelligence Agency, on the Central Intelligence Agency Detention, Interrogation and Rendition Program, September 6, 2006 (DTS #2007-1336)).
2612.
See, for example, ██████████, Memorandum for the Record; subject: Meeting with Deputy Chief, Counterterrorist Center ALEC Station; date: 17 July 2003; Memorandum for: Inspector General; from: James Pavitt, Deputy Director for Operations; subject: re (S) Comments to Draft IG Special Review, “Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Program” (2003-7123-IG); date: February 27, 2004; attachment: February 24, 2004, Memorandum re Successes of CIA’s Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Activities; CIA briefing slides entitled, “
CIA
Interrogation Program
.” dated July 29, 2003, presented to senior White House officials; Hearing of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, February 14, 2007 (DTS #2007-1337). For additional details,
See
Volume II.
2613.
ALEC ██████ (170117Z JAN 03).
2614.
See
intelligence chronology in Volume II.
2615.
A cable describing the foreign government interrogation of Majid Khan stated, “[a foreign government officer] talked quietly to [Majid Khan] alone for about ten minutes before the interview began and was able to establish an excellent level of rapport.” (See ██████████ 13678 (070724Z MAR 03).) Records indicate that this information was also disseminated in FBI channels. See ALEC ██████ ███████████████.
2616.
See intelligence chronology in Volume II.
2617.
██████████ 13678 (070724Z MAR 03), disseminated as ███████████████; ████████ 10865 (171648Z MAR 03), disseminated as ███████████████; ████████ 10866 (171832Z MAR 03). Prior to Majid Khan’s reporting in foreign government custody, the CIA was aware from sources outside of the CIA detainee program that KSM had used couriers to transfer money to Hambali. Even while being questioned about such transfers, however, KSM made no mention of Majid Khan. See DIRECTOR ███████ (251938Z SEP 02); ALEC ███████ (072345Z MAR 03); ██████████ 10755 (111455Z MAR 03), disseminated as ██████████████.
2618.
████████████ 84783 ███████████████; ████████████ 84837 ██████████████.
2619.
████████████ 84854 ███████████████; █████ 84876 ████████████████; ████████████ 87617 █████████████; ███████████ 84908 ████████████.
2620.
████████ 84908 ███████████.
2621.
████████ 84908 ███████████.
2622.
████████████████████ 40568 █████████.
2623.
██████████84876 ███████████████; ████████████ 84908 ███████████████; ████████████████████ 40915 ██████████████; ████████████████████ 41017 ██████████████. █████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████ In response to this information, ██████████████ wrote “Wow..this is just great . . . you guys are soooo closing in on Hmabali [sic].” See email from: ██████████████; to: ██████████████, and others; subject: “wohoo—hilite for EA team pls . . . aliases for Hambali”; date: June ██, 2003, at 9:51:30 AM.
2624.
████████████ 86449 ██████████████.
2625.
████████████ 87409 █████████████████; ██████████ 87617 █████████████.
2626.
████████████ 87414 █████████████████; ██████████ 87617 ██████████████. ████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████.
2627.
Lillie provided this information immediately and prior to entering CIA custody.
See
██████████ 9515 █████████████; ██████████ 87617 ████████████████████; ██████████ 87414 ████████████████████; ██████████████████████, “Hambali Capture.”
2628.
CIA Oral History Program Documenting Hambali capture, interview of [REDACTED], interviewed by [REDACTED], on November 28, 2005.
2629.
[REDACTED] 45915 (141431Z SEP 03). See
also
February 27, 2004, Memorandum for CIA Inspector General from James L. Pavitt, CIA Deputy Director for Operations, entitled “Comments to Draft IG Special Review, Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Program,” which contains a February 24, 2004, attachment entitled, “Successes of CIA’s Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Activities”; CIA Intelligence Product entitled, “Jemaah Islamiya: Counterterrorism Scrutiny Limiting Extremist Agenda in Pakistan,” dated April 18, 2008; KSM and Hambali reporting from October 2003 in Volumes II and III.
2630.
██████████ 15359 █████████████.
2631.
██████████ 15359 █████████████.
2632.
See
the intelligence chronology in Volume II, including [REDACTED] 45953 (151241Z SEP 03) [REDACTED] 1323 (161749Z SEP 03).
2633.
██████ 1142 (301055Z NOV 03).
2634.
See intelligence chronology in Volume II. Although NSA signals intelligence was not provided for this Study, an April 2008 CIA intelligence report on the Jemaah Islamiya noted that the al-Ghuraba group “consisted of the sons of JI leaders, many of whom completed basic militant training in Afghanistan and Pakistan while enrolled at Islamic universities in Karachi,” and that this assessment was based on “signals intelligence and other reporting.”
See
CIA Intelligence Product entitled, “Jemaah Islamiya: Counterterrorism Scrutiny Limiting Extremist Agenda in Pakistan,” dated April 18, 2008.
2635.
See
intelligence chronology in Volume II.
2636.
██████████ 10223 (221317Z OCT 03); ██████████████.
2637.
WASHINGTON DC ███████ (272113Z OCT 06).
2638.
CIA Intelligence Product entitled, “Jemaah Islamiya: Counterterrorism Scrutiny Limiting Extremist Agenda in Pakistan,” dated April 18, 2008.
2639.
Numerous detainees were stripped and shackled, nude, in the standing stress position for sleep deprivation or subjected to other enhanced interrogation techniques prior to being questioned by an interrogator.
See
for example KSM ████████████████████ 34491 (051400Z MAR 03); Asadullah (DIRECTOR ████████ (██████████ FEB 03)); Abu Yasir al-Jaza’iri ████████████████████ 35558 (███████ MAR 03)); Suleiman Abdullah (██████████████████ 35787 (█████ MAR 03); ████████████████████ 36023 (████ APR 03)); Abu Hudhaifa ████████████████████ 38576 (██████ MAY 03)); Hambali ████████████████████ 1241 ████████████; and Majid Khan (██████████ 46471 (241242Z MAY 03); ████████████████████ 39077 (271719Z MAY 03).
2640.
████████ 10016 (120509Z APR 02); ████████ 10594 (061558Z AUG 02).
2641.
See detainee reviews in Volume III for additional information.
2642.
For example, on May 15 and May 16, 2003, the FBI hosted a conference on KSM and investigations resulting from KSM’s reporting. The agenda included al-Qa’ida recruitment efforts in the U.S., a topic on which KSM had provided significant fabricated information. (See Memorandum from: [REDACTED]; for: ███████████████, [REDACTED], ███████████████, ███████████████, ████████████, [REDACTED], [REDACTED], ████████████, [REDACTED] [REDACTED], ████████████, [REDACTED], ████████████, [REDACTED], ████████████, ████████████, [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], ██████████, ████████████, ██████████, ██████████, [REDACTED], REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], ██████████, [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; date: 8 May 2003.) See
also
Email from: [REDACTED]; to: ██████████, ██████████████, ██████████████, ████████████; cc: █████████████, █████████████; subject: Thanks from FBI; date: May 17, 2003, at 7:25:15 PM; ████████ 12095 (222049Z JUN 03); ████████ 12558 (041938Z AUG 03); ██████ 31148 (171919Z DEC 05); █████ 31147 (171919Z DEC 05), disseminated as ███████████.
2643.
██████████ 10942 (221610Z MAR 03), disseminated as █████████████; ████████ 10948 (222101Z MAR 03), disseminated as ████████████.
2644.
██████████ 12095 (222049Z JUN 03).
2645.
The CIA captured and detained two individuals whom KSM had identified as the protectors of his children. KSM later described his reporting as “all lies.”
See
██████████████████████ 34569 (061722Z MAR 03); ██████ 1281 (130801Z JUN 04).