Prime Minister to General Ismay, for Chiefs of Staff.
18.XI.40.
I am informed that on the night of November 6/7 one of the German K.G. 100 Squadron
19
came down in the sea near Bridport. This squadron is the one known to be fitted with the special apparatus with which the Germans hope to do accurate night-bombing, using their very fine beams. Vital time was lost during which this aircraft or its equipment might have been salvaged because the Army claimed that it came under their jurisdiction, made no attempt to secure it, and refused to permit the naval authorities to do so.Pray make proposals to ensure that in future immediate steps are taken to secure all possible information and equipment from German aircraft which come down in this country or near our coasts, and that these rare opportunities are not squandered through departmental differences.
Prime Minister to Prime Minister of New Zealand.
18.XI.40.
Your telegram is being dealt with departmentally. We dwell under a drizzle of carping criticism from a few Members and from writers in certain organs of the press. This has an irritating effect, and would not be tolerated in any other country exposed to our present stresses. On the other hand, it is a good thing that any Government should be kept keen and made aware of any shortcomings in time to remedy them. You must not suppose everything is perfect, but we are all trying our best, and the war effort is enormous and morale admirable. All good wishes.
Prime Minister to Prime Minister of Canada.
20.XI.40.
1. I am most grateful to you for your message and for your very generous offer to afford facilities for a further expansion of the Joint Air Training Plan. 1 am confident that we shall be able to make excellent use of it.
2. A review of the air training requirements in the light of the latest developments is at present in progress, and it is of the utmost value to the War Cabinet in this connection to know that in such further measures as prove to be necessary they can rely on the continuance of the whole-hearted assistance of the Canadian Government, which has already made such a notable contribution to our common effort.
3. As soon as our review is completed, I will let you know, for your consideration, what we think would be the best direction for our further joint efforts.
4. As you mention in your message, any measures for the extension of the Joint Training Plan must form the subject of discussion and agreement between all the Governments concerned. Would you agree to my repeating to the Prime Ministers of the Governments of Australia and New Zealand the text of your message and of this reply, or would you prefer to take this action yourself?
5. Subject to your agreement, we should like to offer a cordial invitation to Air Vice-Marshal Breadner to pay a short visit to this country. Such a visit would be most valuable for the purpose of consultation on many training questions, and would give Air Vice-Marshal Breadner the fullest and most up-to-date information on our plans for the future development of the Air Force.
Prime Minister to Secretary of State for the Dominions.
22.XI.40.
I think it would be better to let de Valera stew in his own juice for a while. Nothing could be more harmless or more just than the remarks in the
Economist.
The claim now put forward on behalf of de Valera is that we are not only to be strangled by them, but to suffer our fate without making any complaint.Sir John Maffey should be made aware of the rising anger in England and Scotland, and especially among the merchant seamen, and he should not be encouraged to think that his only task is to mollify de Valera and make everything, including our ruin, pass off pleasantly. Apart from this, the less we say to de Valera at this juncture the better, and certainly nothing must be said to reassure him.
Let me see the Parliamentary Questions as they come in.
Prime Minister to Secretary of State for the Colonies.
22.XI.40.
As the action has been announced, it must proceed, but the conditions in Mauritius must not involve these people being caged up for the duration of the war. The Cabinet will require to be satisfied about this. Pray make me your proposals.
[Reference: Proposal to ship to Mauritius Jewish refugees who had illegally emigrated to Palestine.]
Prime Minister to First Lord and First Sea Lord. (General Ismay to see.)
22.XI.40.
In my view Admiral Stark is right, and Plan D
20
is strategically sound, and also most highly adapted to our interests. We should, therefore, so far as opportunity serves, in every way contribute to strengthen the policy of Admiral Stark, and should not use arguments inconsistent with it.2. Should Japan enter the war on one side and the United States on ours, ample naval forces will be available to contain Japan by long-range controls in the Pacific. The Japanese Navy is not likely to venture far from its home bases so long as a superior battle-fleet is maintained at Singapore or at Honolulu. The Japanese would never attempt a siege of Singapore with a hostile, superior American Fleet in the Pacific. The balance of the American Fleet, after providing the necessary force for the Pacific, would be sufficient, with our Navy, to exercise in a very high degree the command of all the seas and oceans except those within the immediate Japanese regions. A strict defensive in the Far East and the acceptance of its consequences is also our policy. Once the Germans are beaten the Japanese would be at the mercy of the combined fleets.
3. I am much encouraged by the American naval view.
Prime Minister to Home Secretary.
23.XI.40.
There seems to be great disparity in these sentences [on A.F.S. men for looting], and I wonder whether any attempt is being made to standardise the punishments inflicted for this very odious crime. Five years’ penal servitude for stealing whisky for immediate consumption seems out of proportion when compared with sentences of three or six months for stealing valuables. Exemplary discipline is no doubt necessary, as people must be made to feel that looting is stealing. Still, I should be glad to know that such cases are being reviewed and levelled out.
Prime Minister to C.I.G.S.
24.XI.40
I sent you today two Foreign Office telegrams from Bucharest and Sofia respectively, which concur in an estimate of thirty thousand Germans, or one full division, as the maximum in Rumania at the present time. In view of this your Intelligence Branch should carefully, review the advice they gave to the effect that there were five divisions in Rumania and that these could be assembled on the Bulgarian-Greek frontier in three or four days. I thought myself that this estimate was altogether too pessimistic, and credited the enemy with a rapidity of movement and a degree of preparedness which were perhaps more serious than the facts. Will you have the whole problem examined most carefully again? I had thought myself that it would be a fortnight before anything serious could happen on the Greek frontier, and that perhaps it might be a month. The great thing is to get the true picture, whatever it is.
Prime Minister to General Ismay, and others concerned.
24.XI.40
This paper shows that we have completely tailed to make cruiser tanks, and that there is no prospect of the present deficiency being made up in the next year. We must therefore equip our armoured divisions in the best possible way open to us in these melancholy circumstances. At this stage in tank production, numbers count above everything else. It is better to have any serviceable tank than none at all. The formation and training of the divisions can proceed, and the quality and character of the vehicles be improved later on. The “I” tank should not be disdained because of its slow speed, and in default of cruisers must be looked upon as our staple for fighting.
We must adapt our tactics for the time being to this weapon as we have no other.
Meanwhile the production of cruiser tanks and of A. 22 [a new model] must be driven forward to the utmost limit.
Prime Minister to General Ismay.
24.XI.40
The full order for the thirty-five thousand vehicles should be placed in the United States without further delay. Meanwhile the inquiry into the scale required by the War Office is to proceed.
Prime Minister to Foreign Secretary.
27.XI.40.
I was the author of this plan of pow-wow, but the Greek complication seems to be serious. It will be of enormous advantage to us if Germany delays or shrinks from an attack on Bulgaria through Greece. I should not like those people in Greece to feel that, for the sake of what is after all only a parade, we had pressed them into action which could be cited by Germany as a justification for marching. The only thing to do is to put the meeting off until we can see a little more clearly on this very confused chessboard of Eastern Europe.
I think the Dominions should be told that we are waiting for the Greek situation to define itself more clearly, and that this ought not to take more than a fortnight. I do not think it is necessary to give any reasons to the Allied Governments, except to assure them that the delay will be short.
[Reference: Draft telegram to General Metaxas.]
Prime Minister to General Ismay.
28.XI.40.
It is of no use giving me these reports five days late. The Admiralty know every day exactly the state of the flotillas. I do not know why this matter should go through the War Cabinet or Defence Ministry. Pray tell the Admiralty to send direct to me, every week, the state o£ their flotillas.
I am much concerned that the patrols on the western approaches should only have gone up to thirty effective. Let me see the chart showing previous weeks tomorrow.
Prime Minister to Minister of Labour.
28.XI.40.
I shall be obliged if you will let me know the present unemployment figures, divided into as many categories as is convenient, and compared with
(a)
how they stood at the outbreak of war, and
(b)
when the new Government was formed.
Prime Minister to First Sea Lord.
30.XI.40.
It is to me incomprehensible that with the 50 American destroyers coming into service we should not have been able to raise the total serviceable to above 77 by November 23, when they stood at 106 on October 16. What happened between October 16 and October 26 to beat down serviceable destroyers by 28 vessels, and why did they go down from 84 to 77 between November 16 and November 23? – just at the very time when another dozen Americans were coming into service.
Prime Minister to C.-in-C. Home Forces.
30.XI.40.
I have authorised the ringing of church bells on Christmas Day, as the imminence of invasion has greatly receded. Perhaps, however, you will let me know what alternative methods of giving the alarm you would propose to use on that day, and, secondly, what steps would be taken to ensure that the ringing of the bells for church services and without any invasion does not in fact lead to an alarm. There must certainly be no relaxation of vigilance.
DECEMBER
Prime Minister to Secretary of State for Dominions. (General Ismay to see for C.O.S. Committee.)
1.XII.40.
All this talk about Atlantic operations and Atlantic islands is most dangerous, and is contrary to the decision to describe such operations as “Shrapnel.” I see no need for these long and pointless telegrams, and it is becoming quite impossible to conduct military operations when everything has to be spread about the Departments and around the world like this.
Kindly give me the assurance that there will be no further discussion of these matters by telegram without my seeing the messages before they are multiplied.
Let me also know exactly the lists of officials and departments to whom these telegrams have been distributed.
(Action this day.)
Prime Minister to C-in-C. Mediterranean (Personal and most secret.)3.XII.40.
Your 270. We considered whole matter this morning with the Director of Combined Operations, Sir Roger Keyes, who will execute it with full control of all forces employed, and final plans are now being prepared by him. His appointment will not be naval, but limited to these combined operations. If necessary he will waive his naval rank. Cannot feel that air counter-attack will be serious having regard to size island, broken character, many houses and detached forts, in which comparatively small attacking force will be inter-mingled with defenders. Enemy aircraft will not know who holds what till all is over, and even then Italian flags may be displayed on soft spots.
2. Capture of “Workshop”
21
no doubt a hazard, but Zeebrugge would never have got past scrutiny bestowed on this. Commandos very highly trained, carefully picked volunteers for this kind of work. Weather and fixed date of convoy may of course prevent attempt, in which case whole outfit will go to Malta or Suda for other enterprises. If conditions favorable, nothing will be stinted.3. Apprehensions you have that A.A. guns, etc., will be diverted from Eastern Mediterranean and new commitment created may be mitigated by capture of enemy A.A., which are numerous. Enemy unlikely attempt recapture, even though garrison left will be small. Commandos will come away after handing over to Regular troops, and be available for further operations.
4. Comparing “Workshop” with other operation you mention, in future called “Mandibles”
22
(repeat
“Mandibles”), kindly weigh following considerations.“Mandibles” requires ten or twelve thousand men and is far larger affair if the two big ones are to be taken. Little ones you mention would stir up all this area without any important reward unless process continued. Secondly, captures in “Mandibles” area would excite keen rivalry of Greeks and Turks, which above all we don’t want now. Thirdly, our reports show “Mandibles” slowly starving, and perhaps we shall get them cheaper later. Apart from the above, trying “Workshop” does not rule out “Mandibles” afterwards, unless ships and landing-craft are lost, which they may be. Also perhaps operations on enemy’s land communications along North African shore may present opportunities.
5. On strategic grounds “Workshop” gives good air command of most used line of enemy communications with Libyan army, and also increased measure air protection for our convoys and transports passing so-called Narrows. Joint Staffs here consider very high value attaches to removal of this obstruction to our East and West communications. Besides all this, we need to show ourselves capable of vehement offensive amphibious action. I call upon you, therefore, to use your utmost endeavours to procure success should conditions be favourable at zero hour.