The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History (102 page)

German doctors on the growth on Kim’s neck, former East German diplomat, interview, September 10, 1994. Kim’s 1992 luncheon troubles, former ROK official, October 1994. Taylor’s assessment of Kim’s health, “Report on Bill Taylor’s Third Trip
to North Korea, 23–29 June 1992,” unpublished manuscript supplied by Taylor. Kim’s “good for another ten years” quote, Cho Kap Che, “The Information War with North Korea,”
Monthly Chosun
(September 1990), in Korean. Kim to Carter on living another ten years, David Sanger, “Kim Il Sung Dead at 82,”
NYT
, July 9, 1994.

Reactions to Kim’s death, conversation with a senior North Korean official in Pyongyang in January 1995; see also ‘“Enormous Crowds’ at Monument” from the Kyodo News Agency and ‘“Mass Hysteria’ in Pyongyang” from the Polish Press Agency, published in
FBIS-EAS
, July 11, 1994. Flanigan’s e-mail on North Koreans “here to deal,” Flanigan interview, August 31, 1995. On KBS film incident, Sohn Tae Soo, “Some TV Programs on Kim Il Sung Draw Fire,”
KH
, July 13, 1994.

On the inappropriateness of the release of the documents, Russian diplomat, interview, March 27, 1995. On the DPRK reaction to the Seoul postdeath events, Steve Glain, “Turmoil Marks Relations Between Pyongyang, Seoul,”
Asian Wall Street Journal
, August 15, 1994. Chung quote to Lake on the DPRK collapse, US official, interview, December 11, 1996.

The Succession of Kim Jong Il
:
Kim Jong Il in Berlin on his father’s train, former East German official, interview, June 10, 1994. On Kim Jong Il’s birth date, Aiden Foster-Carter has written that Kim Jong Il was actually born a year earlier than acknowledged, in 1941, but his age was adjusted to make him exactly thirty years younger than his father. Aiden Foster-Carter, “Birth of a Legend,”
Far Eastern Economic Review
(February 21, 1991).

Cumings “corporate and family state” quote, Bruce Cumings, “The Corporate State in North Korea,” in
State and Society in Contemporary Korea
, edited by Hagen Koo (Cornell University Press, 1993). DPRK dictionary on hereditary succession, Kong Dan Oh,
Leadership Change in North Korean Politics
(Rand, October 1998), 10.

About the filmmakers, some in South Korea and elsewhere have raised doubts about the credibility of Choi and Shin, but they returned with photographs and tape recordings of themselves with Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il that have been accepted by US and ROK intelligence as authentic. I had three meetings with them, the first shortly after their escape through Vienna, and I believe they are credible. My report here is based in part on my three interviews with the couple for the
Washington Post
in the mid-1980s. The quotes are from Choi Eun Hee and Shin Sang Ok, “Kidnapped to the North Korean Paradise,” unpublished manuscript (English translation of their Korean book), 246.

On Kim Jong Il’s connection to the Rangoon bombing, Joseph Bermudez,
Terrorism: The North Korean Connection
(Crane Russak, 1990), 9. The East German report on Kim Jong Il’s “modem” tendencies, “Information About Current Features in Some of North Korea’s Cultural Areas,” Embassy of the GDR, June 9, 1982,
SED Archives
. The Kim Jong Il quotes are from the filmmakers’ tape recording published by
Monthly Chosun
(October 1995), in Korean.

The Framework Negotiations
:
This section is primarily based on interviews with Gallucci and several other members of the US negotiating team. Carlin on Kang’s failure to say “never,” Carlin interview, November 7, 1994. Carlin “game was over” quote, Carlin interview, November 26, 1995. Gallucci on “Talmudic significance,” Gallucci interview, October 8, 1996.

The Kim Jong Il Regime
:
Hubbard discussions in Pyongyang, Hubbard interview, January 6, 1995. DOD cable on heavy oil, Joint Staff, Washington, DC, cable, “Subject: Delivery of Heavy Residual Fuel Oil to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea,” January 14, 1995, unclassified.

The Struggle over the Reactors
:
“We opted for solidarity,” White House official, interview, October 21, 1996. Luck’s cable to Perry, Pentagon official, interview, August 31, 1995.

C
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15: N
ORTH
K
OREA IN
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RISIS

Shalikashvili quote on “implode or explode,” Mary Jordan, “Speculation Grows on Demise of N. Korea,”
WR
, April 6, 1996. For the North Korean rainfall figures, “Pyongyang Media Report on Flood to Get Aid,”
Vantage Point
(Seoul, September 1995). Also, “FAO/WFP Crop and Food Supply Assessment Mission to DPRK,” FAO, Rome, December 1995. Trevor Page quotes, Pierre Antoine Donnet, “Widespread Signs of Famine in North Korea: U.N. Official,”
KH
, December 6, 1996. Floods “made situation worse,” “FAO/WFP Crop and Food Supply Assessment Mission to DPRK.”

The DPRK request to supply grain secretly, Suh Dong Kwan interview, October 28, 1993. Quotes on Kim Young Sam as the man to bring down the DPRK, a prominent South Korean, interview, November 25, 1996. Laney quote on Kim Young Sam, interview, June 27, 1996. For details of DMZ incursions, Oh Young Jin, “Heavily Armed NK Troops Enter JSA in Panmunjom,”
KT
, April 7, 1996.

Disbanding of Sixth KPA corps, curtailment of winter exercises, US intelligence officials, interview, November 1, 1996. On impact of DMZ incursions on election, Sun Phil Kwon, “Policy Issues in the 1996 General Election,”
Korea Observer
(Spring 1997). Adrian Buzo quote from his article “The DPRK and Late De-Stalinization,”
Korean Journal of National Unification
4 (1995).

Political Earthquake in Seoul
:
The account of the inception of the scandal is from an interview with Park Kye Dong, June 25, 1996. On Roh’s postscandal unpopularity, “Roh Named as Most Hated Politician: Poll,”
KH
, November 19, 1995. Kukje episode, Sam Jameson, “Fall of Kukje Corporation Illustrates South Korea’s Corruption,”
KT
reprint of
Los Angeles Times
, November 19, 1995.

Chung Ju Yung’s revelation and Roh’s response are reported in Park Byeong Seog, “Political Corruption in South Korea: Concentrating on the Dynamics of Party Politics,”
Asian Perspective
(Spring–Summer 1995): 172.

Summit Diplomacy and the Four-Party Proposal
:
My account of the 1995 and 1996 diplomacy is based on interviews with four US officials who were involved. For Kim Young Sam quote to Clinton about August 15, US official, interview, August 14, 1996. “We thought we’d done enough,” US official, interview, May 8, 1996.

Chinese response to four-way-talks proposal, “Jiang Sends Letter to Kim to Support 4-Way Peace Talks,”
KT
, May 22, 1996. On the Kissinger proposal of peace talks and others along this line, see Kim Hak Joon,
Unification Policies of South and North Korea, 1945–1991
(Seoul National University Press, 1992), 371ff. The UN special alert, “WFP Warns North Korea Food Situation Deteriorating Sharply,” press release and report of World Food Program, United Nations, May 13, 1996. Contrast in South Korea, “One in Four Koreans Is on Diet: Survey,”
KH
, April 9, 1996.

The Submarine Incursion
:
For details on the submarine incident, see “Chronology of Events Surrounding Incursion on the Territory of the ROK by North Koreans,” information office of the ROK Embassy, Washington, October 4, 1996, and reporting in
KH
and
KT
. The 1976 quote on infiltration,
USFK Hist. 1976
, 53, Secret (declassified 1995).

On DPRK submarines, “PRC Magazine on DPRK’s Submarine Strength,”
FBIS-EAS
, February 21, 1995, 36. Kim Young Sam quotes on submarine incident, Shim Jae Hoon, “Submarine Shocker,”
Far Eastern Economic Review
(October 3, 1996);
Chon Shi Yong, “Kim Sees ‘Possibility of War,’”
KH
, October 8, 1996. Kevin Sullivan’s interview with Kim Young Sam, “S. Korea Demands Apology from North; Kim Suspends Nuclear Deal After Sub Incident,”
WP
, November 9, 1996. Initial DPRK announcement, “Statement by a Spokesman for North Korea’s Armed Forces Ministry,” September 23, 1996,
Korea and World Affairs
(Fall 1996): 516.

Plunk quotes from senior ROK official, “No Way to Deal with North Korea,”
WP
, September 29, 1996; and Plunk telephone interview, February 6, 1997. Revelation about unilateral attack plans, “ROK Ready to Hit 12 DPRK Targets in Event of Attack,”
FBIS-EAS
, October 16, 1996. Kristof’s article in the wake of the submarine incursion, “How a Stalled Submarine Sank North Korea’s Hopes,”
NYT
, November 19, 1996.

US-ROK discussions on unilateral military action, from confidential interviews in Seoul and Washington with officials involved. Tilelli on “complete” satisfaction, Tilelli interview, April 22, 1997.

North Korea’s Steep Decline
:
Song Young Dae on “stability within instability,” his article “Changes in North Korea and How to Respond,”
Korea Focus
(January–February 1997). I also interviewed Song in Seoul, April 22, 1997. The Kim Jong Il speech of December 7, 1996, was published by
Monthly Chosun
in March 1997. My English translation was from the BBC, March 21, 1997. I learned that Hwang Jang Yop was the source of the speech from Kim Yong Sam, the
Monthly Chosun
reporter who obtained it, and whom I interviewed April 16, 1997.

Tilelli quotes from Tilelli interview, April 22, 1997. China customs data for food, fuel from US Institute of Peace, Special Report on Korea, June 1998.

Kim Jong Il’s military and nonmilitary activities in 1996 are listed in
Vantage Point
(Seoul, December 1996 and January 1997). The Tilelli quotes are from the Tilelli interview, April 22, 1997.

The Passage of Hwang Jang Yop
:
This section is based largely on Hwang’s letters and other documents provided to
Monthly Chosun
reporter Kim Yong Sam by intermediary Lee Yon Kil and published after Hwang’s defection. It is also based on interviews with Kim Yong Sam on April 16, 1997; with Hajime Izumi on March 8, 1997; and with Songhee Stella Kim on April 23, 1997; and on Kim Yong Sam’s retrospective article in
Monthly Chosun
in June 1997.

The phone call to set up the defection from interview with a senior ROK official, April 21, 1997. Hwang’s letter written in the South Korean Consulate was released by the ROK Foreign Ministry, February 13, 1997.

On “Red Banner philosophy,” see “Red Banner Philosophy as Kim Jong Il’s Ruling Tool,”
Vantage Point
(Seoul, March 1997). Hwang’s views as expressed in the Moscow meeting of February 1996 are from the Izumi interview, March 8, 1997.

The Two Koreas in Time of Trouble
:
South Korean economic data from Korea Economic Institute of America. North Korea in eighth year of economic decline,
Vantage Point
(Seoul, July 1998), quoting the Bank of Korea (Seoul). IMF report on North Korea, confidential, prepared by Asia and Pacific Department, IMF, November 12, 1997. US Census estimates from Nicholas Eberstadt.

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NGAGEMENT

Into the Heavens, Under the Earth
:
Satellite launch data from KCNA, September 4, 1998. Sanger’s article “North Korea Site an A-bomb Plant, U.S. Agencies Say,”
NYT
, August 17, 1998. Livingston quotes from the
WP
, September 1, 1998.

Toward an Aid-Eased State
:
The new DPRK cabinet, from Yoo Young-ku,
Vantage Point
(Seoul, March 1999).

Perry to the Rescue
and
Engaging the United States
:
These sections are based in part on interviews with William J. Perry, Madeleine Albright, Wendy Sherman, Charles Kartman, Robert Einhorn, and other US officials. Vice Marshal Jo’s bio is from
Vantage Point
(Seoul, March 1999) and ROK press reports.

Summit in Pyongyang
:
Translated text of Joint Declaration from ROK Embassy, Washington, March 23, 2001. Kim Dae Jung quote on one people,
Financial Times
, July 16, 2000.

C
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HE
E
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OF THE
A
GREED
F
RAMEWORK

The observations on George Bush are in John Bolton,
Surrender Is Not an Option
(Threshold Editions, 2008), 99.

A Rocky Start
:
For Lim’s trip to Washington in February 2001, see Lim Dong-won,
Peacemaker
(Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center, 2012), 266–268.

The
Rodong Sinmun
article was carried by the Korean Central News Agency, “Our Principle Position Regarding Issue of DPRK-US Relations,” November 7, 2000.

A version of Secretary of State Powell’s misstep is in Karen De Young,
Soldier: The Life of Colin Powell
(Vintage Books, 2007), 324–326. For an account of the Bush-Kim meeting, see “At White House, Kim Hears U.S. Hard Line on Pyongyang: Bush Tells Korean He Distrusts North,”
www.nytimes.com/2001/03/08/news/08iht-kim.2.t.html
.

The Impact of 9/11
:
North Korea’s terrorist acts include assassination attempts against the ROK president, blowing up a South Korean airliner, and support for groups the United States considered terrorists (others considered them “freedom fighters”). By the late 1990s, North Korea had pulled back from supporting (funding or training) such groups and was no longer seen as active on the terrorist front. Discussions started between the State Department’s Counterterrorism Office and the North Koreans to deal with lingering US concerns.