Authors: Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
“express our surprise and concern at some of the statements attributed to the Administration in the piece, particularly the Presidential statement on the UN International Day in Support of Victims of Torture as well as a quote from the Deputy White House Press Secretary Scott McClellan that all prisoners being held by the USG are being treated ‘humanely.’ ”
1084
While Rizzo expressed the view that the presidential statement did not appear to contain anything “we can’t live with,” Rizzo conveyed to senior CIA leaders that it “might well be appropriate for us to seek written reaffirmation by some senior White House official that the Agency’s ongoing practices . . . are to continue.”
1085
On July 3, 2003, DCI George Tenet sent a memorandum to National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice seeking reaffirmation of the Administration’s support for the CIA’s detention and interrogation policies and practices. The memorandum stated that the reaffirmation was sought because:
“recent Administration responses to inquiries and resulting media reporting about the Administration’s position have created the impression that these [interrogation] techniques are not used by U.S. personnel and are no longer approved as a policy matter.”
1086
While the CIA was preparing to meet with the White House on the reaffirmation of the CIA interrogation program, CIA personnel provided additional inaccurate information about the “effectiveness” of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques to the OIG, as well as to senior CIA leadership. These inaccurate representations described the “thwarting” of specific plots and the capture of specific terrorists attributed to the interrogation of CIA detainees and the use of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques.
On July 16, 2003, Deputy Chief ALEC Station
█████████
was interviewed again by the OIG. In this interview
█████
asserted that KSM “provided information that helped lead to the arrest of Iyman Faris, Uzhair Paracha, Saleh al-Marri, Majid Khan, and Ammar al-Baluchi.
1087
These representations were almost entirely inaccurate.
1088
█████ also informed the OIG that information from CIA detainees “provided a wealth of information about Al-Qa’ida plots,” including: a terrorist plot in Saudi Arabia against Israel; a plot against the U.S. Consulate in Karachi, Pakistan; a plot against Heathrow Airport and Canary Wharf; a plot to derail trains; a plot against subways; a gas station plot; a plot against the “tallest building” in California; a plot against suspension bridges; and a plot to poison water supplies.
1089
Much of this information was inaccurate.
1090
According to OIG records, “[o]n the question of whether actual plots had been thwarted, [█████] opined that since the operatives involved in many of the above plots had been arrested, [CTC had], in effect, thwarted the operation[s].”
█████
provided a list to the OIG of terrorists captured and the plots with which they were associated. None of the individuals listed by
█████
were captured as a result of reporting from CIA detainees.
1091
During this same period in 2003, CIA officers were compiling similar information for CIA leadership. On July 18, 2003, the chief of ALEC Station, ████████, wrote an email to ALEC Station officers requesting information on the “value and impact” of CIA detainee information on behalf of the CIA Renditions Group (RDG),
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which he stated was being compiled for senior CIA leadership.
1093
█████
wrote that “[o]ne way to assist now is to provide input to RDG on highlights of intel and ops reporting from the detainees,” in particular “reporting that helped reveal or stop plots, reporting that clinched the identity of terrorist suspects, etc.”
1094
The first portion of the response compiled by ALEC Station, was drafted by Deputy Chief of ALEC Station ████████, who wrote that CIA detainee reporting “plays a key role in our ability to identify and capture al-Qa’ida terrorists, including those who were planning to attack inside the United States.” In an email, █████ wrote that “[t]he ability of the detainees to identify many operatives previously unknown to us or to the FBI resulted in the successful capture/detention of several terrorists,” and that the use of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques was “key” to acquiring this information on these operatives. As examples of operatives “previously unknown” to the CIA and the FBI and identified by CIA detainees, █████ cited Jose Padilla, Binyam Mohammed, Majid Khan, Iyman Faris, and Sayf al-Rahman Paracha.
1095
These representations were inaccurate.
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█████ email concluded:
“Simply put, detainee information has
saved countless American lives
inside the US and abroad. We believe there is no doubt al-Qa’ida would have succeeded in launching additional attacks in the US and that the information obtained from these detainees
through the use of enhanced measures
was
key to unlocking this information
. It is our assessment that if CIA loses the ability to interrogate and use enhanced measures in a responsible way, we will not be able to effectively prosecute this war.”
1097
The information relayed from ALEC Station to RDG in July 2003 for CIA leadership also included information from a CIA assessment entitled “Significant Detainee Reporting.”
1098
That document included information that was largely congruent with CIA records. It stated that KSM provided details on the Heathrow Airport Plot and the Karachi Plots only after being confronted with the capture of Khallad bin Attash and Ammar al-Baluchi;
1099
that with regard to plots inside the United States, KSM had only admitted to plots that had been abandoned or already disrupted; that KSM fabricated information in order to tell CIA interrogators “what he thought they wanted to hear”; and that KSM generally only provided information when “boxed in” by information already known to CIA debriefers.
1100
This information was not included in CIA representations to policymakers later that month.
On July 29, 2003, as a result of DCI Tenet’s July 3, 2003, request seeking reaffirmation of the CIA’s detention and interrogation policies and practices, Tenet and CIA General Counsel Scott Muller conducted a briefing for a subset of the National Security Council principals.
1101
According to a CIA memorandum, Muller represented that CIA “detainees subject to the use of Enhanced Techniques of one kind or another had produced significant intelligence information that had, in the view of CIA professionals, saved lives.”
1102
The CIA briefing provided the “results” of using the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques in briefing slides with the heading: “RESULTS: MAJOR THREAT INFO.” The slides represented that KSM provided information on “[a]ttack plans against US Capitol, other US landmarks”; “[a]ttacks against Chicago, New York, Los Angeles; against towers, subways, trains, reservoirs, Hebrew centers, Nuclear power plants”; and the “Heathrow and Canary Wharf Plot.” The slides also represented that KSM identified Iyman Faris, the “Majid Khan family,” and Sayf al-Rahman Paracha.
1103
These representations were largely inaccurate.
1104
The CIA slides represented that “major threat” information was obtained from the use of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques on CIA detainee ‘Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri regarding “US Navy Ships in the Straits of Hormuz.” This representation was inaccurate and omitted material facts.
1105
The CIA slides further indicated that “major threat” information was obtained from the use of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques against CIA detainee Ramzi bin al-Shibh—specifically that bin al-Shibh “[i]dentified Hawsawi” and provided “major threat” information on “[a]ttacks against Nuclear Power Plants, Hebrew Centers.” This representation was inaccurate and omitted material facts.
1106
In the context of “[m]ajor threats [that] were countered and attacks averted,” the CIA slides represented that “major threat” information was obtained from the use of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques against Khallad bin Attash on an “[a]ttack against U.S. Consulate in Karachi.” This representation was inaccurate.
1107
The CIA slides further represented that “major threat” information was obtained from the use of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques on CIA detainee Abu Zubaydah, resulting in the “[i]dentification of [Jose] Padilla, Richard Reid,” as well as information on “[a]ttacks on banks, subways, petroleum and aircraft industries.” These representations were inaccurate.
1108
The briefing slides, which contained additional inaccuracies detailed in Volume II of the Committee Study, were used, at least in part, for CIA briefings for Secretary of State Powell and Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld,
1109
as well as for Assistant Attorney General Jack Goldsmith.
1110
In subsequent interviews of CIA personnel, the OIG received information that contradicted other CIA representations about the CIA’s Detention and Interrogation Program. The chief of the
███
Branch of the UBL Group at CTC described at length how the arrests of Majid Khan and Iyman Faris were unrelated to reporting from CIA detainees.
1111
The deputy director for law enforcement for the FBI’s Counterterrorism Division told the OIG how Uzhair Paracha and FBI operational activities were ultimately responsible for the capture of Sayf al-Rahman Paracha.
1112
The chief of targeting and special requirements for CTC’s al-Qa’ida Department and former chief of the Abu Zubaydah Task Force,
█████████
, told the OIG that “the often-cited example of Zubaydah identifying Padilla is not quite accurate.”
1113
According to ██████, “[n]ot only did [Abu Zubaydah] not tell us who Padilla was, his information alone would never have led us to Padilla.”
█████
stated that the Pakistanis had told the CIA about Jose Padilla and his partner prior to Abu Zubaydah providing any information on the pair, relaying, “[i]n essence, CTC got lucky.”
1114
At the same time, however, CIA personnel provided inaccurate examples of the effectiveness of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques to the OIG. The deputy chief of the Al-Qa’ida Department of CTC told the OIG that “KSM gave us Majid Khan and Uzair Paracha.”
1115
Deputy DCI John McLaughlin told the OIG that information from KSM “led to the capture” of Majid Khan, which in turn led to the capture of Hambali. McLaughlin also represented that “the capture of Richard Reid was a result of modus operandi information obtained from [Abu] Zubaydah.”
1116
These representations were inaccurate.
1117
In addition to these specific inaccurate examples, CIA leadership made additional general claims to the OIG about the effectiveness of the CIA interrogation program that highlighted the “critical threat information” that could only be acquired by using the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques against CIA detainees. Jose Rodriguez, then CTC director, told the CIA OIG that “the use of EITs has saved lives and prevented terrorist operations from occurring.”
1118
Deputy DCI McLaughlin told the OIG that he “believes the use of EITs has proven critical to CIA’s efforts in the war on terrorism.”
1119
DDO Pavitt stated that the program was “invaluable to U.S. national security,” that “American lives have been saved as a result of information received from detainees,” and that the CIA “has been able to obtain information that would not have been obtained without the use of EITs.”
1120
According to OIG records, DCI Tenet stated he “firmly believes that the interrogation program, and specifically the use of EITs, has saved many lives.” Tenet added that the use of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques was “extremely valuable” in obtaining “enormous amounts of critical threat information,” and that he did not believe that the information could have been gained any other way.
1121
On January 2, 2004, CIA Inspector General John Helgerson provided a draft of the OIG Special Review, entitled “Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Program,” to senior CIA officials for comment. The draft Special Review, which was based on numerous interviews of CIA personnel, as well as additional research by the OIG, described the origins of the CIA’s Detention and Interrogation Program, the detention sites that were operational at the time of the review, and the guidance that had been provided on both interrogation and detention. The draft also identified a number of unauthorized interrogation techniques that had been used,
1122
and concluded that, in a number of cases, CIA interrogations went “well beyond what was articulated in the written DOJ legal opinion of 1 August 2002.”
1123
The draft report repeated the inaccurate examples of the “effectiveness” of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques that had been conveyed by CIA officers to OIG personnel,
1124
but nonetheless concluded:
“[w]ith the capture of some of the operatives for the above-mentioned plots, it is not clear whether these plots have been thwarted or if they remain viable or even if they were fabricated in the first place. This Review did not uncover any evidence that these plots were imminent.”
1125
After reviewing the draft Special Review, including the OIG’s qualified conclusions about the effectiveness of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques, the CIA’s CTC began preparing a highly critical response. In preparation for that response,
██████
CTC Legal,
██████████
, requested additional information that could be used as evidence for the effectiveness of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques from CTC personnel.
██████
sent an email seeking “a list of specific plots that have been thwarted by the use of detainee reporting that we acquired following the use of enhanced techniques.”
██████
noted that he would compile the information, “emphasizing that hundreds or thousands of innocent lives have been saved as a result of our use of those techniques . . .”
1126
In a separate email,
██████
emphasized that it was “critical” that the information “establish direct links between the application of the enhanced interrogation techniques and the production of intelligence that directly enabled the saving of innocent lives,” that the intelligence obtained after the use of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques be “significantly different in nature from the intelligence acquired before the use of the enhanced techniques,” and that the information be “absolutely ironclad” and “demonstrably supported by cable citations, analytical pieces, or what have you.”
1127
██████ further noted that “[w]e can expect to need to present these data to appropriately cleared personnel at the IG and on the Hill, to the Attorney General, and quite possibly to the President at some point, and they must be absolutely verifiable.” He concluded, “[i]t is not an exaggeration to say that the future of the program, and the consequent saving of innocent lives, may depend substantially upon the input you provide.”
1128