Authors: Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
“Issa al-Hindi: KSM first
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identified Issa al-Hindi as an operative he sent to the US prior to 9/11 to case potential targets in NYC and Washington. When shown surveillance photos provided by ████████████████ [foreign partner authorities], HVDs confirmed al-Hindi’s identity. Al-Hindi’s capture by the British resulted in the disruption of a sleeper cell and led to the arrest of other operatives.”
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Similarly, CIA Director Michael Hayden represented to the Committee on April 12, 2007, that “KSM also provided the first lead to an operative known as ‘Issa al-Hindi,’ with other detainees giving additional identifying information.”
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The CIA provided similar inaccurate representations regarding the thwarting of the United Kingdom Urban Targets Plot and the identification and/or arrest of Dhiren Barot, aka Abu Issa al-Hindi, in 17 of the 20 documents provided to policymakers and the Department of Justice between July 2003 and March 2009.
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A review of CIA operational cables and other documents found that the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques did not result in the unique intelligence that the CIA represented led to the arrest of Dhiren Barot or the thwarting of his plotting.
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The review found that the intelligence that alerted security officials to: (1) the potential terrorist threat posed by one or more U.K.-based operatives with the alias “Issa”; (2) Issa’s more common alias, “Issa al-Hindi”; (3) Issa al-Hindi’s location; (4) Issa al-Hindi’s true name, Dhiren Barot; and (5) information on Dhiren Barot’s U.K. plotting, all came from intelligence sources unrelated to the CIA’s Detention and Interrogation Program.
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Contrary to CIA representations, reporting from CIA detainees subjected to the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques did not lead to the arrest of Dhiren Barot or the thwarting of the United Kingdom Urban Targets Plot, nor did KSM provide the first reporting on a U.K.-based “Issa.” Rather, the disruption of the United Kingdom Urban Targets Plot and the identification and arrest of Dhiren Baro (aka Issa al-Hindi) was attributable to the efforts of U.K. law enforcement ████████████████████, as well as ████████████████████ [a review of computer hard drives], █████████████████ [collected communications], and reporting from detainees in the custody of the U.S. Department of Justice, the U.S. military, and a foreign government. While records indicate KSM did provide the initial information on “Issa’s” tasking to conduct casings in the United States prior to the September 11, 2001, attacks,
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as well as information on an email address related to Issa,
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this information was provided within a larger body of fabricated reporting KSM provided on Issa. The CIA was unable to distinguish between the accurate and inaccurate reporting, and KSM’s varied reporting led CIA officers to conclude that KSM was “protecting” Issa
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and “obstructing [the CIA’s] ability to acquire good information” on the U.K.-based operative well after the CIA ceased using enhanced interrogation techniques against KSM.
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According to information provided to the CIA by the United Kingdom, Dhiren Barot, aka Issa al-Hindi, appeared in ████████████████ reporting related to “terrorist training” and participation “in jihad in occupied Kashmir, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Malaysia throughout the 1990s.”
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Information concerning a book written by Dhiren Barot (under the alias “Esa al-Hindi”) on jihad in Kashmir appeared in ████████████████ and CIA intelligence records as early as December 1999.
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At that time U.K. authorities had a number of U.K.-based extremists under investigation, including Moazzem Begg.
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Begg’s Maktabah al-Ansar bookstore was described as “a known jihadist gathering place.”
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According to intelligence reports, in 1999, █ “
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‘Abu Issa’ stayed with Moazzem Begg
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at the Maktabah al-Ansar bookstore in Birmingham, U.K.,” and that this “Issa” was in contact with other U.K. extremists.
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According to reporting, Begg was associated with two “al-Qa’ida operatives” arrested in 1999 for their involvement in terrorist plotting and later released.
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A report from August 1, 2000, stated that U.K. authorities raided Begg’s bookstore and found an invoice for 5000 copies of a book entitled, “The Army of Madina in Kashmir.”
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A search of computers associated with the two aforementioned “al-Qa’ida operatives” described the book as their “project” written by “a brother from England who was a Hindu and became a Muslim.” According to the reporting, the U.K.-based author of the book “got training in Afghanistan” before fighting jihad in Kashmir.
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(The book advocates for “worldwide jihad” and the author is listed on the cover of the book as “Esa al-Hindi.”
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) Additional reporting on “Issa” appeared in CIA records again in July 2001. At that time the FBI reported that Ahmed Ressam, who was in a U.S. federal prison (arrested by U.S. border patrol with explosives in his vehicle in December 1999), reported that a U.K. national named “Issa” attended a terrorist training camp associated with al-Qa’ida in Afghanistan.
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In February 2002, Moazzem Begg was arrested at an al-Qa’ida safe house in Islamabad, Pakistan, and subsequently transferred to U.S. military custody at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.
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While still in Pakistani custody, Begg provided reporting on U.K.-based extremists in the context of terrorist training camps, including information on an individual who would play a key role in “Issa’s” identification and capture, “Sulayman” (variant Sulyman).
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In May 2002, the CIA was seeking to learn more about “Sulyman.”
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███ [foreign partner] authorities informed the CIA that Sulyman was a person of interest to U.K. authorities for his connections to U.K. extremists and his suspected travel to Kashmir multiple times for terrorist activity. The
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[foreign partner] further reported that Sulyman may have been involved
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.
The same intelligence report provided by ███ [foreign partner] included Sulyman’s likely true name, Nisar Jilal, as well as his date of birth and place of employment.
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Beginning in mid-2002, there was increasing intelligence reporting on one or more U.K.-based individuals referred to as “Issa” who were connected to KSM and possibly planning attacks in the United Kingdom.
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This reporting resulted in efforts by U.K. authorities to identify and locate this “Issa.”
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In August 2002,
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and again in October 2002, █████ [foreign partner] informed the CIA that it was seeking to identify a U.K.-based “Abu Issa” who was reportedly “an English speaker and trusted [terrorist] operative.”
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In September 2002, an email address (“Lazylozy”) was recovered during raids related to the capture of Ramzi bin al-Shibh that would later be found to be in contact with ‘Issa.” Information on the email address was disseminated in intelligence reporting.
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The same email address was found on March 1, 2003, during the raids that led to the capture of KSM. CIA records indicate that █████ sought ███ coverage for the email account.
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Within days, the Intelligence Community was collecting information from the account and had reported that the user of the account was in contact with other covered accounts and that the message content was in English.
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KSM was captured on March 1, 2003. On March █, 2003, KSM was rendered to CIA custody and immediately subjected to the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques including at least 183 applications of the waterboard interrogation technique—until March 25, 2003.
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During the month of March 2003, KSM provided information on a variety of matters, including on a U.K.-based Abu Issa al-Britani. The information provided by KSM on “Issa” included both accurate and inaccurate information. At the time, the CIA was unable to discern between the two. During interrogation sessions in March 2003, KSM first discussed an “Issa al-Britani” among a list of individuals who were connected to KSM’s Heathrow Airport plotting.
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On March 17, 2003, KSM stated that, prior to the September 11, 2001, attacks, he tasked Issa to travel to the United States to “collect information on economic targets.” On March 21, 2003, KSM was waterboarded for failing to confirm interrogators’ suspicions that KSM sought to recruit individuals from among the African American Muslim community. KSM then stated that he had talked with Issa about contacting African American Muslim groups prior to September 11, 2001.
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The next day KSM was waterboarded for failing to provide more information on the recruitment of African American Muslims. One hour after the waterboarding session, KSM stated that he tasked Issa “to make contact with black U.S. citizen converts to Islam in Montana,” and that he instructed Issa to use his ties to Shaykh Abu Hamza al-Masri, a U.K.-based Imam, to facilitate his recruitment efforts.
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KSM later stated that Issa’s mission in the United States was to surveil forests to potentially ignite forest fires.
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During this period, KSM was confronted with a series of emails that the aforementioned “Lazylozy” email account and another email account (“█████████”). KSM confirmed that the emails were established for communication between Issa al-Britani and Ammar al-Baluchi and stated that Issa used the “Lazylozy” account, and that al-Baluchi used the “█████████” account.
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(A month later the CIA reported that Issa did not use the “Lazylozy” email address, but the other email address.)
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Over the next six months, KSM retracted or provided conflicting reporting on Issa. On June 22, 2003, CIA interrogators reported that “[KSM] nervously explained to debriefer that he was under ‘enhanced measures’ when he made these claims” about terrorist recruitment in Montana, and “simply told his interrogators what he thought they wanted to hear.”
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A CIA Headquarters response cable stated that the CIA’s ALEC Station believed KSM’s fabrication claims were “another resistance/manipulation ploy” and characterized KSM’s contention that he “felt ‘forced’ to make admissions” under enhanced interrogation techniques as “convenient excuses.” As a result, ALEC Station urged CIA officers at the detention site to get KSM to reveal “who is the key contact person in Montana?”
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By June 30, 2005, ALEC Station had concluded that KSM’s reporting about African American Muslims in Montana was “an outright fabrication.”
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On April 4, 2003, the CIA provided reporting to the U.K. on “Issa,” stating that “we realize that Abu Issa is a target of interest to your service.” The information compiled by the CIA included an August 2002 report (unrelated to the CIA’s Detention and Interrogation Program) that stated that a U.K. national “Abu Issa Al-Pakistani” was slated by al-Qa’ida for “terrorist operations against foreign targets.”
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On April 18, 2003, a ███ cable the U.K. relayed that the correct email for Abu Issa al-Britani is (“█████”). It further noted that “the Abu Issa account” is “under
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coverage, and
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.” The same cable notes that KSM had changed his reporting on Issa’s background. According to the cable, KSM originally stated Issa was of Pakistani origin, but now claimed that Issa was of Indian origin. The CIA wrote that KSM’s reporting:
“tracks with reporting from another detainee. As you are aware, Feroz Abbasi and other detainees at Guantanmo [
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] Bay have described an Abu Issa that worked for the al-Qa’ida media Committee run by KSM . . . Abassi [at] one time related that Abu Issa described himself as Indian.”
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On May 11, 2003, █████ cable noted that the email address associated with Abu Issa (“█████”) was used and tracked to a specific address in Wembley, a suburb of London.
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On May 28, 2003, a CIA cable documented intelligence obtained by the FBI from interviews of James Ujaama (aka Bilal Ahmed), who was in FBI custody. Ujaama, who had spent time in the U.K. extremist community, reported on an “Issa” in the U.K. who was known as “Issa al-Hindi” and was “good friends with a Pakistani male named Sulyman.”
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██████ had already disseminated intelligence indicating that Sulyman was likely Nisar Jalal, based on reporting from U.S military detainee Moazzem Begg.
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Ujaama provided the FBI with the name of the U.K. law office where Sulyman (aka Nisar Jalal) worked, which matched reporting provided to the CIA by ███ [foreign partner] authorities in ██████ 2002.
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On June 2, 2003, KSM was shown a sketch of Issa al-Hindi provided to the CIA by the FBI and based on reporting by James Ujaama. KSM stated that the sketch did not look like anyone he knew.
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A June 5, 2003, cable states that the FBI had “gleaned new clues about Issa in recent days from detainees, including [from Moazzem] Begg,” who was in U.S. military custody. According to the cable, Begg told FBI special agents “that Issa is likely from Wembley, Alperton, or Sudbury.” A
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noted that
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[technical collection indicated that Issa was located in Wembley].
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U.K. officials highlighted that Issa’s reported “good friend,” Nisar Jilal (aka Sulyman), also had an address in Wembley.
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