The Transfer Agreement (76 page)

As Wise uttered those words, he was really envisioning the orange deal. He was trying to rationalize the Transfer Agreement itself as a regrettable but understandable necessity. He quickly followed his warning with a qualification: "But it is only fair to add, the Reich makes its own laws. Those laws are ruthless .... What shall a Jew in Germany do if Germany says to him: You may go out, you may leave this Reich, ... you can leave this Hell ... but you can only take part of your money with you. The rest you must leave us for purchase of wares. You can leave on no other condition. I could understand the Jews in Germany [concluding] ... that if they cannot go to Eretz Yisrael any other way, they may as well go that way.
²⁷

"It may be that if you and I were in Germany, we too would pay the penalties which a ruthless, lawless Hitler government might exact from us. But I repeat there will be no patience ... for any Jew on earth if, for the sake of profit, he violates the will of the Jewish people and the dictates of human conscience by doing business with Germany!"
²⁸

Wise's condemnation, indeed the condemnation ofthe Jewish world, was provoked by disclosures about the orange deal and the Transfer Agreement. But in fact they were just two of literally dozens of major commercial arrangements being negotiated between Palestine and Germany even as Wise spoke. There were breweries, bakeries, steelworks, cement factories, irrigation systems, printing presses, medical facilities, and a host of other state building enterprises. Wise and the other protesters didn't really understand what was happening, or how fast.

S
EPTEMBER
7 was the day of decision for the Second World Jewish Conference. The tone was set by the first speaker at the morning plenary
session, E. Mazur of the Federation of Polish Jews. Mazur could barely control his rage as he cried, "The entire agreement agreed to by the Zionist
Exec, is a
schande
[in Yiddish, a shameful disgrace]. And this conference must issue a protest resolution against [both] the agreement and the negotiations .... The boycott is the only [defense) means at our disposal. Using it will prove that we still have the power to resist. [Therefore] the boycott must be organized in such a way that Jews will be morally unable to break it." The delegates warmly applauded.
¹

C.
Rasner, also of the Federation of Polish Jews, joined his colleague in condemning the agreements with Nazi Germany and urged the delegates to vote specific sanctions against them. "The agreements made by Zionists with Germany are a
schande,"
protested Rasner.
"If
the Zionist Congress did not have the courage to condemn them, that is its own business. We must do it—in the sharpest possible manner."
²

At this point Nahum Goldmann spoke up. As co-organizer of the World Jewish Congress, and as a major figure in the Zionist movement, Goldmann was a powerful voice at the conference. The day before, he had publicly confessed his failures at Prague, and then called for a world body dedicated to an international boycott, but things now were getting out of hand. Delegates were openly talking about binding resolutions of condemnation that would undoubtedly extend the boycott to the Zionist Organization itself if the transfer were not rescinded.

"I didn't have any intention of participating in this discussion," Goldmann said, "but I'm really forced to .... [Don't] interrupt me because I only have ten minutes [under the rules] .... Among the Jewish public an [anti-Zionist] campaign has started because of the agreement which was signed between a land settlement company in Palestine, which is a private company, and the German government .... Inasmuch as I am among those who had nothing to do with it, but who are one hundred percent in favor of it and are prepared to share the responsibility for it, let me say a few words on the subject—not to make converts ... but rather to clarify it for you and the Jewish public, which is here represented by the Jewish press. Unfortunately, this wasn't possible at the Zionist Congress.
³

"First of all," Goldmann explained, "the Zionist Organization has not signed any kind of agreement.
It
was not even involved in the negotiations. Hanotaiah made this agreement and a Zionist bank participated. The [Reich] foreign-currency management authority decided to permit an exception for Jews who emigrate to Palestine. This does
not
signify a breaking of the boycott. Boycott means throttling of exports from Germany and of the influx of payments into Germany. Here we are dealing with money which is
already
in Germany; thus when these goods are later sold, no additional money flows into Berlin."
⁴

Goldmann's rationales were not working. In desperation, he tried to make the conferees understand: "We are told we must make no deals with Germany. This is absurd! A people must be able to negotiate with any state in the
world, especially during a state of war. Think of the negotiations concerning prisoners of war in Switzerland between the warring nations .... What is involved here is that these people who are emigrating from Germany would otherwise become beggars."
⁵

But Goldmann's impassioned speech was not lessening their conviction that the Transfer Agreement would have to be stopped. A frustrated Goldmann, co-convener of the conference, flatly declared, "I am telling you that we will not permit this forum to be used for anti-Zionist maneuvers and I am asking you not to insist on resolutions which are directed against the Zionist Organization. The conference is to decide about the boycott question. But what has been done here [with the Transfer Agreement] was absolutely necessary and is not a crime."
⁶

The next delegate answered, "Contrary to the opinion of Dr. Goldmann, this conference
is
authorized to deal with the question of agreements with the German government because this subject is organically connected to the question of the boycott." Another delegate added, "Dr. Goldmann has forgotten to talk about the ... oranges of Palestine .... What will happen is this: There will be a store in Palestine which will be proclaiming boycott of German goods, and the store next door will be selling them!"
⁷

Dr. B. Mossinson of the Vaad Leumi, Jewish Palestine's national council, then stood to ask the delegates not to blame Palestine. Mossinson proclaimed that he was personally against the agreements, and Palestine as a whole was boycotting German merchandise vigorously. "This agreement was made by individuals," pleaded Mossinson, "and only individuals are guilty of breaking the boycott." Dr. Mordechai Nurock followed with a demand that "every traitor of the boycott must be designated a strikebreaker." Dr. Nurock used the term "strikebreaker" advisedly, since it was the term Mapai ascribed to Revisionists who sought employment outside the Histadrut combine.
⁸

Dr. Rosmarin, however, tried to end the discussion with reason and. understanding. "The boycott broke out spontaneously,'" he began. "Jewish public opinion started it earlier than did the politicians .... The leadership probably did not have the courage to proclaim the boycott publicly .... It is no secret for anybody that at the Zionist Congress there were great differences of opinion, but I have the courage as an organized Zionist to say from this platform that the boycott should have been proclaimed there.
⁹

"Yet even if we can understand the misgivings that existed there, there must not be any misgivings here," Dr. Rosmarin said.
"If
we had proclaimed the boycott three months ago, today there would be no disunity in public opinion. The Palestinian agreement hurts us because it hurts our dignity and it weakens the Jewish people in its fight.
¹⁰

"It
is obvious that the discussions ... have been passionate, but there are situations—moments in the life of people—when
no compromises
are possible. I am in agreement with those who have spoken against the transfer and ...
want to proclaim the boycott. I am asking you to not waste any more time with discussion. The matter has been decided. Let's concentrate on what we need for the boycott battle. Assistance, implementation, the activities of the various committees, and so on."
¹¹

Those in the hall instantly applauded Rosmarin's clarity, but Rosmarin's call was not heeded. Goldmann continued trying to persuade his fellow Jews not to break with the Zionist Organization. He also disclaimed the orange deal—which he openly condemned as profit-motivated and inexcusable. But to the end, he defended the Transfer Agreement as a historic Zionist obligation.
¹²

After many hours of discussion, much of it outside the formal sessions, the delegates made a decision. At some future date, Jewish elections would be held throughout the world, creating the desired democratic representative body. In the meantime, a so-called Central Jewish Committee would be appointed, probably headquartered in Paris or Geneva, comprised of ten or twelve Jewish leaders. This elite committee would immediately coordinate the boycott efforts of all Jewish organizations represented at the conference.
¹³
Presumably, this Central Jewish Committee would link up alternate suppliers with anxious buyers in the promised rerouting of world commerce around Germany, extend the consumer boycott from the major cities to provincial areas, and vigilantly oppose any barter or bilateral trade arrangements with the Nazis.

Later that day, after the delegates had struggled over the wording for hours, a boycott resolution was finally formulated. It called for a worldwide Jewish boycott to be coordinated by the Central Jewish Committee, so that ''the Jewish people may not abandon legitimate, honorable, and peaceful resistance to the war waged on the Jewish people." No mention was made in the resolution of the Zionist Organization's agreements with Germany, but commercial or other relations between Jews and Nazi Germany were expressly forbidden.
¹⁴
At this point, the chief rabbis of Rome and Florence walked out. They had been arguing on Mussolini's behalf against any boycott resolution at all. Having failed, they no longer wanted to be associated with the conference.
¹⁵
The other conferees remained, but few if any of them were certain about their decisions.

Formal general debate resumed at nine-thirty that night. The last speaker, at about
II :00 P.M.,
was Leo Motzkin, who issued a solemn appeal. He asked the boycotters to understand the Zionists who had negotiated the Transfer Agreement, asserting, "Even this step on the part of some Zionists, who in this way attempted to save as much German Jewish capital as possible, can be justified; we must not speak of treason against the Jewish people. You must understand this!
¹⁶

"Personally, I was one of those in Prague who was against this agreement. And my rationale was as follows. Despite the fact that in this manner thou
sands of Jews are saved and their move to Palestine is thereby made possible, it breaches Jewish solidarity .... But at the same time I must ask you to understand that this is really not a manifestation against Jewry."
¹⁷

Technically, the Transfer Agreement had been consigned by the Eighteenth Zionist Congress to the Actions Committee, which Motzkin chaired. His last words to the conference delegates that night were: "I have from the very beginning stated that this is a big mistake. I will attempt to keep this mistake from being made."
¹⁸
Motzkin had in fact decided to do all in his power to strike the agreement down at the next Actions Committee meeting, due to convene within weeks.

But Motzkin's appeal seemed ineffective. The conference's boycott resolution was on a collision course with the Zionist movement.
If
the Central Jewish Committee were established, it would extend its influence into Palestine, thus making sales of German merchandise there impossible. It would block foreign investment in transfer enterprises. It would quickly have an impact on the Anglo-Palestine Bank. A secondary boycott would ultimately extend to the Zionist Organization itself. And, of course, the resolution would bring into reality the consolidated global boycott Germany had feared, the avoidance of which was a prime motive in the Reich's cooperation with Palestine.

In short, there could be no Zionist solution to the German Jewish question, there could be no transfer, and there could be no Jewish State in the foreseeable future if the resolution creating a global boycott entity was implemented. The members of the resolutions committee were all good Jews, all good Zionists. The Zionist movement was in fact a major impetus in the formation of the World Jewish Congress. These men and women had never expected to have to choose between being good Jews and being good Zionists. But a choice was necessary.

A
T NOON
on Friday, September 8,
1933,
the delegates and reporters
gathered at the Salle Centrale. Divisive conflicts, painful delays, and Jewish communal chaos had preceded this moment. For six months, Stephen Wise had battled and baffled every boycott leader from Samuel Untermyer to Lord Melchett-always on the basis of the superior, decisive boycott organization that would emerge from this Geneva conference. All of Wise's organizational brinkmanship had been devoted to the achievement ofthis one moment.

The delegates and the world knew what to expect. Wise had thrilled the convention and the press in his keynote speech with promises to "organize,
organize,
ORGANIZE."
He had lectured on the inadvisability and uselessness of a "spontaneous" boycott. He had identified international structure as the missing ingredient needed to make the anti-Hitler boycott triumphant. Now came the moment when the global boycott entity was to be announced.