Authors: Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
Responding to the request for information, Deputy Chief of ALEC Station
█████
sent an email describing intelligence from KSM in which she wrote, “let’s be forward [
sic
] leaning.”
1129
The content of █████’s email would serve as a template on which future justifications for the CIA program and the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques were based.
1130
█████’s email stated that “Khalid Shaykh Muhammad’s information alone has saved at least several hundred, possibly thousands, of lives.” She then wrote that KSM “identified” Iyman Faris, “who is now serving time in the US for his support to al-Qa’ida,” and “identified a photograph” of Saleh al-Marri, “whom the FBI suspected of some involvement with al-Qa’ida, but against whom we had no concrete information,” adding that al-Marri “is now being held on a material witness warrant.” █████’s email stated that KSM “provided information” on Majid Khan, who “is now in custody,” “identified a mechanism for al-Qa’ida to smuggle explosives into the US,” and “identified” Jaffar al-Tayyar.
1131
█████’s email also represented that “[a]fter the use of enhanced [interrogation techniques], [Abu Zubaydah] grew into what is now our most cooperative detainee,” and that Abu Zubaydah’s information “produced concrete results that helped saved [
sic
] lives.”
1132
These representations were almost entirely inaccurate.
1133
As she had in an interview with the OIG, █████████, former chief of the Abu Zubaydah Task Force, refuted this view, writing in an email that Abu Zubaydah “never really gave ‘this is the plot’ type of information,” that Abu Zubaydah discussed Jose Padilla prior to the use of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques, and that “he never really gave us actionable intel to get them.”
1134
Separately, Deputy Chief of ALEC Station ███████ forwarded additional inaccurate information from CIA personnel in ALEC Station to CTC Legal related to KSM,
1135
al-Nashiri,
1136
and Hambali.
1137
On February 27, 2004, DDO Pavitt submitted his formal response to the OIG draft Special Review in the form of a memorandum to the inspector general. Pavitt urged the CIA OIG not to “shy away from the conclusion that our efforts have thwarted attacks and saved lives,” and to “make it clear as well that the EITs (including the waterboard) have been indispensable to our successes.”
1138
Pavitt’s memorandum included an attachment describing the “Successes of CIA’s Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Activities,” and why the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques were necessary. The attachment stated:
“Information we received from detained terrorists as a result of the lawful use of enhanced interrogation techniques (‘EITs’) has almost certainly saved countless American lives inside the United States and abroad. The evidence points clearly to the fact that without the use of such techniques, we and our allies would [have] suffered major terrorist attacks involving hundreds, if not thousands, of casualties.”
1139
The attachment to Pavitt’s memorandum repeated much of the inaccurate information contained in Deputy Chief of ALEC Station
█████
’s email about KSM and Abu Zubaydah, as well as the additional information ALEC Station personnel provided on KSM, al-Nashiri, and Hambali. In Pavitt’s memorandum, every intelligence success claim was preceded with some version of the phrase, “as a result of the lawful use of EITs.”
1140
Inaccurate information provided to the OIG during interviews and in the Pavitt memorandum was included in the final version of the OIG’s Special Review.
1141
The relevant portion of the Special Review, including much of the inaccurate information, has been declassified.
1142
As ██████ CTC Legal ████████ anticipated in his February 10, 2004, email, much of the information provided to the inspector general on the “effectiveness” of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques was later provided to policymakers and the Department of Justice as evidence for the effectiveness of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques.
1143
In late 2004, as the National Security Council was considering “endgame” options for CIA detainees, the CIA proposed a public relations campaign that would include disclosures about the “effectiveness” of the CIA program. CIA talking points prepared in December 2004 for the DCI to use with National Security Council principals stated that “[i]f done cleverly, selected disclosure of intelligence results could heighten the anxiety of terrorists at large about the sophistication of USG methods and underscore the seriousness of American commitment to prosecute aggressively the War on Terrorism.”
1144
The following month, the CIA proposed that the public information campaign include details on the “intelligence gained and lives saved in HVD interrogations.”
1145
There was no immediate decision by the National Security Council about an “endgame” for CIA detainees or the proposed public information campaign.
In early April 2005, ████████, chief of ALEC Station, asked that information on the success of the CIA’s Detention and Interrogation Program be compiled in anticipation of interviews of CIA personnel by Tom Brokaw of NBC News. The first draft included effectiveness claims relating to the “Second Wave” plotting, the Heathrow Airport plotting, the Karachi plotting, and the identification of a second shoe bomber.
1146
A subsequent draft sought to limit the information provided to what was already in the public record and included assertions about Issa al-Hindi, Iyman Faris, and Sajid Badat.
1147
That day, Deputy Director of CTC Philip Mudd told █████ that “we either get out and sell, or we get hammered, which has implications beyond the media. [CJongress reads it, cuts our authorities, messes up our budget.”
1148
The following day, the draft was cleared for release to the media.
1149
On April 20, 2005, the same examples were circulated as part of an anticipated official public campaign to promote the “effectiveness” of the still-classified CIA program.
1150
In response,
██████
CTC Legal,
██████████
, expressed concern that “the examples cited, while true, and perhaps as far as we can go, are not nearly the most striking examples of lives saved.” Referencing KSM’s reporting on Iyman Faris, noted that “we risk making ourselves look silly if the best we can do is the Brooklyn Bridge—perhaps we should omit specific examples rather than ‘damn ourselves with faint praise.’ ”
█████
, who offered the Heathrow Airport plot as an example, made the following suggestion: “Can [Office of Public Affairs] be more strongly declarative—‘while we can’t provide details’ (or maybe we can) ‘the program has produced intelligence that has directly saved 100’s/1000’s of American and other innocent lives’?” █████ then attached claims originally compiled in February 2004 for the purpose of responding to the draft OIG Special Review which, he wrote, described “some of the actionable intelligence acquired as a result of the Program and the lawful use of such techniques.”
1151
The examples were inaccurate.
1152
On June 24, 2005,
Dateline NBC
aired a program, accompanied by several online articles, which quoted CIA Director Goss and Deputy Director of CTC Mudd, as well as anonymous “top American intelligence officials.” Among other claims, NBC reported that the capture of Ramzi bin al-Shibh “le[d] ultimately” to the captures of KSM and Khallad bin Attash.
1153
This information was inaccurate.
1154
At the end of 2005, congressional concerns about the treatment of detainees again spurred interest at the CIA for public disclosures on the “effectiveness” of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques. Specifically, congressional action on the Detainee Treatment Act (the “McCain amendment”) prompted a CIA attorney working at the Office of the Director of National Intelligence to express concern that legislative support was needed for the CIA to continue to use its enhanced interrogation techniques, and that a public information campaign would be required to garner that support. The CIA attorney described the “striking” similarities between the public debate surrounding the McCain amendment and the situation in Israel in 1999, in which the Israeli Supreme Court had “ruled that several . . . techniques were possibly permissible, but require some form of legislative sanction,” and that the Israeli government “ultimately got limited legislative authority for a few specific techniques.”
1155
The CIA attorney then wrote:
“Once this became a political reality here, it became incumbent on the Administration to publicly put forth some facts, if it wanted to preserve these powers. Yet, to date, the Administration has refused to put forth any specific examples of significant intelligence it adduced as a result of using any technique that could not reasonably be construed as cruel, inhuman or degrading. Not even any historical stuff from three or four years ago. What conclusions are to be drawn from the utter failure to offer a specific justification: That no such proof exists? That the Administration does not recognize the legitimacy of the political process on this issue? Or, that need to reserve the right to use these techniques really is not important enough to justify the compromise of even historical intelligence?”
1156
As described in more detail in the full Committee Study, the Administration sought legislative support to continue the CIA’s Detention and Interrogation Program, and chose to do so by publicly disclosing the program in a 2006 speech by President Bush. The speech, which was based on CIA-provided information and vetted by the CIA, included numerous inaccurate representations about the CIA program and the effectiveness of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques. The CIA’s vetting of the speech is detailed in CIA “validation” documents, which include CIA concurrence and citations to records to support specific passages of the speech. For example, the CIA “Validation of Remarks” document includes the following:
“ ‘
. . . questioning the detainees in this program has given us information that has saved innocent lives by helping us to stop new attacks—here in the United States and across the world.
’
“
CIA concurs with this assessment.
Information from detainees prevented—among others—the West Coast airliner plot, a plot to blow up an apartment building in the United States, a plot to attack various targets in the United Kingdom, and plots against targets in Karachi and the Arabian Gulf. These attacks would undoubtedly have killed thousands.”
1157
Multiple iterations of the CIA “validation” documents reflect changes to the speech as it was being prepared. One week before the scheduled speech, a passage in the draft speech made inaccurate claims about the role played by Abu Zubaydah in the capture of Ramzi bin al-Shibh and the role of Abu Zubaydah and Ramzi bin al-Shibh in the capture of KSM, but did not explicitly connect these claims to the use of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques. In an August 31, 2006, email exchange, CIA officers proposed the following language for the speech:
“That same year, information from Zubaydah led the CIA to the trail of one of KSM’s accomplices, Ramzi bin al Shibh. Information from Zubaydah together with information from Shibh gave the CIA insight into al-Qa’ida’s 9/11 attack planning and the importance of KSM. With the knowledge that KSM was the ‘mastermind,’ ███████ Pakistani partners planned and mounted an operation that resulted in his eventual capture and detention.”
1158
The August 31, 2006, email exchange included citations to CIA cables to support the proposed passage; however, neither the cables, nor any other CIA records, support the assertions.
1159
Within a few days, the passage in the draft speech relating to the captures of Ramzi bin al-Shibh and KSM was modified to connect the use of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques against Abu Zubaydah to the capture of Ramzi bin al-Shibh. The updated draft now credited information from Abu Zubaydah and Ramzi bin al-Shibh with “help[ing] in the planning and execution of the operation that captured Khalid Sheikh Mohammed.” The updated draft speech stated:
“Zubaydah [zoo-BAY-da] was questioned using these [interrogation] procedures, and he soon began to provide information on key alQaida operatives—including information that helped us find and capture more of those responsible for the attacks of Nine-Eleven. For example, Zubaydah [zoo-BAY-da] identified one of KSM’s accomplices in the Nine-Eleven attacks—a terrorist named Ramzi bin al Shibh [SHEEB]. The information Zubaydah [zoo-BAY-da] provided helped lead to the capture of bin al Shibh. And together these two terrorists provided information that helped in the planning and execution of the operation that captured Khalid Sheikh Mohammed.”
1160
An updated CIA “validation” document concurring with the proposed passage provided a modified list of CIA cables as “sources” to support the passage. Cable citations to Abu Zubaydah’s reporting prior to the use of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques were removed.
1161
Like the previous version, the CIA’s updated “validation” document did not cite to any cables demonstrating that information from Abu Zubaydah “helped lead to the capture of [Ramzi] bin al-Shibh.”
1162
Similarly, none of the cables cited to support the passage indicated that information from Abu Zubaydah and Ramzi bin al-Shibh (who was in foreign government custody when he provided the information cited by the CIA) “helped in the planning and execution of the operation that captured [KSM].”
1163
As described elsewhere in this summary, there are no CIA records to support these claims.
1164