Authors: Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
CIA TESTIMONY
DIRECTOR HAYDEN: “What you have there is a matrix. On the lefthand side of the matrix are the names of the
30 individuals in the CIA program who have had any EITs used against them
. Mr. Chairman and Vice Chairman and Members, you’ve heard me say this before. In the history of the program,
we’ve had 97 detainees
. Thirty of the detainees have had EITs used against them.”
SAMPLING OF INFORMATION IN CIA RECORDS
This testimony is inaccurate. At the time of this testimony, there had been least 118 CIA detainees. CIA records indicate at least 38 of the detainees had been subjected to the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques.
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CIA TESTIMONY
DIRECTOR HAYDEN: “The Army field manual is designed for the folks at Guantanamo to interrogate a rifleman that was in the employ of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar. That guy never gets into our program. The
ticket into
this program is knowledge of threat to the homeland or the interests of the United States or knowledge of location of 1 or 2
.”
SAMPLING OF INFORMATION IN CIA RECORDS
This testimony is incongruent with CIA detention and interrogation records. For example, numerous individuals had been detained and subjected to the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques, despite doubts and questions surrounding their knowledge of terrorist threats and the location of senior al-Qa’ida leadership. They include Asadullah,
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Mustafa al-Hawsawi,
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Abu Hudhaifa,
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Arsala Khan,
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ABU TALHA AL-MAGREBI
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and ABU BAHAR AL-TURKI,
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Janat Gul,
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Ahmed Ghailani,
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Sharif al-Masri,
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and Sayyid Ibrahim.
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The CIA represented to the OLC that the CIA would only use its enhanced interrogation techniques against detainees who had knowledge of imminent threats or direct involvement in planning and preparing of terrorist actions. Not until July 20, 2007, more than three months after this testimony, did the OLC approve the use of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques against detainees based on their suspected knowledge of the locations of UBL or Ayman al-Zawahiri.
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Prior to July 20, 2007, in the case of at least six CIA detainees, the use of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques was nonetheless predicated on the assessment that the detainees possessed “locational information” on senior HVTs, to include UBL or Ayman al-Zawahiri.
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CIA TESTIMONY
DIRECTOR HAYDEN: “Since we began this in the summer of 2002, the 97 detainees have helped us by their testimony create 8,000 intelligence reports.”
SENATOR SNOWE: “Of the 8,000 intelligence reports that were provided, as you said, by 30 of the detainees—”
DIRECTOR HAYDEN: “By all 97, ma’am.”
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SAMPLING OF INFORMATION IN CIA RECORDS
CIA representations suggesting that every CIA detainee provided intelligence reporting are not supported by CIA records. A detailed reporting chart is provided in Vol-ume 11. CIA reporting records indicate that 34 percent of all CIA detainees produced no intelligence reports, and nearly 70 percent produced fewer than 15 intelligence reports. Of the 39 detainees who were, according to CIA records, subjected to the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques, nearly 20 percent produced no intelligence reports, while 40 percent produced fewer than 15 intelligence reports.
CIA TESTIMONY
DIRECTOR HAYDEN: “Detainee reporting has played a role in nearly every capture of key al-Qa’ida members and associates since 2002.”
SAMPLING OF INFORMATION IN CIA RECORDS
The CIA consistently represented that the interrogation of CIA detainees using the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques resulted in critical and otherwise unavailable intelligence that led to the capture of specific terrorists, to include, among others: KSM, Majid Khan, Ramzi bin al-Shibh, Iyman Paris, Saleh al-Marri, Ammar al-Baluchi, Khallad bin Attash, Sajid Badat, and Dhiren Barot.
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These representations were inaccurate.
CIA TESTIMONY
DIRECTOR HAYDEN: “March 2003, KSM gives us information about an al-Qa’ida operative, Majid Khan . . . KSM was aware that Majid had been recently captured. KSM,
possibly believing that Khan was talking
, admitted to having tasked Majid with delivering $50,000 to some of Hambali’s operatives in December 2002 . . . So now we go to [Majid] Khan and we tell him, hey, your uncle just told us about the money.
He acknowledged that he delivered the money to an operative named Zubair. He provided Zubair’s physical description and phone number. Based on that █ captured Zubair in June.
”
SAMPLING OF INFORMATION IN CIA RECORDS
The chronology provided in this testimony, which is consistent with other CIA representations, is inaccurate. Prior to KSM’s capture, in early January 2003, coverage of a known al-Qa’ida email account uncovered communications between the account and a former Baltimore, Maryland, resident, Majid Khan. The communications indicated that Majid Khan traveled to Bangkok for terrorist support activities and was in contact there with a “Zubair.”
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By this time, the CIA had significant intelligence indicating that a “Zubair” played a central supporting role in Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), was affiliated with al-Qa’ida figures like KSM, had expertise in ██████ in Southeast Asia, and was suspected of playing a role in Hambali’s October 12, 2002, Bali bombings.
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On March 6, 2003, the day after Majid Khan was captured (the capture was unrelated to CIA detainee reporting), and while being questioned by foreign government interrogators using rapport-building techniques, Majid Khan described how he traveled to Bangkok and provided $50,000 USD to Zubair at the behest of al-Qa’ida.
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Majid Khan’s physical description of Zubair matched previous intelligence reporting already collected on Zubair.
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When confronted with this information, KSM confirmed the reporting, but denied knowing Zubair.
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By May 2003, the CIA learned that a source the CIA had been developing,
████████████
, received a call from a phone number associated with Zubair. When the source was contacted by the CIA, he described a Malaysian man
███████████████████████████
.
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███ later, the source alerted the CIA that Zubair would be
█████████
. Acting on this information, Thai authorities,
██████
, captured Zubair on June 8, 2003.
CIA TESTIMONY
DIRECTOR HAYDEN: ‘‘
Zubair enters the program
. During debriefing, Zubair reveals he worked directly for Hambali. He provides information on ██████ Hambali and a company ████████████.”
SAMPLING OF INFORMATION IN CIA RECORDS
This testimony is incongruent with CIA records. Prior to entering the CIA’s Detention and Interrogation Program, while still in foreign government custody, Zubair was questioned about his efforts to obtain fraudulent ██ documents, as well as his phone contact with █████ [Business
Q
]
████████████
.
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Zubair admitted to seeking illegal ███ documents on behalf of Hambali, as well as using ████ [Business Q] █████████.
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CIA detention records do not state what immediate investigative steps the CIA or Thai authorities took with regard to
█████
[Business Q], although signals intelligence had indicated that Zubair had been in frequent contact with the company.
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After being rendered to CIA custody, Zubair was immediately subjected to the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques.
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After days of being questioned about other matters, Zubair was asked about his efforts to obtain ██documents for Hambali, at which point he again acknowledged using ██████████ [Business Q]
███████████
.
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When Thai authorities approached “a contact” at █████ [Business Q], they were provided
██████████████████████████████
.
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CIA TESTIMONY
DIRECTOR HAYDEN: “Working with [an entity of a foreign government], we used that information to capture another Hambali lieutenant, a fellow named Lillie—who is also on your list [of CIA detainees]—who provided the location of Hambali. And that location information led us to his capture.”
SAMPLING OF INFORMATION IN CIA RECORDS
In an operation that included surveillance of █████ [Business Q], Hambali associate Amer was arrested on August 11, 2003.
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Amer was immediately cooperative and assisted in the arrest of Lillie hours later at approximately 6:00 PM.
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During his arrest, Lillie was found to have a key fob in his possession imprinted with an address of an apartment building in Ayutthaya, Thailand. In response to questioning, “within minutes of capture,” Lillie admitted that the address on the key fob was the address where Hambali was located. Less than four hours later, Hambali was captured at the address found on the key fob.
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According to the chief of the CTC’s Southeast Asia Branch:
“[The CIA] stumbled onto Hambali. We stumbled onto the [source] . . . picking up the phone and calling his case officer to say there’s ██████ . . . we really stumbled over it. It wasn’t police work, it wasn’t good targeting, it was we stumbled over it and it yielded up Hambali.”
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CIA TESTIMONY
DIRECTOR HAYDEN: “Bringing this story full circle, ‘Abdul al-Hadi then identifies a cell of JI operatives whom Hambali had sent to Karachi for another al-Qa’ida operation. We take this information from Abdul Hadi to his brother, Hambali. Hambali then admits that he was grooming members of the cell for a U.S. operation, at the guidance of KSM—remember, this is where this started—and we’re almost certain these were the guys trying to implement KSM’s plot to fly hijacked planes into the tallest buildings on the west coast of the United States.”
SAMPLING OF INFORMATION IN CIA RECORDS
CIA Director Hayden’s reference to “the guys trying to implement KSM’s plot to fly hijacked planes into the tallest buildings on the west coast of the United States,” is a reference to the al-Ghuraba student group and KSM’s “Second Wave” plotting detailed in this summary and in greater detail in Volume II.
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A review of CIA records found that contrary to CIA representations, Hambali’s brother, ‘Abdul al-Hadi, aka Gunawan, who was in foreign government custody, did not identify a “cell of JI operatives whom Hambali had sent to Karachi for another al-Qa’ida operation.” He identified “a group of Malaysian and Indonesian students in Karachi” who were witting of his affiliation with Jemaah Islamiyah.
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CIA officers on site recalled other intelligence reporting indicating that KSM planned to use Malaysians in the “next wave of attacks,” connected it to Gunawan’s statements about Malaysian students, and reported that Gunawan had just identified “a group of 16 individuals, most all of whom are Malaysians.”
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Records indicate that it was this initial analysis that led the CIA to consider the group a KSM “cell” for the “next wave of attacks.”
While Hambali was being subjected to the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques, he was confronted about KSM’s efforts to find pilots, as well as information on the al-Ghuraba group—which the CIA assessed was a KSM “cell.” Hambali told his CIA interrogators “that some of the members of [the al-Ghuraba group] were destined to work for al-Qa’ida if everything had gone according to plan,” and that “KSM told him to provide as many pilots as he could.
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Months later, on November 30, 2003, after three weeks of being questioned by a debriefer “almost entirely in Bahasa Indonesia,” Hambali admitted to fabricating information during the period he was being subjected to the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques. According to Hambali, he fabricated these claims “in an attempt to reduce the pressure on himself” and “to give an account that was consistent with what [Hambali] assessed the questioners wanted to hear.”
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A November 30, 2003, cable noted that CIA personnel “assesse[d] [Hambali]’s admission of previous fabrication to be credible.” Hambali then consistently described “the al-Ghuraba organization” as a “development camp for potential future JI operatives and leadership, vice a JI cell or an orchestrated attempt by JI to initiate JI operations outside of Southeast Asia.” This description was consistent and corroborative of other intelligence reporting.
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A wide body of intelligence reporting indicates that, contrary to CIA representations, the al-Ghuraba group was not “tasked” with, or witting, of any aspect of the “Second Wave” plotting.
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While KSM’s reporting varied, KSM stated “he did not yet view the group as an operational pool from which to draft operatives.”
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An October 27, 2006,CIA cable stated that “all of the members of the JI al-Ghuraba cell have been released,”
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while an April 18, 2008, CIA intelligence report referencing the al-Ghuraba group makes no reference to the group serving as potential operatives for KSM’s “Second Wave” plotting.
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