The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History (103 page)

The October 6, 2000, US-DPRK joint statement on terrorism says: “As a demonstration of their cooperation in the fight against international terrorism, the US and the DPRK intend to exchange information regarding international terrorism and to resolve outstanding issues in this regard between the two sides.” The statement also states: “On the basis of their common concerns about the threat of terrorism to international peace and stability, the two sides underscored their commitment to support the international legal regime combating international terrorism and to cooperate with each other in taking effective measures to fight against terrorism. The sides shared the view that such measures included not providing material support or resources, including safehaven, to terrorists and terrorist groups, bringing terrorists to justice, and fighting terrorist acts against the safety of civil aviation and maritime navigation.” Any one of these points might have been laid before the North Koreans as a way they could demonstrate their seriousness in cooperating on an issue that had suddenly leaped to the very top of Washington’s priorities. Whether the North actually had any useful information about those responsible for the 9/11 attacks is another question.

Threads Come Together: Japan–North Korea Talks
:
For a detailed account of the secret Japan-DPRK talks and the resulting September 2002 summit, see Yoichi Funabashi,
The Peninsula Question
(Brookings Institution Press, 2007), 1–49. The operative sections of the Japan-DPRK Pyongyang Declaration issued after the summit read:

        
1. Both sides determined that, pursuant to the spirit and basic principles laid out in this Declaration, they would make every possible effort for an
early normalization of the relations, and decided that they would resume the Japan DPRK normalization talks in October 2002.

        
Both sides expressed their strong determination that they would sincerely tackle outstanding problems between Japan and the DPRK based upon their mutual trust in the course of achieving the normalization.

        
2. The Japanese side regards, in a spirit of humility, the facts of history that Japan caused tremendous damage and suffering to the people of Korea through its colonial rule in the past, and expressed deep remorse and heartfelt apology.

        
Both sides shared the recognition that, providing economic co-operation after the normalization by the Japanese side to the DPRK side, including grant aids, long-term loans with low interest rates and such assistances as humanitarian assistance through international organizations, over a period of time deemed appropriate by both sides, and providing other loans and credits by such financial institutions as the Japan Bank for International Co-operation with a view to supporting private economic activities, would be consistent with the spirit of this Declaration, and decided that they would sincerely discuss the specific scales and contents of the economic cooperation in the normalization talks.

        
Both sides, pursuant to the basic principle that when the bilateral relationship is normalized both Japan and the DPRK would mutually waive all their property and claims and those of their nationals that had arisen from causes which occurred before August 15, 1945, decided that they would discuss this issue of property and claims concretely in the normalization talks.

        
Both sides decided that they would sincerely discuss the issue of the status of Korean residents in Japan and the issue of cultural property.

        
3. Both sides confirmed that they would comply with international law and would not commit conducts threatening the security of the other side. With respect to the outstanding issues of concern related to the lives and security of Japanese nationals, the DPRK side confirmed that it would take appropriate measures so that these regrettable incidents, that took place under the abnormal bilateral relationship, would never happen in the future.

        
4. Both sides confirmed that they would co-operate with each other in order to maintain and strengthen the peace and stability of North East Asia. Both sides confirmed the importance of establishing co-operative relationships based upon mutual trust among countries concerned in this region, and shared the recognition that it is important to have a framework in place in order for these regional countries to promote confidence-building, as the relationships among these countries are normalized.

        
Both sides confirmed that, for an overall resolution of the nuclear issues on the Korean Peninsula, they would comply with all related international agreements. Both sides also confirmed the necessity of resolving security problems including nuclear and missile issues by promoting dialogues among countries concerned. The DPRK side expressed its intention that, pursuant to the spirit of this Declaration, it would further maintain the moratorium on missile launching in and after 2003.

        
Both sides decided that they would discuss issues relating to security.

An official text of the document is found on
www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/n_korea/pmv0209/pyongyang.html
.

Slouching Toward the Cliff
:
The North’s unusually fast apology is described in Lim,
Peacemaker
, 320.

The colorful expressions of the potential for ending the Agreed Framework are in Bolton,
Surrender Is Not an Option
, 106–107.

Cheating
is a loaded word, and the State Department lawyers who helped draft the Agreed Framework laugh at the thought that by developing an enrichment capability, the North was “cheating.” The 1994 agreement was silent on enrichment, except for the thin reed of a reference to the 1992 North-South joint statement, which was already at a dead end. For practical reasons, Ambassador Gallucci wanted to include only those activities in the Agreed Framework that the United States could monitor, and enrichment was not one of them. Going down the enrichment path may have been a monumental miscalculation by Kim Jong Il. It was very typical of the North Korean propensity to hedge and exploit the seams. To call it “cheating” put the situation into a legal and moral box where it became more difficult to resolve—and where the administration’s hard-liners were happy to have it.

Kim Jong Il’s Progress
:
A discussion of Kim Jong Il’s July 2002 measures and the debate they set off in North Korea is in Robert L. Carlin and Joel S. Wit, “North Korean Reform: Politics, Economics, and Security,”
Adelphi Paper
382 (July 2006): 35–52.

An account of Chinese reaction to the Sinuiju SAR is in “Does Beijing Back North Korea SAR?,”
South China Morning Post
,
www.scmp.com/article/392912/does-beijing-back-north-korea-sar
.

The Unquiet Americans
:
For a discussion of the “bold approach,” see Charles L. Pritchard,
Failed Diplomacy
(Brookings Institution Press, 2007), 25.

For a description of the Kelly-Kang meeting, see Pritchard,
Failed Diplomacy
, 37–39. Also see Mike Chinoy,
Meltdown: The Inside Story of the North Korean Nuclear Crisis
(St. Martin’s Press, 2008), 120–124.

The Morning After
:
Seoul’s advice to Pyongyang after the Kelly visit is in Lim,
Peacemaker
, 341.

Bolton’s view on what to do if the Agreed Framework collapses is in Bolton,
Surrender Is Not an Option
, 115.

C
HAPTER
18: T
ROUBLE IN THE
US-ROK A
LLIANCE

Problems for Diplomacy
:
For Rumsfeld’s description of his thinking on a coup, see Donald Rumsfeld,
Known and Unknown: A Memoir
(Sentinel, 2011), 642.

The vice president’s thoughts on history are in Richard Cheney,
In My Time
(Threshold Editions, 2011), 493.

Sunshine, Barely
:
The upsurge in anti-US demonstrations and threats to individual American soldiers was a serious concern, especially so because Washington felt the ROK government was not doing enough to tamp down the emotions. For Hubbard’s views, see chapter 9 in
Ambassadors’ Memoirs: U.S.-Korea Relations Through the Eyes of the Ambassadors
(Korea Economic Institute, 2009).

Moon Jae-in granted a long interview for this book in March 2012, contributing to a more balanced view of Roh Moo-hyun.

The episode about the “nuclear umbrella” was clarified through interviews with several participants from both sides.

Tensions Rise
:
The North’s first mention of the incident with the US reconnaissance plane was in a
Rodong Sinmun
commentary entitled “Whom Are You Daring to
Challenge?” on March 10, 2003.

The Six-Party Mirage
:
Rice’s recollection of her advice is in Condoleezza Rice,
No Higher Honor: A Memoir of My Years in Washington
(Crown, 2011), 248. An informed view of the early debate in China is in John W. Lewis and Robert L. Carlin,
Negotiating with North Korea, 1992–2007
(Center for International Security and Cooperation, Stanford University, January 2008).

An account of the talks with Jiang is in George Bush,
Decision Points
(Broadway Paperbacks, 2010), 424. Beijing has at various times over the years told Washington that North Korea was not a Chinese but a US problem to solve. Since 2002 the Americans have put most of their eggs in China’s basket. So far, nothing has hatched. It might be well to remember that the Chinese have a dish called thousand-year-old eggs.

Nuclear Peek-a-Boo
:
See the DPRK Foreign Ministry spokesman’s statement of January 10, 2004. For whatever reason, the Foreign Ministry is very concerned with consistency and, to a certain extent, credibility. One thing North Korean diplomats do not like is to be told that they have reversed their position without warning, or that they are contradicting themselves. They prefer being able to say they gave warning of where Pyongyang was thinking of moving—and much of the time, that is so. In 2010, asked why they had shown their enrichment facility at Yongbyon to a group of visiting Americans, the answer was, “No one believed us when we said in 2009 that we were going to do it, so we had to make clear we meant what we said.” See Siegfried S. Hecker,
A Return Trip to North Korea’s Yongbyon Nuclear Complex
(Center for International Security and Cooperation, Stanford University, November 20, 2010),
http://iis-db.stanford.edu/pubs/23035/HeckerYongbyon.pdf
.

A Year of Zigzags
:
For an account of Prime Minister Koizumi’s discussions in Pyongyang in 2004, see Funabashi,
The Peninsula Question
, 53.

Various high-level North-South discussions in Pyongyang in June 2005 are covered in Lim,
Peacemaker
, 368.

The instructions to the US delegation not to give an inch on the LWR issue at the six-party talks in the summer of 2005 were explained in interviews with participants from several of the parties to the talks.

The North Korean delegation’s reaction to the final American statement is described in Victor Cha,
The Impossible State
(Ecco, 2012), 263–264. Pyongyang’s official response the following day came in the form of a Foreign Ministry spokesman’s “press statement” whose full text was carried in English by the North’s press agency, KCNA.

The Treasury Department’s press release on Section 311 of the PATRIOT Act can be found at
www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/tgl591.aspx
.

In interviews, explanations of why and how the decision was made in July 2005 to move ahead with the Treasury action are all over the map. All of them seem to agree, at least implicitly, on one key point—that whether this action would jeopardize the chances for positive developments on the diplomatic track ended up being of secondary consideration.

The End of KEDO
:
A detailed oral history of KEDO can be found in Charles Kartman, Robert Carlin, and Joel Wit,
A History of KEDO
(Center for International Cooperation and Security, Stanford University, 2012).

Traction, at Last
:
Pyongyang’s decision to cancel its unilateral moratorium on missile launches was included in a lengthy DPRK Foreign Ministry memorandum dated March 2, 2005, carried in full by KCNA the next day. On the issue of the missile moratorium, it said, “We are also not bound to any international treaty or law as
far as the missile issue is concerned. Some forces claim that the DPRK’s moratorium on the missile launch still remains valid. In September 1999, the period of the previous U.S. administration, we announced the moratorium on the missile launch while dialogue was under way but the DPRK-U.S. dialogue was totally suspended when the Bush administration took office in 2001. Accordingly, we are not bound to the moratorium on the missile launch at present.”

The UN Security Council resolution adopted after the launch, Security Council Condemns Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s Missile Launches, Unanimously Adopting Resolution 1695 (2006), is found on
www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2006/sc8778.doc
.

Rumble in Punggye
:
The president’s instructions to Hill are noted in Chinoy,
Meltdown
, 283.

See Cha,
The Impossible State
, 266, for the quote from the Beijing dinner.

C
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19: T
HE
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MPEROR’S
N
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LOTHES