The Senate Intelligence Committee Report on Torture: Committee Study of the Central Intelligence Agency's Detention and Interrogation Program (62 page)

Abu Zubaydah lost his left eye while in CIA custody. In October 2002, DETENTION SITE GREEN recommended that the vision in his right eye be tested, noting that “[w]e have a lot riding upon his ability to see, read and write.” DETENTION SITE GREEN stressed that “this request is driven by our intelligence needs vice humanitarian concern for AZ.”
2673

CIA detainees Abu Hazim and Abd al-Karim each broke a foot while trying to escape capture and were placed in casts; Abd al-Karim’s medical evaluation upon entry into CIA custody included a recommendation that he not be subjected to “extended standing for a couple of weeks,” which was then extended to three months.
2674
A cable describing the CIA enhanced interrogation techniques to be used on the two detainees stated that the interrogator would “forego cramped confinement, stress positions, walling, and vertical shackling (due to [the detainees’] injury).”
2675
Abd al-Karim was nonetheless subjected to two 45-minute sessions of cramped confinement,
2676
repeated walling, and a stress position that involved placing his “head on [the] wall, bent at waist, shuffled backwards to a safe, yet uncomfortable position.”
2677
As part of sleep deprivation, he was also “walked for 15 minutes every half-hour through the night and into the morning.”
2678
A few days later, a cable stated that, even given the best prognosis, Abd al-Karim would have arthritis and limitation of motion for the rest of his life.
2679
Meanwhile, Abu Hazim was subjected to repeated walling.
2680

Subsequently, and despite the aforementioned recommendation related to Abd al-Karim and a recommendation from a regional medical officer that Abu Hazim avoid any weight-bearing activities for five weeks,
2681
interrogators sought and received approval to use standing sleep deprivation on al-Karim and Abu Hazim.
2682

Abu Hazim underwent 52 hours of standing sleep deprivation,
2683
and Abd al-Karim underwent an unspecified period of standing sleep deprivation.
2684

Interrogators left Asadullah, a detainee with a sprained ankle, in the standing sleep deprivation position. When Asadullah was subsequently placed in a stress position on his knees, he complained of discomfort and asked to sit. He was told he could not sit unless he answered questions truthfully.
2685

Due to a lack of adequate medical care at CIA detention sites and the unwillingness of host governments to make hospital facilities available, CIA detainees had care delayed for serious medical issues. See, for example, the detainee reviews for Janat Gul, Hassan Guleed, Mustafa al-Hawsawi, Ramzi bin al-Shibh, and Firas al-Yemeni in Volume III.

CIA TESTIMONY

DIRECTOR HAYDEN: “And, in the section [of the ICRC report] on medical care, the report omits key contextual facts. For example, Abu Zubaydah’s statement that he was given only Ensure and water for two to three weeks fails to mention the fact that
he was on a liquid diet [was] quite appropriate because he was recovering from abdominal surgery at the time
.”

SAMPLING OF INFORMATION IN CIA RECORDS

This testimony is inaccurate. CIA records detail how Abu Zubaydah was fed solid food shortly after being discharged from the hospital in April 2002.
2686
In August 2002, as part of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques, Abu Zubaydah was placed on a liquid diet of Ensure and water as both an interrogation technique, and as a means of limiting vomiting during waterboarding.
2687
In planning for the interrogation of subsequent detainees, the CIA determined that it would use a “liquid diet.”
2688
At least 30 CIA detainees were fed only a liquid diet of Ensure and water for interrogation purposes.
2689

CIA TESTIMONY

SENATOR HATCH: “So this is not tipping the board and putting his head underneath the water.”

DIRECTOR HAYDEN: “No. It’s slightly inclined, cloth, pouring of water under the rules I just laid out, Senator.”

SAMPLING OF INFORMATION IN CIA RECORDS

This testimony is incongruent with CIA interrogation records. As described in the Study, the waterboarding of KSM involved interrogators using their hands to maintain a one-inch deep “pool” of water over KSM’s nose and mouth in an effort to make it impossible for KSM to ingest all the water being poured on him.
2690
According to the attending medical officer, the technique became a “series of near drownings.”
2691

CIA TESTIMONY

DIRECTOR HAYDEN: “[W]ater-boarding
cannot take place any more than five days out of a total of 30 days
. There
cannot be more than two sessions per day
. A session is described as being strapped to the board. No session can last longer than two hours. In any session,
there can be no more than six pourings of the water greater than ten seconds in duration
.
Under no circumstances can any detainee be under the pouring of the water a total of more than twelve minutes in any 24-hour period
, and one pouring cannot exceed, one application cannot exceed 40 seconds.”

SAMPLING OF INFORMATION IN CIA RECORDS

This testimony is incongruent with CIA interrogation records. For example, KSM was waterboarded on nine separate days over a two-week period. On March 13, 2003, KSM was subjected to three waterboard sessions in one day. Over March 12–13, 2003, he was subjected to five waterboard sessions in 25 hours. During that same period, he was subjected to the pouring of water for more than twelve minutes during a 24-hour period.
2692

In regard to the description of “pouring,” a CIA record related to Abu Zubaydah states that:

“Each iteration of the watering cycle consisted of four broad steps: 1) demands for information interspersed with the application of the water just short of blocking his airway 2) escalation of the amount of water applied until it blocked his airway and he started to have involuntary spasms 3) raising the waterboard to clear subject’s airway 4) lowering of the water-board and return to demands for information.”
2693

CIA TESTIMONY

SENATOR NELSON: “On KSM, was it waterboarding that you were able to get the information from him?”

DIRECTOR HAYDEN: “Yes, sir,
it was
.”

SENATOR NELSON: “Although it took you a long time to break him?”

DIRECTOR HAYDEN: “He had nine separate days in which waterboarding took place. He also was subject[ed] to sleep deprivation and I believe his deprivation was the longest of any detainee’s, at one stretch, and I think that may be what Senator Hatch was referring to by that 180 number. That’s the number of hours at one stretch.”

SAMPLING OF INFORMATION IN CIA RECORDS

This testimony is incongruent with CIA interrogation records. CIA personnel—including members of KSM’s interrogation team—believed that the waterboard interrogation technique was ineffective on KSM.
2694
The on-site medical officer told the inspector general that, after three or four days, it became apparent that the waterboard was ineffective, and that KSM “hated it but knew he could manage.”
2695
KSM interrogator ██████ told the inspector general that KSM had “beat the system,”
2696
and assessed two months after the discontinuation of the waterboard that KSM responded to “creature comforts and sense of importance” and not to “confrontational” approaches.
2697
KSM debriefer and Deputy Chief of ALEC Station ██████ told the inspector general that KSM “figured out a way to deal with [the waterboard].”
2698
████CTC Legal, ██████, told the inspector general that the waterboard “was of limited use on KSM.”
2699
CIA records indicate that KSM was subjected to the waterboard interrogation technique at least 183 times.

CIA TESTIMONY

DIRECTOR HAYDEN: “The most serious injury that I’m aware of—and I’ll ask the experts to add any color they want, Senator—is bruising as a result of shackling.”

SAMPLING OF INFORMATION IN CIA RECORDS

This testimony is incongruent with CIA interrogation records. CIA records indicate that CIA detainees suffered physical injuries beyond bruising from shackling, as well as psychological problems:

• During a waterboard session, Abu Zubaydah “became completely unresponsive, with bubbles rising through his open, full mouth.” He remained unresponsive after the waterboard was rotated upwards and only regained consciousness after receiving a “xyphoid thrust.”
  2700
  
• Multiple CIA detainees subjected to prolonged sleep deprivation experienced hallucinations, and CIA interrogation teams did not always discontinue sleep deprivation after the detainees had experienced hallucinations.
  2701
  
• Some detainees exhibited significant bruising and swelling unrelated to shackling. For example, a medical officer noted that, in addition to the swelling of his ankles and wrists, Ramzi bin al-Shibh had a bruise on his brow.
  2702
  
• During the application of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques, KSM was described as “[t]ired and sore,” with abrasions on his ankles, shins, and wrists, as well as on the back of his head.
  2703
  He also suffered from pedal edema
  2704
  resulting from extended standing.
  2705
  
• At the CIA’s DETENTION SITE COBALT, CIA interrogators used “rough takedowns,” described as taking a naked detainee outside of his cell, placing a hood over his head, and dragging him up and down a long corridor while slapping and punching him. Gul Rahman, after his death, was found to have surface abrasions on his shoulders, pelvis, arms, legs, and face.
  2706
  

CIA TESTIMONY

SENATOR LEVIN: “Did anybody die?”

DIRECTOR HAYDEN: “No.”

SENATOR LEVIN: “Not one person?”

DIRECTOR HAYDEN: “No one. The Committee is aware that there was an individual who died in CIA custody prior to the initiation of this program.”

SENATOR LEVIN: “Prior to the initiation of what?”

DIRECTOR HAYDEN: “This program. In fact, the discipline of this program is a product of or result of the undisciplined activity that took place earlier.”

DIRECTOR HAYDEN: “[Gul Rahman] was not part of this program, but I understand it was in CIA custody.”

SAMPLING OF INFORMATION IN CIA RECORDS

This testimony is incongruent with CIA records.

• Gul Rahman died in CIA custody at the CIA’s DETENTION SITE COBALT after being rendered there on November █, 2002. At the time, DETENTION SITE COBALT was described as a place where the CIA could detain suspected terrorists for the purposes of “intense interrogations” by CIA officers.
  2707
  DDO James Pavitt told the inspector general that “there were some who say that [DETENTION SITE COBALT] is not a CIA facility, but that is ‘bullshit.’ ”
  2708
  
• CIA records reveal that Gul Rahman was subjected to what the CIA chief of interrogations described as “coercive techniques without authorization.”
  2709
  At ALEC Station’s request, CIA contractor Hammond DUNBAR conducted an assessment of Gul Rahman to determine which CIA enhanced interrogation techniques should be used on him.
  2710
  While the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques were never authorized, DUNBAR interrogated Rahman, once employing the “insult slap” enhanced interrogation technique without CIA Headquarters approval.
  2711
  On November █, 2002, Gul Rahman was shackled to the wall of his cell in a short chain position,
  2712
  which required him to sit on the bare concrete.
  2713
  Rahman was wearing a sweatshirt, but was nude from the waist down. On November █, 2002, the guards at DETENTION SITE COBALT found Gul Rahman’s dead body.
  2714
  Although a CIA employee tried to perform CPR, Gul Rahman remained unresponsive and was declared dead.
  2715
  An autopsy report by the CIA found that the cause of Gul Rahman’s death was “undetermined,” but that the clinical impression of the medical officer who conducted the autopsy was that the cause of death was hypothermia.
  2716
  

CIA TESTIMONY

SENATOR LEVIN: [Reading a SSCI staff document, “Summary Notes of the Februaiy 14, 2007 ICRC Report”] “Prolonged stress standing position, naked, armed chained above the head [?]”

DIRECTOR HAYDEN: “Not above the head. Stress positions are part of the EITs, and nakedness were part of the EITs, Senator.”

SAMPLING OF INFORMATION IN CIA RECORDS

This testimony is inaccurate.

There are multiple descriptions of CIA detainees being forced to stand with their arms shackled above their heads for extended periods of time at the CIA’s DETENTION SITE COBALT.
2717
In one example, a U.S. military legal advisor observed the technique known as “hanging,” involving handcuffing one or both wrists to an overhead horizontal bar. The legal advisor noted that one detainee was apparently left hanging for 22 hours each day for two consecutive days to “break” his resistance.
2718