How vain are human calculations of self-interest! Rarely has there been a more convincing example. Admiral Darlan had but to sail in any one of his ships to any port outside France to become the master of all French interests beyond German control. He would not have come like General de Gaulle with only an unconquerable heart and a few kindred spirits. He would have carried with him outside the German reach the fourth Navy in the world, whose officers and men were personally devoted to him. Acting thus, Darlan would have become the chief of the French Resistance with a mighty weapon in his hand. British and American dockyards and arsenals would have been at his disposal for the maintenance of his fleet. The French gold reserve in the United States would have assured him, once recognised, of ample resources. The whole French Empire would have rallied to him. Nothing could have prevented him from being the Liberator of France. The fame and power which he so ardently desired were in his grasp. Instead, he went forward through two years of worrying and ignominious office to a violent death, a dishonoured grave, and a name long to be execrated by the French Navy and the nation he had hitherto served so well.
* * * * *
There is a final note which should be struck at this point. In a letter which Darlan wrote to me on December 4, 1942,
1
just three weeks before his assassination, he vehemently claimed that he had kept his word. As this letter states his case and should be on record, I print it at the end of this chapter. It cannot be disputed that no French ship was ever manned by the Germans or used against us by them in the war. This was not entirely due to Admiral Darlan’s measures; but he had certainly built up in the minds of the officers and men of the French Navy that at all costs their ships should be destroyed before being seized by the Germans, whom he disliked as much as the English.
* * * * *
Those of us who were responsible at the summit in London understood the physical structure of our island strength and were sure of the spirit of the nation. The confidence with which we faced the immediate future was not founded, as was commonly supposed abroad, upon audacious bluff or rhetorical appeal, but upon a sober consciousness and calculation of practical facts. When I spoke in the House of Commons, I founded myself upon realities which I and others had carefully studied – some for many years. I will presently analyse in detail the invasion problem as I and my expert advisers saw it in these memorable days. But first of all there was one step to take. It was obvious, and it was dire.
The addition of the French Navy to the German and Italian Fleets, with the menace of Japan measureless upon the horizon, confronted Great Britain with mortal dangers and gravely affected the safety of the United States. Article 8 of the Armistice prescribed that the French Fleet, except that part left free for safeguarding French Colonial interests, “shall be collected in ports to be specified and there demobilised and disarmed under German or Italian control.” It was therefore clear that the French war vessels would pass into that control while fully armed. It was true that in the same article the German Government solemnly declared that they had no intention of using them for their own purposes during the war. But who in his senses would trust the word of Hitler after his shameful record and the facts of the hour? Furthermore, the article excepted from this assurance “those units necessary for coast surveillance and mine-sweeping.” The interpretation of this lay with the Germans. Finally, the Armistice could at any time be voided on any pretext of non-observance. There was in fact no security for us at all. At all costs, at all risks, in one way or another, we must make sure that the Navy of France did not fall into wrong hands, and then perhaps bring us and others to ruin.
The War Cabinet never hesitated. Those Ministers who, the week before, had given their whole hearts to France and offered common nationhood, resolved that all necessary measures should be taken. This was a hateful decision, the most unnatural and painful in which I have ever been concerned. It recalled the episode of the destruction of the Danish Fleet in Copenhagen Harbour by Nelson in 1801; but now the French had been only yesterday our dear allies, and our sympathy for the misery of France was sincere. On the other hand, the life of the State and the salvation of our cause were at stake. It was Greek tragedy. But no act was ever more necessary for the life of Britain and for all that depended upon it. I thought of Danton in 1793: “The coalesced Kings threaten us, and we hurl at their feet as a gage of battle the head of a King.” The whole event was in this order of ideas.
* * * * *
The French Navy was disposed in the following manner: Two battleships, four light cruisers (or
contre-torpilleurs),
some submarines, including a very large one, the
Surcouf,
eight destroyers, and about two hundred smaller but valuable minesweeping and anti-submarine craft, lay for the most part at Portsmouth and Plymouth. These were in our power. At Alexandria there were a French battleship, four French cruisers, three of them modern eight-inch cruisers, and a number of smaller ships. These were covered by a strong British battle squadron. At Oran, at the other end of the Mediterranean, and at its adjacent military port of Mers-el-Kebir, were two of the finest vessels of the French fleet, the
Dunkerque
and the
Strasbourg,
modern battle cruisers much superior to the
Scharnhorst
and
Gneisenau
and built for the express purpose of being superior to them. These vessels in German hands on our trade routes would have been most disagreeable. With them were two French battleships, several light cruisers, and a number of destroyers, submarines, and other vessels. At Algiers were seven cruisers, of which four were eight-inch armed, and at Martinique an aircraft-carrier and two light cruisers. At Casablanca lay the
Jean Bart,
newly arrived from Saint Nazaire, but without her guns. This was one of the key ships in the computation of world naval strength. It was unfinished, and could not be finished at Casablanca. It must not go elsewhere. The
Richelieu,
which was far nearer completion, had reached Dakar. She could steam, and her fifteen-inch guns could fire. There were many other French ships of minor importance in various ports. Finally, at Toulon a number of warships were beyond our reach. “Operation Catapult” comprised the simultaneous seizure, control, or effective disablement or destruction of all the accessible French Fleet.
Prime Minister to General Ismay.
1.VII.40.
1. The Admiralty are retaining
Nelson
and her four destroyers in home waters, and “Operation Catapult” should go forward, aiming at daybreak the 3d.2. During the night of 2d/3d all necessary measures should be taken at Portsmouth and Plymouth, at Alexandria, and if possible at Martinique, on the same lines as Catapult. The reactions to these measures at Dakar and Casablanca must be considered, and every precaution taken to prevent the escape of valuable units.
On account of the pressure of events, I added also:
The Admiralty should endeavour to raise the flotillas in the narrow seas to a strength of forty destroyers, with additional cruiser support. An effort should be made to reach this strength during the next two or three days and hold it for the following fortnight, when the position can be reviewed. The losses in the Western approaches must be accepted meanwhile. I should like also a daily return of the numbers of craft on patrol or available between Portsmouth and the Tyne.
* * * * *
On the night of July 3, all the French vessels at Portsmouth and Plymouth were taken under British control. The action was sudden and necessarily a surprise. Overwhelming force was employed, and the whole transaction showed how easily the Germans could have taken possession of any French warships lying in ports which they controlled. In Britain the transfer, except in the
Surcouf,
was amicable, and the crews came willingly ashore. In the
Surcouf
two British officers were wounded, one leading seaman killed and an able seaman wounded. One Frenchman was killed in the scuffle, but the utmost endeavours were made with success to reassure and comfort the French sailors. Many hundreds volunteered to join us. The
Surcouf,
after rendering distinguished service, perished on February 19, 1942, with all her gallant French crew.
* * * * *
The deadly stroke was in the Western Mediterranean. Here, at Gibraltar, Vice-Admiral Somerville with “Force H,” consisting of the battle cruiser
Hood,
the battleships
Valiant
and
Resolution,
the aircraft-carrier
Ark Royal,
two cruisers and eleven destroyers, received orders sent from the Admiralty at 2.25
A.M
. on July 1:
Be prepared for “Catapult” July 3.
Among Somerville’s officers was Captain Holland, a gallant and distinguished officer, lately Naval Attaché in Paris and with keen French sympathies, who was influential. In the early afternoon of July 1 the Vice-Admiral telegraphed:
After talk with Holland and others Vice-Admiral “Force H” is impressed with their view that the use of force should be avoided at all costs. Holland considers offensive action on our part would alienate all French wherever they are.
To this the Admiralty replied at 6.20
P.M
.:
Firm intention of H.M.G. that if French will not accept any of your alternatives they are to be destroyed.
Shortly after midnight (1.08
A.M
., July 2) Admiral Somerville was sent the following carefully conceived text of the communication to be made to the French Admiral:
It is impossible for us, your comrades up to now, to allow your fine ships to fall into the power of the German or Italian enemy. We are determined to fight on to the end, and if we win, as we think we shall, we shall never forget that France was our Ally, that our interests are the same as hers, and that our common enemy is Germany. Should we conquer, we solemnly declare that we shall restore the greatness and territory of France. For this purpose, we must make sure that the best ships of the French Navy are not used against us by the common foe. In these circumstances, His Majesty’s Government have instructed me to demand that the French Fleet now at Mers-el-Kebir and Oran shall act in accordance with one of the following alternatives:
(a)
Sail with us and continue to fight for victory against the Germans and Italians.(b)
Sail with reduced crews under our control to a British port. The reduced crews will be repatriated at the earliest moment.If either of these courses is adopted by you, we will restore your ships to France at the conclusion of the war or pay full compensation, if they are damaged meanwhile.
(c)
Alternatively, if you feel bound to stipulate that your ships should not be used against the Germans or Italians unless these break the Armistice, then sail them with us with reduced crews to some French port in the West Indies – Martinique, for instance – where they can be demilitarised to our satisfaction, or perhaps be entrusted to the United States and remain safe until the end of the war, the crews being repatriated.If you refuse these fair offers, I must, with profound regret, require you to sink your ships within six hours.
Finally, failing the above, I have the orders of His Majesty’s Government to use whatever force may be necessary to prevent your ships from falling into German or Italian hands.
In the evening of the 2d, I requested the Admiralty to send the Vice-Admiral the following message (despatched 10.55
P.M
.):
You are charged with one of the most disagreeable and difficult tasks that a British Admiral has ever been faced with, but we have complete confidence in you and rely on you to carry it out relentlessly.
The Admiral sailed at daylight and was off Oran at about 9.30. He sent Captain Holland himself in a destroyer to wait upon the French Admiral Gensoul. After being refused an interview, Holland sent by messengers the document already quoted. Admiral Gensoul replied in writing that in no case would the French warships be allowed to fall intact into German and Italian hands, and that force would be met with force.
All day negotiations continued, Captain Holland waiting in his destroyer off the boom. The distress of the British Admiral and his principal officers was evident to us from the signals which had passed. Nothing but the most direct orders compelled them to open fire on those who had been so lately their comrades. At the Admiralty also there was manifest emotion. But there was no weakening in the resolve of the War Cabinet. I sat all the afternoon in the Cabinet Room in frequent contact with my principal colleagues and the First Lord and First Sea Lord. A final signal was despatched at 6.26
P.M
.
French ships must comply with our terms or sink themselves or be sunk by you before dark.
But the action had already begun. At 5.54 Admiral Somerville opened fire upon this powerful French fleet, which was also protected by its shore batteries. At 6.0
P.M
. he reported that he was heavily engaged. The bombardment lasted for some ten minutes, and was followed by heavy attacks by our naval aircraft, launched from the
Ark Royal.
The battleship
Bretagne
was blown up. The
Dunkerque
ran aground. The battleship
Provence
was beached. The
Strasbourg
escaped, and, though attacked and damaged by torpedo aircraft, reached Toulon, as did also the cruisers from Algiers.
At Alexandria, after protracted negotiations with Admiral Cunningham, the French Admiral Godfrey agreed to discharge his oil fuel, to remove important parts of his gun-mechanisms, and to repatriate some of his crews. At Dakar on July 8 an attack was made on the battleship
Richelieu
by the aircraft-carrier
Hermes,
and most gallantly by a motor-boat. The
Richelieu
was hit by an air torpedo and seriously damaged. The French aircraft-carrier and two light cruisers at Martinique were immobilised after long-drawn-out discussions under an agreement with the United States.