Authors: Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
Within days after the attacks of September 11, 2001, CTC officers suspected KSM of playing a key role in the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks.
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Shortly thereafter, CTC officers also noted the “striking similarities” between the September 11, 2001, attacks, and the 1993 World Trade Center bombing by KSM’s nephew, Ramzi Yousef, █████████████████████████.
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On September 26, 2001, the CIA’s ALEC Station issued a cable on KSM and Ramzi Yousef that described extensive derogatory information on █████████████████████████████████████████████████████.
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The CIA officer who drafted the September 26, 2001, cable wrote an email that ████████████████████ were “associated with terrorists,” and that ████████████ “probably is a close associate of KSM.”
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In a separate email, the CIA officer wrote that, “at a minimum, we should go after” ██████████. Both emails were sent to CIA officers who, a few days later, would consider ██████████ ASSET X, a potential CIA source whose access to KSM through █████████████ was readily apparent.
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ASSET X came to the CIA’s attention in the spring of 2001 ██████████████████████████. However, CIA officers did not meet with ASSET X until after the September 11, 2001, attacks.
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On September 28, 2001, ALEC Station sent a cable ██████████████████████, noting that “[g]iven the events of 11 September . . . [w]e are very interested in exploring whatever information [ASSET X] may have with regard to terrorist plans by [UBL].”
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The CIA held its first meeting with ASSET X on ███████, 2001, at which time ASSET X indicated that he knew ███████████.
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The cable describing the first meeting states that “[ASSET X’s] knowledge ██████████████ appears to check out and demonstrates some degree of access/knowledge ████████████.”
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On ████████, 2001, the cable describing the first meeting with ASSET X was forwarded by the drafter of the September 26, 2001, cable on the derogatory information concerning ████████████ to a number of CTC officers in an email with the subject line: “Re: [ASSET X] Information Re
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.”
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The following day, the cable was forwarded again to CTC officers with the subject line: “Access to Khalid Shaykh Muhammad.”
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On
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, 2001, ASSET X held his second meeting with CIA officers, who described ASSET X as “very willing to clandestinely assist the USG as directed.”
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At the same meeting, ASSET X identified a photograph █████████████████.
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On ███████, 2001, CIA Headquarters wrote that the CIA would be “keenly interested” if ASSET X “can dig into the [KSM] ████████████████████.”
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In ███████████ 2001, ASSET X proposed multiple times to the CIA that CIA that he use his contacts to locate KSM through ██████████████████████—the same approach that would lead the CIA to KSM more than 15 months later.
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ASSET X also argued for “a more aggressive and proactive approach ██████████████,” but was eventually convinced by CIA officers to █████████████, instead.
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After ALEC Station rejected the CIA case officer’s recommended financial compensation for ASSET X, ASSET X declined to work with the CIA as a CIA source.
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Over the next nine months, the CIA continued to believe that ASSET X had the potential to develop information on KSM and his location, and sought, but was unable to reestablish contact with ASSET X.
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During this time, the CIA continued to collect intelligence on KSM’s ████████,
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and sought other opportunities to gain access to KSM through ███████.
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In July 2002, a detainee in foreign government custody provided extensive information on KSM’s █████ and confirmed that KSM was “very close” to █████████████ who “should know how to contact KSM.”
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When the CIA finally located and met again with ASSET X on ████████, 2002, ASSET X stated that “he could ███████████████████████ within a few weeks,” and was “willing to travel ██████████ to locate █████████.”
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ASSET X was recruited as a source by the CIA, but, despite his offer to track KSM’s █████████████, ASSET X was dispatched by the CIA to
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.
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.
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By the time ASSET X returned to ███████████ 2002,
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his previous CIA case officer “handler” there had departed for another CIA assignment ████. ASSET X was thus handled by a new CIA officer who was unfamiliar with ASSET X’s potential utility in tracking KSM.
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Seeking guidance on how to proceed with ASSET X, the new CIA case officer sent several cables to CIA Headquarters, which he later described as disappearing into a “black hole.” According to an interview of a CIA officer involved in the operation, the cables were being sent to a special compartment at CIA Headquarters which had been previously used by the team ███████████████████████████████. With the dispersal of that CIA team, however, the compartment was idle and no one at CIA Headquarters was receiving and reading the cables being sent to the special compartment.
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When the CIA case officer received no response to the cables he was sending to CIA Headquarters, he made preparations to terminate the CIA’s relationship with ASSET X. According to interviews, in █████ 2002, the CIA officer ██████████████████ and was on his way to meet ASSET X to terminate the asset’s relationship with the CIA. By chance, a CIA officer who had previously handled ASSET X ████████████ was visiting ███████████. This visiting CIA officer overheard the discussion between the chief of Base and the CIA case officer concerning the CIA’s termination of ASSET X as a CIA source. The discussion included names that ASSET X had been discussing with the case officer ██████—names that the visiting officer recognized ████████. The visiting CIA officer interceded and recommended that the CIA Base delay the termination of ASSET X as a CIA source.
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At the next meeting ASSET X again demonstrated that he had direct access to KSM’s ████████████████████.
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As a result, the CIA decided not to terminate ASSET X’s work as a CIA source.
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Shortly thereafter, in █████ 2003, ASSET X traveled on his own volition, and without prior discussion with the CIA, to
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, and █████ a face-to-face meeting with KSM. When ASSET X later informed CIA officers about his trip,
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direct access to KSM
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.
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The internal debate within the CIA continued, however, with the
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, and ASSET X and his CIA handlers urging the CIA to delay action and wait for an opportunity for ASSET X to locate KSM.
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ALEC Station initially supported immediate action to capture any KSM associate ASSET X could lead them to, before reversing its position on February ██, 2003.
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The next day, ASSET X arrived in Islamabad ████████████. ██████████████████████████████████████████, where he was surprised to find KSM. ██████████████, ASSET X ██████████████ sent a text message to his CIA handler stating: “I M W KSM.”
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, ASSET X contacted the CIA and conveyed what had just occurred.
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In an interview with the CIA’s Oral History Program, the CIA case officer described what had happened:
“We went around, you know,
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. [ASSET X] turns around to me and says, look I don’t know, I guess I’m nervous,
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. I said, ‘Look brother there are twenty five million frigging reasons why you need to find
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.’ That’s what the reward was. He looks at me and says, ‘I understand. I understand.’”
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Shortly thereafter, ASSET X found ██████ and, in the early morning hours of March 1, 2003, Pakistani authorities conducted a raid and captured KSM.
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On March █, 2003, KSM was rendered to CIA custody.
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5. The Capture of Majid Khan
The CIA represented that intelligence derived from the use of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques against CIA detainee KSM led to the capture of Majid Khan. These representations were inaccurate.
In multiple interviews with the CIA Office of Inspector General, CIA officers stated that “information from KSM led to the capture of [Majid] Kahn [
sic
],” and that “KSM gave us Majid Khan.”
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The deputy chief of ALEC Station and former KSM debriefer ██████ represented that KSM “provided information that helped lead to the arrest of . . . Majid Khan, an operative who could get into the U.S. easily.”
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The draft OIG Special Review repeated the representations of ████ and others, stating that KSM “provided information that helped lead to the arrests of terrorists including . . . Majid Khan, an operative who could enter the United States easily and was tasked to research attacks against U.S. water reservoirs.”
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On February 27, 2004, DDO James Pavitt submitted the CIA’s formal response to the draft Inspector General Special Review. Pavitt’s submission represented that Majid Khan was in custody “because of the information we were able lawfully to obtain from KSM.”
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The final, and now declassified, CIA Inspector General Special Review states that KSM “provided information that helped lead to the arrests of terrorists including . . . Majid Khan, an operative who could enter the United States easily and was tasked to research attacks . . . .”
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In its analysis of the legality of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques, the OLC relied on passages of the Inspector General’s Special Review that included this inaccurate representation.
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On July 29, 2003, CIA leadership met with select members of the National Security Council to obtain reaffirmation of the CIA interrogation program. The CIA stated that “detainees subject[ed] to the use of Enhanced Techniques of one kind or another had produced significant intelligence information that had, in the view of CIA professionals, saved lives.”
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Briefing slides provided by the CIA stated that “major threat” information was acquired, providing the “Identification of . . . the Majid Khan Family” by KSM as an example.
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The same slides were used, at least in part, for subsequent briefings.
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On September 16, 2003, a briefing was conducted for Secretary of State Colin Powell and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, the content of which was described as “virtually identical” to the July 29, 2003, briefing.
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The slides were also used in an October 7, 2003, briefing for Assistant Attorney General Jack Goldsmith.
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CIA records indicate that Majid Khan was identified and located prior to any reporting from KSM, There is no indication in CIA records that reporting from KSM—or any other CIA detainee—played any role in the identification and capture of Majid Khan.
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On January 10, 2003, the FBI’s Baltimore Field Office opened a full field international terrorism investigation on the email account “BobDesi(@)hotmail.com.” According to FBI investigative records, the investigation was “predicated upon information received through the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) concerning” a known al-Qa’ida email account that was already “under FTSA coverage ████.”
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Six days later, on January 16, 2003, open source research related to the “BobDesi” email account “revealed a personal website for the user, Majid Khan.”
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In February 2003, ████ was tracking Majid Khan’s Internet activity and was confident he was located at his brother’s house in Karachi, Pakistan.
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On March 4, 2003, ALEC Station noted that activity on an al-Qa’ida email account—associated with Khallad bin Attash—that was in contact with Majid Khan, had been dormant. ALEC Station recommended that
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move to capture Majid Khan in the hope that Majid Khan could lead CIA officers to Khallad bin Attash.
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The following morning, March 5, 2003, officers from Pakistan ███████ carried out a raid on Majid Khan’s brother’s house, detaining Majid Khan.
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