Authors: Edmund Morris
45
Not until after
Qu. in E. Alexander Powell,
Yonder Lies Adventure
(New York, 1932), 312; TR,
Letters
, vol. 5, 358–59.
46
The full extent
Historiological Note:
The best summary of archival lacunae attendant to the Venezuelan crisis is in Marks,
Velvet on Iron
, 42–47 and notes. To Marks’s list might be added a corresponding gap in the dispatches of French Ambassador Jules Cambon at the Quai d’Orsay in Paris, and another (Oct.–Dec. 1902) in the normally copious correspondence between John Hay and Assistant Secretary of State Alvey A. Adee in JH. Elsewhere, this correspondence routinely refers to burnings and deletions. See also Beale,
Theodore Roosevelt
, 407–8, and Edmund Morris, “ ‘A Few Pregnant Days’: Theodore Roosevelt and the Venezuelan Crisis of 1902,”
Theodore Roosevelt Association Journal
, winter 1989. Gould,
Presidency of Theodore Roosevelt
, 78–79, dismisses the evidence of these sources and states flatly that TR in later life “came to believe that he had in fact delivered a warning.”
47
ROOSEVELT HAD SEEN
In 1902, sixty-two million bolivars was the equivalent of twenty-five million U.S. dollars.
The Washington Post
, 19 Nov. 1902. For a detailed background to the Venezuela crisis of 1902, see Holger Herwig,
Germany’s Vision of Empire in Venezuela
(Princeton, N.J., 1986), chap. 3.
48
These powers
D. M. Platt, “The Allied Coercion of Venezuela, 1902–1903: A Reassessment,”
Inter-American Economic Affairs
, spring 1962, notes that, contrary to traditional opinion, Germany, not Britain, was the aggressor against Venezuela throughout 1902.
49
The President sympathized
TR to Cecil Spring Rice, 13 Aug. 1897, in Stephen Gwynn, ed.,
The Letters and Friendships of Cecil Spring Rice: A Record
(Boston, 1929), vol. 1, 229–30. TR could even be said to have invited the action by stating in his First Annual Message, “We do not guarantee any [Latin American] State against punishment if it misconducts itself, providing that punishment does not take the form of the acquisition of territory by any non-American power” (TR,
Works
, vol. 17, 135). But as will be seen, he expected the built-in warning to be heeded to the letter. For TR the diplomatic moralist, see Marks,
Velvet on Iron
, chap. 3.
50
Ever the stern
TR,
Letters
, vol. 3, 116. TR was not alone in his contempt for Castro, “that unspeakably villainous little monkey.” The Venezuela leader was reviled with near unanimity by contemporary diplomats, and modern historians have endorsed their verdict. See Herwig,
Germany’s Vision of Empire
, 86–87.
51
Baron von Sternburg
Emil Witte,
Revelations of a German Attaché: Ten Years of
German-American Diplomacy
(New York, 1916), 78, describes von Sternburg as “a sworn enemy of all writing.” See Stefan H. Rinke, “The German Ambassador Hermann Speck von Sternburg and Theodore Roosevelt, 1889–1908,”
Theodore Roosevelt Association Journal
, winter 1991, and Rinke’s master’s thesis, “Between Success and Failure: The Diplomatic Career of Ambassador Hermann Speck von Sternburg and German-American Relations, 1903–1908” (Bowling Green State University, 1989).
52
When Roosevelt condoned
TR,
Works
, vol. 17, 135.
53
a secret memorandum
Henry C. Taylor to TR, ca. late Nov. 1902 (TRP).
54
“The first method”
Ibid.; TR,
Letters
, vol. 3, 98; Putnam,
Theodore Roosevelt
, 102–11.
55
Part of him
TR,
Letters
, vol. 3, 98, 108; Gwynn,
Letters and Friendships
, vol. 2, 10; Morris, “ ‘A Few Pregnant Days.’ ”
56
The adjective
temporary
Beale,
Theodore Roosevelt
, 400; Gwynn,
Letters and Friendships
, vol. 1, 246; Fritz Fischer,
Germany’s Aims in the First World War
(New York, 1967), 7–21;
Review of Reviews
, Jan. 1901; John C. G. Röhl, ed.,
Kaiser Wilhelm II: New Interpretations—The Corfu Papers
(Cambridge, 1982), 144. TR had been hearing from Cecil Spring Rice about German colonial ambitions in Latin America since at least 1897 (see, e.g., Gwynn,
Letters and Friendships
, vol. 1, 227). Vice Admiral Büschel, chief German naval war planner, summarized his country’s 1902–1903 policy
vis-à-vis
the United States in language that requires no translation: “Feste Position in Westinden. Freie Hand in Südamerika. Aufgabe der Monroe Doktrine.” Qu. in Paul M. Kennedy, ed.,
The War Plans of the Great Powers, 1880–1914
(London, 1979), 57.
57
What better place
In March 1901, John Hay, Henry Cabot Lodge, and Elihu Root had been alarmed by reports that a German gunboat was making hydro-graphic surveys of the Margarita Islands (Richard W. Turk, “Defending the New Empire, 1900–1914,” in Kenneth J. Hagan, ed.,
In Peace and War: Interpretations of American Naval History
[Westport, Conn., 1984], 189). Their scare communicated itself to TR. “The only power which may be a menace to us in anything like the immediate future is Germany,” he wrote (TR,
Letters
, vol. 3, 32). In July 1901, he warned Karl Bünz, Germany’s Consul General in New York, that his country must not think of acquiring “a foot of soil in any shape or way in South America.” TR,
Letters
, vol. 3, 98.
58
idea of the
Weltpolitik
Herwig,
Politics of Frustration
, 55; Röhl,
Kaiser Wilhelm II, 1
43ff.; Marks,
Velvet on Iron
, 6. The Kaiser’s brother had actually intended to propose “a German sphere of influence” in South America to TR on his recent state visit, until silenced by von Bülow. J. Lepsius et al.,
Die Grosse Politik der Europäischen Kabinette, 1871–1914
(Berlin, 1922–1927), vol. 17, 243.
59
Germany, therefore
According to Herwig,
Politics of Frustration
, 46, the German high command also regarded war with the United States around this time as “a distinct possibility.” See also ibid., 42–46, and John A. S. Grenville and George B. Young,
Politics, Strategy, and American Diplomacy: Studies in Foreign Policy, 1873–1917
(New Haven, 1966), 305–7.
60
“For the first”
TR,
Works
, vol. 17, 182.
61
Coincidentally or not
Seward W. Livermore, “Theodore Roosevelt, the American Navy, and the Venezuela Crisis of 1902–1903,”
American Historical Review
, Apr. 1946.
62
SEA POWER
TR,
Letters
, vol. 3, 225, 217. For TR’s 1902 naval thinking, see his speech to the United States Naval Academy in TR,
Presidential Addresses
, vol. 1, 39–41; Gordon C. O’Gara,
Theodore Roosevelt and the Rise of the Modern Navy
(Princeton, N.J., 1969), 116; TR,
Letters
, vol. 3, 253–54; Beach,
United States
Navy
, 390–97. Marks,
Velvet on Iron
, 40, shows how from Dec. 1901 on TR “accompanied every step in the diplomatic confrontation with a corresponding buildup of American sea power.”
63
The most recent
Review of Reviews
, Apr. 1902; memorandum from Office of Naval Intelligence, 11 Feb. 1903 (TRP); Charles D. Sigsbee to TR, 22 Mar. 1902 (TRP).
64
They sat
Photograph in Ronald Spector,
Professors of War: The Naval War College and the Development of the Naval Profession
(Newport, R.I., 1977). United States Naval War College,
Rules for the Conduct of War Games
(Naval War College, R.I., 1902); Ronald Spector, “Roosevelt, the Navy, and the Venezuelan Controversy, 1902–1903,”
American Neptune
, Oct. 1972.
65
Germany, the tacticians
Livermore, “Theodore Roosevelt”; TR,
Letters
, vol. 3, 367–70.
66
HE WAS ABLE
Amy S. Strachey,
St. Loe Strachey: His Life and His Paper
(New York, 1931), 142–43; Speck von Sternburg to TR, 19 Oct. 1902 (TRP); Tilchin,
Theodore Roosevelt
, 28–29; Marks,
Velvet on Iron
, 50. On 29 Oct. 1902, Henry White wrote TR that Strachey’s White House invitation was “the greatest honor that has ever befallen him” (TRP).
67
Strachey, through his
He also had the reputation of being “Germany’s sharpest critic.”
Review of Reviews
, Dec. 1902.
68
Awake, however
Dewey was in full court uniform, having learned that the Roosevelts preferred their military aides that way. “They are getting to be quite a palace down there.” Mrs. Dewey diary, 25 Nov. 1902 (GD).
69
As Roosevelt reminded
TR,
Letters
, vol. 3, 275.
70
But Dewey had
John Garry Clifford, “Admiral Dewey and the Germans,”
Mid-Atlantic
49 (1967). Like TR, Dewey had been monitoring the Venezuela situation for eleven months, in his capacity as President of the General Board of the Navy. Ronald Spector,
Admiral of the New Empire: The Life and Career of George Dewey
(Baton Rouge, 1974), 140–41.
Chronological Note:
The shared concern of President and Admiral can be traced back to Germany’s formation of Caribbean and South Atlantic Squadrons in 1901. The following chronology is instructive.
13 Dec
. 1901: Germany notifies the United States that she might have to “coerce” Venezuela and make a “temporary occupation” of her ports.
17 Dec. 1901:
TR issues an executive order making Culebra, Puerto Rico, a naval base “in case of sudden war.”
Jan. 1902:
Navy Department advises TR of a plan for emergency deployment of warships in the Caribbean; Dewey warns that Venezuela situation looks dangerous, works out defense strategy centering on Virgin Islands; TR redoubles efforts to buy the islands from Denmark; German Embassy in Washington notifies Berlin of these developments; Wilhelmstrasse strategists refocus their contingency war plans on Long Island; Navy reports German espionage team in Port of Spain, Trinidad.
February:
State Department asks information on Venezuelan landing places and roads; TR appoints young, aggressive William H. Moody to be Secretary of the Navy.
May:
Naval intelligence reports German cruiser skulking in Venezuelan waters.
June:
Forthcoming assembly of “greatest fighting fleet in U.S. history” announced in world press; TR asks Dewey to command it; State Department perfects plan for defense of Venezuelan coast.
July:
Moody orders a similar plan providing for “offense”; TR urges Speck von Sternburg, in Europe, to visit White House: “I have very much I want to say to you” (19 July [TRP]); Dewey takes personal role in plotting maneuvers; Navy Department informed that TR is “deeply interested” in same; Germany informs Great Britain of
willingness for joint reclamation measures against Venezuela.
August:
Imperialist expansion pressures increase on Wilhelmstrasse.
24 Sept.:
TR has strategic conference with Dewey, and tells him “in strictest confidence—what had better not be written now” (Mrs. Dewey diary [GD]).
27 Oct.:
TR presses for new naval bases in Cuba; two days later, he sounds out Balfour on the vulnerability of Dutch Caribbean colonies and invites Strachey to make “a flying visit” to the White House. All these activities, implying an extraordinary feeling of gathering crisis, predate the Anglo-German agreement to coerce Venezuela on 12 Nov. 1902.
71
Meanwhile, the United States
Livermore, “Theodore Roosevelt.”
72
Finally, on
1 Washington
Evening Star, 1
Dec. 1902.
1
One good copper
“Mr. Dooley” in
The Washington Post, 1
Feb. 1903.
2
ON THE MORNING
Morris,
Edith Kermit Roosevelt
, 224–26, 416; in 1902, the West Wing was seen as providing “temporary quarters” for White House staff, until Congress should take up the question of “a permanent, adequate, and thoroughly dignified office for the Chief Executive.” Gilson Willets,
Inside History of the White House
(New York, 1906), 69.
3
on his right
TR’s Cabinet Room is now the Roosevelt Room. The Oval Office was not built until after he left the White House. The following description is taken from photographs in TRC and from William Bayard Hale,
A Week in the White House
(New York, 1908), 9–11.
4
The room’s main
A famous 1903 photograph of TR shows him with the globe in this position.
5
There was nothing much
TR,
Letters
, vol. 8, 1108; TR to Grover Cleveland, 26 Dec. 1902, ibid., vol. 3, 398.
6
Congress was back
Washington
Evening Star, 1
Dec. 1902.
7
For two and a
Ibid. When the President’s Message was published the following day, its reception was equivocal. The
Harrisburg Telegraph
, clarion of Old Guard Republicanism, called it “one of the most conservative documents ever issued by the White House,” while
The Washington Post
(Dem.) rejoiced that every line of the Message was “progressive.”
8
By 4 December
New York
American
, 4 Dec. 1902. The Washington newspapers’ front-page coverage of the maneuvers was as warlike as TR could wish. On 5 Dec. 1902, as the “white” half of Dewey’s fleet prepared to engage the “blue” half, the Washington
Evening Star
excitedly announced,
ENEMY PUTS TO SEA
.