Authors: Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
2646.
The CIA has referred only to Abu Zubaydah in the context of this representation.
See
Memorandum for John A. Rizzo, Senior Deputy General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, May 30, 2005, Re: Application of United States Obligations Under Article 16 of the Convention Against Torture to Certain Techniques that May be Used in the Interrogation of High Value Al Qaeda Detainees. The OLC document states: “As Zubaydah himself explained with respect to enhanced techniques, ‘brothers who are captured and interrogated are permitted by Allah to provide information when they believe they have ‘reached the limit of their ability to withhold it’ in the fact of psychological and physical hardships.”
2647.
While there are no records of CIA detainees making these statements, the Deputy Chief of ALEC Station, ███████████████, told the Inspector General on July 17, 2003, that the “best information [the CIA] received on how to handle the [CIA] detainees came from a walk-in [a source █████████████████████████████████████████████ to volunteer information to the CIA] after the arrest of Abu Zubaydah. He told us we were underestimating Al-Qa’ida. The detainees were happy to be arrested by the U.S. because they got a big show trial. When they were turned over to [foreign governments], they were treated badly so they talked. Allah apparently allows you to talk if you feel threatened. The [CIA] detainees never counted on being detained by us outside the U.S. and being subjected to methods they never dreamed of.” See ████████████, Memorandum for the Record; subject: Meeting with Deputy Chief, Counterterrorist Center ALEC Station; date: 17 July 2003.
2648.
██████████ 10262 (151138Z MAR 02).
2649.
██████████ 10262 (151138Z MAR 02).
2650.
█████████ 10496 (162014Z FEB 03).
2651.
█████████ 10496 (162014Z FEB 03).
2652.
█████████ 10496 (162014Z FEB 03).
2653.
In addition, CIA officer ██████████████ testified at the April 12, 2007, Committee hearing: “I spoke with Zubaydah. I was at one of these facilities for several months and I spent around 18 hours a day with Abu Zubaydah. At the conclusion of my time, as I was leaving the facility, he spoke with me, and he said there is something I need you to understand – to go back to the question that came earlier about walling and a collar. He looked at the plywood wall in the cell and said I want to thank you for that. I’ve had a lot of time to sit and reflect, and I understand why that’s there. That’s there so I don’t get hurt. In terms of the totality of the experience, his advice was I may have been the first person, but you need to continue to do this because I need to be able to live with who I am and I will continue to be the religious believing person I am, but you had to get me to the point where I could have absolution from my god to cooperate and deal with your questions. So he thanked us for bringing him to that point, beyond which he knew his religious beliefs absolved him from cooperating with us.” There are no CIA records to support this testimony.
2654.
According to the Inspector General Special Review, a debriefer threatened al-Nashiri by saying “[w]e could get your mother in here,” and, “[w]e can bring your family in here.” In addition, one of KSM’s interrogators told the inspector general that the psychologist/interrogators told KSM that, if anything happens in the United States, “[w]e’re going to kill your children.” (
See
Special Review, pp. 42–43; interview of ██████████, by [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], Office of the Inspector General, 30 April 2003; interview of ██████████ by [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], Office of the Inspector General, 22 October 2003; ████████ 10757 (111505Z MAR 03).) According to a CIA cable, a case officer “used [Abu Zubaydah’s] ‘family card’ to apply more psychological pressure on [Abu Zubaydah].” The cable stated that the case officer “advised [Abu Zubaydah] that even if [Abu Zubaydah] did not care about himself…[Abu Zubaydah] should at least care about his family and keep in mind their welfare; the insinuation being [that] something might happen to them.”
See
██████████ 10095 (220713Z APR 02).
2655.
██████████ 10507 ██████████████. CIA leadership, including CIA General Counsel Scott Muller and DDO James Pavitt, were also alerted to allegations that rectal exams were conducted with “excessive force” on two detainees at DETENTION SITE COBALT.
See
email from [REDACTED]; to [REDACTED]; cc: ███████████████, ████████████, [REDACTED]; subject: ACTIONS from the GC Update this Morning, date: ██████ 12:15 PM; Email from ██████████████; to: [REDACTED]; cc: ███████████, [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], subject: ACTIONS from the GC Update this Morning; date: ███████ 1:23:31 PM; Email from ████████████; to: [REDACTED]; cc: ██████████, [REDACTED]; subject: Re: ACTIONS from the GC Update this Morning REQUEST FOR STATUS UPDATE; date: ██████, at 10:47:32 AM. ███ 3223 ██████████████; HEADQUARTERS ████ ██████████.
2656.
████████ 10070 █████████.
2657.
[REDACTED] 3868 (291534Z DEC 04); [REDACTED] 3868 (291534Z DEC 04).
See also
HEADQUARTERS █████ (302114Z NOV 04).
2658.
████████████████████ 34491 (051400Z MAR 03); Interview of ██████████, by [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], Office of the Inspector General, 27 March 2003. ████████████, ██████████the Office of Medical Services (OMS), described the rectal rehydration of KSM as helping to “clear a person’s head” and effective in getting KSM to talk.
2659.
See
█████████████████████████ 2563 ███████████████; email from: ██████████████████; to: ████████████████████, [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; subject: Re: TASKING – Fw: ██████████; date; March 30, 2007; DTS #2007-1502.
2660.
As described in the context of the rectal feeding of al-Nashiri, Ensure was infused into al-Nashiri “in a forward-facing position (Trendlenberg) with head lower than torso.”
See
██████████ 1203 (231709Z MAY 04).
2661.
According to CIA records, Majid Khan’s “lunch tray,” consisting of hummus, pasta with sauce, nuts, and raisins was “pureed” and rectally infused. See ████████████████████ (231839Z SEP 04).
2662.
See
Volume III for additional information.
2663.
The CIA’s June 2013 Response states, “DCIA Hayden stated that ‘punches’ and ‘kicks’ were not authorized techniques and had never been employed and that CIA officers never threatened a detainee or his family.” The CIA’s June 2013 Response adds: “Part of that assertion was an error. The DCIA would have been better served if the Agency had framed a response for him that discussed CIA’s policy prohibiting such conduct, and how the Agency moved to address unsanctioned behavior which had occurred (including punches and kicks) and implement clear guidelines.”
2664.
Memorandum for Deputy Director of Operations, from ██████████████████, January 28, 2003, Subject: Death Investigation – Gul RAHMAN, pp. 21–22.
2665.
CIA Inspector General report, “Report of Investigation, Death of a Detainee ██████████,” (2003-7402-IG), April 27, 2005, at 38.
2666.
███████████████ 37493 █████████.
2667.
ALEC ██████ (182321Z JUL 02). According to the CIA attorney who reviewed the videotapes of the interrogation of Abu Zubaydah, “the person he assumed was a medical officer was dressed completely in black from head to toe, and was indistinguishable from other [interrogation] team members.”
See
June 18, 2003, Interview Report of [REDACTED], Office of General Counsel Assistant General Counsel.
2668.
Abu Ja’far al-Iraqi was subjected to nudity, dietary manipulation, insult slaps, abdominal slaps, attention grasps, facial holds, walling, stress positions, and water dousing with 44 degree Fahrenheit water for 18 minutes. He was shackled in the standing position for 54 hours as part of sleep deprivation, and experienced swelling in his lower legs requiring blood thinner and spiral ace bandages. He was moved to a sitting position, and his sleep deprivation was extended to 78 hours. After the swelling subsided, he was provided with more blood thinner and was returned to the standing position. The sleep deprivation was extended to 102 hours. After four hours of sleep, Abu Ja’far al-Iraqi was subjected to an additional 52 hours of sleep deprivation, after which CIA Headquarters informed interrogators that eight hours of sleep was the minimum. In addition to the swelling, Abu Ja’far al-Iraqi also experienced an edema on his head due to walling, abrasions on his neck, and blisters on his ankles from shackles.
See
██████████ 1810 (████████ DEC 05); ██████████ 1813 (████████ DEC 05); ██████████ 1819 (████████ DEC 05); ██████████ 1847 (██████████ DEC 05); ██████████ 1848 (████████ DEC 05); HEADQUARTERS ██████ (████████ DEC 05).
See
additional information on Abu Ja’far al-Iraqi in Volume III.
2669.
██████████ 10536 (151006Z JULY 02); ALEC ██████ (182321Z JUL 02).
2670.
██████████ 10536 (151006Z JULY 02).
2671.
██████████ 10607 (100335Z AUG 02).
2672.
██████████ 10647 (201331Z AUG 02); ██████████ 10618 (121448 AUG 02); ██████████ 10679 (250932Z AUG 02).
2673.
██████████ 11026 (070729Z OCT 02).
2674.
██████████████ 44147 ███████████████; ████████████████████ 36862 (181352Z APR 03); DIRECTOR █████ ███████████████; ██████████ 44147 ██████████████; DIRECTOR ███████ █████████████.
2675.
████████████████████ 36908 ██████████████; ████████████████████ 36862 (181352Z APR 03). The interrogator requested approval to use sleep deprivation, the facial slap, attention grasp, abdominal slap and water dousing. To accommodate Abu Hazim’s and Abd al-Karim’s injuries, the cable stated that, rather than being shackled standing during sleep deprivation, the detainees would be “seated, secured to a cell wall, with intermittent disruptions of normal sleeping patterns.” For water dousing, the detainees’ injured legs would be “wrapped in plastic.” The request was approved.
See
DIRECTOR █████ ██████████; DIRECTOR █████ ██████████.
2676.
████████████████████ 37121 (221703Z APR 03); ████████████████████ 37152 (231424Z APR 03).
2677.
████████████████████ 37508 (021305Z MAY 03); ████████████████████ 37202 (250948Z APR 03).
2678.
████████████████████ 37152 (231424 APR 03).
2679.
DIRECTOR █████ █████████.
2680.
████████████████████ 37410 (291828Z APR 03); ████████████████████ 37509 (021309Z MAY 03).
2681.
DIRECTOR █████ ████████MAY 03); ████████████████████ 37754 █████████████.
2682.
████████████████████ 38161 (131326Z MAY 03); DIRECTOR █████ ████████MAY 03); DIRECTOR █████ ████████MAY 03).
2683.
████████████████████ 39582 (041743Z JUN 03); ████████████████████ 39656 (060955Z JUN 03).
2684.
████████████████████ 38365 (170652Z MAY 03).
2685.
Asadullah was also placed in a “small isolation box” for 30 minutes, without authorization and without discussion of how the technique would affect his ankle. See ████████████████████ 34098 ███████████████; ████████████████████ 34294 ███████████████; ████████████████████ 34310 ███████████████.
2686.
In May 2002, ██████████ stated that variety was introduced into Abu Zubaydah’s diet; in addition to his daily intake of two cups of kidney beans, one cup of rice, Ensure, and juice, Abu Zubaydah was given a piece of fried chicken, Coke, and several cups of hot tea.
See
██████████ 10327 (240624Z MAY 02).
2687.
Email from: [REDACTED]; to: ██████████ and [REDACTED]; date: August 4, 2002, at 09:45:09 AM.
2688.
██████████ 10961 (260650Z SEP 02).
2689.
See
detainee reviews in Volume III.
2690.
Email from: [REDACTED]; to: ███████████████; cc: ████████████████████; subject: Re: Sitrep as of AM 3/15; date: March 15, 2003, at 3:52:54 AM; Interview of ██████████████████, by [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], Office of the Inspector General, May 15, 2003. See
also
interview of ██████████████████, by [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], Office of the Inspector General, May 15, 2003.
2691.
Email from: ███████████████; to: ████████████████; cc: ████████████████; subject: More; date: April 10, 2003, at 5:59:27 PM.
2692.
████████ 10800 (131909Z MAR 03); ████████ 10801 (131918Z MAR 03); ████████ 10802 (131921Z MAR 03); ████████ 10803 (131929Z MAR 03).
2693.
CIA record entitled, “Aggressive Interrogation Phase Synopsis,” Abu Zubaydah, August 2002.
2694.
Similarly, participants in the interrogation of Abu Zubaydah wrote that Abu Zubaydah “probably reached the point of cooperation even prior to the August institution of ‘enhanced’ measures –a development missed because of the narrow focus of the questioning. In any event there was no evidence that the waterboard produced time-perishable information which otherwise would have been unobtainable.”
See
CIA Summary and Reflections of ██████ Medical Services on OMS participation in the RDI program, at 41.
2695.
Interview of ██████████████████, by [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], Office of the Inspector General, May 15, 2003.
2696.
Interview of ████████████, by [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], Office of the Inspector General, October 22, 2003.
2697.
████████ 11715 (201047Z MAY 03). In August 2006, ████████ wrote in a Sametime communication that KSM and Abu Zubaydah “held back” despite the use of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques, but added “I’m ostracized whenever I suggest those two did not tell us everything.”
See
Sametime Communication, ██████████ and ██████████, 15/Aug/06, 10:28:38 to 10:58:00.